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ABSTRACT 
 
In the aftermath of the Great War (1914-18), Britons could, arguably for the first 
time since 1763, look to the immediate future without worrying about the rise of an anti-
British coalition of European states hungry for colonial spoils. Yet the shadow cast by 
the apparent ease with which the United States rose to global dominance after 1940 has 
masked the complexity and uncertainty inherent in what turned out to be the last decades 
of the British Empire. Historians of British international history have long recognised 
that the 1920s were a period of adjustment to a new world, not simply the precursor to 
the disastrous (in hindsight) 1930s. As late as the eve of the Second World War, 
prominent colonial nationalists lamented that the end of Empire remained impossible to 
foresee. Britons, nevertheless, recognised that the Great War had laid bare the need to 
modernise the archaic, Victorian-style imperialism denounced by The Times, amongst 
others.  
 Part I details the attempts to create a ‗New Way of Empire‘ before examining 
two congruent efforts to integrate Britain‘s self-governing Dominions into the very heart 
of British political life. The first occurred during the final year of the War, when the 
apparatus to coordinate imperial governance began to take shape. However, owing to the 
unexpected end of the War in 1918, little came of the Committee of Prime Ministers. 
More than a decade later, the Canadian-born press baron, Lord Beaverbrook, sought to 
make Empire Free Trade the cornerstone of British politics, but his campaign was 
thwarted by 1) his own missteps and 2) the broader Establishment intent on preserving 
 iii 
 
 
the restored, quasi-Edwardian political order. Part II deals with constitutional changes in 
Greater India, using the Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin (1926-31) and events in Ceylon and 
the investigations of the Donoughmore Commission as case studies. These examples 
saw Britons trying to counteract that impossible doctrine of Wilsonian self 
determination, while also thwarting bourgeois, colonial nationalists intent on supplanting 
British rule with ‗a narrow oligarchy of clever lawyers‘. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 To many scholars, particularly younger ones, ‘the only point of studying 
European imperialism is to unmask the derogatory racial stereotypes encoded in the 
modernizing myths of the Enlightenment’. Yet, said another doyen, ‘the empire 
happened. A small island state off the northwest shores of Europe ran a quarter of the 
globe for hundreds of years. This was no small thing. And it demands close study.’1 The 
question is: how. Almost an entire generation of scholars were preoccupied with the 
“holy trinity”: race, class and gender. ‘Discourse’, ‘representations’ and ‘imagined’ 
communities being the overwhelmingly preferred framework of choice, often with 
dubious results. In the case of gender and empire, Anthony Hopkins concludes, for 
example, ‘a good deal of it is disappointingly predictable and repetitive ....’ The older 
‘nationalist’ approach is not much better.2 Only recently has the pendulum swung back 
towards proper imperial history, that is to say the practice and pursuit of (imperial) 
power and/or trans-national studies.
3
 The latter is particularly important, being a 
corrective to the tendency towards regional specialisation which followed the end(s) of 
                                                 
1
 A. Hopkins, ‘Back to the Future: From National History to Imperial History’, Past and Present, clxiv 
(1999), pp. 198-9; P. Kennedy, ‘The Imperial Mind’, The Atlantic, Jan./Feb. 2008. 
2
 A. Hopkins, The Future of the Imperial Past: Inaugural Lecture Delivered 12 March, 1997 (Cambridge, 
1997), pp. 26 n. 43 and 24 n. 40; J. Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-
System, 1830-1970 (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 6-7. 
3
 See, for example, J. Burbank and F. Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of 
Difference (Princeton, 2010), J. Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the 
Anglo-World, 1783-1939 (Oxford, 2009), J. Pocock, ‘The Neo-Britains and the Three Empires’, in J. 
Pocock, ed., The Discovery of Islands, Essays in British History (Cambridge, 2005) and C. Bridge and K. 
Fedorowich, ‘Mapping the British World’, in C. Bridge and K. Fedorowich, eds., The British World: 
Diaspora, Culture and Identity (London, 2003). 
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empire: a development that was by no means preordained.
4
 Imperial historians should 
not, therefore, lapse into the assumption that because empires disappeared, it was a 
foregone conclusion that they were ‗always doomed to destruction by the forces of 
history‘. Such are the pitfalls of the ‗tyranny of hindsight‘.5 Historians of early 
twentieth-century Britain can perhaps be excused for lapsing into such thinking, given 
their subjects‘ widespread anxieties, bordering almost on neurosis.  
‗Will England Last the Century‘, wondered one writer. Or will Germany 
(peacefully) supersede Britain? This was no idle speculation. Ever since the 
Renaissance, so went the argument, a new century had meant the ‗transfer of political 
supremacy‘. Whether the ‗natural repetition of history‘ would continue would remain 
(for another two decades, at most) an open question. But if Britons failed to take heed, 
warned ‗Calchas‘, they would not only lose the Empire, but risked a ‗dispeoplement like 
that of Ireland [only] upon a greater scale‘.6 Juxtaposed against Elgar‘s Pomp and 
Circumstance March No. 1, commonly known as Land of Hope and Glory, was a steady 
stream of deeply pessimistic literature, only partly explained by the Second Boer War 
(1899-1902).
7
 Not even the centennial of Nelson‘s victory at Trafalgar escaped this 
                                                 
4
 Hopkins, The Future of the Imperial Past, p. 40; J. Darwin, ‗Diplomacy and Decolonization‘, Journal of 
Imperial & Commonwealth History, xxviii (2000), pp. 5 and 10-21. Also see P. Buckner, ‗Whatever 
Happened to the British Empire‘, Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, iv (1993), pp. 3-32. 
5
 I. Copland, The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire, 1917-1947 (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 13-14. 
6
 'Calchas', ‗Will England Last the Century?‘, Fortnightly Review, lxxv (1901), pp. 20-28 and 34. The 
article‘s author was J.L. Garvin, future editor of The Observer. G. Searle, A New England?: Peace and 
War, 1886-1918 (Oxford, 2005), p. 302. 
7
 In addition to the lively debates over imperial preference/federalisation, see, for example, Rudyard 
Kipling‘s The Lesson (1901), M. Bodkin, ‗Why Ireland is Disloyal‘, Fortnightly Review, lxxii (1902), pp. 
1019-27 and E. Mill, alias 'For the Good of the Race', The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, a Brief 
Account of Those Causes Which Resulted in the Destruction of Our Late Ally, Together with a 
Comparison between the British and Roman Empires; Appointed for Use in the National Schools of Japan, 
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solemn mood of ‗national self-examination‘. Inspired by the examples of Oliver 
Cromwell and Cecil Rhodes, employing ‗methods ... weaker man would have feared to 
use,‘ the solution—if not entirely new by 1905—was obvious, the ‗old colonial era‘ 
needed to give way to a Greater Britain.
8
 Such sentiments were not universal, but there 
was a growing realisation amongst Edwardians that the British Empire ‗never had ... any 
engine of power to match those of the militarised Continental nations‘.9 All at a time 
when the challengers were piling up, said one imperialist: ‗Nothing short of a miracle 
can enable the British empire, even as it stands, to tide over the first half of the new 
century‘. Opinion differed on what, if anything could be done. The great Victorian 
portraitist George Watts simply ‗look[ed] forward to the judgement of the future without 
fear‘, adding that if Britain falls let it be ‗with the dignity of Caesar arranging his robes‘. 
Others persisted in championing, amongst other causes, national efficiency and the 
imposition of tariffs, without much to show for their tireless efforts.
10
 (Provided one 
                                                                                                                                                
Tokio, 2005, (Oxford, 1905). British Library, Curzon MS, MSS Eur[opean] F112/85 has a series of 
newspaper clippings on the question of whether Britain was in decline, 1909-13. 
8
 C. Goldman, ed., The Empire and the Century: A Series of Essays on Imperial Problems and 
Possibilities by Various Writers (London, 1906; originally published Nov. 1905), pp. viii and xx-xxii. 
Also see E. Green, ‗The Political Economy of Empire, 1880-1914‘, in A. Porter, ed., The Oxford History 
of the British Empire, III: The Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1999). 
9
 A.P. Thornton, The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies: A Study in British Power (London, 1959), p. 125. 
Student journalism at (the antecedents to) Imperial College tended to paint a more optimistic portrait of the 
Empire, perhaps (as Hannah Gay speculates) because many hoped for overseas employment. H. Gay, The 
History of Imperial College London, 1907-2007: Higher Education and Research in Science, Technology 
and Medicine (London, 2007), p. 220 n. 2. 
10
 Quoted in B. Porter, ‗The Edwardians and Their Empire‘, in D. Read, ed., Edwardian England (London, 
1982), pp. 138-9. Perhaps the propagandists‘ greatest feat was to lay the ground work for ‗Declinism‘, one 
of the three ‗grand‘ narratives of (twentieth-century) British historical writings. A. Thompson, The Empire 
Strikes Back?: The Impact of Imperialism on Britain from the Mid-Nineteenth Century (Harlow, 2005), p. 
7. For an introduction to (and sharp critique of) ‗Declinism‘, see the special issue of the International 
History Review on ‗The Decline of Great Britain‘, 13 (1991). 
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views Ireland as a domestic issue) It was the Empire of Queen Victoria that was plunged 
into war in the summer of 1914.
11
 
 Even proponents of imperial reform balked at the staggering costs. ‗It will be 
difficult to say which is the worst‘, wrote Garvin, ‗reorganisation or ruin‘. Only a tax on 
wheat and tea could have raised the necessary revenue, without the public becoming 
unduly aware of the new burden(s).
12
 Such thinking, however, was an absolute political 
non-starter before 1914. Simple-mind Britons, wrote the editor of the National Review, 
Leo Maxse, were unable fully to comprehend the world outside of the British Isles; a 
sentiment shared by society‘s (supposed) betters.13 Nevertheless, the degree to which 
British society was interested in empire remains highly contested.
14
 
Edwardians, in particular, seemed indifferent, perhaps (as Bernard Porter 
suggests) because expansion had drawn to a close, so developments were no longer 
marked with ‗bugles and bunting and bloodied bayonets‘; defeating those preposterously 
little fellows—other commentators likened the Boers to peasants—had produced neither. 
Amongst the middle classes, the Empire had also yet to offer much in the way of 
                                                 
11
 On the problems of including Ireland in (modern) Imperial history, see S. Howe, Ireland and Empire: 
Colonial Legacies in Irish History and Culture (Oxford, 2000). 
12
 'Calchas', ‗Will England Last the Century?‘, p. 32. A decade later, nothing had changed. The Empire 
remained at a crossroads, confronted with ‗liabilities [of defence] so enormous that merely to think of 
them is nerve-shaking', said an ‗Imperialist‘. Newspaper clipping of 'Our Empire of Fine Words', 25 June 
1911, Curzon MSS F112/85. 
13
 F. Trentmann, Free Trade Nation: Commerce, Consumption and Civil Society in Modern Britain 
(Oxford, 2008); Quoted in Porter, ‗The Edwardians and Their Empire‘, pp. 139-40; 1917 diary entry of 
Cambridge don, A.C. Benson, quoted in R. Hyam, ‗The British Empire in the Edwardian Era‘, in W.R. 
Louis and J. Brown, eds., The Oxford History of the British Empire. IV: The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 
1998), p. 47. 
14
 Compare, for example, J. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public 
Opinion, 1880-1960 (Manchester, 1984) with B. Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society 
and Culture in Britain (Oxford, 2004). 
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tangible benefits.
15
 A minority may have found overseas employment, and potentially a 
better life, but the lion‘s share went to gentlemanly capitalists.16 The Victorian Empire 
was (in that well-worn phrase) one gigantic system of outdoor relief for the British 
aristocracy, yet for others it was a ‗damned bore‘. Nor was this an isolated refrain 
(during the long nineteenth century). Boredom was in fact the natural consequence of the 
prelude to the new imperialism, the period in which British rule came to depend upon 
centralised administration rather than swashbucklers of imperial yore, conspiring with 
and against indigenous rulers. (Travel) Literature by contrast continued to portray the 
empire as a thrilling, adventurous arena.
17
 A picture almost completely at odds with 
reality until the Great War, which (as had been anticipated) proved to be the ‗hours of 
supreme crisis‘ needed to rouse (Greater) Britons into ‗stand[ing] for Empire, for 
solidarity of race….‘18 
 Materially the wealth (and by implication power) of the British Empire should 
never have been in question. But pre-war German propaganda, as Hitler later wrote, 
‗cultivated a conception of the Englishman's character, and almost more so of his 
empire, which inevitably led to one of the most insidious delusions ... [that the British 
                                                 
15
 Porter, ‗The Edwardians and Their Empire‘, pp. 128-9; L. Davis and R. Huttenback, Mammon and the 
Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of British Imperialism, 1860-1912 (Cambridge, 1986). 
16
 N. Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global 
Power (New York, 2004), pp. xiv-xvii, provides a stereotypical example; P. Cain and A. Hopkins, British 
Imperialism, 1688-2000, (2nd edn., London, 2002). 
17
 Early nineteenth century poem quoted in J. Auerbach, ‗Imperial Boredom‘, Common Knowledge, xi 
(2005), p. 283; Ibid., pp. 284-305. Numerous literary works went onto become standard-bearers of the 
Imperial adventurer film genre of the inter-war era and beyond. 
18
 'A Conception of Empire', The Outlook, 13 May 1911, Curzon MSS F112/85. The far flung, extra-
European naval skirmishes and theatres that made the Great War a truly global conflict are—presumably 
with the exception of Lawrence of Arabia—now all but forgotten; some of which, including the operations 
against Germany‘s South Pacific wireless stations discussed in Section 2.1, had all the makings of a Boy‘s 
Own adventure. 
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Empire was held] together by mere subterfuge and swindling‘.19 Similarly, historians for 
decades wondered: ‗Why Did the British Empire Last so Long?‘ There was after all no 
grand ―imperial project‖, regardless of what post-colonial and cultural historians of 
empire prattle on about. There were simply too many competing, often contradictory, 
agendas amongst those interested in empire: the military, the church, humanitarians, 
business, banking, (varying types of) colonial governments, etc.
20
 This perpetual 
inability to look beyond local interest(s), in favour of the Empire as a whole, prompted 
one observer to wonder: ‗Are we [even] an Imperial people?‘ An answer came a few 
weeks later, when the 1911 Imperial Conference agreed that a Royal Commission should 
study the issue of an imperial council. Such a decision, said an ‗Imperialist‘, was simply 
a ‗polite way of shelving an inconvenient question‘. Thanks to the continued 
predominance of the Royal Navy, proponents of the principle of local autonomy and 
those of joint control need not compromise.
21
 But as Canada‘s then prime minister, Sir 
Wilfrid Laurier, who personally believed Empire meant ‗freedom, decentralisation and 
autonomy‘, anticipated, if imperial security was genuinely imperilled, any government 
that did not pledge Canada‘s full resources to the war effort would be ignominiously 
                                                 
19
 K. Neilson, ‗‗Greatly Exaggerated‘: The Myth of the Decline of Great Britain before 1914‘, 
International History Review, xiii (1991), pp. 695-725; A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Manheim 
(Unexpurgated edn., London, 1972), pp. 132-3. England‘s immorality was a ‗major theme‘ of the popular, 
weekly German satirical magazine, Simplicissimus. P. Hugill, ‗German Great-Power Relations in the 
Pages of ―Simplicissimus‖, 1896-1914‘, The Geographical Review 98 (2008), p. 6. 
20
 P. Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945 (London, 1984), pp. 201-2; D. Cannadine, ‗‗Big Tent‘ 
Historiography: Transatlantic Obstacles and Opportunities in Writing the History of Empire‘, Common 
Knowledge, xi (2005), p. 389.  
21
 'A Conception of Empire'; 'Our Empire of Fine Words'; ‗The Guarantee of Empire‘, The Westminster 
Gazette, 14 June 1911, Curzon MSS F112/85. Much of this debate occurred against the backdrop of the 
Second Boer War, which saw limited Dominion participation (as seen in Section 2.1).  
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driven from office.
22
 (Greater) Britons arguably were not a truly imperial people before 
1914, nor did their empire—with its naval stations scattered across the world, treaty 
ports, protectorates, condominiums, Crown colonies, Dominions and India, an empire 
unto itself—appear even remotely coherent.23 This apparent disunity, however, masked a 
sleeping behemoth, a subject pursued more fully in Section 2.1. 
Awash in red, those old Mercator map projections grossly oversimplified 
Britain‘s imperium. Britain had not an empire, but an imperial system. This project of 
empire, as Adam Smith first termed it, sought to fuse Britain‘s settler empires, with 
Greater India and the financial power of the City.
24
 But, unlike the ―imperial project‖ 
referenced earlier, the British government exercised little, if any, control over its own 
imperial system. ‗Of the half-dozen states whose loyalty was most vital to British power 
in 1914, only one could be given direct orders from London‘, John Darwin wrote.25 
Doubts even existed then over how much longer London could command the (resources 
of the) Raj, a development that made the Dominions even more vital. Contemporaries, 
                                                 
22
 ‗The Sixth Imperial Conference: Its Five Premiers and its Two Problems‘, Review of Reviews, May 
1911, Curzon MSS F112/85. In the case of limited wars, such as the Second Boer War, Laurier argued, 
even though troops were despatched, Canada would have been within her rights to stand aloof. 
23
 R. Blyth, The Empire of the Raj: India, Eastern Africa and the Middle East, 1858-1947 (New York, 
2003). Eighteenth-century Britons tended to identify with individuals or polities, like Carthage, that 
resisted Roman aggression, while for early-to-mid Victorians Roman analogies were associated with the 
republicanism that culminated in France‘s Reign of Terror and later the ‗vainglorious swaggerings‘ of 
Napoleon III. Over the course of the nineteenth century, however, admiration for Rome‘s administrative 
competence grew. Roman notions of duty not surprisingly became inter-tangled with Kipling‘s white 
man‘s burden, with the ‗moral indignation‘ aroused by the Second Boer War marking the end, not the 
beginning, of the traditional unease over Empire in British political thought. N. Vance, ‗Imperial Rome 
and Britain's Language of Empire, 1600-1837‘, History of European Ideas, xxvi (2000), pp. 211-23; N. 
Vance, The Victorians and Ancient Rome (Oxford, 1997), pp. 49-50, 141 and 189-90. 
24
 Darwin, The Empire Project. 
25
 Ibid., p. xi. In some ways this might even be said to be the high point of metropolitan control, an era that 
did not even really begin until the last quarter of the eighteenth century when successive Parliamentary 
Acts slowly brought the East India Company to heel. Company rule would not be brought to an end until 
after the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny. 
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however, were not troubled by this state of affairs. In fact, just as the Raj drove (the 
expansion of) Britain‘s imperial system during the nineteenth century, the Dominions 
seemed poised to do the same during the twentieth century.
26
 A sentiment echoed during 
the Liberal‘s 1904 re-election campaign: ‗The twentieth century shall be the century of 
Canada and of Canadian development!‘ Ahead of a new trans-continental railway and 
the creation of two new provinces—Alberta and Saskatchewan—out of the North West 
Territories, Laurier‘s statement was widely accepted by contemporaries. Limitless 
horizons, in fact, abounded. Australia‘s population multiplied almost twenty-fold 
between 1840 and 1900, in comparison to Canada and America‘s less than five-fold 
increase. In less than a century, Australia had reached the population that Canada took 
two and a half centuries to achieve. Not surprisingly therefore, as late as 1911, there was 
still talk of Australia being home one-day to ‗a couple of hundred million‘.27 Diminished 
expectations aside, as Section 2.1 illustrates, the Great War marked the arrival of the 
Dominions as the foremost component in their/Britain‘s imperial system. A role only 
reluctantly abandoned.
28
  
                                                 
26
 Belich, Replenishing the Earth. 
27
 Quoted in J. Schull, Laurier: The First Canadian (Toronto, 1965), p. 441; J.W. Gregory, ‗The 
Geographical Factors That Control the Development of Australia‘, The Geographical Journal, xxxv 
(1910), p. 668; ‗The Sixth Imperial Conference‘. These predictions would have been reasonable had it not 
been for unforeseen ecological limit(s), which also led to estimates of New Zealand‘s future population 
being revised downward from fifty to five million. Population growth in Canada during the last three 
decades of the nineteenth century was retarded by the colossus to the south, but finally took off in the early 
twentieth century. Belich, Replenishing the Earth, pp. 363-4 and 408.  
28
 In the case of Australia, see J. Curran, Curtin's Empire (Port Melbourne, Vic., 2011), pp. 84-116 and 
131-4 and, particularly, W. Reynolds, Australia's Bid for the Atomic Bomb (Carlton, Vic., 2000). Although 
Ottawa broke the indivisibility of subjecthood within the British Empire, with the introduction of a then 
radical distinctive Canadian citizenship in 1946, English Canada also continued to see itself as part of the 
British World; a trend that continued (to varying degrees) until the 1957 Suez Crisis, perhaps even beyond 
that. A view that stands in stark contrast to (the lone essay in) The Oxford History of the British Empire. J. 
Igartua, The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945-71 (Vancouver, 2006); 
C. Champion, The Strange Demise of British Canada: The Liberals and Canadian Nationalism, 1964-
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Scholarly interest in the British Empire has undergone something of a revival in 
recent years. The dizzying array of works on the eighteenth century, when the divide 
between domestic and imperial is not always clear-cut, has been likened to ‗the energy 
and radiance of an exploding galaxy‘. In other respects, the field continues to resemble 
‗those ancient charts with the legend ―here be dragons‖‘.29 Unlike scholarship on British 
foreign policy, which (as part of the broader effort begun a generation ago to write a new 
international history) found that the 1920s were in fact a period of adjustment to a ‗brave 
new world‘, the inter-war era remains all but a ‗nomansland‘ in imperial history.30 
Scholarship on migration, particularly the 1922 Empire Settlement Act, is probably the 
main exception to this regrettable development.
31
 That is rooted in the widely held, 
instinctive assumption that the ‗age of decline and dissolution‘ extends back into the 
entire inter-war period, if not even earlier. Lord Irwin‘s Viceroyalty (1926-31) may not 
have been animated with the self-confidence associated with Sir Alfred Milner‘s tenure 
                                                                                                                                                
1968 (Montreal, 2010); D. Mackenzie, ‗Canada, the North Atlantic Triangle and the Empire‘, in W.R. 
Louis and J. Brown, eds., The Oxford History of the British Empire, IV: The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 
1998). 
29
 A. Thompson, ‗Is Humpty Dumpty Together Again? Imperial History and the Oxford History of the 
British Empire‘, Twentieth Century British History, xii (2001), pp. 511-27; P. Corfield, ‗British History: 
The Exploding Galaxy‘, Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies, xxxiv (2011), p. 517; J. Gascoigne, ‗The 
Expanding Historiography of British Imperialism‘, The Historical Journal, il (2006), p. 577. 
30
 J. Jacobson, ‗Is There a New International History of the 1920s?‘, American Historical Review, lxxxviii 
(1983), pp. 617-45; A. Sharp, ‗Adapting to a New World? British Foreign Policy in the 1920s‘, 
Contemporary British History, xviii (2004), p. 74; J. Darwin, ‗Imperialism in Decline? Tendencies in 
British Imperial Policy between the Wars‘, The Historical Journal, xxiii (1980), p 657. 
31
 Amongst the works that have appeared since the publication of the Oxford History of the British Empire 
(1998-) include: R. Bickers, ed., Settlers and Expatriates: Britons over the Seas (Oxford, 2010), C. Bridge 
and K. Fedorowich, eds., The British World: Diaspora, Culture and Identity (London, 2003), J. Cavell, 
‗The Imperial Race and the Immigration Sieve: The Canadian Debate on Assisted British Migration and 
Empire Settlement, 1900–30‘, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, xxxiv (2006), pp. 345-67, 
K. Fedorowich, ‗Ex-Servicemen and the Politics of Soldier Settlement in Canada and Australia, 1915-
1925‘, War & Society, xx (2002), pp. 47-80, M. Harper and S. Constantine, Migration and Empire 
(Oxford, 2010), M. Johnson, ‗‗Promises and Pineapples‘: Post-First World War Soldier Settlement at 
Beerburrum, Queensland, 1916-1929‘, Australian Journal of Politics and History, li (2005), pp. 496-512 
and C. Miller and M. Roche, ‗New Zealand's ‗New Order‘: Town Planning and Soldier Settlement after 
the First World War‘, War & Society, xxi (2003), pp. 63-81. 
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as high commissioner in southern Africa and governor of the Cape colony, let alone that 
of Lords Cromer or Curzon‘s proconsulships, but he had (as Section 3.2 argues) no 
qualms about trying to break (politically) the Indian National Congress.
32
 Moreover, 
Britain‘s victory in the Third Afghan War (1919) had not only led to the first stable 
frontier with Afghanistan since the 1830s, but left (nationalist) Indian politicians with no 
illusions that independence could ever be won by force of arms.
33
 The history of the 
British Empire during the 1920s needs to be seen not as a plateau on the ascent to 
decolonisation, but as an autonomous historical subject in its own right.
34
 Furthermore, 
those histories also need to consider Britain‘s imperial system in its entirety. 
The Dominions, whose ties to Britain actually intensified during the inter-war 
period, have been expunged almost entirely from imperial history in the years since the 
publication of The Cambridge History of the British Empire (1929-40), first by national 
historians determined to downplay their country‘s imperial pasts and later by British 
academics, who spent (much of) their careers under the long shadow cast by Ronald 
Robinson and John Gallagher. In fact, the editors and authors of (the latter volumes of) 
The Oxford History of the British Empire (OHBE) deliberately downplayed the actual 
Britishness of the British Empire.
35
 Calls to reintegrate the Dominions into British 
                                                 
32
 Darwin, ‗Imperialism in Decline?‘, p 657. Irwin‘s ultimate aim was in a sense the same as Curzon‘s, 
though his methods were slightly subtler than partitioning Bengal.  
33
 B. Robson, Crisis on the Frontier: The Third Afghan War and the Campaign in Waziristan 1919-20 
(Staplehurst, 2007), p. xiv. Also see N. Collett, The Butcher of Amritsar: General Reginald Dyer (London, 
2005). 
34
 My phrasing here consciously echoes C. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 
1780-1830 (London, 1989), p. 11 and J. Ferris, The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 1919-26 
(Basingstoke, 1989), p. xi. 
35
 P. Buckner, ‗Was There a 'British' Empire? The Oxford History of the British Empire from a Canadian 
Perspective‘, Acadiensis, xxxii (2002), pp. 110-128. Notwithstanding the fact that Australia‘s High Court 
only declared Britain was legally-speaking a foreign country in 1999, Australian historians have also spent 
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history are by no means new, but the task is probably more important than ever. Having 
already eclipsed the economic and political dimensions of the past, perhaps to the point 
of producing a ‗reductionist reading of British imperialism‘, postmodernism, which 
increasingly holds sway amongst Americans, both in the field of colonial studies and the 
profession at large, likely threatens an emerging sub-branch.
36
 The British World, which 
promises to move beyond Robinson and Gallagher‘s overarching interest in the 
motivations underpinning imperial expansion, has the potential of giving British history 
‗global importance‘ once again. Understandably, India looms large in Robinson and 
Gallagher‘s work, but its centrality has led to the neglect of ‗inter-coloniality, or the 
relationships within and between the periphery‘. Furthermore, the metropole-periphery 
dichotomy is particularly ill-suited to the twentieth century, when colonial cities, such as 
Cape Town, Lagos, Hong Kong or Sydney, were not only acting as regional 
metropoles.
37
 But policy was increasingly being set in imperial conferences, the 1920s 
                                                                                                                                                
decades downplaying the significance once accorded to imperial ties. Bridge and Fedorowich, ‗Mapping 
the British World‘, p. 10; See, for example, J. Moses, ‗An Australian Empire Patriot and the Great War: 
Professor Sir Archibald T. Strong (1876-1930)‘, Australian Journal of Politics and History, liii (2007), p. 
407 and G. Mansfield, ‗'Unbounded Enthusiasm': Australian Historians and the Outbreak of the Great 
War‘, Australian Journal of Politics and History, liii (2007), pp. 369-73. 
36
 J. Pocock, ‗British History: A Plea for a New Subject‘, The Journal of Modern History, xlvii (1975), pp. 
601-21; Thompson, ‗Is Humpty Dumpty Together Again?‘, p. 514. It is also possible (given how little 
Dominion history is studied) that the British World could pass by virtually unnoticed. 
37
 J. Darwin, ‗Gallagher's Empire‘, in W.R. Louis, ed., Yet More Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, 
Politics and Culture in Britain (London, 2005), pp. 236-9 and 243-6; D. Peers, ‗Is Humpty Dumpty Back 
Together Again?: The Revival of Imperial History and the Oxford History of the British Empire‘, Journal 
of World History, xiii (2002), p. 467. An example of the sort of work Peers called for is J. Mwaruvie, 
‗Kenya's ―Forgotten‖ Engineer and Colonial Proconsul: Sir Percey Girouard and Departmental Railway 
Construction in Africa, 1896-1912‘, Canadian Journal of History, xli (2006), pp. 1-22.  
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would later be deemed the ‗age of Committees and Conferences‘.38 Much of this remains 
unexplored.
39
  
Understanding the British World is also a necessary prerequisite to telling the 
‗full story‘ of the British Empire, whether or not it will be ever be seen as a ‗golden 
age‘—the term the Dutch use to describe their imperial past—is another issue entirely. 
Regardless, it will be an uncomfortable task for those that prefer being ‗thought of as 
part of the colonized rather than as part of the colonizers‘.40 Such delusions have given 
Canadian, and presumably other Dominion, histories more than a slight air of 
artificiality, little wonder that even practitioners cannot agree upon start dates for their 
field(s). 
The chapters that follow—each have their own introductions, so in the interests 
of brevity—are both an attempt at understanding (aspects of) the British World, as well 
as a partial answer to what might have happened had the ideas primarily associated with 
Milner‘s South African ‗Kindergarten‘ been enacted.41 Arguably for the first time since 
1763, Britons could look to the immediate future without worrying about the rise of ‗an 
                                                 
38
 W.T. Furse to Sir Frederic Aykroyd, 1 June 1932, A[dvisory Council on Plant and Animal Products]Y 
3/7. A partial list of the conferences held is in Part I, footnote 35.  
39
 A notable exception is R. Rajan, Modernizing Nature: Forestry and Imperial Eco-Development 1800-
1950 (Oxford, 2006). In the case of cotton, easily the most important imperial commodity, for example, 
there is nothing comparable to G. Stewart, Jute and Empire: The Calcutta Jute Wallahs and the 
Landscapes of Empire (Manchester, 1998) or B. King, Silk and Empire (Manchester, 2005), let alone L. 
Butler, Copper Empire: Mining and the Colonial State in Northern Rhodesia, c.1930-64 (Basingstoke, 
2007). A recent companion volume to the OHBE all but ignores cotton, while devoting entire chapters to 
Malaysian rubber and Kuwaiti oil, whose importance only began in the early-to-mid twentieth century. W. 
Beinart and L. Hughes, eds., Environment and Empire, Oxford History of the British Empire Companion 
Series (Oxford, 2007). 
40
 The Guardian, 28 Dec. 2012, online edition; Buckner, ‗Was There a 'British' Empire?‘, p. 128. Buckner 
was writing specifically of Canadian nationalists, but his point is likely applicable to others living in the 
former British World as well. 
41
 Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, p. 215, poses a slightly different question. This is not to say that 
other influences were not present, such as the imperialist wing of the Tory party and those whose views, 
while undoubtedly imperialist, fit awkwardly (at best) within Britain‘s party system.  
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anti-British coalition of European states hungry for colonial spoils‘.42 Examining post-
war imperial policy wholesale would be Laputan. Fortunately, however, the British 
Empire offers an almost endless variety of case studies to choose from. Of the three 
principal components of Britain‘s imperial system discussed above, only the first two 
feature in what follows. Part I details the (challenges to the) creation of a ‗New Way of 
Empire‘ before moving onto two congruent efforts to integrate Britain‘s settler empires, 
more commonly known then as the Dominions, into the very heart of British political 
life, while Part II is concerned with constitutional changes in Greater India, designed to 
thwart bourgeois, colonial nationalists intent on supplanting British rule with ‗a narrow 
oligarchy of clever lawyers‘.43 
 
 
                                                 
42
 J. Darwin, 'The Fall of the Empire State,' Diplomatic History, xxv (2001), p. 501. Also see J. Ferris, 
'Treasury Control, the Ten Year Rule and British Service Policies, 1919-1924,' The Historical Journal, 
xxx (1987), pp. 859-83. 
43
 The Times, 24 May 1916, p. 17; W[ar] C[abinet] Minutes, 14 Aug. 1917, CAB 23/3/214. 
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2. PART I: 'WE LIVE[D] IN AN AGE OF COMMITTEES AND 
CONFERENCES‘, OR (CHALLENGES TO) THE CREATION OF A ‗NEW 
WAY OF EMPIRE‘ 
 
No one pretends that we have made the most, in the past, of our vast Imperial 
resources. All are resolved that we shall make the most of them in the future 
... Unless we bring ourselves to know the weakness of our Imperial system, 
unless we compel ourselves to reflect upon the best means of developing its 
huge latent strength—of structure, of resource, of moral influence—we shall 
fail in that duty. – The Times, Empire Day Edition, 1916. 
 
 Even before the war ended, attention had turned to the numerous challenges of 
reconstruction. Of the twenty-five resolutions passed by the inaugural 1917 Imperial 
War Conference, at least half dealt with reconstruction. A new Trade Commissioner 
Service would coordinate and promote Intra-Imperial Trade, while an Imperial Mineral 
Resources Bureau would collect and disseminate information on the ‗mineral resources 
and the metal requirements of the Empire‘. The Canadian Prime Minister, Sir Robert 
Borden, explained, using information previously conveyed to him by the manager of a 
prominent steel producer, who had visited the ‗great Krupp works‘ just before the 
outbreak of war, that the Germans had ‗made it their business to know what was being 
done in various parts of the world with regard to the production of minerals, and so on‘. 
German consuls submitted (at a minimum) a yearly report on the ‗most minute 
particulars‘, thereby allowing their country to exploit ‗the minerals and other natural 
resources‘ of the British Empire. Britons said Borden diplomatically had ‗not been alive 
to our advantages or opportunities‘. Talk naturally turned to an ‗Imperial Development 
Board‘, but the New Zealand Finance Minister, Sir Joseph Ward, predicted that cable 
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and wireless communication would also prove critical to the ‗development of the 
Empire‘.1 Their discussions reflected the broader (pre-war) faith that ‗practical 
knowledge‘ offered a panacea whatever the problem, of which there were many: German 
superiority in chemistry and knowledge of ‗non-ferrous metals and their ores‘ was 
undeniable by 1917; while, on the home front, Britons were experiencing serious food 
insecurity. Food prices by the summer of 1916 were 161 per cent higher than in 1914. A 
year later they rose to 204 per cent.
2
 The Conference not surprisingly resolved to 
develop and control the natural resources required for imperial autarky. Further 
resolutions foresaw the ‗control of Wool Supplies ... of Ores and Metals ... [and] of Meat 
Supplies‘. In effect, the 1917 Imperial War Conference reached some of the same 
conclusion(s), including the need for an ‗Imperial Development Board‘, as the 
Dominions Royal Commission, which had been established by the 1911 Imperial 
Conference and issued its final report the very month the Imperial War Conference 
convened.
3
  
 After five interim reports, fifteen volumes of ‗evidence and papers‘—gathered 
during sittings in London, New Zealand, Australia, London, South Africa, London, 
Newfoundland, Atlantic, Central and Western Canada and London one last time—and 
                                                 
1
 Imperial War Conference, 1917: Minutes of Proceedings and Papers laid before the Conference (Other 
than those published in [Cd. 8566]), The National Archives, CAB[inet Secretaries Notebooks] 32/1. Title 
quotations are from W.T. Furse to Sir Frederic Aykroyd, 1 June 1932, A[dvisory Council on Plant and 
Animal Products]Y 3/7; The Times, 24 May 1916, p. 17.  
2
 P. Bowler, Science for All: The Popularization of Science in Early Twentieth-Century Britain (Chicago, 
2009), pp. 53, 26-7 and 60; Appendix XVIII, Imperial War Conference, 1917; F. Trentmann, Free Trade 
Nation: Commerce, Consumption and Civil Society in Modern Britain (Oxford, 2008), pp. 194-6 and 199. 
Worse was yet to come as Britain suffered ‗―milk famines‖ in the winters of 1917-18 and 1918-19‘. 
Quoted in Ibid., p. 200. 
3
 Resolutions XVI & XXI; Resolutions XVIII, XIX and XX, Imperial War Conference, 1917; Dominions 
Royal Commission: Final Report of the Royal Commission on the Natural Resources, Trade and 
Legislation of Certain Portions of His Majesty's Dominions, Cd. 8462 (London, 1917), pp. 158-60. 
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three additional Command Papers of miscellaneous material, the Commission identified 
nine inadequacies of ‗existing organisation to deal, promptly and efficiently, with the 
following matters: 
1) Telegraph, cable and shipping communications between the various portions 
of the Empire. 
2) Inter-Imperial Mail Services and postal rates. 
3) The development of Harbours and Waterways on the great routes of 
commerce to meet Imperial requirements. 
4) Migration as a factor in Empire Development and Trade. 
5) Legislation affecting the mechanism of trade, such as that on patents, 
companies, copyright, weights and measures, &c. 
6) The application and better utilisation of capital raised in the United Kingdom 
and other parts of the Empire towards promoting the development of the 
Empire‘s resources. 
7) The systematic dissemination throughout the Empire of news bearing upon 
Imperial questions and interests. 
8) The preparation and publication of Imperial statistics. 
9) Better organisation for handling and for disposal of the produce of various 
parts of the Empire.‘4 
 
Collectively these recommendations constituted a reply of sorts to The Times‘ call for a 
‗new way of empire‘. But could/would imperial authorities move beyond ‗periodic 
conferences‘?5 
 Unlike previous efforts undertaken in 1905 and 1911 to organise respectively an 
‗Imperial Commission‘ and a ‗Standing Committee of the [Imperial] Conference‘, by the 
spring of 1917, no one doubted the ‗urgency of promoting Imperial Development on 
scientific lines‘.6 Such is the clarity proved by a Darwinian, imperial war. Not 
                                                 
4
 Ibid., pp. ii and 159. 
5
 The Times, 24 May 1916, p. 17; Cd. 8462, p. 160. 
6
 Cd. 8462, p. 161. It was suggested that an ‗Imperial Development Board‘ be appointed, with a dozen 
members—with the Dominions receiving one representative each and the remaining seven members 
representing the ‗United Kingdom, India, Crown Colonies and Protectorates‘—who ‗should be required to 
give their whole time to the work‘. The Board, whose ‗main functions‘ were closely related to the 
inadequacies identified earlier, was to be ‗advisory in its initial stage ... and [would focus on] matters 
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surprisingly, therefore, the recommendations of the Dominions Royal Commission were 
taken seriously, particularly in the case of materials, including ‗cotton, petroleum, 
nitrates and potash‘, that came primarily from non-imperial sources.7 Control of 
‗essential raw materials‘ would be vital to reconstruction, consequently the second 
Imperial War Conference reaffirmed in 1918 the importance of science to the Empire‘s 
future. The post-war period (as explained in the Conclusion) promised to be another 
‗Antonine Age of peace and prosperity‘. Britain‘s official mind wasted little time, 
turning its attention in the summer of 1919 to (what Leo Amery, then Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary for the Colonies, deemed) the ‗great problems of reconstruction in the 
Empire‘.8  
Although a number of Britain‘s colonies and protectorates profited from the 
‗immense demand for raw materials of all sorts‘, administration suffered universally for 
a want of men. Development work was at best set aside, at worst set back by nearby 
colonial military campaigns. Furthermore, said a prominent politician, in hindsight, a 
‗century of [political] evolution‘ had been ‗compressed into half a decade‘.9 Britain‘s 
imperium (as explained briefly in the Introduction) rested on three foundations: all of 
which were profoundly affected by the Great War. Anglo-Dominion relations were 
forever altered, though not as much as they could have been as Section 2.1 argues. 
                                                                                                                                                
affecting the development of the natural resources and trade of the Empire‘. Ibid., pp. 162-3. As discussed 
below, these discussions foreshadowed the creation of the Empire Marketing Board (EMB) almost a 
decade later. 
7
 Cd. 8462, p. 163-9. 
8
 Resolutions II and III; Resolutions VII, VIII, IX and XVI, Imperial War Conference, 1918: Minutes of 
Proceedings and Papers laid before the Conference (Other than those Published in [Cd. 9177]), CAB 32/1; 
J. Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970 (Cambridge, 
2009), p. 359; Hansard[‘s Parliamentary Debates], cxviii. 2172.  
9
 Hansard, cxviii. 2174; Baldwin quoted in P. Williamson, Stanley Baldwin: Conservative Leadership and 
National Values (Cambridge, 1999), p. 263. 
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‗Imperialism as it was known in the nineteenth century is no longer possible‘, concluded 
a former member of the Ceylon Civil Service by 1928.
10
 What would replace Victorian-
style imperialism was therefore very much an open question. But the challenge, as 
Amery explained, was clear: 
Reconstruction in the outer Empire, just as much as here at home, must mean 
something more than the restoration of pre-war conditions. It must mean that we 
must set up a new and more positive standard of our duty and obligation towards 
the peoples to whom this House is in the position of a trustee and to those 
territories whose boundless-potentialities call urgently for development in the 
interests of their own inhabitants, of the British Empire as a whole, and of the 
impoverished and wasted world.
11
 
 
To underscore the seriousness of the commitment of Britain‘s imperial mind to the task 
of regeneration, less than a week after Amery spoke, King George V despatched the 
Prince of Wales, the future Edward VIII, on an extensive imperial walkabout, visiting 
Canada (and America) in 1919 and two subsequent tours of the East.
12
  
Breaking with protocol, as David Lloyd George had deduced that the Dominions 
‗wanted, if not a vaudeville show, then a first-class carnival in which the Prince of Wales 
should play a ... natural role‘, Edward shook as many hands as possible. Obliviously, he 
spoke to the ‗relatives of the fallen‘. Thousands turned out in Canada‘s major cities, but 
‗most touching‘ were the ‗little parties waiting at wayside stations, often in the middle of 
                                                 
10
 Quoted in J. Darwin, Britain, Egypt and the Middle East: Imperial Policy in the Aftermath of War, 
1918-1922 (London, 1981), p. 267. On the war‘s impact on the third component, the City, see P. Cain and 
A. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000 (2nd edn., London, 2002). ‗In 1931,‘ wrote Darwin, ‗of the 
great treasure trove of dollar securities built up before 1914, scarcely one tenth remained‘. In July 1919, 
the Treasury held ‗a little more than 500,000,000 dollars‘ versus £836 million in 1913. Darwin, The 
Empire Project, pp. 375 and 736; Poverty Bay Herald, 9 July 1919, p. 4. 
11
 A. Toynbee, ‗Angora and the British Empire in the East‘, Contemporary Review, cxxiii (1923), pp. 681-
91; Hansard, cxviii. 2174. Also see, P. Johnson, Land Fit for Heroes: The Planning of British 
Reconstruction, 1916-1919 (Chicago, 1968). 
12
 P. Ziegler, ed., The Diaries of Lord Louis Mountbatten, 1920-1922: Tours with the Prince of Wales 
(London, 1987), pp. 9-10; Bay Of Plenty Times, 8 Aug. 1919, p. 9. 
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the night, many having come across rough country or prairie by journeys of many hours 
by horse or buggy or car‘. Repeatedly the Prince of Wales insisted the train stop for a 
few minutes.
13
 By contrast, the itinerary of the 1920 tour was considerably more varied. 
Over the course of almost seven months, Edward visited Barbados, the Panama Canal, 
San Diego, Honolulu, Fiji and New Zealand and Australia, the ‗most important period of 
the tour‘. After almost four months, Renown departed; making brief visits to Fiji, Apia, 
Honolulu, Acapulco, Trinidad, British Guiana, the Windward & Leeward Islands and 
finally Bermuda.
14
 The Prince of Wales‘ third tour lasted eight months, of which four 
months were spent in India (including Burma and Nepal), a month in Japan and, on both 
the ‗outward and homeward voyages, the Prince visited all British processions strung 
along the great highway between Gibraltar and the Pacific‘. A banner in Aden asked the 
Prince of Wales to ‗tell daddy we are all happy under British rule‘.15 The bonds of 
imperial solidarity reaffirmed, attention slowly shifted to more substantive issues.
16
  
Imperial tours may have remained commonplace during the 1920s, but to answer 
a question posed earlier: Imperial authorities could most definitely move beyond the 
                                                 
13
 E. Windsor, A King's Story: The Memoirs of the Duke of Windsor (New York, 1951), p. 141; The Prince 
of Wales' Book: A Pictorial Record of the Voyages of H.M.S. ―Renown‖, 1919-1920, (London, 1921), 
unpaged. The National Archives has made images from C[olonial] O[ffice Records] 1069 available via 
flickr. 
14
 The Prince of Wales' Book. Crowds, especially gatherings of children, were larger and more enthusiastic 
than in Canada. On meeting the Prince of Wales in Barbados, an ‗old negro lady‘ proclaimed: ‗Tank de 
Lord, mine eyes hab seen ‗im!‘ This was said to be a typical reaction. Quoted in Ibid.  
15
 P. Philips, The Prince of Wales' Eastern Book: A Pictorial Record of the Voyages of H.M.S. ―Renown‖ 
1921-22 (London, 1922), unpaged.  
16
 Interestingly, while General Lord Byng of Vimy and Viscount Jellicoe were respectively appointed as 
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was a career Conservative politician, Sir Henry William Forster; whose wartime service was confined to 
Whitehall. From 1915 until 1919, he was financial secretary to the War Office. C. Cunneen, ‗Sir Henry 
William Forster (1866–1936)‘, Australian Dictionary of Biography, online. 
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occasional conferences.
17
 The remainder of this section will briefly consider efforts to 
address (several of) the deficiencies identified by the Dominions Royal Commission, 
and to what extent said plans/efforts (could have) met Amery‘s desire to improve upon 
pre-war conditions. Efforts to preserve (and maybe even strengthen) that ‗great Empire 
feeling‘ are dealt with first, before considering developments in 
technology/communication and efforts at fostering knowledge/trade.
18
  
Building off the success of the Prince of Wales‘ tours, the Royal Navy undertook 
in 1924 an inaugural ten month ‗Empire Cruise‘ headed up by the ‗Mighty Hood‘ and, 
the battle-cruiser, HMS Repulse. The seven ship squadron was a demonstration of 
Britain‘s imperial commitment. But it was also a visible reminder of the continued need 
to find a means of ensuring greater Dominion participation in imperial defence; included 
in Section 2.1 is a brief discussion of an abortive scheme (proposed in the final months 
of the war) that would have done just that. Consequently, the Empire Cruise was also 
                                                 
17
 The Prince of Wales made a private visit in 1923 to his Canadian ranch, purchased in 1919, which the 
Press deemed a ‗Canadian Balmoral‘. Between 1924 and 1928, he continued to travel extensively, 
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visited Africa in 1929. Evening Post, 2 Oct. 1924, p. 5; Press, 26 May 1920, p. 7; Windsor, A King's Story, 
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Dilks, The Great Dominion: Winston Churchill in Canada, 1900-1954 (Toronto, 2005), pp. 29-112.  
18
 Quoted in The Advertiser, 3 Apr. 1920, p. 8. The phrase has been taken out of context, but it is in 
keeping with Lord Palmerston‘s tribute to imperial spirit following the relief of Lucknow: ‗It is impossible 
for any Englishman to allude to that which has been achieved in India—not by soldiers only, but by 
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sentiment was unquestionably fitting of invocation following victory in the Great War. The New York 
Times, 23 Nov. 1857. Also see G. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory: The First World War, Myths and Realities 
(London, 2001).  
 21 
 
 
designed as a joint training mission between the Australian Navy and the Royal Navy‘s 
China Squadron; HMAS Adelaide joined the squadron at Sydney, before sailing to 
Canada to demonstrate what Australia was doing and ultimately Portsmouth, where 
Adelaide‘s company were declared the ‗squadrons aggregate for the best all-round 
sporting team‘.19 Tours were merely one form of publicity imperial proponents 
employed. 
Leaving aside postcards, paintings and prints, stamps, maps, board games, 
adventure stories and advertisements for everything from Bovril to Colman‘s Starch to 
cigarette and tea cards, as well as the Empire Free Trade movement, which is the subject 
of Section 2.2, the focus here is on the selling of empire.
20
 While Empire Day—with its 
pageantry of a little girl, portraying Britannia in 1939, receiving tribute from her 
classmates appropriate to the country they represented and, after singing God Save the 
King, going home for tea—was principally for school children of all classes. There was 
also ‗a significant degree of public sympathy with Empire Day and its message of 
triumphant imperialism‘. Although advertisers filled pre-war Empire Day editions of 
newspapers with full and even double page features, the allure of the ‗imperial trope‘ 
was not that strong.
21
 The ‗cheap loaf‘, that potent symbol of Victorian and Edwardian 
Free Trade, loomed supreme. But the food insecurity referenced early meant that post-
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 ‗The Empire Cruise‘, United Empire, 15 (1924), p. 5; R. Harrington, ‗‗The Mighty Hood‘: Navy, 
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20
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war consumers wanted not only fair pricing, but nutritional food. Vitamins had been 
discovered in 1912, but it was experiments on ‗special breads‘ by the Royal Society‘s 
Food War Committee during the last year of the war that produced remarkable results. 
Brown bread, said the wife of a London artisan in 1925, was ‗more nutritious to the 
children [and] I think it would be better if they had less pure white bread‘.22 Further 
complicating matters was the enfranchisement of women over thirty in 1918, which 
turned housewives‘ shopping baskets into arbiters of the Empire‘s future. The first 
Empire Shopping Week was organised by the British Women‘s Patriotic League in 
1922, but only exploded following the creation four years later of the Empire Marketing 
Board (EMB); a subject discussed at greater length below. In this new world of 
imperialist consumers, women had to decide whether to buy (in the language of 
Christian cleanliness and race) ‗dirty‘ Turkish sultanas rather than the ‗sweet, clean and 
carefully packed dried fruits of Australia and South Africa‘.23  
Migration, as well as developments in technology, fostered imperial sentiment in 
and of themselves. Britons had left over generations by the millions; an act that is 
arguably ‗Britain‘s most fundamental and enduring legacy to the modern world‘.24 The 
Imperial Government, however, took little notice of emigration before 1914; 
notwithstanding the creation of an Emigrants Information Office in 1886. By the first 
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decade of the twentieth century, approximately half of emigrating Britons opted for 
foreign lands, a figure that (for a variety of reasons) began to decline sharply in the last 
years of peace. A central issue in reconstruction planning was what to do with all the 
‗ex-soldiers‘, a term that included the men (and their families) of the army and Royal 
Navy, widows and orphans; as well as women who performed ‗war service, such as 
nurses and munition workers‘. Wartime sacrifices had amply demonstrated that the ‗man 
or woman who leaves Britain is not lost to the Empire, but has gone to be its stay and 
strength in other Britains overseas‘. Henceforth, London‘s approach to emigration had to 
focus not on her needs, but on strengthening the ‗British world‘, which, as Lord 
Burnham, owner of the Daily Telegraph, proclaimed in 1920, ‗is a world of its own, and 
it is a world of many homes‘.25 By the mid-1920s slightly more than three quarters of 
British emigrants opted to settle in one of those homes.  
Those who left the British World, however, were not entirely forgotten. The 
Foreign Office sought ways to foster a ‗greater spirit of solidarity‘ amongst British 
communities in foreign countries. While the telegraph annihilated the 10,000 miles of 
ocean that lay between Australia and Canada, it obviously did little, if anything, for 
regions unconnected to the inaptly termed ‗Victorian internet‘. Furthermore, for decades, 
the telegraphic network could not get any messages ‗through to the borders of the 
Empire without a long train journey involved at the end of the line‘. Nevertheless, the 
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 S. Constantine, ‗Migrants and Settlers‘, in W.R. Louis and J. Brown, eds., The Oxford History of the 
British Empire, IV: The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1998), pp. 172-3 and 167; Report of Committee 
Appointed to Consider the Measures to be Taken for Settling within the Empire Ex-Servicemen Who May 
desire to Emigrate after the War, Cd. 8672 (London, 1917), pp. 1-2 and 27; Quoted in C. Bridge and K. 
Fedorowich, ‗Mapping the British World‘, in C. Bridge and K. Fedorowich, eds., The British World: 
Diaspora, Culture and Identity (London, 2003), p. 7.  
 24 
 
 
‗mid Victorian cable revolution ... brought some of the distant spaces of the British 
Empire within mere minutes of one another, and aligned them more closely with both 
the metropole and with each other‘. Technological developments during the 1920s had 
the potential therefore to reorder the entire Empire.
26
 
Not long after the first anniversary of the Armistice, the then Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, Viscount Milner, appointed an Imperial Wireless Telegraphy 
Committee to formulate ‗a complete scheme of Imperial wireless communication‘, one 
that met both strategic and commercial interests. With the lone exception of the 7,364 
miles that separated Vancouver and Brisbane, all the links on the main lines of imperial 
communication were feasible ‗under present conditions‘. The Committee recommended 
building a chain of six ‗valve‘ stations to link England-Egypt-India-Far East-Australia, 
which would be ‗entirely independent of the route England-Egypt-East Africa-South 
Africa‘. It was envisioned that the ‗arc and valve‘ stations in Egypt and England would 
provide extra capacity, while a decision on communication with Canada was deferred 
until a conference with authorities there could be held. It was anticipated that any 
Imperial wireless chain would initially operate at a loss, but financial costs had be 
weighed against the benefits ‗to commerce, to social intercourse and to national defence 
throughout the Empire‘. Moreover, warned the Committee, ‗the overseas communities 
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are eager and impatient for these Imperial links to be forged‘.27 Concern even extended 
beyond the British World. ‗No matter how profound is our friendship with the English,‘ 
lamented a University of Hanoi professor, ‗the subjection to which we were reduced in 
having to turn to foreign intermediates for our communications with the metropole was 
somewhat humiliating for our national self-esteem‘.28 Despite pressure from both the 
Dominions and peripheries, including Hong Kong, plans for an imperial wireless chain 
stalled; in large part due to the Home Government‘s reluctance to deal with Guglielmo 
Marconi, though the ‗demanding‘ individualist Dominion cabinets did not help 
matters.
29
 Long-wave wireless telegraphy, however, was not the only method of 
broadcasting to the Empire.  
In the spring of 1924, Marconi announced that direct communication using short 
waves was a reality. A message transmitted from Cornwall was received in Australia, 
India, South Africa and America. Thanks to the skip effect provided by ionospheric 
propagation, short-wave radio had the potential to compete with telegraphic cables as it 
‗united audibility with commercial viability‘.30 However, the construction of ‗an all-
Empire chain‘ was no longer possible. Australians had rejected being the final link in the 
chain proposed by the 1920 Imperial Wireless Telegraphy Committee in favour of direct 
communication with England. The Australian Government concluded an agreement with 
                                                 
27
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Amalgamated Wireless (Australia) Ltd, part of Marconi‘s empire, to build the main 
trunk stations in Australia and Britain; with communication to Canada to be arranged 
within two years. The other Dominions followed Australia‘s lead, as did the Government 
of India which rejected having its ‗messages re-transmitted via Cairo‘. Dominion public 
opinion held that wireless communication ‗will improve Empire unity‘ by facilitating the 
spread of ‗news and propaganda‘, thereby ‗bring[ing] the people of the British 
Commonwealth closer together in good understanding and mutual friendship‘.31 Two 
years after the high-power Leafield Station, near Oxford, became operational, it was 
transmitting ‗some 35,000 words of news weekly to Halifax, Nova Scotia, for a group of 
American and Canadian newspapers‘. Those 35,000 words represented approximately 
half of the outward traffic.
32
 In time, those regions not connected to the ‗Victorian 
internet‘ could be ‗served by minor links in an Empire Chain‘. In the case of the West 
Indies, for example, a central station at Barbados would disseminate news via wireless to 
the ‗smaller islands‘.33 Ultimately, following the 1928 Imperial Wireless and Cable 
Conference, the British government merged all communication companies, including 
Marconi‘s, into a single entity, Imperial and International Communications. To 
contemporaries, the late 1920s witnessed a ‗marked idealisation‘ of the potential 
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unifying power of short-wave communication across large swaths of the British 
Empire.
34
  
If telegraph cables and wireless communication ‗broke the link between transport 
and communications‘, aircraft, that third annihilator of space, held out the promise of 
Imperial Cabinets assembling ‗without the often serious loss of time now involved‘.35 
Such enthusiasm is not particularly surprising, but predictions ‗that distances which have 
hitherto been expressed in weeks or days can now be reckoned in hours‘ was optimistic, 
to say the least!
36
 However, airpower demonstrated another application a year later when 
the Royal Air Force (RAF), acting ‗for the first time ... as the primary striking 
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instrument‘, bombed and machine-gunned the forces of Somaliland‘s Mad Mullah to 
‗good effect‘. In less than three weeks, Amery informed the Commons, ‗the power of the 
dervishes in British Somali-land has been entirely destroyed‘, thereby ending more than 
a decade of ‗continuous‘ hostilities.37 Nevertheless, in (for want of a better term) a non-
colonial war, Amery understood that British air power would be of limited use unless the 
Royal Navy maintained its control of the world‘s oceans, thereby safeguarding the sea 
and air stations needed for refuelling, etc. As Mr Punch later told Britannia: ‗If you want 
to go on ruling ‗em [waves], you‘ve got to rule the air too‘. However, in the 1920s, the 
future of airpower seemed to lie in the commercial and civilian realm. A development 
that had been anticipated by those associated with the Inter-Departmental Committee on 
Territorial Changes. A staff member in the War Office‘s Military Aeronautics 
Department divided ‗aerial considerations ... into two categories: a) Routes immediately 
available; b) Routes available in (say) three to four years‘ time‘, including a possible 
trans-Atlantic route via Gibraltar, the Azores, Bermuda and St. Vincent.
38
 That 
distinction between existing and potential routes is important, as previous scholarship 
has ‗underestimated‘ the degree of technological change aircraft underwent during the 
1920s.
39
 Nevertheless, a Trans-Atlantic air route between Britain and Canada 
represented a ‗much greater technological challenge‘ than the two routes that most 
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excited opinion, Britain-India-Australia and Trans-Africa.
40
 An Empire of the Air 
certainly seemed possible by the end of the Great War.  
With 22,647 airplanes and 103 airships, Britain had the largest air force in the 
world and, as a consequence, the largest aircraft industry; with an estimated work force 
of 177,000 people, 112,000 of whom worked for the 122 companies that manufactured 
airframes. Towards the end of the war, Britain was producing some four thousand 
aeroplanes per month. All told an estimated 26,000 pilots were trained, with a further 
266,000 officers and men having received aviation training.
41
 It was not long before idle, 
demobilised pilots sought adventure and fame. 1919-20 witnessed ‗three successful, 
privately funded ―flights of discovery‖‘, which eventually crossed the Atlantic, flew to 
Australia and down the length of Africa.
42
 In passing, it is worth noting that the secretary 
of the Zoological Society of London accompanied the final flight as ‗little‘ was known 
about a ‗large part‘ of Africa. Britain therefore had the ‗chance to lead the world in air 
transport development‘, but ignored the opportunity as Winston Churchill, then 
Secretary of State for War and Air, could not break free of his mid-Victorian mindset. It 
was the role of government to develop routes, aerial infrastructure and to legislate, not 
subsidise private enterprise. ‗Civil aviation must fly by itself‘, he famously declared, ‗the 
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Government cannot possibly hold it up in the air‘.43 By February 1921, the hurdles had 
proved too much and Britain‘s early airlines had all ceased operations.44 As in so much, 
timing is everything. Britain‘s opportunity to establish herself as an aviation pioneer had 
come in 1919-20, but a visionary did not enter office until October 1922.
45
 
Although concern lingered over the commercial viability of an Empire of the Air, 
others were quick to point out Churchill‘s blindness to the strategic advantages of the 
airplane. ‗For mails and for passengers in a great hurry, aeroplanes should have no rival, 
especially when meteorology is better understood,‘ anticipated Nature. An English 
woman living in Delhi foresaw air travel revolutionising life abroad (by making it 
possible—among other things—to visit one‘s children back in England during their 
school holidays). ‗It is an interesting feeling that you can sail away in this great omnibus 
and read novels all the time‘, said one Viceroy.46 However, in the early 1920s, it 
remained unclear what technology would prevail, lighter- or heavier-than-air transport.  
Airships had a greater carrying capacity, but their adoption implied a rejection of 
Britain‘s steam-powered nautical past and a return to ‗the days of erratic schedules and 
service‘. More was known about airplanes, thanks to the war and two years of 
commercial service between London and Paris, but the key argument in favour of the 
airplane was cost. Capital costs were lower as were the per-word cost of airmail in 
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comparison to cable traffic. It was estimated air mail could reach the most distant 
outskirts of Empire, i.e. Sydney, in one hundred hours. Moreover, unlike telegraph 
messages, airmail could deliver a variety of documents, including signed contracts, 
blueprints, etc.
47
 An Empire of the Air could also have distributed newsreels and other 
forms of imperial propaganda, thereby addressing the seventh deficiency identified by 
the Dominions Royal Commission. Implementing an Empire air service, however, was 
delayed by economic uncertainties and changes within the Air Ministry, as well as 
technological uncertainty that persisted beyond the 1921 fatal crash of the R38 airship. 
As the mid-1920s neared, Britain‘s official mind increasingly favoured becoming (in the 
words of one politician) ‗a flying race‘. The first Labour Secretary of State for Air, 
Baron Thomson of Cardington, wanted to ‗encourage an ―air-faring outlook‖ to match 
the seafaring one of days gone by‘. Consequently, in addition to the one being built by 
Vickers, which had won the Trans-Atlantic contract, the Government announced in 1924 
that it would construct its own R101 airship at the Royal Airship Works, Cardington. 
That same year also witnessed the creation (with a ten year subsidy) of Imperial 
Airways. Britain‘s Empire of the Air slowly began to take shape during the course of 
Stanley Baldwin‘s second government.48 But fostering empire aviation was far from the 
lone effort at imperial reconstruction in the (second half of the) 1920s.  
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Conventional wisdom holds that ‗constructive imperialism‘, that is to say the 
policy taken up by Joseph Chamberlain in 1903, was a failure. The ever deepening 
Anglo-Dominion relationship detailed in Section 2.1 is said to be an illusion.
49
 One that 
‗evaporated as normality returned: Baldwin‘s 1923 electoral fiasco is proof enough of 
that‘.50 Similarly, it is said that the Great War killed the ‗dream of imperial union‘.51 
Normality seems an odd description for a society that was so profoundly affected by a 
conflict, the likes of which had not been seen since the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars. Over a quarter of the men that had gone up to Oxbridge between 1910 and 1914 
died in the Great War. While one can pose the ‗interesting if insoluble problem‘ of what 
impact the generation of Harold Macmillan and Anthony Eden might have had on 
British policy in the 1950s had it survived intact, doing so ignores a more immediate 
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issue.
52
 Within a matter of weeks following the outbreak of war, Britons slowly began to 
realise that their country‘s industries were heavily dependent upon ‗chemical products, 
colours, and dyestuffs of kinds hitherto largely imported from countries with which we 
are present at war.‘ A week later, just as the German advance into France was halted at 
the First Battle of the Marne (5-12 September 1914), Nature issued a call to arms of its 
own. Having found herself ‗back in the days of the Huns‘, Britannia‘s (to use 
contemporary terminology) ‗men of science‘ and her ‗men of commerce‘ needed to 
unite, if they were to take advantage of the ‗unprecedented opportunity‘ to develop a 
domestic chemical industry.
53
 In the interim, imports of natural dye-stuffs from India 
and various dependencies resumed; though at levels far below those of the late 
nineteenth century. The Imperial Institute also investigated potential ‗new natural dye-
stuffs‘, some of which could even hold their own ‗in competition with synthetic dyes‘.54 
As Britain sought to exploit her vast (potential) agro-industrial estates, attention also 
shifted to the laboratory, or more specifically the lack there of.
55
  
British chemists after 1914 were principally occupied with the ‗production of 
high explosives and the other direct needs of the forces‘. But they nevertheless made 
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progress during the war in the ‗making [of simple] colours‘. Development of a domestic 
dyestuff industry was slowed by the diversion of new dye works to the manufacturing of 
‗service explosives and products for chemical warfare‘. British manufactures 
nevertheless produced a surplus of the dyes used in naval and military uniforms, which 
were exported to allied countries. Problems persisted into the (short) post-war boom as 
the industry struggled to produce ‗high quality intermediates‘, the very basis of synthetic 
chemistry.
56
 British chemists first needed to be able to produce their own research grade 
chemicals, only then could they move onto elucidating the synthetic pathway(s) for all 
but the ‗simplest‘ intermediaries and the colours themselves. Britons may have 
pioneered the chemical industry, but Germany by 1914 supplied ninety per cent of 
British dyestuffs and other chemicals.
57
 Calls to scour the country‘s universities and 
technical schools for chemicals (as a stop-gap measure) began emanating within weeks 
of the outbreak of war.
58
 It is perhaps not surprising therefore that Britain is discounted 
in the twentieth century transition from an agro- to a techno-industrial world economy.
59
 
Contemporaries by contrast saw the war as presenting ‗an unprecedented opportunity ... 
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to establish the manufacture of a very large number of chemicals which have hitherto 
been produced mostly abroad‘.60 Ongoing research, together with a ‗much improved 
production of intermediates ... [slowly] brought the industry up to a high standard of 
production‘. By the mid-1920s, English chemists were able to produce not only ‗every 
colour of importance ... in first-class quality and sufficient quantity‘ but ‗almost every 
colour obtainable in the world‘. Furthermore, British industry had discovered ‗a totally 
new class of colours called the ionamines, for the dyeing of acetyl cellulose silk‘. British 
Dyestuffs Corporation was also exporting synthetic indigo, which as late as 1914 had 
been a German monopoly.
61
 ‗British resources and brains are more than adequate to 
enable us to head the world in the production of intermediates and dyes‘, the survey 
concluded.
62
  
 Such optimism—partially misplaced as it turned out—was unusual.63 One of the 
more immediate lessons of the Great War was the inadequacy of an Oxbridge education 
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knowledge and experience‘ and a complete withdrawal from the UK market, IG wanted (among other 
provisions) to divide ‗the export business to all other countries within the British Empire (including Egypt) 
… according to quotas to be agreed [upon]‘. The Cabinet was torn, and ‗in view of the conflicting interests 
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in a capitalist, increasingly scientific world. Knowledge of Latin prose, acknowledged a 
classicist, was irrelevant to anyone that wanted to ‗spin cotton or build bridges‘.64 
Classical education not surprisingly had its defenders, who maintained that the motto of 
‗Know thyself‘ remained as relevant in 1917 as when it was first ‗written 2,500 years 
ago on the walls of the Temple Apollo at Delphi‘.65 However, the debate over 
‗educational reconstruction‘ was not just about the merit(s), or lack thereof, of ancient 
literature. It also divided along economic/class lines, with ‗two opposing camps: those 
who recognise the humanity of the employees and those who do not‘. Preparing ‗young 
people‘ for the ‗work of the shop or the office‘, however, was far from the central 
                                                                                                                                                
involved‘ opted to study the matter further; naturally further memoranda and notes were composed and a 
month later the first Labour government opted to form a Cabinet Committee ‗to examine the whole 
question of British Dyes‘. While British negotiators were told privately that the Government was willing 
to consider ‗any proposed agreement‘, the Cabinet also authorized the President of the Board of Trade the 
right to veto any agreement that strayed too far from the intent of the original Act. Ultimately, following 
the appointment of another Cabinet Committee and a subsequent investigation by the Committee on Civil 
Research, it was decided that the first Cabinet Committee had been correct, the deal was ‗impossible‘. 
Baldwin‘s second government accepted what a Labour government never could, that the best course of 
action was the liquidation of the state‘s shares in the BDC. In 1926, in response to the creation the 
previous fall of the German conglomerate, IG Farbenindustrie, several British companies, including BDC, 
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issue.
66
 In the midst of the 1918 coupon election, Churchill proclaimed that nothing had 
been too good for war and, looking ahead, he was buoyed by the fact that ‗all the arts 
and science that we used in war are standing by us now ready to help us in peace‘.67 But 
were they, or is such rhetoric akin to invoking the Angels of Mons?  
By the eighteenth century, Oxbridge colleges had (d)evolved into little more than 
finishing schools for the aristocracy; where non-firstborn sons prepared for an entry into 
politics or life as a schoolmaster or clergyman.
68
 Early modern, proto-capitalist Britain 
saw no need for anything as intellectually rigorous as ‗higher study or research‘.69 
Scientific work in Britain was primarily carried out by (often aristocratic) amateurs, 
including James Watt, Joseph Priestley, Henry Cavendish, John Dalton and Michael 
Faraday, working on their own as Oxbridge continued to forsake ‗original research‘, in 
favour, complained a distinguished chemist in 1874, of lavishing ‗thousands of pounds 
... each year ... upon the encouragement of classical and mathematical attainments‘.70 By 
contrast, Germany, lacking a colonial empire and the geographic diversity of America, 
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embraced post-graduate research with (stereotypical German) zeal. Research labs in time 
became their irreplaceable colonies.
71
 Britons‘ interest in experimental science 
developed extremely slowly. Spurred on by the Great Exhibition of 1851, the 
establishment of a Natural Sciences Tripos that same year necessitated the construction 
of an experimental physics laboratory. When he became Chancellor of Cambridge 
University in 1867, William Cavendish, the Seventh Duke of Devonshire, donated 
£6,300 to build said laboratory on the condition that the Colleges establish a 
Professorship of Experimental Physics. Opened in 1874, under the direction of James 
Clerk Maxwell, the Cavendish Laboratory, despite its humble beginnings, produced its 
first Nobel Laureate three years after the founding of the award when Lord Rayleigh, the 
Lab‘s second director, was honoured in 1904 for his work on the density of atmospheric 
gases, which also resulted in the conjointly discovery of argon with fellow Nobel 
Laureate, Sir William Ramsay.
72
 The twenty-five-ish years before the outbreak of war 
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have been called ‗the age of discovery‘. While new technologies transformed almost all 
aspects of daily life and slowly brought about the end of the ‗Carboniferous Age‘, 
Britons were generally ill-prepared for the laboratory-based Second Industrial 
Revolution.  
In the short run, it was the boffins or ‗ingenious mechanics‘, as G.R. Searle terms 
them, who remained responsible for British technological innovations.
73
 However, as 
time passed, scientific men pushed aside the gentlemanly amateurs. The percentage of 
Fellows of the Royal Society, who worked as academics or applied scientists, increased 
from 41 per cent in 1881 to 78 per cent by 1914. This impressive rise, however, masks 
the quantitative weakness of British science.
74
 Germany by contrast needed by 1913 
5,630 professional journals to disseminate the work of its presumably considerably 
larger scientific community.
75
 Although British firms had their successes, including the 
Rolls-Royce engine and the Morris Oxford launched in 1913, Britain fell behind in 
automobile, and in turn airplane, design and manufacturing. However, it was not because 
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of ‗shoddy design or inadequate technical education‘. Chemistry, however, was another 
matter. By the early twentieth century, German chemical works employed 4,000-odd 
chemists, approximately two-thirds of whom held a doctorate. British industry by 
contrast only employed an estimated 1,500 chemists, barely a fifth of whom held a 
degree let alone postgraduate training.
76
 Britain‘s weakness in pure and applied science 
had been highlighted as early as 1867, when British manufactures only won prizes in ten 
categories out of ninety at that year‘s Paris Exhibition. Matters improved with the 
founding of provincial colleges of science and advanced technology, which led to a 
dramatic increase in student enrolment in higher education. Nevertheless, by 1900, 
Germany was thought to be spending over ‗six times as much as England on university 
science and technology departments‘. Worse still was that Scotland, Wales and even 
Ireland all had more universities relative to total population than England. A wave of 
university openings would double the number of English universities to ten by 1909 and, 
on some measures, England had drawn almost even with Germany, but science had yet 
to cast off its ‗Cinderella-status‘.77 A further problem was that, even at the largest of 
British universities, only a ‗handful‘ of students continued beyond a Bachelor‘s degree.78 
If ‗knowledge‘, as Imperial College‘s motto proclaims, ‗is the adornment and protection 
of the state‘, then, perhaps, the Declinists—discussed in the Introduction—were right to 
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worry. Arguably the biggest problem of all was that Oxbridge remained concerned with 
turning out not a well-trained cadre of experts, but a ‗governing national elite‘. Typical 
of whom was Britain‘s Prime Minister since 1908, Herbert Asquith, a man wholly 
unequipped to provide effective wartime leadership; to help pass the time during Cabinet 
meetings, when he was not writing love letters to one of his daughter‘s friends, Asquith 
passed notes to Lord Curzon, challenging him to identify the author of Classical 
quotations.
79
 
The Oxbridge elites had been able to oversee Britain‘s world system up until the 
Great War as doing so had been relatively easy; admittedly Foreign Office mandarins 
were needed to navigate the ‗new insecurity and instability‘ of 1900-14, which they did 
as effectively as any other (aspirant) world system.
80
 Wanton slaughter, however, could 
not continue indefinitely without provoking a backlash. Thanks to the Harmsworth 
papers, Britain experienced its first bout of political upheaval two years year ahead of 
the fall of German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and Russia‘s dual revolution.81 In a 
sense both, the formation of a Coalition Government in the spring of 1915 and Lloyd 
George‘s subsequent accidental coup against Asquith at the end of 1916 were a 
repudiation of the pre-war consensus.
82
 Curzon‘s political career was unexpectedly 
resurrected when Asquith asked him to assume the post of Lord Privy Seal. David Lloyd 
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George latter doubled the number of ‗satraps‘ in his government when Lord Milner 
joined the War Cabinet. These were ‗men whom no one would tolerate before the war as 
... [they were] essentially reactionary‘, proclaimed C.P. Scott, editor of The Guardian. 
Indeed. Such a development would have been unthinkable before 1914, but turning to 
two of the last great ‗satraps of the [British] Empire‘ was a harbinger of things to 
come.
83
  
Curzon‘s appointment was not a one-off. Expertise mattered. In reorganising the 
War Cabinet, Lloyd George turned to: Sir Joseph Maclay, a Glaswegian ship owner, to 
head the new Ministry of Shipping, Christopher Addison, a committed social reformer, 
was tasked with Reconstruction planning, John Hodge, a trade unionist leader and 
Labour politician, and Lord Devonport, the food-chain magnate, respectively became the 
first Ministers of Labour and Food. Similarly press barons became propagandists, while 
the distinguished Oxford historian, then serving as the Vice-Chancellor of Sheffield 
                                                 
83
 Lord Salisbury to Curzon, 9 August 1902, quoted in D. Dilks, Curzon in India (2 vols., London, 1969), 
I, p. 220; Scott quoted in Gallagher, ‗The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire‘, p. 86. Salisbury 
also counted Lords Cromer and Kitchener (d. May 1916) amongst the Empire‘s remaining satraps. The 
Lothian and Arnold Prizes, as well as election to All Souls, more than made up for Curzon‘s failure to 
achieve a first in Greats (Literae Humaniores). ‗Duty, desire to learn ... and a mission from the Times‘ had 
established Curzon as the leading expert on (what he termed) the ‗Central Asian Question‘, laying the 
basis for his appointment as Viceroy in 1898. Curzon, like Milner, who served in South Africa, returned to 
Britain as a proconsul, and it was this reputation that led to their being given vital roles in managing 
Britain‘s war effort. Milner became Lloyd George‘s ‗chief lieutenant‘. Similarly, upon the formation of 
the War Cabinet, Curzon became Leader of the House of Lords. But he is best known for his chairmanship 
of the Eastern Committee, which was created in March 1918 to deal with all military and diplomatic 
problems east of Suez. Curzon believed this position was distinct from other War Cabinet committees. It 
was the product of a public life that ‗had brought him into close contact with almost every aspect of 
Middle Eastern affairs; he had served as Under-Secretary of State both at the Foreign Office and the India 
Office; he had been Viceroy of India, and there were few countries concerned with which he had not 
personal acquaintance‘. Quoted in D. Blakeley, ‗―Duty, Desire to Learn, and a Mission from the Times‖: 
Lord Curzon and His Travel Writings‘, Nineteenth Century Prose, xix (1992), pp. 100 and 102; Darwin, 
The Empire Project, p. 311; Quoted in H. Mejcher, ‗British Middle East Policy 1917-21: The Inter-
Departmental Level‘, Journal of Contemporary History, viii (1973), p. 94. On Curzon‘s varied personas 
see, G. Bennett and M. Gibson, The Later Life of Lord Curzon of Kedleston- Aristocrat, Writer, Politician, 
Statesman: An Experiment in Political Biography (Lewiston, N.Y., 2000). 
 43 
 
 
University, H.A.L. Fisher, accepted the post of President of the Board of Education. This 
turn to non-political ‗experts‘ was driven partly by the desire to diminish the strong 
Unionist element of his government; and perhaps suggests that Lloyd George was trying 
to construct a new political party. It also reflected the broader quest for national 
efficiency, and (wrote John Grigg) ‗exemplified Lloyd George‘s flair for improvisation 
and disregard for convention‘.84 Expert advice, however, was slowly penetrating into 
other areas of British life. The Ministry of Munitions as part of its broad mandate sought 
to ensure that glass and steel works were operating at maximum capacity. Before 1914 
these industries had been ‗very secretive about their methods, but a consequence of 
mandatory wartime inspections was that expert advice became more appreciated, and 
more eagerly sought, after the war‘. To the Cabinet‘s Reconstruction Committee, the 
answer was obvious: ‗Education is the foundation of true national greatness‘.85  
The war stimulated research in a diverse number of fields, including medicine 
and surgeries obviously as well as aeronautics, botany, chemistry, entomology, 
metallurgy and physics. Minerals and oil also needed to be sourced. But complaints over 
the shortage of well trained personnel persisted.
86
 Almost half a century on, the findings 
of the 1871-5 Devonshire Commission on Scientific Instruction and the Advancement of 
Science had yet to be acted on; discounting ‗minimal half-hearted concessions that 
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research-minded academics had ... been able to wring from their reluctant colleagues‘.87 
Such was the stranglehold of liberal education, that is to say the Bachelor of Arts degree, 
Oxford did not introduce ‗research degrees‘—the Bachelors of Science and Literature—
until 1895. That same year also saw the introduction of three five-year research 
degrees—the Doctors of Letters, Philosophy and Science—at all four Scottish 
universities.
88
 A German Ph.D. by contrast took two years; alternatively, one could take 
a ‗research bachelorship‘ at Oxbridge in a year or two. Post-graduate instruction at 
England‘s ancient universities only ‗existed on paper‘. A lack of funding was certainly 
an issue, but, in thanking Andrew Carnegie for his largesse donation to Scottish 
universities, Arthur Balfour, then Chancellor of Edinburgh University and First Lord of 
the Treasury, identified a deeper problem: 
[I am] amazed and almost ashamed, at the indifference with which the British 
public have acquiesced in the wholly inadequate provision which we make for 
scientific teaching and research ... According to my view, (which I think you 
share), we ought to regard our Universities not merely as places where the best 
kind of knowledge already attained is imparted, but as places where the stock of 
the world‘s scientific knowledge may be augmented .... 
 
Others were less confident. In 1907, at the outset of his eighteen year tenure as 
Chancellor of Oxford University, Curzon asked, in his two hundred plus page Principles 
& Methods of University Reform: Being a Letter Addressed to the University of Oxford, 
if it was even ‗feasible, to convert Oxford into a place where the main occupation should 
be the pursuit of original Research‘. He believed such an attempt to be undesirable, in 
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part because Oxford could not hope to emulate the German influenced American 
universities when it came to post-graduate work. Nevertheless, with the Rhodes 
scholarship already five years old, overseas students would be arriving in numbers that 
would be hard to ignore.
89
 Simultaneously, concern was building over the adverse 
effects of (to quote Professor A.H. Young of Trinity College in the University of 
Toronto) the fact that ‗Oxford has ceased to be the intellectual centre of the Empire‘.90 
Worse still was that Oxford had not grasped the new reality of the laboratory-based 
Second Industrial Revolution. In 1906, the Hebdomadal Council decreed that anyone 
who had passed the examination for their Ph.D. either magna cum laude or summa cum 
laud from a German, Austro-Hapsburg or Swiss university could ‗read for the Oxford 
BA in two years instead of three!‘ Germans, not surprisingly, did not flock to Oxford, 
nor did Americans as a Ph.D.—unattainable at Oxford—was by then the accepted route 
into the American professoriate. Curzon‘s efforts had come to naught. Two years after 
his intervention, he confessed, in a letter to the President of Magdalen College: ‗Council 
and Congregation go pottering along term after term, amending and revising and 
postponing ....‘ Meanwhile post-graduate studies developed at varying rates at 
Manchester and other provincial universities; the regulations for the first ‗bona fide MA 
by research‘ appeared in the calendar of the University of Wales for the 1898-9 
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academic year. But the introduction of the Rhodes scholarship had created a pan-Empire 
interest in education, culminating in the first Universities Congress of the British Empire 
in 1912, where the Principal of McGill University, after surveying existing opportunities 
for post-graduate education in America, Britain and Canada, pointedly asked why had 
not British universities—out of their own, as well as imperial, interests—established the 
Ph.D. Oxbridge, he reasoned, offered the best hope for not fetishising the Ph.D. and its 
(alleged) financial value. Another Canadian professor predicted that if an appropriate 
degree was not forthcoming, Rhodes scholarships would go unfilled. Although no formal 
resolutions were passed, plans were made for a second congress in 1917. Said meeting 
would not actually be held until 1921, but events would compel Oxford to introduce the 
Ph.D. in 1917. 
 The outbreak of war, with the cessation of imports discussed earlier, and the 
sudden need to become self-reliant in almost everything, laid bare ‗the short-sightedness 
of past British governments and of universities, in relation to science and technology, 
research and specialisation‘ in a way that finally could not be ignored. Britons‘ 
ignorance had become a danger to the realm!
91
 In the first fifteen months of the war, 
Britain‘s ‗lawyer-politicians‘ faithfully observed Article 28 of the Declaration of London 
concerning the Laws of Naval War, thereby allowing Germany to import British cotton, 
fats and oils, essential to the production of propulsive ammunition, through its ‗two 
mouths‘, Holland and Sweden.92 A policy based on the faulty suggestion of an ‗eminent 
                                                 
91
 Simpson, How the Ph.D. Came to Britain, p. 112. Also see Poulton, Science and the Great War, pp. 4-9. 
92
 Poulton, Science and the Great War, pp. 14-18. Said policy was only reversed when Sir William 
Ramsay, a chemist and member of the Royal Society‘s Committee that advised the Government on 
scientific matters, abandoned ‗personal interviews with many people in authority‘ and turned to the press 
 47 
 
 
lawyer-politician, who ―at the beginning of the war gave as his opinion that it would be 
useless to make cotton contraband, as there were so many substitutes for it which the 
Germans could use‖‘. Replacing cotton was actually quite difficult, if not impossible.93 
In the case of oil, a private company became aware of a ‗practical process‘ for making 
glycerine, necessary to the production of nitro-glycerine, from linseed oil. Rather than 
profit on this previously unused pre-cursor, the company informed the Government and 
within forty-eight hours the exporting of linseed oil was prohibited. Such was the danger 
of neglecting science. In her greatest struggle, Britannia relied not upon a Government 
basing decisions on expert opinion but that the patriotism of her businessmen would 
trump their capitalist instincts.
94
 However, those lawyer-politicians that the naturalist, 
E.B. Poulton, condemned were still the ‗true children of Palmerston, Lord Salisbury‘s 
sons, cynical, calculating‘ and determined to secure British interests, whatever the 
means.
95
  
Amidst considerable Treasury resistance, a 1915 White Paper laid the basis for 
the creation in 1918 of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research.
96
 In the 
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interim, however, criticism mounted apace. A memorandum, signed by three dozen 
individuals, with numerous letters after their last names, on ‗The Neglect of Science‘, 
appeared in The Times on 2 February 1916. Its message was stark and unequivocal. 
Addressing the near universal ignorance of science was ‗a reform which is vital to the 
continued existence of this country as a Great Power‘.97 Whether The Times‘ article, and 
subsequent conference, forced the government to act is not clear, but in August 1916 
Asquith tasked the third Cavendish Professor of Experimental Physics at Cambridge and 
President of the Royal Society, Joseph Thomson, to investigate the position of science in 
Britain‘s education system. Henceforth, having proven itself in the White Heat, science 
was to be treated ‗as an honoured guest in our education system‘.98 Nevertheless, a 
durable, yet flexible, scheme of education was required to prevent ‗any relapse into the 
old conditions‘.99 The Committee therefore endorsed the findings of the 1917 UK 
Universities Conference, which had resolved that a Doctor of Philosophy should be 
                                                                                                                                                
‗enduring nature‘. Cotton presumably fell into the later group; by the mid-1920s, for example, the link 
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attainable after a minimum of two years‘ advanced work.100 A further incentive for 
reform came from the need to further reinforce the bonds of Dominion loyalty; with 
hundreds of thousands of neo-Britons fighting in France and elsewhere, British 
authorities could hardly be unsympathetic to Dominion desires for the Rhodes 
scholarship to be made viable for their graduates. Propaganda aimed at Americans who 
had attended German universities also attracted the attention of the British Foreign 
Office, stirred in part by the poet, Alfred Noyes, who levelled amongst other charges that 
there was something seriously wrong with Americans attending German universities to 
study English literature! Curzon saw things differently; save for a handful of schools, 
like Harvard, Americans were not sufficiently educated for Oxbridge. German 
universities, with their thesis-only Ph.D.‘s, naturally became ‗the happy hunting ground 
of these uneducated people‘.101 Faced with protracted discussions, the Foreign Office 
ceded the problem of post-graduate degrees to the Board of Education. Further 
discussion, as well as conferences involving all British universities, followed. But 
Oxford‘s Hebdomadal Council had appointed a committee in December 1915 to 
consider how the university might meet the post-war needs of American and colonial 
students, thereby helping to turn the school into a bastion of post-graduate studies for the 
Anglo-Saxon world. Ultimately, Oxford became the first British university to introduce 
the Doctor of Philosophy, designating it (in Oxford‘s traditional individualistic fashion 
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as) the D.Phil.
102
 ‗Chance for Rhodes Men‘, was one New York Times‘ headline. But 
what of Churchill‘s claim?103 
 On the one hand Churchill‘s faith in science was undoubtedly justified, as 
evident by Britain‘s wartime experience and the emergence of her proto-warfare state.104 
Edgerton‘s ‗expert state‘, however, is very much a feature of the latter half of the 
interwar era than the 1920s, when the technical experts of the armed forces 
predominated.
105
 Such a development was to be expected as the Great War gave 
aviation, in particular, a considerable head start, whose development was further 
accelerated by the air scares of the early 1920s.
106
 However, Churchill‘s invoking the 
practitioners of wartime arts and science seems overstated in light of the preceding 
discussion on the shortage(s) of Britons with post-graduate training. Edgerton 
perpetuates this myth, when he claims that the exclusion of post-graduate students may 
‗underestimate the research strength of the universities‘ in comparison to the Royal 
Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough and/or the Research Department at the Woolwich 
Arsenal.
107
 In time, could an imperial equivalent to Britain‘s warfare state have 
emerged?  
Contemporary opinion certainly believed so. From the late-eighteenth until the 
mid-twentieth century, Europeans never doubted their ability to harness the natural 
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world to their own ends. Africa, in particular, was presented as a land of unlimited 
opportunities.
108
 While a 1911 illustration in Harmsworth Popular Science may have 
depicted an academic—presumably Sir Ronald Ross, who confirmed that the Anopheles 
mosquito transmits malaria—opening the door to the colonisation of the tropics, 
arguably the apogee of this trope was the 1924 Empire Exhibition at Wembley. In his 
inauguration address, George V promulgated: ‗This Exhibition will enable us to take 
stock of the resources, actual and potential, of the Empire as a whole; to consider where 
these exist and how they can best be developed and utilised ....‘ To develop His 
Majesty‘s ‗tropical territories and ... the yet unexplored capacities of the Empire‘, 
however, required a cadre akin to that which built the Warfare State.
109
  
Yet, as discussed earlier, in the quarter century before the outbreak of war, only a 
handful of Britons took higher degrees.
110
 By March 1918, however, the furtherance of 
post-graduate study had again come to the attention of the Foreign Office. Drawing 
international students into British universities had become a ‗sphere of [British] foreign 
relations‘.111 Two months later, in May 1918, the United Kingdom Universities 
Conference resumed their discussions from the previous year and agreed that they had to 
take action ‗to encourage immigration of students from foreign countries and from the 
King‘s Dominions overseas‘. Almost half of British universities had by then—or were 
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planning to introduce—the Ph.D. for foreign students.112 The new degree proved an 
immediate success. The first five years, that is to say the academic years 1919-20 
through 1924-5, saw 774 Ph.D.‘s awarded; with the Universities of London, Cambridge 
and Edinburgh accounting for just over half of the first Ph.D.‘s.113 But the first decade 
also witnessed considerable problems, including administrating an ever-growing student 
population, evaluating overseas qualifications, the issue of admitting applicants before 
they arrived in Britain and how to evaluate the suitability of an individual for advanced 
studies.
114
 Then there was the issue of residence and research driven need(s) to study at 
other institutions, the supervisor‘s role(s) and who should select dissertation topics.115 
Britons, said the physicist Oliver Lodge, were slowly learning to do for themselves 
‗what we have been too ready to allow other nations to do for us ... The new [Ph.D.] 
Degree is not to be a mark of achievement but an indication of promise‘.116 But what 
exactly were students studying?
117
 In the early years, the ―Arts‖ enjoyed a marginal lead, 
but, by the late-1920s, the gap between the ―Sciences‖ and ―Arts‖ had started to open up. 
Over the course of the 1920s, includes the years 1917-19, the percentage of Ph.D. 
students in the Arts declined by almost a third. The Social Sciences and Technology 
witnessed modest growth, but together only accounted for approximately twenty per cent 
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of all students. The Sciences held a dominant position, approaching sixty per cent by the 
end of the 1920s.
118
 Financial support for the Arts was virtually non-existent throughout 
the interwar period, while support for the Sciences ‗began almost simultaneously with 
the Ph.D.‘ itself.119 Not surprisingly, in light of the preceding discussion, chemistry 
accounted for just over forty per cent of Ph.D. students in the Sciences during the inter-
war period. Biology, not physics, however, was the second most popular field.
120
 An 
emerging principle of university education held that all men should be trained to be 
‗useful members of the community, and to be ready to do their best in national [and 
imperial] service‘. Its implementation can be seen in several ways: approximately a 
hundred postgraduate students in the Sciences during the 1920s opted to study medicine, 
agriculture or veterinary science.
121
 Secondly, of the little more than a third of overseas 
Ph.D. students during the 1920s, slightly more than a half came from India and the 
Dominions.
122
 In the absence of information on their specific courses of studies, as well 
as the specialisation(s) of the close to four hundred Ph.D. students in biology, it is 
difficult to say definitely whether or not a cadre akin to that which built the Warfare 
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State was emerging.
123
 Personnel are but one component of an expert state. 
Contemporaries, by the mid-to-late 1920s, had come to see science (and imperial 
advocacy, which is discussed below) as providing that ‗fresh wind‘ which would propel 
the British Empire into a new era. Another commentator, contemplating the ongoing 
transition from the ‗―palaeotechnic‖ to the ―neotechnic‖ age‘, anticipated that ‗Science 
[would come] to the Rescue‘.124 If Kew Gardens‘ triumphant emergence as a scientific-
imperial institution during the latter half of the nineteenth century represented a 
‗scientific empire‘, the 1920s heralded the creation in the not too distance future of a far 
more bountiful second empire.
125
 
Ever since Columbus‘ discovery of the West Indies, in addition to gold and 
silver, Europeans frenziedly sought to identify potentially valuable plants. ‗Historia 
Naturalis is the base for all economics, commerce and manufactures‘, wrote one of 
Carolus Linnaeus‘ students in 1748.126 The long eighteenth century (c.1670s-1760s) 
witnessed an intensification of this process as ‗botanistes voyageurs‘ continued to search 
out new plants and, once classified, specimens were transported to ever-expanding slave 
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plantations or one of more of the sixteen hundred botanical gardens—that Europeans had 
founded across the globe by the end of the eighteenth century—to be propagated and, if 
successful, subsequently cultivated elsewhere.
127
 Botanical gardens were the first 
agricultural research stations, and as such remained an important institution, but efforts 
to engineer empire increasingly came to characterise the long nineteenth century 
(c.1760-1914).
128
 While it would be a stretch to say that scientists in the 1920s could 
engineer nature, the rediscovery of Gregor Mendel‘s work at the outset of the twentieth 
century, together with developments in genetics, meant that it was possible to 
‗synthesize new plant varieties‘.129 Moreover, beginning in the early-1920s, there was a 
concerted effort to develop the dependent empire on a scientific basis.  
The Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture (ICTA), Trinidad, founded in 1922, 
was to be ‗the main training centre in the Empire ... [for] instruction covering the whole 
field of agriculture and agricultural science under tropical conditions‘.130 Within a few 
years, some two dozen graduates had taken up appointments in a dozen different African 
and Caribbean colonies/dependencies, as well as in Ceylon.
131
 Details on the exact 
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nature of these appointments are somewhat scarce, but the ICTA‘s first graduate, E.S. 
Eldridge, for example, accepted a post with the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, 
becoming the ‗farm manager‘ at their Nyasaland experiment station.132 Said station was 
but one link in the ‗chain of agricultural research stations‘ that Britain was slowly 
building throughout the ‗tropical and sub-tropical regions of the Empire‘. Expansion was 
limited primarily by the lack of trained staff. A year earlier, the Agricultural Institute at 
Amani, Tanganyika, which had been established by the Government of German East 
Africa in 1902, and overrun by British Forces in 1916, had been reopened as a ‗centre of 
agricultural research‘. Its research programme focused on ‗soil surveys, coffee 
investigations, problems connected with the conservation and restoration of soil fertility, 
plant breeding, insecticides, insect migration, virus diseases and plant pests‘.133 Perhaps 
the most important development, however, was the establishment of a central cotton 
research station in Trinidad; which (among other advantages) did not grow cotton, 
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thereby avoiding the problem of hybridisation with commercial varieties, and the new 
station would be in close proximity to the ICTA. It was widely recognised by 
participants at the 1927 Imperial Agricultural Research Conference that all of this work 
was regarded ‗as ―fundamental,‖ ―long range‖ and ―wide rang[ing]‖ research‘.134 
Nevertheless, the atmosphere, the following year, wrote a visiting EMB official, gave 
the impression that ‗the College is a most important place [and] that its future scope for 
useful work is unlimited ....‘ The staff genuinely believed that they were laying the 
foundations of a truly ‗great Imperial institution‘.135 
 A significant contributor of funds to the aforementioned efforts at basic research 
was the EMB. Created in the spring of 1926, with a budget of £500,000 for the 
remainder of the financial year and a planned £1,000,000 per annum thereafter, the new 
Board was the first step in thinking about imperial development in the same manner as 
the Committee of Imperial Defence (est. 1902) had been ‗charged with the duty of 
thinking out plans for the organised defence of the Empire‘.136 Its task was threefold: 1) 
publicity and education, 2) research and 3) promoting schemes for the improvement of 
production and marketing of imperial goods. The ‗immediate‘ focus, however, was 
publicity and research; more specifically, ‗scientific research and economic 
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investigation‘.137 In terms of the former, building off the success of the 1924 Empire 
Exhibition at Wembley,
138
 the EMB took part in almost seventy different exhibitions—
including one overseas event, the 1928 Jubilee Anniversary of the Canadian National 
Exhibition in Toronto—that had in excess of twelve million visitors. Between 1927 and 
1932, more than 1.5 million people attended one of the over nine thousand lectures 
arranged by the Board, which also extensively utilised print culture; including some ten 
million booklets and leaflets, advertisements in nearly seventy leading British 
newspapers and hundreds of commissioned artwork/posters.
139
 New methods of 
promotion were also being pioneered, most notably the creation of a film unit whose role 
was to be akin to Henry the Navigator‘s fourteenth century School of Projection.140 But 
perhaps the most visible form of propaganda were the Empire Shops and Empire 
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Shopping Weeks, which the EMB actively encouraged provided that local organising 
bodies were both ‗non-party and ... thoroughly representative of the district in which 
they were to be held‘.141 The former ranked amongst the EMB‘s ‗most successful ... 
activities‘, while the impact of the over 200 Empire Shopping Weeks that were held 
throughout Britain and Northern Ireland by early 1933 is (as discussed below) 
debatable.
142
 Displays were not just confined to the larger cities—the borough of 
Bideford, North Devon, population (including adjoining villages) some 20,000, attracted 
6,000 visitors over five days in October 1925—nor to the British Isles, Melbourne, 
Adelaide and Sydney held an Empire Shopping Week as early as May 1925, while 
Canada held its first three years later.
143
 Window displays, particularly that of the Army 
and Navy Co-operative Society, demonstrated ‗to a remarkable degree the extent to 
which the colonies are able to feed us‘. Sugar was the only ‗essential article‘ lacking, but 
its absence was presumably only temporary.
144
 Press advertisements by the early 
summer of 1929 were touting that Britain‘s dependence upon foreign countries for dried 
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fruits was no more. Australia could now provide sultanas, currants and raisins, which 
were ‗sound, clean and wholesome‘.  
Said ad was part of a broader campaign championing ‗Empire Quality‘. South 
African oranges of ‗splendid quality‘ were arriving each week until the season ended in 
November. New Zealand‘s apple orchards were ‗bursting into flower‘ just as the harvest 
ended in Britain, thereby ensuring consumers a year round supply of ‗Empire Apples‘. 
Between April and August, apples bearing a New Zealand label signified quality and 
freshness as ‗only the best fruit passes the government inspection for export to British 
markets‘. Similarly, unlike its Western counterparts, Bengali and Burmese rice grew in 
its ‗natural surroundings‘. Housewives were challenged by the EMB to ‗taste ... how 
good rice dishes can be, when every grain is separate, firm and full flavoured‘. It was 
predicted that once the ‗quality and value for money‘ were known, Britons would never 
give up Indian rice. A similar argument was made for East African coffee.
145
 Like 
Section 2.2‘s Empire Free Trade Crusade, which also originated in mid-1929, the EMB‘s 
advertising campaign was designed to ‗make the British people realise, as they have 
never yet done, how great are the opportunities ... which the Empire affords‘. It was, 
however, only a prelude to the five week intensive ‗Buy British from the Empire at 
Home and Overseas‘ campaign of late 1931.146  
Recent scholarship has cast doubt on the effectiveness of these campaigns, 
arguing that visitors to the numerous exhibitions were merely sightseers and that almost 
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two thirds of 481 local grocers witnessed no increased interest in Empire goods in the 
months following the ‗North East Exhibition‘, presumably centred upon Newcastle upon 
Tyne. Does that mean over a third did see an increased demand for imperial goods?
147
 
Demand certainly existed elsewhere in Britain. Personal visits to ‗nearly 3,000 shops‘ in 
eighteen ‗large towns‘, including London, Manchester and Liverpool, with a total 
population of twelve million, found regional variance in the butter market. Housewives 
paid two or three pence extra a pound for their preferred type of butter. Empire butter 
was more popular in the south as the ‗north-country housewife‘ generally preferred 
foreign butter, with its familiar ‗cask-shaped blocks or ―kiels‖‘.148 A (presumably) 
subsequent tour of Yorkshire and Lancashire by agents of the EMB discovered that 
‗firms stocking Empire butter had increased by some 30 per cent‘. Such was the effect of 
‗sentiment, quality and advertisement‘ that foreign importers were increasingly using 
‗British names‘ for their goods, even going as far as to include a ‗lion or John Bull in 
them [to] imply British origin‘.149 A year earlier the EMB had reported that record 
amounts of a variety of foodstuffs, including wine, had been imported into Britain 
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principally from possessions in the southern hemisphere. The exact number of records 
broken is unclear. Twenty-one were set according to The Spectator, while the EMB 
reported a year later that twenty-five new records had in fact been established. Nearly 
half of the latter were broken that same year, in addition to a ‗substantial list of Empire 
foodstuffs ... [that] exceeded, in 1930, all earlier figures‘. As far as the EMB was 
concerned, the motto (by the end of 1931) was ‗full speed ahead‘.150  
 While anecdotal evidence suggests that six months on there was still ‗no falling 
off in the ―Buy British‖ sentiment in the shops,‘ marketing alone cannot renew, let alone 
make, an empire.
151
 Nor for that matter could research or the training of (scientific) staff, 
the latter being but the first step in bringing about George V‘s vision of a developed, 
prosperous (dependent) empire. Colonial development, however, had been far from a 
priority in the two decades preceding the Great War, if not longer. In addition to the 
prevailing financial orthodoxy of the Treasury (and the broader official mind), the 
Colonial Office was hamstrung by its prevailing ethos that it supervised, while governors 
and their staffs administered. But the Office also lacked vision, believing that economic 
growth, by which it meant the increased production of raw materials, could only be 
brought about by ‗scientific research, technical innovations and especially by an 
improved economic infrastructure, particularly the building of railways, roads and 
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harbours‘.152 Such attitudes persisted, following the 1918 Imperial War Conference‘s 
endorsement of the creation of an ‗Inter-Imperial [Shipping] Board‘.153 But the Colonial 
Office only reviewed developmental scheme(s) that originated overseas, with (as one 
official put it) ‗excess caution‘ being their prevailing maxim. There was therefore no 
overarching empire-wide strategy for colonial development. Economic change after all 
was (potentially) at odds with the principle duty of any colonial government, the 
maintenance of law and order. Said policy is also said to reflect the ‗official mind‘s 
[supposed] contempt for trade‘.154 But the division of the Colonial Office into six quasi-
geographic departments—the Dominions, West Africa and the Mediterranean, Nigeria, 
East Africa, the West Indies and the East—during the generation before 1914 also 
inhibited economic development by favouring/creating regional specialists over or 
instead of officials capable of addressing broader, potentially empire-wide, issues. 
Lastly, only a minority of the upper echelon of the Colonial Office possessed a scientific 
education, but it would not have mattered even if they did as the increasing workload 
which accompanied imperial expansion meant that officials ‗did not have the leisure to 
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speculate on the future of the empire; they rarely had the opportunity of consciously 
moulding developments‘.155 The Great War seemingly swept away many of these old 
constraints, while the desire for imperial autarky (discussed at the outset of this section) 
implicitly implied extensive colonial development.  
Little concrete, however, was accomplished by the numerous wartime 
committees and unofficial lobbies, including amongst others the Board of Trade‘s 
Faringdon Committee, Lord Balfour of Burleigh‘s Committee on Commercial and 
Industrial Policy, the British Cotton Growing Association or the Empire Resources 
Development Committee. The Colonial Office greeted this work/lobbying with a 
remarkable degree of disinterest, underlying its conservatism and continued faith in pre-
war practices.
156
 Paradoxically, the short-lived economic boom of 1919-20 further 
undermined proponents of colonial development. The seemingly rapid return of 
normality led once again to the ascendancy of the Treasury—whose overarching aim 
was to lower drastically government expenditure out of a fear of inflation and the 
(transient) weakening of British credit on international markets—thereby ensuring the 
continuation of pre-war developmental policy (in East Africa) through the early 
1920s.
157
 Persistent post-war unemployment, however, rendered the preponderance of 
the Imperial Exchequer impractical. Intra-imperial migration schemes could not alleviate 
the problem, the Dominions wanted settlers who could aid in rural development, not a 
                                                 
155
 Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, p. 21; Quoted in Ibid., p. 20. 
156
 Ibid. pp. 31-6 and 39-41. 
157
 Ibid., pp. 54-5 and 62-84. Other influences, such as the Aborigines Protection Society and Lord Lugard, 
also helped thwart any innovation in developmental policy. Ibid., pp. 51-3. The extent to which these 
conclusions apply to the empire as a whole during the 1920s is unclear; Constantine‘s geographic-specific 
case studies all come from Africa. 
 65 
 
 
resumption of the old practice of exiling paupers. By the winter of 1922-3, in an effort to 
confront the structural changes buffeting the domestic economy, the British government 
slowly began to see colonial development as ‗a long-term solution to Britain‘s loss of 
overseas markets‘. Treasury objections, nevertheless, continued (through the first Labour 
Government).
158
 The controller of finance at the Treasury confided to an official in the 
Colonial Office: ‗I doubt myself if much will come of this business‘. He was right. The 
1924 Trade Facilities Act accomplished ‗trifling‘ little during its three year existence.159 
Tentative, half measures clearly were not the solution. (As discussed above) The EMB 
was a more imaginative response, even if it was simply the implementation of the 
‗Imperial Development Board‘ proposed by the Dominions Royal Commission almost a 
decade earlier.
160
 Empire Shopping Weeks and the subsequent Buy British Campaign, 
while successful, had two fundamental flaws. Demand at times outstripped supply.
161
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Secondly, like the Trade Facilities Acts, it was only a short-term measure. Without 
‗some definite step‘, resolved the Marketing Committee of the EMB, ‗the impetus of the 
campaign‘ would eventually be lost.162 With unemployment having become a structural 
problem, officials and politicians not associated with the Colonial Office were forced to 
question their view that colonial development was akin to ‗domestic public works 
programmes‘. If it was treated as an investment, colonial development had the potential 
to increase the production of cotton and other imperial resources, thereby enriching 
(elements in) colonial societies, whose greater purchasing power could ultimately bring 
long-term benefits to the British Empire. But could the Colonial Office wrest control of 
policy away from the Cabinet‘s Trade Policy and Unemployment Committees, the 
Treasury and, above all, the Board of Trade (who had ‗dominated‘ the discussions that 
led to the Trade Facilities Acts)?
163
  
 Resistance to the Treasury attempts to improve the position of the Imperial 
Exchequer at the expense of (portions of) the dependent empire in fact dated back to the 
fall of 1921 and only strengthened following Churchill and Edward Wood‘s departure 
from office the following year.
164
 The dispute over Uganda‘s development loan and her 
war liability reminded William Ormsby-Gore, Wood‘s replacement as Under-Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, of Lord Milner‘s ‗outstanding impression‘ of his tenure as 
Secretary of State for the Colonies. ‗The Treasury continuously and by tradition do 
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everything they can to make Colonial Development difficult‘, lamented Ormsby-Gore at 
the end of 1923.
165
 As the previous paragraph suggested, as time passed, unemployment 
figures proved an ever more effective cudgel against Treasury enmity at sanctioning 
expenditure. Metropolitan lobby groups, like the Oldham Chamber of Commerce, also 
not surprisingly lined up in support of railway construction in tropical Africa, a 
prerequisite to expanding cotton cultivation, as the city was home to the world‘s greatest 
concentration of cotton weaving sheds and Platts, the world‘s largest producer of cotton 
textile machinery. While the Treasury complained of being ‗blackmailed by the C.O. 
into wholly uneconomic expenditure on schemes which haven‘t been properly thought 
out‘, there was little they could do.  
Parliament authorised the £3,500,000 loan for Kenya and Uganda on 3 March 
1924. Significantly, while persistent unemployment had led to the Colonial Office‘s 
victory, unemployed Britons could not hope for any relief before the winter of 1924-5. 
The Conservative, and then Labour, government sought to assist the mill workers of 
Lancashire, not those in the iron and steel industries.
166
 Nevertheless, the loan was 
defended in the House of Commons on its ability to stimulate demand for British goods. 
In reality, the Colonial Office was assisting in the broader effort to offset the departure 
of the cotton growing states of the southern US from Britain‘s informal empire.167 If 
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Britain was to remain an ‗industrial nation, it is to Africa that we shall have to look for 
our raw materials,‘ argued a delegation of Lancashire MPs and representatives of the 
British Cotton Growing Association, who lobbied the Secretary of State on 4 April 1924. 
Tropical Africa had little hope of attracting private capital given its undeveloped nature, 
but, with an area in excess of a million square miles, coupled with a ‗native population 
of upwards of 30,000,000‘, its potential would have seemed almost limitless. Two years 
later, during the Parliamentary debate over a loan guarantee for East Africa and another 
for Palestine, a Conservative MP anticipated that the region could ‗become the Eldorado 
of the twentieth century,‘ provided the Amani Institute was supplied with the necessary 
funds to undertake practical research on a scale that would ‗serve the whole of East 
Africa‘. Development, however, was also retarded by the lack of transportation, resulting 
in significant amounts of wasted labour.
168
 Acting on a report by the 1924-5 East Africa 
Commission, whose main recommendations were later endorsed by numerous 
(un)official lobbies and, more importantly, the Cabinet Committee on Industry and 
Trade, the Colonial Office proposed the introduction of an East African Transport Loan 
Guarantee Bill which would authorise a £10 million loan, with the interest during the 
five year construction period to be advanced by the Imperial Exchequer. Once again, the 
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loan was sold, politically, at least, on the need to relieve unemployment in Britain. It 
proved to be of limited use.
169
 During the year-and-a-half that passed between the 
Cabinet‘s provisional endorsement of developing East Africa and the Bill receiving 
Royal Assent in December 1926, Treasury officials, backed by Churchill at almost every 
step, waged a brutally effective campaign questioning the (fiscal) competence of Amery 
and the Colonial Office—who, unlike the lead up to the Kenyan and Ugandan loan, had 
been caught without even a provisional scheme(s) of how to spend the money—thereby 
preserving their ‗financial omnipotence‘. Although the 1926 East Africa Loans Act as 
developmental policy was essentially a failure, it nevertheless represented something of 
a breakthrough for the Colonial Office. Unlike earlier measures, it was not an ad hoc 
approach to colonial development (as evident by the provision for scientific research). In 
attempting to secure £10 million before even preliminary surveys had been conducted, 
Amery had sought a measure of independence for colonial development in East Africa 
from both Westminster and Whitehall, and the latter‘s ever-present budgetary 
weltanschauung. Secondly, the East Africa Loans Act signified that long-term 
considerations were beginning to assume equal sway to contemporary economic issues 
within elements of Britain‘s official mind. Lastly, the experience of 1925-6 laid the 
ground work for future policy.
170
  
 Building also from the creation of the EMB, whose annual budget was already 
being spent at the discretion of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Amery continued 
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advocating colonial development as the solution to Britain‘s structural economic 
problems. Rising unemployment was one thing, but the Conservative Party also needed 
to devise a manifesto distinctive from that of the other parties ahead of the 1929 general 
election. Overruling his own officials, who had grown sceptical and even hostile, to the 
idea, Amery initially proposed an annual grant of £500,000 for colonial development; 
with unspent funds being retained by the Colonial Office for future expenditures.
171
 The 
‗bitter experience‘ of the previous four years had convinced Amery of the necessity of 
bypassing the Treasury entirely, their ‗powers of obstructionism‘ being ‗infinitely 
greater on an Imperial subject than on a domestic issue where there is constant 
parliamentary pressure‘. Progress, he argued in a letter to the Prime Minister, could 
therefore only be achieved ‗on Empire Marketing Board lines‘. But results could not be 
rushed. Unemployment, Amery simultaneously told Churchill, could not be ‗treated as if 
it were an exceptional emergency to be dealt with by special measures taken in a hurry, 
in a crisis‘.172 What was needed was a ‗real long range [colonial development] policy‘, 
lasting a decade, perhaps longer. Disregarding the trite Chamberlainite rhetoric of 
‗undeveloped estates‘, Amery sought to ‗extend and expedite the policy already pursued 
[in part by the EMB] in Africa and elsewhere, which in the past 4.5 years has resulted in 
so great an expansion in the Colonial market for British produce‘.173 Ultimately, despite 
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being humiliated again by Treasury officials, political expediency trumped economic 
orthodoxy and, by mid-April 1929, Amery had prevailed. Announcing the new policy, in 
a speech described by The Guardian as ‗one long, ostentatious refusal to make 
promises‘, Baldwin unveiled (to cheers) his intention of establishing an ‗independent 
commission‘ to oversee and advise the Government on colonial development.174 It was 
just a matter of devising the details. A task easier said than done. Matters drifted in the 
months before the general election; owing to a lack of direction from Amery and 
Churchill, as well as persistent foot dragging by Treasury officials reluctant as ever to 
sanctioning expenditure. Not even the need to flesh out the details of their election 
manifesto could elicit a decision from Baldwin as to who, Amery or Treasury lackeys, 
more charitably known in Amery‘s words as ‗eminent business men‘, would chair the 
aforementioned commission. Electoral defeat relieved Baldwin from having to make a 
decision; though it also (as Section 2.2 argues) almost compelled his retirement from 
public life. In any event, acting in a manner reminiscent of its predecessor, the new 
Labour government quickly turned a ‗nebulous Conservative proposal‘ into 
legislation.
175
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Great War, the reconstruction of the British Empire was not only well under way, but 
was finally being extended to the ‗outer Empire‘: the broader significance of which is 
discussed below in the Conclusion. For now, as this section highlights, a variety of ways 
of reforming/modernising/revolutionising Britain‘s imperial system were being 
explored. But truly to create a ‗New Way of Empire‘ change also needed to occur at the 
empire‘s highest levels.176 George V‘s decision to despatch his eldest son on an extended 
imperial walkabout during the 1920s was a reaffirmation of imperial unity, as well as an 
acknowledgment of the evolving relationship between the Crown and its subjects.
177
 
This new ‗theatre of empire‘, however, could not placate everyone.178 Aden‘s residents 
may have been happy with ‗daddy[‘s]‘ rule, but demands for change were rising 
elsewhere. As Part II argues, India and Ceylon in the 1920s could still be assuaged in 
part by constitutional tinkering, but not the Dominions. As a consequence of their 
wartime contributions they were demanding a greater say in imperial governance. A 
scheme for this emerged in the final months of the Great War, but the rapid, unexpected 
end of the conflict brought this political evolution to an abortive end. Whereas the next 
section exemplifies the almost limitless scope for refashioning the Empire, section 2.2 
underlines the limits of reform. Contemporaries would have thought it macabre, but the 
Great War arguably ended too early, allowing just enough of Old England to survive to 
barely thwart another effort at reordering British political life.
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2.1 A ‗new age‘ brought about by ending ‗the days of the Huns‘? 
 
It was a few minutes before the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the 
eleventh month. I stood at the window of my room looking up 
Northumberland Avenue towards Trafalgar Square, waiting for Big Ben to tell 
that the War was over.... Our country had emerged from the ordeal alive and 
safe, its vast possessions intact, its war effort still waxing, its institutions 
unshaken, its people and Empire united as never before. – Winston Churchill, 
The World Crisis (1927).  
 
 Three years later in his Romanes Lecture, Churchill declared: ‗The compass has 
been damaged. The charts are out of date‘.1 In fact, they had been out of date since at 
least 1883, when John Robert Seeley highlighted the fact that ‗the old colonial system is 
gone‘. Seeley‘s ‗earnest‘ desire that Britain‘s colonial empire become ‗part of England‘ 
was a reflection of wider idea(s) circulating in late-Victorian Britain.
2
 Despite the unity 
implied by those old mercator map projections, which depicted large swaths of the globe 
awash in red, by the outset of the twentieth century, Britain‘s imperium bore a closer 
resemblance to the ill-coordinated patrimony of Holy Roman Emperor Charles V (r. 
1519–56) than an organic whole.3 In reality, as discussed above, Britain‘s imperial 
project was the fusion of three different empires which ultimately proved capable of 
transforming itself into ‗a fighting Empire‘. The Second Boer War (1899-1902) had 
                                                 
1
 Quoted in P. Williamson, National Crisis and National Government: British Politics, the Economy and 
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see D. Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860-1900 (Princeton, 
2007). 
3
 D. Cannadine, ‗―Big Tent‖ Historiography: Transatlantic Obstacles and Opportunities in Writing the 
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convinced many Britons that they were only suitable for ‗a peaceful Empire of the old 
type‘. ‗Nothing will give us the power‘ to change that, concluded a future Prime 
Minister.
4
 Although first articulated by Lord Palmerston during the 1850 Don Pacifico 
Affair, it was Benjamin Disraeli who truly understood that Britain‘s power in world 
affairs was ultimately of her choosing.
5
 Churchill‘s claim that Britain‘s ‗institutions‘ 
were ‗unshaken‘ by the Great War is therefore rather curious, given the adoption of 
(quasi-industrial) conscription and that Britannia invoked ‗a war conference of the 
empire‘ following David Lloyd George‘s accidental coup at the end of 1916.6 Naturally, 
the Conference included representatives from Britain and India, but the ten meetings 
held over the course of a month also saw the participation of four of the five 
Dominions.
7
 Such a development at first glance seems at odds with the latter‘s minimal 
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role in Britain‘s world‘s system during the latter half of the Victorian and Edwardian 
eras.
8
  
Unlike the Raj, whose army was deployed on imperial missions more than a 
dozen times in the second half of the nineteenth century, venturing as far west as Malta 
(1878) and as far south as New Zealand (1860-61), the Dominions still looked to the 
Mother Country for their defence. Construction of a Martello tower in Sydney Harbour, 
probably the last one built in the entire British Empire, was started in the early months of 
the Crimean War to calm the city‘s ‗peculiar anxieties‘ with respect to its vulnerability 
to Russian naval bombardment; a highly improbable, but not impossible, event as Tsarist 
Russia did possess a Pacific fleet.
9
 Within a fortnight of the 1861 attack on Fort Sumter, 
the British Government decided to reinforce the 2,200 Regulars stationed in Canada. 
Two Regiments of the line, a regiment of rifles, a battery of flying artillery and half a 
dozen Armstrong guns, some four thousand men in total, sailed on the specially 
chartered Great Eastern on 27 June 1861. The crossing was made in eight days, two 
days faster than normal.
10
 The reinforcements ‗excited comment in the United States‘ 
and some confusion among English journals, but the three regiments simply restored the 
Canadian garrison to its pre-Crimean strength. Moreover, with potential for trouble on 
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the frontier, Palmerston thought an increase of regulars represented the ‗best chance for 
the continuance of peace‘.11 In soliciting the Governor General‘s opinion, the Secretary 
of State for War, Sir George Lewis, opined that Washington would not be distracted 
from ‗punishing the South‘. Talk of turning northwards was therefore nothing more than 
‗swagger‘. Less than two months later, with the St. Lawrence starting to freeze, plans 
were hastily drawn up in London to despatch an ‗Imperial army equipped for war‘ and 
materiel for an unformed local army. Britons were not amused by the Trent 
provocation!
12
 ‗We shall soon iron the smile out of their face‘, pledged Lewis.13 During 
the winter of 1861-2, Britain rushed an additional eleven thousand troops to Halifax, 
some of whom then marched/sledded overland through New Brunswick to reinforce the 
reinforcements sent the previous summer. Bermuda also saw its garrison reinforced. 
Between late March and early January 1862, when Washington capitulated and troop 
transport was halted, the number of Regulars stationed in British North America rose 
from less than 4,300 to over 18,500. English and French Canadian volunteer corps were 
also organised, and 38,000 individuals from the local militia were called out.
14
 While 
almost fifteen and a half thousand Regulars were still in British North America on 1 
April 1863, it was only a matter of time before they were withdrawn. However, the Trent 
crisis had provided an opportunity to counter perceptions created by the Crimean 
debacle. Britain was ‗not that insignificant military Power‘ many believed, her military 
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departments were sufficiently organised as to enable immediate action whenever 
Britain‘s strategic position and/or prestige was at stake.15 In March 1862, the House of 
Commons resolved after more than a decade of debate that the self-governing colonies 
should accept the ‗main responsibility‘ for maintaining ‗internal order and security, and 
ought to assist in their own external defence‘.16  
When the threat came from within, even a wide scale massacre of British settlers 
could hardly be constituted as a threat to the Empire as a whole, let alone Britain‘s status 
as a great power. Consequently, even before the Maori Wars (1845-8 and 1860-72) were 
over British Regulars were withdrawn. 1870 also saw British troops depart Australia. 
For the remainder of the nineteenth century, the only British Regulars stationed in 
Canada garrisoned the Royal Navy bases at Halifax and Esquimalt.
17
 Recalling British 
Regulars from ‗distant‘ non-maritime posts cut expenditures by a third. As to whether 
this ‗diminution of force‘ weakened imperial security, the Secretary of State for War, in 
1869, Edward Cardwell, argued the opposite. Colonial forces would have to be raised, 
and these troops could be reinforced in ‗strength‘ with British Regulars in a ‗time of 
need‘. Cardwell relayed the story of one of the ‗Eastern potentates‘, possibly Hyder Ali, 
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the onetime ruler of Mysore, who had said that he was afraid, not of the forces of the 
East India Company, but of the troops he could not see. Even if the Dominions neglected 
their own defence, and they did, they were still secure as ‗war with them is war with 
England‘.18 Given that the Dominions cut a rather poor cloth in the decades before the 
outbreak of war, it is perhaps understandable why they have ‗been all but ignored by two 
generations of imperial historiography‘. On the other hand, the Germans did suffer the 
consequences of declaring war on Britain‘s Dominions, particularly in the Last Hundred 
Days‘ campaign.19  
Unlike India, the Dominions could not be compelled to make a greater 
contribution towards imperial defence. They did, however, in the years before the 
outbreak of war, take steps towards the functional integration of their nascent armed 
forces with those of the Mother Country. Australia and New Zealand, following 
Canada‘s lead, established their own General Staffs, who could work with the Imperial 
General Staff; thereby allowing the War Office from 1909 onward to influence how 
Dominion troops were ‗organised, thought, trained and fought‘. Consequently, if the 
Dominions choose to participate in ‗another ―British war‖‘, their forces would easily 
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function within the broader imperial command structure.
20
 Dominion reasoning for 
participating in the Great War is discussed below, but it is worth noting here that 
Canada‘s Opposition Leader, the Catholic French-Canadian Sir Wilfrid Laurier, declared 
in August 1914 that ‗when the call comes our answer goes at once ... Ready, aye, ready‘. 
However, unlike past wars where Dominion volunteers simply joined British regiments, 
in 1914 London had to accept that Dominion forces would come en masse; Canada‘s 
offer of an ‗army corps‘ was ‗formally accepted‘ two days after Britain‘s declaration of 
war.
21
 The mobilisation of resources, men and otherwise, arguably became the dominant 
characteristic of the first two years of the Great War vis-à-vis the Empire; 
notwithstanding the fact that South Africans, Australians and New Zealanders quickly 
rolled up most of Germany‘s colonial possessions in Southern Africa and the South 
Pacific.
22
  
Once they got to the Western Front, Australians and Canadians proved to be ‗the 
best fighting troops in any army‘, said the British officer and war poet, Charles 
Carrington. At the Battle of Amiens (8 to 14 August 1918), the Canadians, numbering 
slightly over 100,000 men, ‗met and defeated elements of fourteen German divisions‘, 
destroying three whole divisions and capturing 9,311 prisoners, 201 guns, 152 trench 
mortars and 755 machine guns. It is little wonder that General Erich Ludendorff labelled 
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8 August the ‗black day of the German Army‘.23 Admittedly, the Australians faltered in 
the end, owing to a shortage of reinforcements, but, between 26 August and 3 October, 
the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), with Dominion forces acting as elite shock 
troops, breached the Hindenburg Line.
24
 Made at the outset of what became the Last 
Hundred Days, Marshall Foch‘s prediction that the Canadian Corps would be ‗the ram 
with which we will break up the last resistance of the German army‘ came to pass. 
Moreover, the Canadians retook Mons, site of the BEF‘s first major battle in 1914, in the 
early hours of 11 November 1918.
25
 All told the five Dominions enlisted over 1.3 
million men; versus the one and a half million Indians who fought for King and Empire. 
It is estimated that the Dominions provided at least one-fifth of Britain‘s land 
combatants.
26
 India also contributed £100 million to the war‘s cost, but it was Canada 
that became the ‗indispensable ally‘ providing millions of bags of flour in 1914 and, 
following the creation of an Imperial Munitions Board in late 1915, the country became 
‗a western extension of Britain‘s war production economy‘, producing roughly a third of 
the artillery munitions required by the BEF from 1917 onwards. Britain also borrowed a 
billion dollars in Canada, an amount equal to British dollar securities sold off in the US, 
to pay for war materiel. Britain‘s war debt to its senior Dominion was a quarter of what 
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it owed America. The entire Empire aided the war effort—though some offers of aid, 
such as, coconuts from the Marakei people of the Gilbert Islands, were less valuable than 
others—and in doing so ensured that ‗the woolsack and the trident‘ did not pass to 
America.
27
 Whatever doubts the British government may have harboured about the 
military value of the Dominions were long forgotten by the end of 1916. Henceforth, 
instead of the Empire aiding Britain‘s war effort, the British ‗Empire was at war, 
orchestrated by Britain much more as a primus inter pares‘.28 Anglo-Dominion relations 
had become the central cornerstone of the British World System, yet this subject has 
been dismissed as nothing more than ‗Kevin O‘Higgins‘s comma and treaties about 
halibut‘.29 ‗Revision is long overdue‘, suggested a recent work.30 
 Traditionally, the participation of the Dominions in the Great War is said to have 
been ‗a formative moment in the evolution of national self-consciousness. Although the 
outcomes were diametric opposites, Gallipoli and Vimy Ridge became shibboleths to 
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Australian and Canadian nationalism, respectively.
31
 Gallipoli and the Anzac legend 
would seem to possess the stronger allure, but, nevertheless, there is a sense amongst 
Canadians and, in particular, Canadianists, that Imperial Canada ended at (the Battle of) 
Vimy Ridge.
32
 Like many nationalist myths, however, such reasoning is highly suspect. 
Five years after the battle, the former commander of the Canadian Corps, Sir Arthur 
Currie, worried that placing Canada‘s national memorial on Vimy Ridge would ‗confirm 
for all time ... that Vimy was the greatest battle fought by the Canadians in France. We 
fought other battles [Amiens, Arras and Cambrai] where the moral and material results 
were greater and more far reaching than Vimy‘s victory.‘33 The relationship—taking the 
geopolitical component first—between the Dominions and Britain was far more 
complicated than most recognise. The truth is that the ‗Dominions fought for Britain as 
though they co-owned it‘.34 They had no choice, particularly in the case of Australia and 
New Zealand. By the early twentieth century, the metropole/periphery binary no longer 
applied. London was unquestionably the central hub of empire, but select colonial cities 
across the globe acted as or aspired to be regional metropoles.
35
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 Westward expansion is a given in American historiography. However, the 
American West had a twin, who was only recently rediscovered. The ‗British West‘ also 
began in the 1780s, when United Empire Loyalists fled the Thirteenth Colonies for 
Canada, and Britain began dumping its convicts at Botany Bay. Britain, like America‘s 
Mid-Atlantic States, drove the growth of these new worlds, which witnessed population 
growth rates similar to their American counterparts. By 1860, the British West had a 
combined population roughly a third of the American West.
36
 Growth rates in parts of 
the former during the second half of the nineteenth century were astounding. Melbourne 
had a populace of almost half a million by 1891, which made it larger than the ‗ancient 
cities of Cairo, Mexico City and Madrid‘. San Francisco and Los Angeles were 
respectively eighty and nine hundred percent smaller than ‗Marvellous Melbourne‘.37 
Between 1851 and 1891, the population and economy of the state of Victoria 
experienced explosive growth, increasing by over 1,300 percent.
38
 The result was the 
creation of a sub-empire centred on Melbourne, which stretched from pastoral 
Queensland to as far abroad as New Guinea. New South Wales‘ sheep and coal were 
exported though Melbourne, as was New Zealand timber and Queensland beef. 
Moreover, Melbourne was the financial centre of Australia, Fiji and the West Coast of 
New Zealand. Australia‘s ‗imperial age‘ had begun.39 To contemporaries there was no 
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contradiction between (to use Richard Jebb‘s famous phrase) ‗colonial nationalism‘ and 
British subjecthood. ‗The architects of the Australian Commonwealth ... believed they 
had built a dwelling-place spacious enough to house a nation—a nation that was to be 
new and old; Australian, yet still British‘, wrote W.K Hancock at the outset of his 
chapter in volume seven of the Cambridge History of the British Empire (1933).
40
 As 
Australia's second Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, once said, ‗[we are simply] 
Independent Australian Britons‘. Drawing on Canadian scholarship, Australia‘s Empire 
suggests that perhaps Australian settlers—like Canadian colonists—adopted imperialism 
as their nascent nationalism.
41
 But they also stress that Melbourne‘s Empire was a joint 
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project between periphery and metropole, as will be seen New Zealand had similar 
aspirations, whereas Canada did not.
42
  
As part of the Tasman world (1769-1840), ‗Old New Zealand‘ was tethered to 
the ‗convicts, commerce and sheep farms of Eastern Australia‘. The three decades 
following annexation saw both the Maori and maritime frontier slowly gave way to a 
settlement colony, with Auckland developing into an entrepot. By the twentieth century, 
as they came to number nearly a million, New Zealanders had come to regard 
themselves as being the most British dominion.
43
 ‗The ambition of the New Zealand 
settlers‘, said a journalist in 1864, ‗has been to make in the Southern Hemisphere an 
exact counterpart of Great Britain in the Northern‘.44 To achieve this, Julius Vogel 
argued, New Zealand needed to create ‗a maritime version of Canada‘ that incorporated 
Fiji, Samoa and the lesser Polynesian islands. A dream dashed by the economic and 
social crisis of the late 1880s.
45
 However, Vogelism was quickly resurrected following 
technological advances in refrigeration during the mid-1890s that transformed New 
Zealand‘s economy. Imported meat in Britain was marketed under three labels: 
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‗American‘, ‗Colonial‘ and ‗Foreign‘. Lamb carcasses arrived in Britain bearing the 
slogan: ‗I‘m British from New Zealand‘. As early as 1882, the New Zealand Herald 
foresaw that the ‗exportation of frozen meat makes the colony of New Zealand as much 
a province of England ... as Yorkshire or Devon‘.46 This secondary colonisation of the 
country, which lasted into the 1930s, was only part of the story. The liberal reforms 
enacted following the crisis of the late 1880s reaffirmed the ‗unwritten Magna Carta of 
New Zealand politics‘, equal opportunity for all Anglo-Saxon men. New Zealand, at the 
outset of the twentieth century, was a ‗progressive experiment in Britishness‘, which 
further reinforced the image of New Zealand as Arcadia. Although the landscape was 
still only half conquered, an important milestone was reached in 1907 when the country 
shed its colonial status in favour of dominionhood.
47
 Now with two ―neo-Britains‖ in the 
South Pacific, the obvious question was which one would safeguard British interests? 
The answer before 1914 would be neither. Wilhelm II‘s decision to adopt a 
policy of Weltpolitik in the final years of the nineteenth century was not at first 
particularly alarming. It was centred after all on China, specifically Kiaochow. Its chief 
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goal was domestic peace, but the style of German foreign policy provoked other powers 
as the years passed.
48
 Meanwhile, as a consequence of the imperialist war against Spain, 
the US Navy‘s interest in Pacific bases had been reawakened. ‗We surely have an 
abundance of them within the United States, but there is imperative demand for the 
establishment of a naval station in the Philippines and in the West Indies or the 
Caribbean‘, concluded a 1902 Navy Department report.49 Three years earlier, it was said 
‗without fear of contradiction‘ that an American fleet could not in times of war operate 
on ‗the coasts of Europe, Africa, a large portion of Asia and South America for want of 
coal‘.50 The Germans were also building up their ability to operate in the Indian and 
Pacific Oceans, Britain‘s most vulnerable waters. Acquired in 1898, Tsingtao, China was 
Germany‘s only major overseas naval base. But Germany‘s East Asiatic Squadron could 
hide/resupply in the islands of the Marianas, Marshalls, Carolines, New Guinea and 
Samoa, as well as German East Africa.
51
 Both powers were eager to acquire further 
bases in the region; if for no other reason than to deny them to rivals. Germany, unlike 
Britain, did not disguise its displeasure at Washington taking the entire Philippine 
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archipelago.
52
 Opportunities, however, still existed elsewhere. Three turbulent years in 
the late 1870s had led to the supposedly united front of the American, British and 
German consuls playing a leading role in the governance of the chaotic Samoan Islands. 
In reality, said a frustrated Lord Salisbury, the then Prime Minister, the administration 
was ‗furor consularis‘, which left Britain to ‗quarrel either with the Germans or the 
Americans once a month‘. Salisbury wanted to end the triad arrangement as early as 
1889, telling the British Ambassador at Berlin that ‗Samoa matters very little to us‘.53 
And by ‗us‘ Salisbury meant Britain, narrowly conceived, as the islands were rather 
important to both New Zealand and Australia.
54
 To the Colonial Office, however, Vogel, 
who by now was Prime Minister in Wellington, was ‗the most audacious adventurer that 
perhaps has ever held power in a British Colony‘.55 Then Colonial Secretary, the Earl of 
Kimberley, supposed that the ‗New Zealand Government would have thought it as well 
first to get possession of the whole of New Zealand before undertaking to govern other 
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territories‘, not an unreasonable position when one remembers that the Maori Wars had 
just ended.
56
 Neo-British sentiment had led Britain to resist German annexation of 
Samoa in 1886, but, in 1899, notwithstanding a Colonial Office memorandum warning 
the Foreign Office of Australia‘s ‗strong and legitimate feeling‘ against Samoa—which 
lay ‗directly in the track of steamers from Australia and New Zealand to North America‘ 
and the Panama Canal—passing into the ‗hands of a foreign Power,‘ London acted to 
lessen the hostility aroused by the Second Boer War. Samoa was a small price to pay to 
secure German disinterest in Southern Africa.
57
 In making that calculation, the Home 
Government sent a clear message. Neo-British interests mattered naught.
58
 Undeterred, 
the New Zealand Prime Minister, Richard Seddon, undertook a South Seas cruise, 
ostensibly for health reasons, in the spring of 1900. By now, the population density of 
New Zealand had risen from less than half a person per square mile in 1871 to almost 
seven and a half people.
59
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However, the creation of the Commonwealth of Australia at the outset of 1901 
heralded a diminished role for New Zealand in the councils of empire. The cruise was 
the first move in a two year campaign by ―King Dick‖ to forge an ‗island empire in the 
Pacific‘, which would enable New Zealand to stand as an equal with Canada and 
Australia. Unlike previous campaigns by Vogel and others, this latest one came as New 
Zealanders were fighting in South Africa and news of a ‗weary Titan‘ wafted across the 
British world. Ultimately, while the Colonial Office had no objection to New Zealand 
annexing the Cook Islands, the country was judged ill prepared to govern a Crown 
Colony like Fiji. ‗We must try them on a small scale first‘, minuted one official.60 The 
utterances of Joseph Chamberlain notwithstanding, the 1902 Imperial Conference served 
to confirm that Britain‘s great offices of state would resist giving Antipodean opinion a 
role in formulating imperial policy. In contrast to the well-bred men who staffed the 
Colonial Office, politicians like Seddon tended to come from the lower middle, or worse 
still, the working classes. As one official explained, ‗colonial ―statesmen‖ are in many 
respects very like children, and have to be treated accordingly‘.61 Seddon‘s campaign to 
annex Fiji had represented ‗a moment when the future of the Empire was in the melting-
pot‘. A federation of equal states, sharing the benefits and burdens of empire, might have 
emerged if not for the arrogance of the English governing class.
62
 
Whereas London clearly and unequivocally rejected Antipodean claims to a 
greater role in the administration of the colonial empire, Canada rebuffed several 
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opportunities to expand its borders and/or responsibilities. It is said erroneously that 
‗Canadians had few dreams of ―empire‖ for themselves‘.63 This conclusion also ignores 
the less than gentlemanly capitalism of Canadian banks. Building off a Royal 
Commission appointed in 1909 to investigate ways to foster closer trade relations 
between Canada and the West Indies, a campaign started to annex tropical territories as a 
means of re-asserting Canada‘s ties to the Empire in light of the 1911 Reciprocity 
Agreement with America; ultimately rejected by the Canadian electorate.
64
 The West 
Indies, it was predicted, would find themselves on a ‗secure[r economic] footing‘ by 
associating themselves with ‗a member of the Empire as wealthy, powerful and patriotic 
as Canada‘.65 News of the West Indies‘ desire for a ‗union‘ with Canada appears to have 
been common knowledge in Australia, and presumably therefore throughout the British 
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World.
66
 Speaking before the Empire Club of Canada, a month after the Conservatives 
returned to power, the Governor of the Bahamas, Sir William Grey-Wilson, who was a 
cousin of Canada‘s late Governor General, Earl Grey, not surprisingly stressed the 
island‘s attractive climate, but also predicted that, if a regular steamship line could be 
established, Canada could possibly supply all the trade goods that were currently 
imported from America; thereby binding together ‗the outlying portions of the 
Empire‘.67 Though a proposal that proved popular with those assembled the Governor, 
warned that if ‗commercial unity is to be adequately secured, it can best be done by 
political fusion‘. Both Bahamas‘ appointed Legislative Assembly and the elected House 
of Assembly had passed ‗practically unanimous resolutions‘ asking that a joint 
commission ‗examine this problem in detail‘. To Canadian statesmen, who viewed the 
issue as one of annexing the ‗whole of the West Indies or nothing at all‘, Grey-Wilson 
maintained that the former would wreck the whole scheme owing to ‗the different 
constitutions, the divergence of interests, the geographical separation of the West 
Indies‘, etc. If the Bahamas ‗experiment‘ proved successful, the governor anticipated, 
‗the rest of the West Indies would tumble over one another to come in at some time‘.68 
For reasons poorly understood, the 1911-12 campaign to acquire Canadian départements 
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outre-mer failed; though a trade agreement was reached in 1912.
69
 The Colonial Office 
strongly opposed a political union, in part out of a reluctance to surrender Britain‘s 
strategic position over the (still uncompleted) Panama Canal. Interest died off quickly; 
save for a few Canadian commercial information services and pressure groups, most 
notably the Canadian West Indian League.
70
  
However, by the summer of 1916, Britain‘s official mind had turned its attention 
to ‗the question of territorial changes in Africa and elsewhere outside Europe which may 
be expected to follow as a result of the war‘. Borders, wrote Margaret MacMillan, ‗had 
suddenly become quite fluid‘. Writing to the acting Canadian High Commissioner in 
London, Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden, wanted to know how the Imperial 
Government would view bringing Jamaica—and possibly other West Indian islands—
into Canadian Confederation. The war presented an ‗opportunity ... more favourable than 
it ever will be in [the] future‘. He admitted that the proposal might be ‗chimerical‘, but 
also laid out five advantages for it.
71
 Canadian annexation of Greenland, Trinidad and/or 
Antigua was also considered.
72
 However, by the spring of 1917, the sub-committee on 
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territorial changes had resolved that the British North American Dominions would likely 
receive no territorial ‗reward‘ for their sacrifices; the only possibility that remained was 
the recovery of the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon. Opinion within the Canadian 
official mind was split. The President of the Privy Council, for example, hoped that 
Canada, like America, would not seek territorial gain. Nevertheless, the idea of a 
‗Greater Dominion of British America‘, encompassing Canada, Newfoundland, 
Bermuda, the West Indies and ‗if you liked to have them thrown in, the Falkland 
Islands‘, was raised in the summer of 1918 as part of the discussion surrounding the 
‗future of the Imperial Cabinet system‘.73 Less than a week earlier, however, Borden had 
told a joint meeting of the British and Imperial War Cabinets that ‗a very bad impression 
will be created in Canada if we do come out of this war with [a] great increase of 
territory‘. Canadians, he strangely proclaimed, would not fight ‗for any territorial 
extension of the British Empire‘. The continuance of the Empire depended on the 
Dominions, and the ‗co-operation and support of the United States of America‘. 
However, the following morning Borden, after a ‗long discussion‘ with Lloyd George, 
‗acquiesced‘ to the suggestion that Canada ‗should take over the West Indies‘. Yet days 
later, during the voyage home, Borden told several American passengers, including 
Herbert Hoover, that ‗Canada would not fight for a policy of aggrandizement‘.74 A 
policy he clearly (and correctly) discerned after reading an Eastern Committee 
memorandum on territorial adjustments. The following day, amidst all the talk of 
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conquest, Borden struck a discordant note, warning the Imperial Cabinet that a ‗scramble 
for territory‘ would be the prelude to ‗further wars‘.75 Perhaps he remembered the ideals 
he had invoked in closing his speech to the House of Commons on 18 August 1914. 
Equally plausible is that Borden was too obsessed with American opinion, particularly 
the difficulties Irish- and German-Americans would create for Woodrow Wilson.
76
 
Ottawa‘s central geopolitical concern was the management of the ‗North Atlantic 
Triangle‘, though the desire for Caribbean territory lingered. Australia and New Zealand 
by contrast had a far freer hand to play at the Paris Peace Conference.
77
  
 ‗Am I to understand that if the whole civilised world asks Australia to agree to a 
mandate in respect of these islands, Australia is prepared still to defy the appeal of the 
whole civilised world‘, asked an annoyed Wilson. Hughes answered: ‗That‘s about the 
size of it‘. The long serving New Zealand Prime Minister, William Massey, whom a 
Canadian delegate described ‗as thick headed and John Bullish as his appearance would 
lead one to expect‘, grunted his agreement.78 Fuming over leaks that appeared in the 
Paris edition of the Daily Mail, Wilson would not let the matter drop; adding that 
‗Australia and New Zealand with 6,000,000 people between them could not hold up a 
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conference in which, including China, some 1,200 million people were represented‘.79 
Hughes later claimed that he replied: ‗I represent sixty thousand dead‘. If true, it was a 
devastating putdown (as everyone assembled knew Wilson represented fewer). Australia 
and New Zealand, like Canada, drew diplomatic strength from membership in the British 
Empire—which elevated their representatives past those of any number of other smaller 
nations, into the corridors of power—as well as their early contributions and ultimate 
sacrifices in the war effort.
80
 Two days after the declaration of war, the Colonial 
Secretary enquired if the New Zealand government felt ‗able to seize German wireless 
station at Samoa‘. On the following day, the Governor telegraphed his government‘s 
assent to the request, with the only reservation being the availability of an escort.
81
 Apia 
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was captured without resistance on 30 August 1914. Less than two weeks later, ‗after 
eighteen hours‘ bush fighting over six miles of country‘, an Australian Naval Reserve 
detachment captured the wireless station at Rabaul, German New Guinea. ‗Australians 
will be very pleased with the disappearance of the name Kaiser Wilhelm‘s Land from 
the map ...‘, anticipated a New Zealand paper. Meanwhile, another Australian landing 
party destroyed the wireless station at Nauru in the Marshall Islands.
82
 British cruisers 
destroyed the wireless station at Yap in the Caroline Islands, thereby severing Berlin‘s 
wireless link to the Far East.
83
 Although the Australian Defence Minister publically 
proclaimed that the ‗sea routes [were] now safe‘, the two Dominions were reluctant to 
act on the Colonial Office‘s promptings to undertake operations north of the equator as 
German cruisers remained at large; Anzacs meanwhile were focused on preparations for 
service in Europe, the first convoy of thirty-eight transports sailed from Albany, a port 
on King George Sound, Western Australia, on 1 November 1914.
84
 Nevertheless, 
contemporaries were quick to grasp the significance of their seizing ‗the outposts of the 
[Antipodean] Empire‘. The captured wireless stations, whose retention would be 
determined by the ‗clash of arms on the Continent‘, represented the last piece necessary 
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to creating a miniature Far ‗Eastern Arc of Empire‘ to guard the western coasts of New 
Zealand and Australia. Capturing German Samoa, in particular, also demonstrated that 
the Australian Navy was not ‗the ―tin pot‖ nonentity which a certain school of 
Imperialists in this country [New Zealand] has been pleased to declare it‘.85 Before the 
Colonial Office had even requested their assistance, the Committee of Imperial Defence 
had already decided that those islands ‗east of the line of longitude 170ᴏ were to fall to 
New Zealand, those to the west to Australia‘.86 Britain had no essential strategic, 
economic or telegraphic interests in the islands north of the equator, but diplomatic 
reasoning pointed to Japan receiving ‗a fair share of the islands captured‘.87  
Captured German territory in the South Pacific was also ‗not in any way suitable 
for bargaining with‘. Islands captured by Anzacs ‗must remain British‘, while it was 
‗impossible to disturb‘ the Japanese. The sub-committee on territorial changes 
‗unanimously‘ agreed that New Zealand and, in particular, Australia would not accept 
any suggestion of restoring the islands to Germany. The latter, advised the Colonial 
Office, had ‗always resented the intrusion of Germany into what she looks on as a 
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British sphere‘.88 In the case of New Guinea, Hughes was uncompromising, later 
declaring that ‗if you want to shift us, come and do it: here we are – J‘y suis, j‘y reste‘. 
The bluster, however, was premature. As far as the sub-committee was concerned—vis-
à-vis Germany‘s Pacific possessions—all was decided and it was simply a matter of 
obtaining the ‗endorsement of the Allies‘.89 Here lay the origin of the confrontation 
referenced at the outset of this paragraph. Wilson‘s Fourteen Points stood in stark 
contrast to wartime Allied diplomacy, consequently ahead of the decisive Council of Ten 
session, the French Prime Minister, George Clemenceau, reportedly suggested that 
Lloyd George should ‗bring your savages with you‘.90 Unlike Hughes and Massey, who 
respectively dismissed the League of Nations as ‗utopian‘ and ‗idealistic‘, Jan Smuts, the 
South African warrior-statesmen, championed its creation.
91
 All three, however, were 
horrified when the Americans suggested that the League of Nations should assume 
responsibility for all conquered German territory. Mandates, Smuts had suggested prior 
to the Conference, were for countries ‗sufficiently civilised to become democracies in 
time‘, namely former Ottoman territory. Having the three Dominion statesmen, with 
Borden present for diplomatic unity, address the Council of Ten signalled that Britain 
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herself was uninterested in acquiring further territories; even if Lloyd George agreed 
with the position put forth by his colleagues from the British Empire delegation.
92
 
Against the backdrop of a map specially prepared by the Royal Geographic Society, 
Hughes laid out the central thrust of his argument: ‗As Ireland is to the United Kingdom, 
as Mexico is to the United States, as Alsace-Lorraine is to France, so is New Guinea to 
Australia‘. Massey, having previously called for ‗something like the Monroe Doctrine‘ 
being applied to Australasia, also pointed to the danger his country faced from the 
German East Asiatic Squadron at the outset of the Great War as reason enough to 
exclude Germany from the South Pacific. If the islands were returned, in addition to 
naval and wireless stations, they would likely also become submarine and even airship 
bases. Ultimately, following an address by the South African Prime Minister, the ex-
Boer commando, Louis Botha, the compromise put forth by other members of the British 
Empire delegation was accepted. The three Dominions would keep their spoils, but as 
League of Nations mandates under the newly invented ‗C‘ class.93 Hughes, the lone 
holdout for annexation, only accepted the compromise when Col. Maurice Hankey, the 
Secretary to the British War Cabinet and Empire Delegation, assured him that a ‗C‘ class 
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mandate was ‗the equivalent of a 999 years‘ lease‘. A ‗pestiferous varmint‘ was 
Wilson‘s private description of the Australian politician.94  
Whether purely mischievous or a ‗classic piece of ambit claim negotiating 
technique‘, Hughes‘ performance was appreciated far beyond the British Empire 
Delegation. ‗You made out our case for Dalmatia‘, said the Italian Prime Minister. 
Clemenceau was equally impressed.
95
 Hughes‘ desire to be a ‗better Briton‘, however, 
was not without its downside. ‗The only unpleasant episode of the whole Congress‘, was 
how one participant later characterised the debate over what to do with the captured 
German colonies. Compromise eventually prevailed, but the ‗catastrophe of a break up‘ 
had been a possibility.
96
  
In geopolitical terms, this improvised new Anglo-Dominion relationship had 
worked well, for the most part. Disagreements simply were not strong enough to break 
the bonds of ‗Britannic solidarity‘.97 As Seddon explained at the close of the nineteenth 
century:  
We are of the English-speaking race. Our kindred are scattered in dispersed parts 
of the globe, and wherever they are, no matter how far distant apart, there is a 
feeling of affection – that crimson tie, that bond of unity existing which time 
does not affect – and in the end will become indispensible.98 
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His successor voiced a similar sentiment. Speaking at the Guildhall in November 1916, 
Massey proclaimed his belief that ‗the Empire would last to the end of time, and London 
would always be the capital‘.99 Surviving Germany‘s 1918 spring offensive, ahead of 
outright victory in the Great War, confirmed Massey‘s ‗British Israelism‘. However, two 
titanic confrontations with ‗what [historian] J.A. Cramb in 1913 called ―our enemy of 
enemies,‖ the equivalent of France in the eighteenth century and Spain in the sixteenth‘, 
halted the evolution of ‗Greater Britain‘. Had there been a lone war, speculated a recent 
work, the ‗capital would be moving from London to Vancouver about now‘.100  
But, in 1914, ‗even close observer[s] of contemporary events‘ were struck by the 
attention, however fleeting, Britons devoted to the question: ‗How would the Dominions 
and Dependencies take it?‘ Save for a handful of the ‗most farsighted publicists‘, it was 
widely expected within Germany that the opening salvo of a general European war 
would constitute the ‗signal for the break-up of an Empire which had never rested upon 
any substantial basis ....‘101 It is true that the ‗imperial mind‘ struggled with how to 
strengthen intra-imperial bonds in the late Victorian and Edwardian years.
102
 
Furthermore, regardless of whatever ‗confederation‘ actually meant, the dream of a 
‗Britannic Confederation‘ died long before the outbreak of war in August 1914; only 
months earlier a new journal proclaimed that its aim was ‗to explore and encourage the 
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non-political forces of Britannic Union ....‘103 That is to say the Britannic Review sought 
an alternative to the ‗Britannic question‘, or the ‗problem of how to effect a closer and 
permanent union‘ of the self-governing parts of the Empire. Prior to 1914, as the writer 
G.K. Chesterton noted, the Dominions, like Londoners then and now, acted as though 
they were on the Underground and did their best to ignore each other. Bilateral ties to 
Britain, however, remained strong. The Second Boer War roused the Dominions ever so 
slightly into action—Australia, Canada and New Zealand combined contributed 31,500 
men to the war effort—but the declaration of war on Germany (as alluded to earlier) 
prompted an entirely different reaction.
104
 (To invoke the language of the turn of the 
century Toronto Globe) The ‗Britons of Greater Britain‘ had heard the ‗ominous‘ news: 
‗The barbarians [truly] were thundering at the frontiers‘.105 With efforts to avert war 
likened to ‗whispering around the death bed‘, a provincial newspaper wondered: ‗Is it 
Armageddon?‘ Regardless of what the future held, another thought the Dominions‘ task 
clear: ‗We are called upon to show to all the world the character of the metal of which 
our bonds of Empire are forged, and our patriotism must display itself not in loud 
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outbursts of jingoistic song ....‘106 Those outbursts frequently emphasised a parental 
theme, a notable (and more than a bit prophetic) example is Herbert Kaufman‘s ‗Mother 
Britain and Her Sons‘, which begins: 
 
 We are coming, Mother, coming—we  
   are coming Home to fight, 
 To defend the Empire‘s honour, to  
   uphold the Empire‘s might. 
 From the Plains of Manitoba, from the  
   diggings of the Rand, 
 We are coming, Mother Britain—com- 
    ing home to lend a hand. 
 From the islands and the highlands,  
   fast across the seven seas; 
Look where‘er the sun is shining, and  
   your Flag is in the breeze. 
We‘ll prove our breed in your hour of  
   need, and teach the bally Huns 
Who strike at Britain, they must like- 
   wise reckon with her sons. 
 
We are coming, Mother, coming—save 
   a good place at the front; 
Where the battle wages fiercest ...
107
 
 
While the poem maybe ‗about as bad as verse can be‘, the last three lines highlight the 
ideal of Better Britons.
108
 
Being British-born, the bulk of the first contingent of Canadians to arrive in 
Britain experienced a homecoming of sorts. The chance to visit relatives was welcome, 
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but as time passed some came to see England (in the words of one soldier) as ‗one of the 
most godforsaken places in the world‘.109 Such attitudes were not commonplace. The 
increasing assertion, particularly after 1900, of Britannic nationalism, which combined 
being an equal partner in the pan-British world, with localised nationalism, meant that 
New South Wales was akin to Yorkshire or any other part of London‘s hinterland. 
Australian, Canadian, etc, simply became another sub-regional identity of Britishness, 
no different than Manx or Irish.
110
 Dominion nationalism was in many ways ‗not a 
repudiation of imperialism but its confident vanguard‘. Britons, however, dismissed the 
(Canadian) troops arriving from their Dominions as ‗colonials‘, (descendents of) men 
who could not make it in Britain. Their indiscipline was taken as proof that abroad ‗the 
British race had slipped a bit‘.111 Residents of Australia, Canada and New Zealand 
rejected this charge in favour of viewing among other descriptions their respective 
countries as representing a ‗New Britannia‘, a ‗Nova Britannia‘ and even ‗God‘s Own 
Country‘.112 It had long been known that members of the Canadian Militia tended to be 
‗far taller and larger‘ than British Regulars; similarly, a minority of Australians saw their 
‗climate, soil and social system‘ as the basis for the creation of the ‗New Australian 
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Man‘.113 Undeniable, however, is the effect less rigid class barriers had. Only ten years 
after immigrating, Hughes, the onetime itinerant worker, was elected to the New South 
Wales Parliament; ten years later, he was Minister for External Affairs in a short-lived 
minority Labour government. Furthermore, it was part-time civilian soldiers, such as 
Currie and John Monash, who planned many of the offensives during the Last Hundred 
Days Campaign and who were made the ‗centre of congratulations‘ at a chance 
gathering of senior allied generals and politicians three days after the Amiens‘ operation 
had begun.
114
 The Dominions ‗provided the back-up that the German army never had‘. 
But even here the shadow of Better Britons loomed; approximately a third of all British 
pilots were Canadian, while Australian engineers were equal to, if not faster than, 
Britons at counter-battery operations.
115
 ‗Magnificently equipped and highly trained in 
storm tactics,‘ was the German view of the Canadian Corps by the summer of 1918. The 
Commander-in-Chief of the BEF, Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig‘s judgement 
notwithstanding, scepticism exists as to this supposed superiority of Dominion troops 
over those from Britain.
116
 What is undeniable, however, is the decisive impact Better 
Britons had away from the front lines.  
Although the Colonial Secretary was in ‗continual communication‘ with the 
Dominions, and Borden became the first Dominion Prime Minister to visit London for 
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‗full and confidential discussion[s]‘ in the summer of 1915, the Acting Canadian High 
Commissioner was growing increasingly frustrated with the calls for more troops 
without finding a way to ‗consult more with you [Borden] and other Dominions 
regarding general policy of war operations‘.117 The Times had already pronounced that 
the war had forever altered the relationship between Britain and her Dominions. 
Moreover, advised the correspondent, ‗Imperial problems as well as Canadian problems‘ 
were mounting and would need addressing once ‗peace comes‘.118 The New Brunswick-
born Bonar Law, however, continued on as if nothing had changed, not recognising that 
Borden and the other Dominion leaders were responsible to their own populaces for the 
‗conduct of [the] war‘. Borden merely wanted ‗fuller and more exact information from 
time to time‘. He struggled even in London to obtain information, seemingly because of 
a ‗lack [of] proper co-ordination between several Departments responsible for conduct of 
war‘.119 Perley duly conveyed his government‘s concerns to the Colonial Secretary, who 
uttered the correct platitudes but incredibly said of the ‗question of consultation‘ that ‗if 
no scheme is practicable then it is very undesirable that the question should be raised‘.120  
Such attitudes were reflective of a far ‗too-prevalent fallacy‘. ‗Responsible 
Canadians‘, warned The Times, were tired of the ‗constant talk in this country about 
―help‖ from Canada‘. Thanks to the war Britain‘s status as ‗the ―Mother Country‖ of the 
Empire‘ existed only in ‗sentiment and tradition‘. One could excuse the commoners‘ 
misunderstanding of the changes hastened by the war, but as to ‗the Government nothing 
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excuses the old spirit of mingled patronage and surprise‘.121 Privately, Borden had lost 
patience with the Home Government. Writing to the Acting High Commissioner, he 
fumed:  
Mr. Bonar Law‘s letter [of 3 November] is not especially illuminating and leaves 
the matter precisely where it was before my letter was sent.  
 
During the past four months since my return from Great Britain, the Canadian 
Government (except for an occasional telegram from you or [the Canadian 
newspaper baron] Sir Max Aitken) have had just what information could be 
gleaned from the daily press and no more .... 
 
It can hardly be expected that we shall put 400,000 or 500,000 men in the field 
and willingly accept the position of having no more voice and receiving no more 
consideration than if we were a toy automata. Any person cherishing such an 
expectation harbours an unfortunate and even dangerous delusion. Is this war 
being waged by the United Kingdom alone or is it a war waged by the whole 
Empire? If I am correct in supposing that the second hypothesis must be accepted 
then why do the statesmen of the British Isles arrogate to themselves solely the 
methods by which it shall be carried on in the various spheres of warlike activity 
and the steps which shall be taken to assure victory and a lasting peace?
122
  
 
From the war‘s outset, Borden had seen the conflict as a just one, with Britain and the 
Dominions fighting ‗for the cause of honour, to maintain solemn pledges, to uphold 
principles of liberty, to withstand forces that would convert the world into an armed 
camp‘.123 Although the carnage of the Western Front appalled him, while in Britain, 
Borden visited wounded Canadians in fifty-two different hospitals.
124
 It is against this 
backdrop that Borden questioned continuing Canada‘s war effort if her ‗role of 
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automata‘ persisted.125 He was angry that ‗procrastination, indecision, inertia, doubt, 
hesitation and many other undesirable qualities have made themselves entirely too 
conspicuous in this war‘.126 Less than two and a half weeks later, a fellow-traveller 
boarded the R.M.S. Makura already at sea. The Australian Prime Minister landed in 
Vancouver—via Auckland, where he consulted Massey ‗on vital matters to the 
Dominions arising out of the war‘—on 15 February and, after refusing to speak to the 
press, boarded a ‗special train‘.127 While in Ottawa, Hughes was sworn in as a Privy 
Councillor, discussed imperial affairs with the Cabinet, addressed a meeting at the 
Rideau Club—in which he paid tribute to the Royal Navy for safeguarding the Seas and 
announced (to an ‗immense cheer‘) that Australia would soon have 300,000 men in the 
field and that Germany would never again interfere with Australian commerce—told the 
Canadian Club that Australia would fight to the last man rather than agree to an ‗ignoble 
peace‘ with Germany.128 Publically the Governor General said Hughes‘ speeches ‗made 
an excellent impression‘, while the two premiers discussed privately ‗the conduct of the 
war and the future relations of the Empire‘. Both men, and presumably Massey as well, 
agreed that the ‗Overseas nations‘ needed an ‗adequate voice‘ in the councils of the 
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Empire.
129
 They also agreed publically to pressure London to achieve their aims. This 
‗rare lateral consultation spooked Asquith‘, who decided to invite Hughes to attend two 
March Cabinet meetings. Symbolism fulfilled, Hughes spent the rest of his visit to 
London delivering speeches; which the Press Association said ‗were electrifying the 
Empire‘.130 Through a young-ish Melbourne journalist, Keith Murdoch, father of Rupert 
Murdoch, Hughes met Lord Northcliffe and other press barons. Hughes‘ view of the war 
was similar to Borden‘s, which thereby assured Hughes favourable press coverage.131 
Following his first speech in London, the influential Evening News declared: ‗Mr. 
Hughes not only talks bravely, but also acts bravely. He comes from a country where the 
Britons have not been afraid to cut out the German cancer, while England has done little 
beyond consultations regarding the necessity for such an operation‘. Hughes, to the 
editor of the liberal Daily News, arrived as a ‗representative statesman of Greater Britain, 
called in to advise on the biggest work of Imperial reconstruction the world has ever 
seen‘. Germany had set out to destroy the British Empire, now, declared Alfred 
Gardiner, ‗―John Bull‖ must become ―John Bull and Sons‖‘. Even The Times could not 
ignore the ‗plain warning from Mr. Hughes‘.132 In Hughes, Britons had finally found an 
‗outstanding figure to command public confidence‘, proclaimed the Pall Mall Gazette. 
The paper‘s suggestion that Hughes join the Cabinet for the ‗duration of the war‘, 
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however, was a non-starter.
133
 Before Lloyd George‘s accidental coup in December 1916 
elements of Britain‘s official mind regarded the Dominions with ‗an attitude of suspicion 
and arbitrariness that might perhaps be appropriate in dealing with a private firm but is 
scarcely to be expected or tolerated by the Government of one of the Dominions of the 
Empire‘. Borden, however, was far from alone in decrying the ‗present anomalous 
constitutional organization (or lack of it) of the Empire‘.134  
While there had been earlier calls for imperial reform—specifically with respect 
to the Crown Colonies, who were subjected to neglect as ‗the ―limelight‖ is monopolised 
by the Dominions‘— the trickle had turned into a torrent by the spring of 1916.135 
Gardiner‘s two and a half columns‘ ‗character sketch‘ of Hughes was 
reprinted/summarised in at least six New Zealand papers, including the Auckland Star, 
and fifteen Australian papers, including the Sydney Morning Herald and Brisbane 
Courier. Meanwhile, the Empire Club of Canada considered the issue of how the 
‗United Kingdoms of Greater Britain‘ should organise themselves (to do away with 
‗autonomy at home and subordination abroad‘ and ensure that the ‗burdens of Empire‘ 
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are shared equally). ‗Call us to your councils‘, was the Dominions‘ common refrain.136 
Thanks to ‗the accidental and haphazard growth of this curious political organization to 
which we belong‘, explained the influential Canadian journalist, and correspondent for 
The Times since 1908, Sir John Willison, ‗we have no more voice in the making of this 
war than has the State of New York‘.137  
Britain‘s imperial mind was not blind to this problem, but (said The Guardian) 
‗the problem ... is in what way can political union be made more definite without 
undoing the growth of sentiment which is worth more than the most perfect political 
institutions. Yet there must be some definite expression of unity.‘ For Sidney Low, a 
‗well-known‘ journalist and Lecturer on Imperial and Colonial History at King‘s College 
London, the shift of responsibility for the war effort from the Cabinet to the War 
Committee represented ‗a transitional stage towards a true Empire Constitution‘. The 
writing of which could take years of negotiations and multiple Imperial Conferences, in 
the interim admitting the Dominion premiers to ‗full and definite membership‘ on the 
War Committee would give them an effective voice in military and imperial affairs.
138
 
Mr Hughes, proclaimed an editorial on Empire Day, ‗stands for the new ideals of 
Imperial organic unity‘ and says the things, others merely thought about in that ‗vague 
British way‘. Almost two years into the war, even The Times was ‗beginning to see that 
things imperial cannot just go on as they are‘.  
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Symbolically things were changing: 1916 witnessed for the first time the 
‗hoisting of the flag on public buildings‘ officially to mark Empire Day. Britons 
everywhere had succumbed to the ‗vague belief that ... [the world,] despite the much 
advertised German menace, had got past the days of universal wars‘. Too busy 
‗pour[ing] their manhood and their treasure in a manner which would have been thought 
impossible a year or two before‘, few noticed that ‗inter-Imperial relations‘ had 
undergone a transformation.
139
 Henceforth foremost was not the place of the Raj in 
Britain‘s imperial system, but deciding ‗what the constitutional relations of the self-
governing portions of the Empire are to be‘. It was time, said a correspondent, for ‗a new 
way of empire‘. Much to the surprise of ‗those who were most aware of its fundamental 
weakness‘ the existing Imperial system had survived the test of war thanks to the 
prevalence and depth of Britannic nationalism. Pursuing a theme reminiscent of 
Willison‘s speech to the Empire Club of Canada, the correspondent argued that the 
Dominions were not truly self-governing as they lacked a voice ‗in any question of the 
foreign policy of the Empire‘. Had he stayed in Scotland, Andrew Fisher, a former 
Australian Prime Minister, would have had a greater ability to influence imperial policy 
as he could heckle his local M.P. before voting. Wartime efforts to keep the Dominion 
governments apprised of developments cannot disguise the fact that the Dominions were 
never consulted during the July Crises.
140
 Perhaps, as Willison speculated months 
                                                 
139
 The Times, 24 May 1916, pp. 17, 9 and 22. Also see p. 5 and J. English, ‗Empire Day in Britain, 1904-
1958‘, The Historical Journal, il (2006), pp. 247-76. 
140
 The Times, 24 May 1916, p. 17. The only hint provided by the editorial as to the identity of the 
correspondent is that ‗his conclusions are the same as those reached by Mr. Lionel Curtis in ―The Problem 
of the Commonwealth‖.‘ Willison was a member of the Round Table, but he resisted the ‗more centralist 
prescriptions of the movement's London leader, Lionel George Curtis‘. Clippingdale, ‗Sir John Willison‘. 
 114 
 
 
earlier, European capitals might have taken greater notice of Sir Edward Grey‘s words 
had they known that he spoke for Greater Britain.  
Peace represented the next flash point. What if, as part of a compromise peace, 
for example, Britain had to return South-West Africa to Germany? It seems reasonable 
to assume that the South African Government would likely have voiced its opposition 
during the promised consultation of the Dominion premiers. But, if Britain ignored said 
opinion, the South African Government faced a difficult choice: ‗acquiesce, or it could 
declare its independence of Britain, occupy the territory, and do its best to hold it‘. Such 
were the ‗grave contingencies ... inherent in the present Imperial system‘, warned The 
Times‘ correspondent. Obviously, no one expected a solution to be found while the 
Empire remained at war, but the Dominions needed to know that ‗the people of Great 
Britain are earnestly determined to attempt a solution of the problem‘. A gesture was 
needed, something beyond ‗a mere non possumus‘.141 British public opinion was said 
increasingly to favour the Dominions‘ position. The Times took up the Round Table‘s 
call for an Imperial Conference in late November, elsewhere Massy told an audience in 
his hometown of Londonderry that ‗some of their leading British statesmen were not 
enthusiastic in promoting a closer Empire Union‘.142 Leading statesmen, however, were 
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quickly losing their ‗position of supreme responsibility‘. For his part, Lloyd George, like 
the Dominion premiers, wanted to talk war, not peace.
143
 
The change in government initially promised to bring about a greater sharing of 
information. The new Colonial Secretary, Walter Long, opted for the radical (sic) 
measure of writing a weekly private letter to the various governors general and their 
prime ministers in which he would ‗summarize the main points of interest as they arise‘. 
Lloyd George was ill, so further statements, which offered the ‗fullest recognition for 
status of Dominions‘, were delayed until the following week. As far as Anglo-Dominion 
relations were concerned a ‗new leaf‘ truly was turning over.144 In his first message to 
the Dominion premiers, Lloyd George spoke of ‗our brothers beyond the Seas‘, whose 
‗determination is no less high that ours and that however long the path to final victory 
we shall tread it side by side‘. Writing ‗on behalf of [the] Canadian people‘, Borden 
submitted that ‗our determination as resolute as when we ranged ourselves in Empire‘s 
battle lines two years ago‘. Anything less than outright victory would render ‗all our 
sacrifices ... worse than useless‘. Borden, then in western Canada working to better 
mobilise ‗resources from Atlantic to Pacific‘, pledged to ‗throw the full strength of 
Canada into the struggle‘. ‗We shall indeed tread the path side by side ...‘, he said in 
conclusion.
145
 Wilson‘s peace note was despatched the following day. ‗That conceited 
Yankee wind-bag, Mr. W.J. Bryan, who was kicked out of his Secretaryship of State by 
Woodrow Wilson on account of his pro-German sympathies, has had the unspeakable 
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impudence to telegraph to Mr. Lloyd George urging him to enter into peace 
negotiations‘, opened one indignant New Zealand newspaper. Nothing less than total 
victory over the ‗Hun hordes‘ was acceptable. The paper hoped that Lloyd Gorge would 
bin the ‗impertinent‘ telegram, while saying ‗to his secretary, ―Next business, 
please.‖‘146 Lloyd George‘s response was considerably bolder; and, unlike Wilson and 
his ‗―kiss and be friends‖ policy‘, most definitely ‗suited to the present temper of the 
Allies‘. Rather than hold an ‗ordinary Imperial Conference‘, Lloyd George invited the 
Dominion premiers (and representatives of British India) into the War Cabinet as part of 
a ‗special War Conference of the Empire‘. Punch aptly depicted the announcement with 
the figure of Britannia trumpeting from the shoreline. A cursory reading of Trove and 
Papers Past shows that the message was heard loud and clear, with the Canadian press 
hailing Lloyd George as a ‗statesman with the widest Imperial outlook‘.147 
While the existing constitution vis-à-vis the Dominions was ‗in theory ... more 
autocratic than that of the Hohenzollern Empire in Germany‘, it was nevertheless 
unanimously agreed that the ‗readjustment of the constitutional relations of the 
component parts of the Empire is too important and intricate a subject to be dealt with 
during the War‘. Besides (the majority agreed that) until ‗the days of the Huns‘ were 
brought to an end, the ‗new age‘ Lloyd George spoke of had to wait.148 Consequently, in 
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December 1916, Britannia made the decision to transform herself into ‗the foremost 
military power in the world‘.149 While Hankey was ‗amused‘ by the summoning of the 
Dominion premiers to London to ‗discuss [unknown] ―questions of great urgency‖‘, he 
was also apprehensive ‗as Bonar Law said ―When they are here, you wish to goodness 
you could get rid of them‖‘. After explaining why Germany‘s false peace overtures at 
the end of 1916 must be rejected, if the ‗arrogant spirit of the Prussian military caste‘ 
was to be broken, said Lloyd George, Britons had to plunge ever deeper into the ‗vortex 
of blood‘. Continuing he told the House of Commons that his government ‗departed, 
perhaps, from precedent‘ in three areas. In reality, the decision ‗formally‘ to consult the 
Dominions constituted a fourth departure.
150
 Lloyd George opened the first IWC—held 
to plan for the waging of total war—with an apology of sorts for why the broader 
Empire and the Dominions, in particular, were not consulted in 1914, before discussing 
‗what it is we are aiming at, what we should like to achieve, what we hope to achieve‘. 
In the days that followed, the IWC were briefed by all the relevant offices of state and 
(military) officials. Lloyd George, however, left no doubt as to what he wanted: ‗more 
men‘. The outcome of the conflict depended ‗upon the efforts which the British Empire 
is able to put forward‘ in the year(s) to come. ‗To be ready for 1918 means victory,‘ he 
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boldly predicted.
151
 The tone of Britain‘s government had at last caught up to Dominion 
sentiment. The German peace overtures referenced earlier were dismissed as an ‗insult to 
the Empire‘. Massey, in the same piece for Lloyd‘s Weekly, went even further, pledging 
to ‗carry on until Germany atones for her crimes‘. Borden, who spoke after Lloyd 
George, also stressed the need to continue fighting until the newly sown ‗spirit of the 
[military] autocracy‘ was driven from the German people. Germany must be made to 
understand that a ‗war of aggression cannot be undertaken as a profitable enterprise‘. 
Massey‘s position continued to harden, telling the IWC of his belief that the ‗people of 
the Empire are prepared to go on until the power of Germany is broken‘. Next to 
winning the war, uppermost in Massey‘s mind was the hope that the first meeting of the 
IWC meant that the Dominions would forever more be ‗properly represented in the 
councils of the Empire‘.152 The following day Long met with the overseas 
representatives at the Colonial Office, the ‗Imperial War Conference‘ was to be the 
‗corollary of the Imperial [War] Cabinet‘. Over the course of five and a half weeks, a 
whole host of topics ranging from ‗the future of the Empire to the immediate work of the 
proper conduct of the War‘ and the ‗care of soldiers‘ graves‘ were discussed at great 
length.
153
 On day two, the Secretary of State for War and his advisors were ‗good 
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enough‘ to attend, but, before discussion could begin, Borden objected to the 
terminology used in departmental memorandum, specifically the word ‗America‘: 
 
Sir Robert Borden ... I suppose ―America‖ there means the United States. I have 
always considered that Canada was in America. 
 
Mr. [Austen] Chamberlain: We are rather apt here to think you have outgrown 
America. 
 
Lord Derby: I offer on behalf of the Quartermaster-General my apologies, and 
ask that the words ―U.S.A.‖ be substituted for ―America.‖ 
 
Mr Chamberlain: The difficulty here is that the United States Ambassador calls 
himself the American Ambassador and calls the Embassy, not the Embassy of the 
United States, but the American Embassy. 
 
Sir Robert Borden: I am aware that they have assumed in their official 
communications a title which embraces both the North and South American 
Continents. But we have never adopted that designation in Canada, and I hope it 
will not be adopted here ....  
 
Mr Chamberlain: Did I understand the Secretary of State for War to say that we 
would not discuss ―War Medals‖ to-day? 
 
Lord Derby: I have had a message to say that medals would not be taken to-day 
.... 
 
Mr Massey: It is on the Order Paper .... 
 
[Derby:] If it comes up I can be over here in five minutes.
154
 
 
Neither noblesse nor holding a great office of state offered much protection from the 
representatives of Greater Britain; as will be seen, Lloyd George made good use of their 
verve. It was hoped, however, that the deliberations might (in the words of George V) 
‗lead to the closer knitting together of all parts of His Empire in their united efforts to 
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bring the present war to a victorious conclusion‘.155 Contrary to the predictions of the 
‗greatest intellects of the Empire‘, Dominion self-government had strengthened the 
imperial bond. The proof was the million men from the Dominions then under arms, a 
development that Borden thought should be ‗constantly in mind‘. Granting ‗full 
citizenship, which involves a voice in foreign relations,‘ would likely further strengthen 
imperial loyalty, particularly with George V having been the first Sovereign to visit ‗all 
parts of the Empire‘ prior to assuming the throne. The simultaneous sitting of the IWC 
and a British War Cabinet was of ‗great significance‘, said Borden in opening the 
discussion on the Empire‘s Constitution. Massy believed it to be ‗one of the most 
important events that had ever taken place in the history of the British Empire‘.156 Smuts 
had a similar reaction, though he warned that the problems, which would confront them 
in this new ‗era‘, would likely be far greater than in the previous one. Smut‘s prediction 
presumably contributed to the discord expressed by the former New Zealand Prime 
Minister. Sir Joseph Ward on the one hand recognised the importance of Borden‘s 
resolution, but worried about the effect(s) of postponing the ‗consideration of this 
question‘. Asserting that local autonomy is to be preserved would create the impression 
among the millions of ‗sensitive or nervous people‘ that their autonomy was open to 
negotiation. Westminster, even if it wanted to do so, would find that it lacked the power 
to ‗interfere with the local autonomy of South Africa, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
or any other portion of the self-governing Dominions unless they each separately so 
decide[d]‘. Foreign policy and the issue of naval defence necessitated some sort of 
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Dominion representation ‗at the heart of the Empire‘. But Ward objected to Borden‘s 
desire that the matter be settled at a future meeting as it meant everyone returned to their 
respective countries in a ‗state of generalisation‘, unable to say what said conference 
would even debate. How the ‗equality of nationhood‘ was to be brought about needed to 
be addressed at the current conference, Ward argued. Based on Dominion experience, 
the forthcoming extension of the franchise in Britain was bound to have a negative effect 
on the Empire. The House of Commons would be debating an ever widening array of 
issues, thereby lessening the chances of ‗having purely Empire matters expeditiously 
dealt with‘. After all, said an exacerbated Ward, it is ‗notorious that the machinery of the 
House of Commons has been clogged and has been inadequate for years‘. Until Britons 
came to the realisation that Westminster cannot be both a domestic and imperial body, 
said Ward, it would be impossible ‗to raise a structure for the Empire that is going to 
keep the Empire for the English, the Irish, the Scotch, and the Welsh, the South 
Africans, the Indians and for all the people of the other dependencies of the Empire‘. 
Ironically, Ward correctly anticipated that rapidly moving events would force this issue 
to the fore ‗at an earlier period than perhaps any of us imagine at the present moment‘.157  
 To mark the importance and significance of their meetings, the Conference 
addressed a request to the Palace ‗to present a humble address to His Majesty‘; which in 
part read: 
Summoned to the centre of Your Majesty‘s Empire in the midst of the greatest 
War that has ever afflicted the human race, it has been our privilege to share in 
the deliberations of Your Majesty's advisers in this country and ... have further in 
our Imperial War Conference considered the steps which may be required to 
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ensure that the fruits of victory may not be lost by unpreparedness in the time of 
peace, and so to develop the resources of the Empire that it may not be possible 
hereafter for an unscrupulous enemy to repeat his outrages upon liberty and 
civilisation.
158
 
 
Two different interpretations, however, emerged as to what had actually occurred. 
Whereas Lloyd George saw the gathering as an ‗Imperial Cabinet‘, less than a fortnight 
later, Borden, in a speech to the Empire Press Association, spoke of ‗two Cabinets‘. The 
War Cabinet directed the British war effort, while IWC had a ‗wider purpose, 
jurisdiction and personnel‘. Given the flexibility of the British Constitution neither 
vision was initially problematic.
159
 Both interpretations, however, were faulty; a point 
Lloyd George recognised in the final meeting of the IWC. ‗If there were to be a 
resurrection of the old British Cabinet system it would be obviously impossible to graft 
an Imperial Cabinet on to a Cabinet of twenty or more members‘, he reasoned. Lloyd 
George foresaw an Imperial Cabinet as ‗a delegation of the British Cabinet meeting‘ 
with the Dominion Premiers and Indian representatives, including the Secretary of State. 
A true Imperial Cabinet, however, came into existence in the final months of the war. 
Borden and the other Dominion politicians came to regret their initial agreement with 
Lloyd George‘s interpretation of future Imperial Cabinets.160  
 The overseas representatives possessed real influence, while in London. As the 
Imperial War Conference ended, Lloyd George was awarded the Freedom of the City of 
London. The summary cable of his Guildhall speech emphasised that the Prime Minister 
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believed that the ‗Council of Empire must become a reality‘. Moreover, he said, the 
Empire should be consulted before, not during, a war. However, the IWC adopted rather 
vague objectives as to ‗the policy of the Empire‘. None of these dealt with the conduct of 
the war effort.
161
  
Once the Dominion politicians left Britain, their influence evaporated. 
Consequently, with the failure of the Nivelle offensive and the collapsing Tsarist state, 
and consultation by cable being deemed ‗practically impossible‘, it was left to the British 
War Cabinet alone to sanction the Flanders Offensive, with the capture of Vimy Ridge in 
April 1917 having had no affect on the ‗strategic picture of the war‘. Between 9 April 
and 17 May, the British suffered 159,000 casualties; with a daily causality rate higher 
than during the Battle of the Somme. The major British offensive for 1917, however, 
was Passchendaele, also known as the third Battle of Ypres, which Haig had been 
planning since 1915. Two of Britain‘s five armies attacked on 31 July 1917, but quickly 
became bogged down in a ‗quagmire of mud and misery‘.162 An assault on Hill 70 
overlooking the city of Lens was designed to draw German reserves away from 
Flanders, but the ten days of fighting in August 1917 saw 8,677 Canadians killed, 
wounded or missing. But with an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 German casualties, it was, 
to quote the commander of the Canadian Royal Artillery, General E.W.B. Morrison, ‗the 
greatest Boche-killing week that anyone on the Canadian Corps has ever taken part in‘. 
The Battle of Hill 70 was to that point in the war one of the Allies‘ few successful 
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examples of attrition warfare. Such a strategy was repellent, but unavoidable on the 
Western Front.
163
 Passchendaele, however, ‗epitomizes the nadir of warfighting‘. 
‗Seemingly homicidal, chateau-dwelling generals‘, kilometres from the front, seemed 
delighted in cycling through fifty-one of the sixty British divisions in theatre. The 
Australians alone suffered a ‗crippling 38,000 casualties‘, in comparison to the 16,404 
suffered by the Canadian Corps. The 109-day campaign cost the British Empire some 
275,000 men, versus an estimated 220,000 German casualties.
164
  
Lloyd George, in particular, was shaken by the Flanders Offensive but felt 
powerless to stop the carnage as that meant forcing the generals to ‗conform to his 
strategic judgement‘. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field Marshall Sir 
William Robertson, had his own concerns about Haig‘s Flanders‘ Offensive, and, in 
turn, Haig had concerns about Robertson, but neither officer accepted that the War 
Cabinet had ‗any effective say in military affairs‘.165 Even the CIGS had to plead for 
‗some interesting information‘ to assuage the War Cabinet.166 Six weeks later, the 
newest member of the War Cabinet, Sir Edward Carson, assured Haig that ‗the War 
Cabinet would not be allowed to interfere‘ with his offensive. Meanwhile, events in 
Russia were rapidly moving Lenin‘s way.167 Opinion differs on which country least 
could afford the loss of manpower wasted in the mud fields of Flanders. In hindsight, the 
answer was clearly Germany. Contemporary perspective, however, suggested the 
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opposite. The Russian armies were disintegrating long before the Americans would enter 
the line. Moreover, in light of what was to come, Haig‘s depletion of imperial manpower 
is indefensible.
168
 As the Germans were planning their spring offensive, in response to 
the suggestion of holding another Imperial Conference sometime before mid-February 
1918, Bonar Law, now Chancellor of the Exchequer, stressed that the ‗Government fully 
realises the importance of keeping in the closest touch with ... [the Dominions] and will 
be guided by their wishes as to time of holding the next Conference‘. Parliamentary 
business meant that Borden did not sail until 27 May, while Hughes setoff for London—
via Vancouver, Seattle and Washington, where he met Wilson on 29 May and addressed 
the Anglophile Pilgrims Club of New York a few days later—the previous month. 
Hughes‘ propagandising meant that he did not arrive in Britain until after the start of the 
second Imperial War Conference. Massey travelled with Hughes‘ party on the Pacific 
crossing, and evidently parted company at some point as he attended the first session of 
the IWC.
169
 Whereas Lloyd George and the rest of the British War Cabinet were 
reluctant to address the problem(s) of the ascendancy of ‗professional advice‘, the 
Dominion premiers would be undaunted.
170
 
 ‗Since we separated last year neither our hopes nor our fears have been realised‘, 
announced Lloyd George at the outset of the second IWC. As problematic as the 
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Bolshevik Revolution had been, with only one of a promised seventeen divisions in the 
line, the ‗American Army undoubtedly is our worst disappointment‘. Aeroplanes and 
artillery were also lacking. Lloyd George could not say this publically, but the 
Dominions had the ‗right ... [to] know exactly what the position is‘. The wanton 
slaughter of Passchendaele, claimed Lloyd Gorge, was really the fault of General Petain, 
who had refused to throw the ‗whole of his strength‘ at the German lines. Had he done 
so ‗great results might have been achieved‘. As to the future, Lloyd George warned that 
the war effort was entering a ‗very critical time‘, but that the Allies could look forward 
to possessing ‗superior forces‘ in 1919. Two days earlier, the Secretary of State for War, 
Lord Milner, had warned Lloyd George to prepare ‗for France and Italy being beaten to 
their knees‘. If this came to pass, the ‗German-Austro-Turko-Bulgar bloc will be master 
of all Europe and Northern and Central Asia up to the point where Japan steps in to bar 
the way‘. Milner advised ‗knit[ting] together in the closest conceivable alliance‘ the 
‗remaining free peoples of the world‘ to confront this nightmare scenario.171 Long, not 
surprisingly, therefore stressed the need to further strengthen imperial bonds in his 
opening address to the 1918 Imperial War Conference, while also hoping that their work 
would also contribute to the ‗oiling of the great Imperial machine‘.172 Borden, for better 
or worse, stuck a spanner into that very machine.  
After summarising the ‗war activities‘ undertaken by Canada since they last met, 
with the new CIGS, General Sir Henry Wilson, having just re-entered the room, Borden 
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said that ‗in order to discharge my duty both to you and to my own people, I will be 
perfectly frank‘.173 Alarmed at Lloyd George‘s statement, and lacking advanced 
‗knowledge of military matters‘, Borden, who wanted to know the reason(s) behind the 
‗terrible disasters‘ that had befallen Imperial forces since the onset of the German 
offensive, had earlier ‗ordered‘ Currie ‗to tell me the truth so far as he understood it‘. In 
short, 16,000 Canadians were lost in taking Passchendaele for what Currie considered 
‗no result of importance‘. Worse still, improper planning led to two British battalions 
positioning themselves roughly a hundred yards from where they were supposed to be. 
When the British artillery barrage lifted, the men were ‗non-existent‘. In the confusion, 
another two British battalions mistakenly attacked adjacent Canadian troops. Currie, said 
Borden, disregarded all documents signed by the Chief Intelligence Officer, as they were 
‗more likely to mislead than to inform‘. Whereas the Canadian Corps used 375,000 
yards of barbed wire in their defences, the Portuguese used none and two British 
commanders together used a paltry 63,000 yards. Borden naturally enquired about the 
difference, which Currie said was due to the misplaced belief among ‗many‘ British 
Corps Commanders that having ‗held the Germans in 1914 without barbed wire ... they 
could hold them in the same way in 1918‘. Another British officer told Currie that when 
his men were constructing their extensive barbed-wire entanglement, his battalion were 
busy ‗preparing lawn tennis courts‘. A clearly angry Borden declared: ‗This war cannot 
be won by casual allusion to or reliance upon what was done in 1914‘. The past four 
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years had simply seen too many ‗remarkable changes in methods of warfare‘. 
Furthermore, the apparent policy of limiting promotions to no higher than Brigadier-
Generals amounted ‗to scrapping the brains of the nation in the greatest struggle of 
history‘. Had Canada adopted such a policy, Currie‘s talent and leadership would have 
been missed (to give but one example). ‗I think Sir Robert Borden was justified in 
expressing the opinion that he has expressed ...‘, said Massey at the outset of his 
remarks. Quite simply, proclaimed the New Zealand Prime Minister, ‗the Empire is in 
danger‘.  
New Zealanders also struggled to understand the setbacks of 1918; to say nothing 
of the ‗great deal of uneasiness felt ever since the Passchendaele fight‘. Massey had 
‗reliable officers and men‘ volunteering ‗horrifying [information] with regard to what 
took place at Passchendaele‘. Another man Massey had known for years said New 
Zealanders were ‗simply shot down like rabbits‘. Massey demanded accountability.174 
Borden had thought Smuts would speak in support, but he said nothing. Later that day, 
Lloyd George circulated an explanation of why the Flanders Offensive was launched. 
The next day Smuts, who was a member of both the Imperial and British War Cabinets, 
explained why Lloyd George‘s ‗policy of conserving our resources for the great effort 
which was to come in 1918‘ was abandoned. ‗In the last resort,‘ Smuts proclaimed, ‗the 
Government was bound, in regard to matters strategic, to follow the advice of its expert 
military advisers‘. Moreover, both the Canadians and New Zealanders arrived in the 
later stages of the offensive, so their comments emphasised the ‗indescribable‘ without 
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bearing ‗the whole situation in mind‘. The New Zealanders were not ‗sent to a useless 
slaughter‘, suggested Smuts. They simply ‗appeared in this offensive in its later stages 
when it had already become impossible to achieve success‘. Half a million men were 
sacrificed at Passchendaele over the course of six months when (as it turned out) the 
Royal Navy and a ‗very small force‘ were able to secure the same strategic objective—
depriving the German fleet of the use of Ostend and Zeebrugge—over the course of two 
nights. Lions were indeed led by donkeys. The meeting ended with Lloyd George 
suggesting that the discussion be continued as the Australian representatives had yet to 
arrive.
175
 In the interim, Borden was undaunted. In a memorandum written the next day 
for a colleague in Ottawa, he repeated his belief that the ‗present situation is due to lack 
of organisation, lack of system, lack of preparation, lack of foresight and incompetent 
leadership‘. Quite simply, he concluded, ‗we are being defeated by our own methods‘. 
Overall, his rebuke was well received; particularly amongst the overseas representatives, 
who ‗either openly or privately‘ expressed gratitude for Borden‘s ‗service‘.176 Lloyd 
George thought the speech was ‗memorable‘, while Lord Curzon and Long offered ‗very 
warm congratulations‘. Borden later recalled Milner whispering to him that his remarks 
would not go unanswered. But they did.
177
 Not surprisingly, Hughes also wanted to 
know: ‗Are the men that we are pouring into this machine, the men who are dying, the 
men who are suffering, are they being properly led? Is the strategy as good as it possibly 
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can be? If there have been blunders, at the eleventh hour can we repair them?‘ With all 
the overseas representatives, Lloyd George said, ‗following largely on the same lines as 
Sir Robert Borden‘, the Prime Minister suggested that the premiers and, as the 
representative of South Africa, Louis Botha, Smuts, meet to discuss the matter.
178
 
 Technically, only a sub-committee of the IWC, the Committee of Prime 
Ministers held their first meeting the following day. Nevertheless, the Secretary of State 
for War joined the CIGS in the ranks of those ‗also present‘. With the latter warning of a 
‗grave crisis on the Western Front, the CIGS proposed transferring a British and 
Australian division from Palestine to France. Concluding his memorandum, Wilson 
wrote that he ‗shall be glad to have the War Cabinet‘s approval of these proposals as 
soon as possible ....‘ At the Conference, however, the CIGS was asked to choose which 
force he preferred, ‗if only one were decided on‘. The ‗higher direction and strategy of 
the War‘ was slowly passing to Lloyd George and his overseas counterparts.179 With 
Lloyd George held up in the House of Commons, the Dominion premiers peppered 
Milner and Smuts with questions. Hughes wondered if air power could ‗produce greater 
results than the costly and exhausting offensives‘ like Flanders and were imperial 
scientists doing all they could? Hughes and Borden both enquired as to why Britain‘s 5th 
Army collapsed when the German Offensive hit. Massey wanted to know if plans to 
have Allied troops join the Japanese intervention in Siberia would weaken the Western 
Front. Next, they heard a detailed statement from Curzon on the ‗position and prospects 
                                                 
178
 IWC Shorthand notes, 20 June 1918, CAB 23/43. Borden excused himself from attending the Imperial 
War Conference to ‗devote‘ his attention on the ‗conditions at the front‘. 
179
 Secretary‘s Notes from the Conference of Prime Ministers, 21 June 1918, CAB 23/44A; Henry Wilson, 
‗Reinforcements for the British Army in France‘, 13 June 1918, CAB 24/54/GT 4837.  
 131 
 
 
of the War in the East‘. The Admiralty had already supplied its brief.180 Five days after 
ordering the transfer of the 54
th
 Division from Palestine to France, the Committee of 
Prime Ministers issued instructions to the Deputy CIGS temporarily to suspend their 
departure. The successful Italian repulse of an Austrian attack meant that reinforcements 
for the Western Front could now be withdrawn from Italy, which also had the advantage 
of being able to be transported in ten days, whereas the 54
th
 Division ‗could only be 
rapidly withdrawn when the shipping was available‘.181  
Meanwhile, the IWC resumed consideration of the post-war naval defence of the 
Empire. In response to Resolution IV of the 1917 Imperial War Conference, the 
Admiralty proposed that a lone Fleet be placed ‗under the control of an Imperial Naval 
Authority both in peace and war‘. Ministers would be responsible to their local 
Parliaments for the ‗Local Navy Boards‘, which would oversee dockyards, training 
institutions and all ‗other subjects connected with the maintenance of the Fleet in a state 
of efficiency‘. Policy/Strategy, however, would be set by a (yet to be defined) Imperial 
Naval Authority. The Admiralty ‗tentative[ly]‘ proposed modelling the new Authority 
on the Committee of Prime Ministers. Whenever possible, ‗and at least once a year,‘ the 
Dominion Ministers of the Navy would gather to consider the ‗Annual Estimates and 
deliberation on large matters of policy‘. When not assembled, they would be represented 
by the First Lord of the Admiralty, whom they would be in ‗direct communication‘ with 
‗at all times‘. It was expected that such a system would in time give way to one of 
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‗continuous representation‘, and that Dominion officers would move into ‗higher 
administrative posts‘.182 It was hoped ‗preliminary discussions‘ would occur before the 
Dominion representatives departed. When the British War Cabinet asked for ‗any 
information as to the course which the Committee of Prime Ministers was taking,‘ Lloyd 
George had nothing to offer. The Premiers were still largely ‗asking for information‘.183 
Hughes was demanding an explanation of the British government‘s policy regarding 
manpower and technology. Victory, he proclaimed, had to come at an ‗infinitely lower 
price of blood‘. While Lloyd George wondered what was behind the Australian‘s 
outburst, it was the Minister of Munitions, Winston Churchill, who understood the point 
Hughes was trying to make. ‗Why do our men go on foot and get shot down in tens of 
thousands and the [unmanned] Tanks should be handed to the Americans‘, asked 
Churchill. Imperial manpower should be channelled into the ‗highest forms of scientific 
apparatus‘, leaving infantry duties to the ‗fresh‘ Americans. Talk of fighting to the ‗last 
man‘ had to be abandoned, particularly as the conflict might persist for ‗another two 
years‘. Causalities on the ‗scale of 1916 and 1917‘ were unsustainable. ‗England has to 
live‘, Hughes proclaimed. Chamberlain appears to have abruptly ended the discussion, 
upon enquiring whether this was not the kind of issue that the Committee of Prime 
Ministers was to deal with.
184
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 At Lloyd George‘s suggestion, the premiers visited France the following week, in 
part to participate in discussions at the Supreme War Council.
185
 Before the resumption 
of meetings of the IWC, Borden, Hughes and Smuts discussed the ‗desirability of a 
change in the method of communication between the Governments of the Dominions 
and the Home Government‘. Lloyd George‘s invocation of an IWC in December 1916, 
they thought, had forever rendered passé the conduct of Anglo-Dominion relations 
through a ‗Department of the Home Government‘. Akin to the proposed Imperial Naval 
Authority, communications henceforth should be between the Dominion premiers and 
the British Prime Minister, who would, if necessary, convey information to the Imperial 
Cabinet.
186
 Leo Amery, then an M.P. and Assistant Secretary to the IWC, thought that 
there was no reason why Borden should not be able to ‗send a cable from Ottawa to 
Hankey containing your views in any matter of common Imperial interest either for the 
Prime Minister himself or for circulation to your colleagues of the IWC‘. In an enclosed 
memorandum, labelled for ‗private circulation‘, Amery made the case for appointing an 
‗Imperial Secretary of State‘. But if the ‗Imperial Cabinet system‘ were to go forward, 
Amery argued, then Borden was correct. Communication was the central crux. However, 
he also raised a second point: to be effective an Imperial Cabinet needed a means of 
measuring imperial opinion. Consequently, Imperial Conferences had to be broadened 
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into a ‗Conference of Parliaments‘. Such a system had the potential of avoiding the 
constitutional troubles associated with even the simplest form of Imperial Federation.
187
  
 Although the Imperial War Conference endorsed a change in the ‗channels of 
communication‘, and the IWC generally accepted that the ‗old machinery‘ needed 
replacing, the issue of how the Dominions would remain in communication with Lloyd 
George once the ‗Cabinet of Governments‘ disbanded quickly became moot.188 By the 
time the Committee of Prime Ministers met to discuss their ‗preliminary draft Report‘ on 
future military policy, the Last Hundred Days‘ campaign—discussed earlier—had 
begun. As Borden was about to sail for home he spoke first, and his only ‗remark of 
substance‘ concerning the ‗body of the Report‘ related to the phrase: ‗The Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff stated ... that public opinion in the Allied countries could be 
sustained by the hope of almost certain victory to be achieved, by the accumulation of 
overwhelming forces, in 1920‘. Other sections of the Report, Borden suggested, pointed 
to the Allies being at their greatest strength in July 1919.
189
 No one, least of all the 
General Staff, knew that the end was nigh; though Haig was once again claiming that 
victory was at hand.
190
 It was estimated that the arriving American divisions would by 
June 1919 simply ‗make up for the drop in French and British strength‘. German 
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divisions, it was predicted, would considerably outnumber the Allies on the Western 
Front, even ‗allowing 21 Divisions in the Eastern theatre‘.191  
It is, of course, impossible to say what would have happened if the Great War 
had persisted. One can say with certainty, however, that the unexpected end of the Great 
War rendered the Committee of Prime Ministers into an all but forgotten development 
that usurped, albeit in an ‗unconstitutional but commonsensical way‘, the British and 
Imperial War Cabinets.
192
 Lloyd George remained in communication with his Dominion 
counterparts, informing the Canadian Prime Minister (and presumably Massey, who 
departed shortly after Borden) of the Ottoman request for an armistice in late October; in 
part because he ‗sympathized with Dominion nationalism, as Churchill never did‘.193 
However, Lloyd George also needed the Dominion premiers. In his memoirs, Borden 
recalls a mid-July 1918 walk on which Lloyd George confessed to having been ‗boiling 
with impotent rage‘ for the previous eight months. ‗He explained at great length their 
constant mistakes, their failure to fulfil expectations, and the unnecessary losses which 
their lack of foresight had occasioned‘, wrote Borden. Borden enquired why had not 
those responsible been removed from their position(s) within the ‗high command‘? 
Lloyd George, of course, had tried, but he was unable to persuade the Cabinet. 
Furthermore, as was seen with Carson, ‗the high command had their affiliations and 
roots everywhere‘.194 Lloyd George later admitted that the Passchendaele Offensive 
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could have been halted if the War Cabinet ‗had the moral courage to do it‘. But they 
feared generals later insisting ‗they had been on the point of breaking through, that the 
enemy was demoralised, and at the last moment they had been stopped by civilian 
politicians‘. Both Massey and Hughes declared that had they been present, they would 
have opposed Passchendaele. It was the responsibility of the Committee of Prime 
Ministers to ‗fully examine the probabilities before sanctioning the operations‘. ‗If the 
British Empire won a victory on the field of battle, but bled to death in the process‘, 
Hughes added, they would ‗have gained the shadow but lost the substance‘.195  
The Great War effectively ended before the Committee of Prime Ministers could 
accomplish the task envisioned by Lloyd George. That new age never came; thereby 
creating the paradox that the Great War both strengthened and weakened the British 
world.
196
 Instead, as the next section demonstrates, Churchill was in a sense right. 
Institutional Britain had indeed survived, but it too would eventually shake.  
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2.2 ‗The laurels were with the new second Tory party‘: The Empire Free Trade 
crusade and the United Empire by-elections, 1929-1931 
 
In our lifetime dynasties have fallen, empires have been shaken, nations have 
emerged. But the same English politicians go on playing the same game in the 
same way. Once he has scaled the ladder at Westminster, only death or 
directorships have [the] power to dislodge a British statesman. – Novelist, 
Robert Gore-Browne, Saturday Review, 1 November 1930.  
 
Whereas the previous chapter was concerned with the views of that small cadre 
of officialdom that set the tone for discussions of imperial issues, this chapter examines 
the efforts of one man—who while powerful, was not part of the Establishment—to 
force Westminster to recognise that not only was the ‗Second Age of Union‘ over but 
that Free Trade as a political philosophy had lost its allure.
1
 Ultimately, the Empire Free 
Trade Crusade came to naught, later dismissed as ‗a trivial episode hardly worthy of 
record‘. The fact that a press baron drove the leader of the Tory party to the brink of 
resignation speaks volumes to the abortive evolution of the British Empire.
2
 For 
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thousands of years contests over imperial power have ‗inspired ambition and 
imagination and opened up and closed down political possibilities‘, thereby constantly 
altering imperial trajectories. Imperial history therefore has to take conflicts, like Empire 
Free Trade, seriously.
3
 Moreover, recent scholarship has suggested that Britain‘s 
political system throughout the 1920s was inherently unstable owing to the near total 
destruction of the linchpin of the Edwardian era, the Liberal Party. The restoration of 
quasi-Edwardian politics after 1922 simply delayed the inevitable reordering of party 
politics in Britain.
4
 The assistant secretary to the cabinet attributed the problem to the 
absence of a figure ‗comparable to Joseph Chamberlain‘, but the Conservative Party was 
also plagued by deep, ongoing internal divisions.
5
 The Tories were also the only party to 
periodically advocate the abandonment of Free Trade in favour of imperial preference 
throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century, thereby making any sort of 
‗rapprochement with other parties most difficult‘.6 In a sense, the Empire Free Trade 
Crusade was an ‗embryonic attempt to refashion some elements of the Conservative 
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Party into a new political alliance‘.7 Lord Beaverbrook, the proprietor of the Daily 
Express, had hoped his Crusade would capture ‗Socialist and Liberal votes‘.8 But in 
fighting the all important St George by-election, which was a straight-up contest 
between two conservative candidates, on the issues of ‗Irwinism‘ and ‗the leadership of 
the Conservative party‘, Beaverbrook, writing to a supporter, soon after the victory of 
the official Tory candidate, confessed that ‗the defeat is due to my own stupidity‘. 
Continuing he wrote, ‗the issue might have been the policy of Empire Free Trade and the 
cause and cure of unemployment. On that platform we can turn and win Socialist and 
Liberal votes.‘9 Whether Beaverbrook was right or not will never be definitively known; 
his Crusade was a one-off affair as a series of crises precipitated the formation less than 
a year later of a National Government, which radically altered the political landscape in 
Britain down to 1945.
10
 A.J.P. Taylor ‗implicitly‘ thinks not, but a speculative essay 
suggests that ‗the fragmentary evidence that exists at least invites an open mind on this 
issue‘.11 Measuring public opinion before the advent of the Mass Observation project is 
highly problematic. Consequently, this chapter will use newspaper coverage of by-
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election results, including the traditional five empire by-elections, Twickham, Bromley, 
South Padington, East Islington and Westminster, St George‘s, as a means of assessing 
Beaverbrook‘s appeal with non-Tories; a methodology that admittedly is not without 
flaws.
12
 However, it is necessary first to consider the intertwined factors that enabled the 
rise of the Empire Crusade.  
 One the one hand, the Empire Free Trade Crusade took place against the 
favourable backdrop of rising unemployment and the defeat the Conservative Party 
suffered in the 1929 election, which further increased doubts over Stanley Baldwin‘s 
leadership. Its significant, albeit brief, success is also attributable to the dwindling band 
of defenders of Free Trade, along with even broader changes in post-war British society. 
It was not simply a case of Cobdenite Liberals dying off. The Cobden Club itself was 
fading in importance, with Coalition Liberals resigning en masse in 1921-2 and John 
Maynard Keynes abandoning the Club that was once home to the Liberal titans of 
Victorian society in 1924. Four years later, the Club, once the standard-bearer of Free 
Trade, had ‗almost ceased to function‘.13 Keynes was not alone in questioning pre-war 
assumptions. Whereas consumers had previously associated the cheap loaf as the 
principle benefit of Free Trade, wartime shortages, over milk, in particular, led many to 
demand (in the words of a woman from Salford) ‗an equitable distribution of food‘. The 
hundreds of thousands of Britons who descended on Hyde Park less than a year after the 
Armistice wanted not free markets, but ‗democratic entitlements, fair shares, and 
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regulated, stable supplies and prices‘.14 Industrialists also worried about stable supplies; 
in August 1914, Germany effectively supplied all of Britain‘s magnetos and tungsten, 
plus three quarters of the ‗lifeblood‘ of the textile industry, dyes. The chairman of the 
Bradford Dyers‘ Association, Milton Sharp, told a Board of Trade Committee mid-way 
through the war that although a Tory, he had also been ‗an out and out unrepentant Free 
Trader‘ but, once the war was over, planned to ‗be a little child again and learn my 
lessons anew‘.15 Similarly, segments of the electorate were also re-examining Britain‘s 
classes, which led to tariffs becoming the lesser of two evils and, in the city of Leeds, 
voters abandoned Liberalism wholesale.
16
 Middle class voters, already weary of the 
possibility of higher income taxes under Labour, concluded in the midst of the Crusade 
that the working classes were ‗getting too uppish‘. ‗The inability of would-be 
employers‘, noted a long time Liberal organiser, ‗to obtain domestic servants and 
unskilled labour, while they see the statistical records of the participants in ―the dole‖ 
mounting every week, is making a formidable impression, particularly on the mind of 
the middle-class voter, and especially of the women‘.17 The Empire Free Trade Crusade 
came about only a year after women under thirty but over twenty-one received the vote. 
And, as Fleet Street‘s first press baron, Alfred Harmsworth, later Lord Northcliffe, 
wrote, in 1903, ‗every extension of the franchise, renders more powerful the newspaper 
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and less powerful the politician‘.18 ‗It was commonly believed‘, writes one media 
historian, that ‗the arrival of a mass electorate would ... open the door to demagogues 
and newspaper proprietors who could appeal to the poorly educated and excitable new 
electors‘.19 Moreover, Beaverbrook‘s Empire Free Trade Crusade took place against the 
backdrop of the Empire Marketing Board‘s motherly ‗Buy British‘ campaign and the 
safeguarding vans of the Empire Industries Association, which promoted the hundreds of 
open-air, pro-tariff meetings that were being held initially in London and later in 
Lancashire and Yorkshire, as well. In 1929-30 alone, there were a thousand rallies.
20
 
Beaverbrook launched his campaign in an even more favourable environment than that 
accorded by the preceding summary of the twilight of Free Trade thanks to the 
unforeseen consequences that followed from the Tory‘s unexpected poor performance in 
the 1929 general election.
21
  
The crisis that enveloped the Tory Party following its shocking loss in the 
aforementioned election has received little scholarly attention; particularly, in 
comparison to the numerous works on the Liberal and Labour parties from the fall of 
Herbert Asquith in 1916 to the mid-1920s.
22
 Together these two periods of crisis 
determined the nature of party politics in Britain until the emergence of Margaret 
Thatcher. And yet writing on the Conservatives‘ time in opposition between 1929 and 
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1931 remains ‗not so much one of debate as a vacuum‘.23 The present chapter seeks not 
to challenge the conclusions of Stuart Ball or Gillian Peele, who incidentally do not even 
agree on which by-election was the decisive one, but to further illuminate the Empire 
Free Trade Crusade by data mining newly accessible material, including material from 
the databases British Periodicals and Periodicals Archive Online, supplemented as 
needed by the conservative press and diaries, the very epitomisation of ‗high politics‘.24 
While Peele privileges the March 1931 Westminster, St George‘s by-election and Ball 
argues that the most critical phase in the prolonged campaign against the leadership of 
Stanley Baldwin came in September and October 1930, the high water mark of 
Beaverbrook‘s Crusade actually came in the days following the by-election at East 
Islington.
25
  
Running on a platform of ‗Safety First‘, Tories were stunned to lose the election 
on 30 May 1929, and dissatisfaction with the increasingly directionless Baldwin 
mounted. Among the many conservatives that lost their seats that night was the future 
prime minister, Harold Macmillan; who decades later wrote that he was quite rightly 
voted out as his ‗unhappy constituents did not want ―safety‖- which meant hanging 
about the streets or haunting the factories in despair. Safety meant the dole. They wanted 
work‘. On 5 June, Labour formed its second minority government, prompting 
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Beaverbrook to write (in a letter to the food and shipping magnet, Sir Edmund Vestey): 
‗In my opinion the Conservative Party will have no success in the future unless there is a 
change of leadership. Mr Baldwin is a stubborn man, and like all stubborn men, he is 
weak and vacillating and quite unable to take decisions in most maters‘.26 Neville 
Chamberlain, a generally loyal lieutenant, later likened his leader to a spinning top, 
advising that ‗you must keep whipping him or he falls over‘.27 Baldwin eventually 
drifted into the belief that what the Tories ‗were at present fighting was not a 
programme, but an atmosphere, which no amount of promulgation of counter-
programmes would affect‘. While there probably was some degree of truth in this, Lord 
Irwin, who returned to Britain in June 1929 in order to consult the government over 
constitutional changes he proposed for the Raj, thought that Baldwin found the ‗task of 
opposition ... constitutionally repugnant‘ and that ‗his temperament leads him to push it 
over far into encouraging himself to sit in the front row of the stalls while the play 
[Question Period] is being performed‘.28 A position that the newly empowered ‗blood-
and-thunder Tories‘ found increasingly intolerable.29 Nevertheless, the first inklings of 
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revolt emanated from Tory constituency associations. Ex-Cabinet ministers, by contrast, 
quickly attributed their electoral defeat to swinging pendulums, socialist propaganda, 
working class alienation arising out of the depressed state of British trade and, of course, 
the continued machinations of Lloyd George. The only minister to lose his seat, Sir 
Arthur Steel-Maitland, simply chalked up his loss to the absenteeism from one‘s 
constituency that inevitably comes with being a cabinet minister. A group prone to 
retrospection they were not; the exception being the former secretary of state for 
Dominion Affairs and the Colonies, Leo Amery, who sarcastically recorded in his diary 
that after the last Cabinet meeting everyone ‗parted very happily, voting ourselves the 
best government there has ever been, and full of genuine affection for S.B.‘ Amery 
attributed their defeat in large part to ‗Winston‘s hostility to Empire development‘, but 
kept his thoughts to himself.  
In early July 1929, as part of a half-hearted enquiry, questionnaires were 
distributed unevenly to riding associations across England and Wales to seek local 
perspectives on the electoral disaster.
30
 While party stalwarts quickly lost interest in the 
exercise, the surviving draft reports make clear the position of rank and file Tories: 
‗elections are won and lost on questions of policy, which should be definite and 
constructive‘.31 Or, for those that do not speak Tory-esse, a ‗definite and constructive‘ 
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policy was a euphemism for protectionism. Why the response from the North 
Oxfordshire association may have been a bit tardy—arriving in late September 1929—it 
was succinct. The defeat lay principally with ‗the actions of the Cabinet in riding 
roughshod over public and party opinion in the country, as expressed locally and at 
Conferences of the Party‘.32 Ties of party loyalty were not as immovable as one might 
presume (in light of the present tyranny of party in several Westminster systems).
33
 Long 
term proponents of more robust imperial policies were now emboldened. Speaking at the 
Empire Industry Association, only days after the aforementioned enquiry was initiated, 
Neville Chamberlain announced that the Tory Party was no longer bound by its pre-
election promises and called for the introduction of tariffs. The speech attracted 
‗immense interest‘ from ‗many quarters‘, Chamberlain told one of his sisters following 
‗an uncomfortable week in the House‘.34 Amery used the debate on the throne speech to 
publically lay bare the deep division within the Conservative caucus between those that 
favoured tariff reform in whatever guise and Winston Churchill, who as one of the last 
Unionist free traders, remained ‗tied down by dead dogma‘. Although the speech 
garnered ‗much applause from our people‘, Amery thought his attack on the former 
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chancellor of the exchequer aroused ‗anxiety and horror‘ amongst the Tory Front 
Bench.
35
 A considerable number of young Tories avoided the division lobbies, thereby 
allowing the minority Labour government to survive its first vote with a majority of one 
hundred and twenty. There was a widespread belief amongst backbench MPs that 
Baldwin had been ‗in Winston‘s pocket‘ for some time.36 Even as Churchill reacted ‗like 
a bear with a sore head‘, the combined effect of Amery and Chamberlain‘s speeches  
 
finally induced [Stanley Baldwin] to have a meeting to discuss policy ... [but the 
caucus] refused to consider making any new statement about policy lest the 
Liberals should take fright but on the whole they were not averse from the idea 
that we should make Empire the starting point when we did come to consider the 
future.
37
  
 
It is into this environment that Beaverbrook—believing that he could coerce Baldwin 
and the Tories into adopting imperial preference through the ‗efficacy of the weapon of 
the press‘—launched his Empire Free Trade Crusade.38  
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Writing in his Sunday Express, Beaverbrook acknowledged on 30 June 1929 that 
he too was guilty of ignoring imperial affairs during the recent election campaign before 
proclaiming that ‗the fiscal union of the Empire will only be achieved by a crusade 
carried on by those who are animated by the crusading spirit‘.39 Days later, he told 
Churchill that the forthcoming campaign would be ‗worth a lifetime of strife‘. Whatever 
his motivations were, his ‗Who is for the Empire?‘ article generated a ‗mass of 
correspondence‘. The Canadian Pacific Railway‘s European general manager hoped the 
article would prove to be ‗the first advance in a great crusade‘. The widely respected 
businessman, Sir Herbert Morgan stressed the importance of finding proper leadership, 
namely ‗a poet with the inspiration of Kipling voicing true economic principles‘. Retired 
Brig.-Gen. P.R.C. Groves, who among other titles was the Hon. Secretary General of the 
Air League of British Empire, bemoaned the neglect in the aerial integration of the 
empire but ended his letter with the declaration of ‗more power to Lord Beaverbrook‘s 
proposals‘.40 A week after asking ‗Who is For the Empire?‘, Beaverbrook next outlined, 
again in the Sunday Express, ‗A New Project For Empire‘. The political correspondent 
for the Daily Express naturally declared it ‗the greatest project that can ever be offered to 
the British people‘. In its simplest form the plan proposed free trade within the entire 
British Empire and a tariff ‗barrier will be raised against the foreigner until such time as 
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he shall plead for economic admittance into the greatest Free Trade unit the world has 
ever seen‘. To those that objected to a tax on foodstuffs from outside the Empire, the 
Empire Crusaders told Westminster:  
 
The fight is on. The minority movement is launched. If the old parties fail a new 
party must rise. If the older generation is afraid then youth must carry on the 
cause. A new vision of Empire has been created—with all its possibilities, 
spiritual and material. A new political force is knocking at the door of 
Westminster.
41
 
 
Unlike Joseph Chamberlain, whose campaign for Tariff Reform at the outset of the 
twentieth century included a tax on all foodstuffs, Beaverbrook insisted on ‗absolutely 
free trade among all the countries under the British flag‘ in response to America‘s 
‗impenetrable tariff wall ... that it can open or close the gates just as it pleases, with the 
Dominions powerless to retaliate‘. If the empire was welded into a ‗One Great Free 
Trade Unit‘, Beaverbrook argued, it would be a ‗far more powerful free trade unit‘ than 
the one that existed within America‘s borders. Having launched the ‗Imperial crusade‘, 
in conjunction with the Daily Express, Beaverbrook intended to step aside and await the 
emergence of the British Empire‘s ‗Hamiltons‘ and ‗Madisons‘.42  
At the outset of the campaign, Amery spoke with Beaverbrook and was 
convinced of his ‗sincerity and enthusiasm‘. Britons were ‗more than ready to respond‘, 
while the ‗rank and file of the Conservative Party, in Parliament and outside, were 
delighted to find someone who ... really meant action‘. Baldwin may not have 
understood what all the ‗fuss‘ was about, but the ideas underpinning the Crusade 
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appealed to a broad wing of the Conservative party. H.A. Gwynne, editor of the die-hard 
newspaper, The Morning Post, thought in hindsight that the party leadership erred in not 
pre-empting Beaverbrook during the Crusade‘s initial phase. What had been intended to 
be an intra-party movement eventually became a campaign to forge a new party that 
would draw ‗strength from Conservatives and Socialists and offering a raft to the 
Liberals who flee their sinking ship‘.43 Less than a week before Beaverbrook launched 
the Crusade, he learned that he and Viscount Rothermere, a fellow press baron and the 
brother of the late Lord Northcliffe, who by the end of the 1920s owned fourteen 
newspapers, were on the Conservative party‘s ‗list of ―Untouchables‖‘. It was a position 
Beaverbrook thought advantageous, as he had ‗seen almost every Conservative ex-
Cabinet minister. I do not believe the leader [Baldwin] has a single sincere supporter.‘ In 
reality, suggest Middlemas and Barnes, ‗it is difficult to gauge just how far 
dissatisfaction had spread.‘ Nevertheless, Rothermere believed that he and Beaverbrook 
had ‗the situation entirely in our hands‘, telling Churchill that the Rothermere Press 
views ‗two or three Conservative ex-Ministers‘ as ‗Untouchable‘. It seemed that the ‗Era 
of the Press Caesars‘ was at hand.44  
Ten days after the Crusade was launched, the Daily Express triumphantly 
proclaimed that the ‗empire issue to be fought at Twickenham‘. Speaking at York House 
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the night before, the Conservative candidate, Sir John Ferguson, told those assembled 
that ‗there comes a time in politics, as in religion, when a man must recite his creed‘. To 
‗Little Englanders‘ and those opposed to a ‗stomach tax‘, Ferguson welcomed the 
Empire Crusade and thought 
that when we have learned to regard, say Canada or New Zealand as fiscally a 
prolongation of the British Isles, when we have made up our minds that the seas, 
so far from sundering us, are links and highways that bind us together, just as 
America is bound by her railways, then the British Empire will be not only 
secure but eternal and impregnable. 
 
Ferguson went on to call for a ‗vision of statesmanship‘ that was tantamount to 
resurrecting the Navigation Acts. The Daily Express noted the ‗immense enthusiasm‘ 
that the speech generated, which was ‗a striking contrast to the lethargy which 
characterised the general election campaign‘.45 Amery wrote in his diary that same day 
that Baldwin was ‗very indignant with Ferguson‘, who had a respectable, if somewhat 
undistinguished, record of public service.
46
 Consequently, official support from the 
Conservative Central Office was withdrawn, and Baldwin refused to endorse his 
candidacy. Ferguson‘s local association remained undaunted. The chairman for some 
thirty-three years said: ‗I approve entirely of the line Sir John Ferguson has taken. We 
are all behind him and will do our utmost to secure his return.‘ Relations between 
Ferguson and the Central Office were already on ‗bad terms‘.47 But Amery attributed 
this ‗stupid blunder‘ to Baldwin‘s inability to overlook ‗his dislike of Ferguson as a rich 
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man who ousted better candidates, his conviction that Beaverbrook is out to wreck him 
and the idea that it is possible to carry on indefinitely an ostrich policy about food taxes‘. 
The ‗official excommunication‘ (as Amery termed it) alarmed the Tory backbenches, 
particularly members of the Empire Industries Association. Party heavyweights were 
hopelessly divided over how to respond to Beaverbrook‘s Empire Crusade, which from 
the outset had the potential to tear the party apart.
48
 Concluding his speech, which had 
put the Crusade at the forefront of British politics, Ferguson asked ironically: ‗Is there a 
Socialist, a Liberal, or a Conservative who will dare to say that this great project of 
Empire is not a thousand times worthwhile?‘49  
Discounting the Daily Express for the moment, coverage of the Twickenham by-
election amounted to little more than an occasional story and/or letter to the editor.
50
 One 
suspects that the various controversies surrounding Ferguson in part led to said coverage. 
There was, of course, the standard assertion that the Liberals were the party of free trade, 
with Lloyd George denouncing the ‗grotesque policy of the Conservative candidate, 
involving, as it does, the taxation of food and raw materials‘ for good measure. Another 
leading Liberal, Sir Herbert Samuel, called on readers of The Guardian to ‗vote against‘ 
Ferguson as he ‗accepts the Protectionist policy in its most extreme form‘.51 All three 
candidates ‗motored‘ across the constituency ahead of polling to attend final rallies and 
visit ‗many institutions and places of employment‘. Ferguson told a reporter that they 
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were ‗quite confident‘ but, just to be sure the late member, Joynson-Hicks, now Lord 
Brentford, wrote to Ferguson to say that ‗defeat in Twickenham is unthinkable‘ and to 
make a ‗final appeal to all my old friends and supporters to stand firm by you as for 
many years they did for me‘.52 Interestingly, Ferguson went on to say that ‗there has 
certainly been more enthusiasm throughout the constituency since I introduced the 
Empire policy. The people have awakened up to it. ―At last,‖ they say, ―we have 
something to counter the deadening effects of Safety First.‘‖ A Labour party official by 
contrast predicted an upset, on the assumption that not even a longstanding 
‗Conservative stronghold‘ would vote for ‗a tax on their food‘.53  
In the end, they did and Ferguson won, though it was ‗by the skin of their teeth‘. 
In post-war elections, Tories majorities in Twickenham never fell ‗below about 6,000‘. 
Ferguson was returned with a majority of a mere five hundred and three votes.
54
 Turnout 
was a low 49.5 percent. Many were away for the Bank Holiday, but the Chairman of the 
Tory Party noted that in the other by-election being fought in Preston the Tory vote went 
up and wrote in his draft memoirs that ‗there were about 6,000 Conservative abstentions‘ 
in Twickenham. Yet Ferguson told the press that he won because the people agreed with 
his opinion ‗that in the Empire lies our one great hope‘. Before going on to say that 
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Unemployment can be cured by the development of the Empire .... The subject I 
put before the electors of Twickenham was of such an engrossing nature that they 
had to consider it thoroughly before arriving at a decision, and because they 
addressed the matter so wholeheartedly they were brought round to a very strong 
and fixed opinion .... This constituency is very highly organised and it is a keen 
Empire trade centre. This fine result is but the start of a great popular movement 
.... It must not be allowed to be lost sight of for one moment, but must be 
continually before us all.
55 
 
The outcome empowered the rank and file members of the party, who in effect had been 
told by Baldwin and the Central Office ‗to abstain from voting‘. The Daily Express even 
boasted that ‗a man flew from Paris and back-again today in order to record his vote on 
the question of Empire‘. Beaverbrook (to quote his biographers) ‗had tasted blood, 
barely a month after he had unmasked his batteries‘. Moreover, in the process had 
disgusted influential figures within the Tory establishment, who lamented ‗the cynical 
audacity of modern journalism‘.  
After proclaiming sentiments like those in the above block quote week after 
week, Neville Chamberlain noted that ‗on the day when the result was announced not 
only did the ―Empire Crusade‖ disappear from its [Daily Express] pages but we searched 
its columns in vain for any mention of the election at all‘. Beaverbrook sailed for the 
Soviet Union a few days after the by-election and upon his return concentrated on 
building an organisation for his Crusade.
56
 It was claimed that ‗Twickenham‘s lesson‘ 
was that the ideals of the Empire Crusade could save seats that would otherwise be 
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lost.
57
 Others, however, drew different lessons. Churchill, writing to his wife from 
Quebec, worried that this by-election ‗is a forerunner of what would happen in every 
consistency if we let ourselves be lured into it‘. Liberal voters, concurred another 
observer, ‗went almost en masse to Labour‘.58 However, coverage of the campaign in the 
Daily Express, along with the liberal monthly magazines/journals, suggests that opinion 
was more fluid and complex than a simple en masse move to Labour.  
 By the spring of 1929, persistent unemployment was changing attitudes towards 
‗safeguarding‘. The executive sub-committee of the Wool Textile Trade Union voted 
fifteen to nine to support their employer‘s bid for protective tariffs against ‗foreign 
worsted and woollen goods weighting from two to eleven ounces per square yard‘. 
Yorkshire Liberal candidates reacting to this shift in policy reaffirmed their ‗unqualified 
adherence to Free Trade‘ and warned that hunger would once again plague Britain if 
protective duties were not abolished. Appeals to the ‗hungry forties‘, however, rang 
hollow in post-war Britain, where memories fixated on wartime shortages.
59
 In a letter to 
the editor, Arthur Conan Doyle drew attention to the fact that in November 1918 
‗Germany had 125 U-boats upon the stocks‘ and, in the intervening years, ‗our margin of 
home grown foodstuffs is much less‘. Britons ‗lived in a more dangerous position‘ than 
any other nation in history. Doyle thought that if explained ‗fairly‘, the British public 
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would accept a tax on non-imperial food as ‗the memory of the past might lead to 
wisdom for the future‘.60 In proposing to remove all tariffs from imported food from the 
Dominions—and colonial empire—Beaverbrook‘s Crusade was in a sense appeasement 
in its more noble sense.
61
 Patrick Hannon, a conservative MP from Birmingham, argued 
that the Dominions‘ contribution to Britain‘s prosperity ‗in the last quarter of a century 
has been incomparably greater than the contribution of all foreign countries combined‘.62 
Wartime cooperation in defeating the Central Powers, thought the chairman of Waring & 
Gillow, Lord Waring, bode well for imperial development. Still others saw the 
challenges facing Britain as too big to be ‗measured by the foot-rule of any of the 
parties‘. During his brief interlude as a Conservative, Leslie Haden-Guest, who served as 
a Labour MP from 1923-7 and 1937-50, wanted to cast ‗aside fearlessly all shackles on 
the freedom of our thought and action ....‘ The possibilities for the ‗British 
Commonwealth of Nations‘ were almost limitless, which rendered Empire Free Trade 
into a ‗political war cry‘ for a policy that did not go far enough. New wealth needed to 
be created, if unused imperial resources were to be developed.
63
  
Others were more open, provided certain conditions were met. Less than two 
weeks into the Twickenham campaign, Beaverbrook wrote in the Daily Express that the 
former Liberal Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald McKenna, was willing to support 
Empire Free Trade, including tariffs on foreign foodstuffs, if the Dominions 
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reciprocated; which that day‘s edition of the Morning Post declared would never happen. 
Lord Melchett, who amalgamated several companies into the colossal Imperial Chemical 
Industries, dismissed such doubts over Empire Free Trade. But warned that the task 
would not be an easy one as 
 
it involves, of course, an adjustment between competing industries here and in 
the other parts of the Empire, and especially in the case of industries fostered by 
tariffs. But it will be the task of those who will have the arranging of this Empire 
merger to see that neither capital nor employment suffers.  
 
In closing Beaverbrook concluded, based on the ‗innumerable communications‘ he had 
received from ‗many Liberals and from some supporters of the Labour Party, that the 
whole country is stirred by our campaign‘. Such an assessment was not entirely idle 
boasting.
64
 The tobacco magnate, Hugo Cunliffe-Owen, in a letter to the editor, 
expressed his support for Empire Free Trade as being beyond the realm of party politics 
and that supporters of the Crusade ‗are tired of the Safety First slogan in an Empire 
which has been made by adventure and daring‘. He urged Britons to embrace this 
courageous new ‗trail‘, predicting that: 
if we arrive at a system of rational tariffs between the Colonies and the mother 
country, with surtaxes on foreign imports, we shall have prosperity, employment 
for our people and employment at higher wages, which will more than pay for 
any slight and very problematical increase in the cost of foodstuffs.
65
 
 
Support from industrialists was one thing: ‗A political bombshell‘, proclaimed the Daily 
Express. Charles McCurdy, a ‗dyed-in-the-wool Liberal‘, a Privy Councillor and an ex-
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whip in Lloyd George‘s coalition government, had renounced free trade in favour of the 
‗new and wider Liberalism‘ that was Empire Free Trade. A project that if enacted would 
create, McCurdy proclaimed, ‗the greatest market, the most perfect machine for the 
creation and distribution of wealth which the world has ever known‘.66 Roughly, a year 
would pass before Britons got another chance to see the Crusade in action—the death of 
the Conservative member for Bromley precipitated another by-election, which was held 
in early September 1930—and, in the interim, developments took a baleful turn.67 
 As late as the end of October 1929, Beaverbrook still had not decided if his 
ultimate goal was ‗to wreck or to capture the Conservative party‘. Others perceived that 
his ‗dominating motive is detestation of S.B. It is difficult to see how we can have any 
accommodation with him if that be so‘. Nevertheless, a mutual friend arranged a meeting 
between Beaverbrook and Neville Chamberlain, where the later pledged that the 
Conservatives would not come out against a tariff on foodstuffs. A day later, the former 
agreed ‗to do a deal‘. Beaverbrook then published (what Amery termed) a ‗signal of 
reconciliation in the Sunday Despatch‘.68 Writing on Armistice Day, no less, Baldwin 
invited Beaverbrook to ‗come and have a private talk‘ the following day. Nothing came 
of the meeting.
69
 As the drama of high politics peaked, over the course of the 
Parliamentary recess (late July to late October) the rank and file of the party were 
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equally busy absorbing the criticisms of Baldwin and the alluring entice of the Empire 
Crusade. The back of the Conservative Party was breaking, and ‗in Beaverbrook the 
protectionist dissidents would find a leader of national stature, prepared to go the full 
distance in pursuit of their ends, whatever the political cost.‘70 Looking back on the past 
‗five somnolent and uncomprehending years‘, the influential editor of The Observer, J.L. 
Garvin, worried that, unlike Germany, Britain‘s ‗further greatness is [not] assured‘. To 
the ‗average citizen‘ the Tories would be ‗dead and forgotten‘ if not for the Empire 
Crusade, which was, he declared, ‗the only vivid, living thing that is now going on in the 
Conservative Party‘.71 
Yet that very vitality worried others, who judged ‗it will be a real business trying 
to keep these things from being run by Beaverbrook ....‘ The ‗informal sub-committee of 
the Empire Crusade‘ that centred on Melchett had planned to organise an association of 
businessmen as the Empire Economic Union, while ‗reserving the possibility of bigger 
things‘. To forestall Melchett, who ‗was not definite enough on food taxes‘, 
Beaverbrook rushed out his Empire Free Trade pamphlet in late October, thereby 
securing control over the Crusade as neither Melchett nor Amery could openly advocate 
for tariffs on foodstuffs.
72
 Appearing on the same day as the crash of the American stock 
market, the pamphlet‘s coloured cover ‗showed a helmsman at sea, bare-chested, 
gripping a wheel beneath a high curling wave .... Round the rim of the wheel ran the 
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words ―The British Empire‖, and, on the visible spokes, ―Canada‖, ―Australia‖ and ―Ind 
....‖‘ Empire Free Trade cost a penny, as its author believed that propaganda worked 
better when people paid for it. Beaverbrook also pursued his Crusade through 
constitutionally appropriate venues.
73
  
On 19 November 1929, he made a rare appearance in the House of Lords ‗to ask 
His Majesty's Government if they will do anything to encourage the movement for Free 
Trade within the Empire‘. At the outset of his speech, Beaverbrook defined what the 
Crusade‘s desire for Empire Free Trade entailed: 
 
We mean a movement which is to develop the resources, the industry and the 
commerce of all parts of the Empire to the fullest possible extent and for that 
purpose, so far as may be possible, to make of the whole British Empire one 
economic unit, to do everything in our power to break down all obstacles to Free 
Trade within the Empire, and to make the financial resources of the Empire more 
fully available for the benefit of all parts of the Empire. I suppose that in these 
proposals we shall have general agreement, but when it comes to the methods by 
which we hope to carry them out there may be considerable points of difference. 
We hope to carry them out by building up such tariffs against the foreigner as 
may be necessary to realise those ideals. 
 
As the speech that followed was ‗one of the most considered expositions that the 
Crusade manifesto ever received‘, it is worth examining it in some detail.74 
Beaverbrook began by explaining how his Crusade differed from the plan put 
forth by Joseph Chamberlain in 1904. Whereas Chamberlain wanted to erect a tariff wall 
around Britain, as the Germans and Americans had already done, Beaverbrook and his 
Crusaders called for ‗a tariff wall around the whole Empire and, of course, the building 
of that tariff wall is conditional upon reasonable response from the rest of the Empire‘. 
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The early statement proclaiming that ‗Canada joins the Great Empire Crusade‘ based on 
an editorial in the Alberta Farmer speaks to the audacious reporting that offended 
Neville Chamberlain and others; one seriously doubts that the endorsement of the 
‗greatest farming journal in Canada‘ mattered little to anyone outside the Canadian 
wheat belt.
75
 A little over two weeks after the speech in the House of Lords, the Daily 
Express published a ‗frank survey‘ of opinion from the Canadian press, which 
demonstrated that the ‗outstanding newspapers of the Dominion are lending their 
strength to create support in every province and city‘. The conservative Toronto Mail 
and Empire said that, unlike Chamberlain‘s time, the Canadian people were ‗ready for 
Empire Trade co-operation‘. But it was the Vancouver Province that put it best: 
 
They (the majority of the British Conservative journals) cannot understand that a 
man who has been for years a political jumping-jack should finally have jumped 
into something good and something that in the long run—and not a very long run 
at that—should make the British Empire the leading aggregation of traders in the 
world.
76
  
 
The degree of support varied, with the Daily Colonist of Victoria, BC being outraged 
that the ‗economic re-creation of the Empire‘ had become subject to party politics. But 
on the whole, the view that ‗critics of the Empire Crusade who have been crying out that 
Canada would never come in must look elsewhere for comfort‘ was likely accurate.77 
This change in attitude is due in part to the fact that Empire foodstuffs would enter 
Britain duty free, whereas Chamberlain had called for ‗a duty on Empire foodstuffs, 
subject to rebate‘. Beaverbrook informed their Lordships that were he still alive 
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Chamberlain would undoubtedly be a Crusader before moving on to address the viability 
of his proposal.
78
 
Utilising figures from Melchett‘s recent ‗manifesto‘, Beaverbrook told the Lords 
that the empire imported £2,200,000,000 in all, but ‗only £900,000,000 are brought in 
from one part of the Empire to another, leaving a surplus of £1,300,000,000 imported 
from foreign countries‘. To Beaverbrook‘s mind, this surplus alone justified Empire Free 
Trade. Nevertheless, to further his argument, he brought up the fact that post-war British 
exports to the Empire had risen by sixty-seven percent, while exports to foreign 
countries were only up sixteen percent. Sixty percent of Britain‘s re-exports went to the 
Empire, with a paltry five percent going to foreign destinations. Exports to Australia and 
Canada were flat or falling, yet their imports from America were steadily growing. 
American exports to Australia actually doubled between 1913 and 1927. Beaverbrook 
argued that America‘s success was: 
 
due to mass production in the United States, and that this mass production is 
founded on the American domestic market. We argue that the Empire, with a 
larger area, with a bigger population and with more buying power, offers as good 
an opportunity or a better opportunity for the same development of mass 
production and for the same reliance upon the domestic markets. But in order to 
attain this we urge that economic fusion within the Empire is completely 
essential.  
 
As compelling as these figures are Beaverbrook‘s main argument was actually rooted in 
history and aimed squarely at sceptics who claimed the Crusade‘s plan could never be 
implemented.
79
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‗We think it can be done,‘ Beaverbrook reasoned, ‗because it has been done.‘ 
Drawing on the examples of the Thirteen Colonies and Australia, Beaverbrook reminded 
their Lordships, that even these contiguous colonies took years to form a united country, 
under a common fiscal policy. It was the Zollverein that over the course of fifty years 
drew together the numerous states/duchies of varying sizes and power of the German 
Confederation into modern Germany. This was a development that was ‗perhaps more 
familiar to the people of this country than any other,‘ mused Beaverbrook. More 
worrying was that newspapers were reporting that the ‗German Empire‘ is making 
‗immense progress ... in competition with us, in the sale of manufactured goods‘.80 It 
was, however, the history of his native Canada that provided Beaverbrook with his most 
compelling answer to sceptics of Empire Free Trade. A quarter century before 
Confederation, there were six colonies—Province of Canada, formerly known as Upper 
and Lower Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island 
and British Columbia—in British North America, all with separate tariffs designed for 
protection and/or for generating revenue. In 1865, two years before Confederation, the 
voters of Beaverbrook‘s adopted province, New Brunswick, voted against confederation. 
Ultimately, on 1 July 1867, the British North America Act created the Dominion of 
Canada, with the provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and, the Province of Canada 
being split to create Ontario and Quebec. Winter tended to isolate each province, but 
British Columbia was ‗over 2,000 miles‘ from Canada and completely isolated with (as 
Beaverbrook said) ‗no communication by telegraph or telephone, as there is now. There 
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were no means of access by [inland] waterways. And yet this Union was [eventually] 
carried out.‘81 It was the promise of a trans-continental railway that led in large part to 
the province joining Canada in 1871.
82
 If a projet national could succeed under these 
circumstances, surely, with time and negotiations, it could be made to work across the 
entire British Empire, which was already integrated by ‗Our Ocean Railways‘ and would 
increasingly be bound ever tighter by new technologies.
83
  
 Having addressed the feasibility of custom unions, Beaverbrook moved on to 
‗the very next question directed against us most frequently and, as our critics think, with 
most damaging effect. That is, will the Dominions consent to it and have a fiscal union?‘ 
In addition to the support expressed by broad sections of the Canadian Press alluded to 
earlier, Beaver informed their Lordships of a statement made on 17 July in Parliament 
House, Wellington, by the Minister of Industries and Commerce, Mr. Cobbe, who 
declared that ‗the Empire of which we are part should not be a mere counter for the 
display of the manufactures of other countries ....‘ Empire Free Trade, along with 
retaliatory tariffs on foreign goods, Cobbe thought, was the only plausible solution at 
hand. The Canadian Parliament had also begun to study the issue, and with good reason. 
Under Empire Free Trade, Canadian wheat farmers would not need to worry about being 
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undersold by Argentina and other foreign competition as they would have a near 
monopoly.
84
 Particularly troubling was the creation of the American Federal Farm 
Board, which was given $500,000,000 and had a twofold mandate: 1) to subsidise 
farmers and 2) dump any surplus wheat onto the international market, i.e. Britain, for 
whatever ‗price it will bring‘. Any losses would be borne by the Federal Farm Board. 
Ultimately, Canada could see her cost advantage in the production of wheat disappear as 
the ‗American farmer, with a sure market for his wheat, will increase his acreage under 
wheat, and there will be more American wheat for export‘.85  
Australia was also held up as an example of a country that would never accept 
preference. Invoking the fact that ‗many Australians‘ viewed the issue ‗entirely from the 
economic point of view‘, Beaverbrook did the same and first suggested that seeing as 
‗Australia is very greatly in need of credit,‘ perhaps the ‗financial resources of the 
Empire‘ could eliminate this need. Beaverbrook was ‗convinced‘ that if this did not 
happen, Australia would turn to America. Britain was the largest importer of Australian 
wool, meat and wheat; consequently, Australia also had to contend with competition 
from Argentina and eventually America. Exports of manufactured goods were 
‗practically negligible‘. Almost half of all manufactured goods imported into Australia 
came from foreign sources. A fact that led Beaverbrook to conclude that Britain could 
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‗at least double her present sales‘ to Australia in select products, like motors, ‗without 
the slightest damage to the existing key industries of the Dominion of Australia‘. The 
main loser in this case would be America. In time, under Empire Free Trade, the 
Dominions could develop their manufacturing base and look forward to finding a market 
for all their exports throughout Britain‘s colonies and protectorates and all on an equal 
footing with Britain.
86
 Less than six months after Beaverbrook‘s appearance in the 
House of Lords, the leader of the Australian Country Party and ex-Federal Treasurer 
proposed that British engineering and electrical goods, not manufactured in Australia, be 
allowed into the country tax free in return for ‗preferential treatment for Australia‘s 
primary products‘. ‗Empire Free Trade is in sight‘, extolled the Daily Express. However, 
at the time of his speech, Beaverbrook freely acknowledged that the Crusade still faced 
‗very great difficulties‘ notwithstanding the success at Twickenham.87  
 The central argument against protection had always been that Britons would 
never consent to a tax on foodstuffs. Beaverbrook, however, found such statements 
unconvincing. The French had accepted tariffs on foreign foodstuffs, with French 
colonies enjoying free trade with the metropole. ‗If France could be persuaded to adopt 
food taxes,‘ Beaverbrook reasoned, ‗I do not see why England cannot be persuaded to 
take the same course.‘ After all, there were several key differences between 1929 and 
1904; in addition to the absence of tariffs on empire foodstuffs mentioned earlier.  
The biggest difference was that the British Empire was capable of feeding itself; 
except for ‗one or two negligible [and unstated] exceptions‘. Canada and Australia had 
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increased wheat production fivefold in the preceding quarter century, thereby producing 
surpluses within the Empire of ‗20,000,000 quarters of wheat, 1,000,000 quarters of 
barley, and sufficient oats for our purposes‘. Australia, to say nothing of Canada or 
Britain‘s various African possessions, had more cattle than the entire British Isles, 
including ‗Ireland, North and South‘/the Irish Republic.88 Mutton, Beaverbrook claimed, 
came entirely from imperial sources, yet ‗as much as ninety per cent‘ of imported beef 
came from Argentina. ‗Is it necessary to do that at all in order that we shall have cheap 
beef?‘, he asked. The five firms—one British/Argentine and four American—that 
controlled the trade were simply just better organised and more efficient than producers 
in Australia or New Zealand, to say nothing of the extreme fertility of the Pampas.
89
 By 
1913, Argentina‘s share of the import trade ‗amounted to fifty-eight per cent (£43m.) of 
the total entering Britain from Latin America, a figure which placed Argentina above 
any of the white-settled parts of the empire‘. It is little wonder that the country came to 
be seen as the ―Sixth Dominion‖. However, while the real Dominions proved their 
dependability during the war, Argentina, presumably under pressure from Germany, 
halted wheat exports to Britain in 1917. The following year a British meat-packing 
mogul demanded that ‗foreign trading in the food of her people must be eliminated in 
favour of [Greater] British trading‘.90 Thanks to the so-called ‗Perfect Food Process‘, 
developed by the Australian engineer, C.H. McLeay Rayson, after considerable 
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experimental and research work, air-chilled beef arrived in England as near to fresh as 
meat imported from the other side of the world could be. Beaverbrook suggested it was 
simply a matter of persuading some/all of these firms into supplying Britain with 
‗Empire beef‘. In addition to the ‗fiscal and economic advantages‘ that Beaverbrook 
suggested be used to persuade these firms, there was also a marketing advantage to be 
hand. As will be argued later the newly enfranchised housewives of Britain held in their 
shopping baskets ‗the key to the welfare of their husbands and the Empire as a whole‘.91  
Overall the climate for introducing Protection was far more favourable in the late 
1920s than it had been in ‗Old Joe‘s‘ time. Concluding his House of Lords speech, 
Beaverbrook made a last pitch for a limited form of Empire Free Trade: ‗Even if you 
exclude the Dominions, and if you exclude India and Egypt, and take only the United 
Kingdom and its non-self-governing Colonies and Dependencies, you find that we have 
an area of 3,500,000 miles against only 3,000,000 miles in the United States of 
America.‘ Whatever version was pursued, Beaverbrook (erroneously) warned, ‗this is 
the opportunity. If we reject it now, we can never expect to get another chance.‘ The 
opening sentence from the Paymaster-General warned that ‗the reply which I shall give 
to the noble Lord will not be that which he desires‘. In light of the recent election, Lord 
Arnold, told the House ‗that the mandate of His Majesty's present Government is to 
maintain Free Trade and they will do it‘.92 Over all, Beaverbrook‘s speech was met (to 
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quote the Earl Beauchamp) with a ‗chorus of criticism‘. Arnold mockingly noted that 
Beaverbrook‘s entire plan ‗is remote from reality. It does not deal with things as they are 
....‘ Pursuing the Empire Crusade through constitutionally appropriate venues and the 
Tory Party Conference was a road to nowhere. By the end of 1929, the Crusaders once 
again concluded that Baldwin was not serious about developing an imperial economic 
policy. Between December 1929 and February 1930, the Crusade slowly morphed into a 
movement outside the Conservative Party.
93
 
 In channelling Beaverbrook into the House of Lords, where his inexperience as a 
debater was exposed very quickly by the ‗old hands‘, ‗who had been logic-chopping 
over Free Trade and Tariff Reform for more than thirty years,‘ Baldwin had made a 
tactical error. Beaverbrook had many virtues, including ‗the force of a revivalist 
preacher‘ when speaking from a campaign platform, but patience was not one of them 
and he soon resumed his propagandist stance. On 4 January 1930, Beaverbrook ‗dined 
with Rothermere and his editors‘, where it was decided that the two press barons‘ 
agendas dovetailed nicely. The next day Rothermere‘s Sunday Pictorial predicted that 
Beaverbrook would soon reside in 10 Downing Street.
94
 Both men were profoundly pro-
empire, but differed over the meaning of the word. Empire for Beaverbrook principally 
meant Canada, with the other white dominions a distant second. Rothermere, like 
Churchill, had a Victorian outlook that revolved around the Raj, and thwarting 
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‗Irwinism‘.95 Although Beaverbrook was ‗indifferent‘ regarding India, and Empire Free 
Trade, he, nevertheless, did harbour strong views:  
 
There is no sense or reason in comparing the position with the Irish situation, 
which the Indians quote. In Ireland we were never free to bomb towns, wipe out 
villages, or turn machine guns on the people. In India we can, and the rebellion 
can be crushed the moment a decision is taken to do so. 
 
Rothermere was just as problematic an ally for Beaverbrook, if not more so. Not only 
was he, like Baldwin, an ‗insular protectionist‘, Rothermere (as Beaverbrook told 
Melchett) ‗never does get over his hostility to food taxes‘.96 If that was not bad enough, 
Rothermere was allegedly a Liberal. Ultimately, their common desire to dictate policy, 
and, if needed, bring about Baldwin‘s demise, united the two press barons. Their Empire 
Crusade movement was at the outset of 1930 still akin to previous pressure groups, 
including the nineteenth century Anti-Corn Law League and Rothermere‘s post-war 
Anti-Waste League.
97
 Six days after dining with Rothermere, Beaverbrook, in a letter to 
the editor of the Morning Post, fired a shot across Baldwin‘s bow: 
  
we shall oppose every Parliamentary candidate, no matter of what party, who 
does not adopt and further the policy of Empire Free Trade as defined by the 
Provisional Committee of the Empire Crusade. We have one object ... and in the 
pursuit of that we shall not allow ourselves to be affected by existing party labels 
or divisions.
98
 
 
A few days later, Baldwin asked the novelist, later Governor General of Canada, John 
Buchan what he made of the press barons‘ diversions and was told that while 
Beaverbrook ‗has no admiration for the other fatted calf. I fancy it is Lord B‘s restless 
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ambition temporarily combined with Lord R‘s detestation of you.‘ Beaverbrook finally 
agreed on 15 January to undertake a joint appeal and action with the Rothermere 
newspapers.
99
  
 The last two weeks of January saw the Daily Express continue on as if nothing 
fundamentally had changed. Letters of support and political gossip continued to appear 
on the front page. Interestingly, the day after it was reported that the president of the 
National Union of Manufactures, George Terrell, would be contesting the anticipated by-
election in Nottingham, Central as a Conservative Empire Free Trader, the Conservative 
Central Office issued a statement denying that the sitting MP intended to resign ahead of 
‗an extended absence abroad‘. Terrell was quoted as saying ‗that an election was 
pending has never been denied until now‘. It was indeed quite the ‗political surprise‘, 
and for once the Daily Express‘ headline was not an exaggeration.100 It would seem that 
Beaverbrook‘s Crusade was making party officials uncomfortable, at the very least. 
Churchill thought Baldwin is ‗absolutely hopeless‘ and complained that ‗no instructions 
have been given to the provincial candidates and agents as to the line that decent 
Conservatives should adopt‘. He feared ‗that this Empire free trade is going to split the 
Conservative and possibly the Liberal Parties‘. Beaverbrook‘s propaganda was definitely 
having an ‗effect on the country‘.101 ‗Oxford is no longer the home of lost causes‘, was 
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the Daily Express‘ reaction to the founding of an undergraduate Empire Free Trade 
Club.
102
  
With Neville Chamberlain touring East Africa, others were left the task of trying 
to reconcile Baldwin and Beaverbrook, who was still leery of a complete rupture with 
his party‘s leaders.103 At the end of January 1930, Buchan, who had been trying to 
persuade Baldwin on the benefits of ‗closer and franker co-ordination‘ between the 
Conservative Research Department and Beaverbrook, wrote the latter:  
 
All we Conservative Members have been talking loosely for years about the 
necessity of treating the Empire as an economic unit, and it is high time that we 
got down to brass tacks. You have done a very great service in forcing this on, 
and I need not tell you how much I admire your courage and devotion.
104
  
 
Ultimately, when the two men met on 12 February, Baldwin flatly rejected any notion of 
a compromise, and called Beaverbrook‘s bluff. He would later write that ‗I am fighting 
with beasts at Ephesus and I hope to see their teeth drawn and their claws broken before 
the battle is over!‘ ‗Baldwin,‘ Taylor concluded, ‗not Beaverbrook, was the good 
hater‘.105 
 ‗The rest of the Press largely ignored or pooh-poohed it‘ is Amery‘s description 
of the reaction to the announcement on 18 February that the Empire Crusade had 
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become the United Empire party.
106
 But it did not matter. Lord Rothermere had accepted 
the necessity of food taxes, and the next day the Daily Express announced that the 
United Empire party had the support of Britain‘s largest newspaper. The Daily Mail‘s 
front page contained stories about the new party for ten straight days. ‗With their 
combined total of eight national papers, and Rothermere‘s chain of provincial papers,‘ 
argues Chisholm and Davie ‗the press barons were laying down a joint barrage scarcely 
paralleled in newspaper history.‘ Beaverbrook‘s strategy was that Baldwin would have 
to yield or forgo any chance of winning a majority in the next election. On 26 February, 
the Daily Express served notice that Conservative MPs had a choice to make; they could 
either embrace Empire Free Trade and win—if they wished—the support of the press 
barons or be opposed by a United Empire candidate. This was far from an idle threat. 
Two days after the new party had been announced Beaverbrook established a £100,000 
‗fighting fund of the United Empire Party‘ and pledged that all contributions would be 
acknowledged in the Daily Express.
107
 Dismissed by Baldwin as not only unhelpful but 
‗very dishonest‘, the new party enrolled 173,000 members during the first two weeks 
and received over 100,000 subscriptions. Some supporters wanted to go even further: 
  Sir,—why only £100,000 fighting fund? Why only contest fifty seats? 
  Do you not realise that the whole country is solidly behind you? 
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  Copy Lord Kitchener and call it ‗The First Hundred Thousand,‘ remembering 
that that developed into millions and won the war. This will develop into millions 
and win the Peace. 
  Let us leave timidity to Mr. Baldwin. Let us contest every seat in the country. 
   It will be the biggest political turnover in history.  
   Down with timidity. Up with the Crusade. 
   I enclose £2.—Yours, 
  J.B. Kingdon, Lt-Cdr. 
 RN. (retired). 
  Endsielgh-Gardens, W.C.1
108
 
 
Exciting rank and file Tories was one thing. But for the laurels to be truly with the new 
Tory party, Beaverbrook needed to persuade Liberal voters, in particular, to see the 
United Empire Party as a ‗raft‘ and ‗flee their sinking ship‘.109 Amery wrote in his 
memoirs that in the ‗autumn of 1929 ... the public [was] more than ready to respond‘. 
Perhaps because Beaverbrook‘s Empire Free Trade, like Lloyd George‘s recent election 
platform and Sir Oswald Mosley‘s Birmingham Proposals, was a plan for prosperity, 
but, unlike its competitors, Empire Free Trade looked beyond Britain and called for the 
‗deliberate sharing out of imperial markets and resources‘.110  
Traditionally, it is The Times that is credited with being able to influence policy, 
but amongst Liberals the ‗Observer‘s influence was undoubtedly great‘. The Guardian 
did adopt a more independent position after the War, but it remained the ‗liberal quality 
paper‘ and consequently was ‗deeply opposed to what it deemed the ruthless exploitation 
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involved in colonies and the Imperial idea‘.111 Years later, when asked by the historian 
Robert Blake, why he chose the phrase Empire Free Trade, Beaverbrook answered ‗that 
the British public was addicted to free trade and fond of the Empire, they would only 
swallow protection if suitably disguised‘. He also thought his phrasing ‗could be 
reconciled with Cobdenism‘, which would explain his interest in capturing Liberal 
voters for his new movement/party.
112
 After the war, some Liberals, including Alfred 
Eckhard Zimmern, saw the Third British Empire as a more liberal, non-racialised 
organisation built on genuine cooperation. Self-determination, however, was still the 
exclusive domain of the ‗white ―adult‖ nations‘; as will be seen in Part II, the policies 
pursued in Ceylon and India were ahead of their time.
113
 By the spring of 1930, having 
come to the conclusion that an economic slump of historical proportion had taken hold, 
Britons of all political stripes became increasingly open to new ideas as the number of 
unemployed continued to rise.
114
 
Instead of taking the lead and committing to something ‗definite‘, Baldwin, 
believing the party rank and file thought as he did, wanted to respond to the formation of 
the United Empire Party by arranging ‗a suitable by-election which should expose the 
real weakness of the ―Press Lords‘‖. He was only dissuaded from launching this ‗frontal 
attack‘ by the party chairman, J.C.C. Davidson, who warned that ‗by threatening to fight 
four by-elections at a time when the enemy‘s attack is at its zenith, would be disastrous 
to the Party, and might break it up altogether. This is not my view alone, but is shared by 
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my officials.‘115 Baldwin was advised two days later by the former Unionist MP, 
Viscount Elibank, and committee member of the Empire Crusade, to keep Beaverbrook 
‗in his Councils until after the General Election‘, the timing of which could not be 
anticipated as the 1929 poll had produced a hung Parliament. He was also told that any 
attempt to unite the two sides should be sooner rather than latter as ‗Lord Rothermere 
was getting out of hand with his Press‘.116 Ultimately, Baldwin accepted Beaverbrook‘s 
suggestion that a referendum be held after the next general election, thereby allowing 
voters to consider the issue of food taxes in conjugation with whatever agreement(s) 
emerged from an Imperial Conference. The day after Beaverbrook publically endorsed 
the compromise announced at the National Union Central Council on 3 March, Baldwin 
thanked him for having ‗played the game‘.117  
The 6 May West Fulham by-election is noteworthy as it split the Liberal vote.
118
 
However, the lukewarm endorsement of Empire Free Trade by the Liberal candidate 
from the last general election, who The Times quoted as urging his supporters to ‗vote 
for Cobb‘, could not bring about the decisive result Beaverbrook called for. Voter 
turnout was, of course, lower. Nevertheless, Cobb polled higher in 1930 than he had the 
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year before, unfortunately for the Crusade the electorate had divided almost fifty-fifty.
119
 
Beaverbrook, who was playing the role of a generally loyal party stalwart, had yet to 
realise that he was being played. ‗I was anxious to detach Beaverbrook from the United 
Empire Party and was willing to lead him on a bit‘, wrote the party chairman in his draft 
memoirs.
120
 Beaverbrook and the Tory party drew radical different conclusions on the 
meaning of Cobb‘s victory. The narrow margin of victory alarmed the party leadership. 
But for Beaverbrook the results were encouraging given the large number of socialists 
that he encountered while campaigning. The West Fulham by-election demonstrated that 
the Crusade could attract Liberal support and co-exist with the ‗Baldwinites‘. 
Maintaining this ‗alliance‘ almost immediately proved difficult.121  
Acting alone, and presumably unaware of the grievous ‗nature of his crime‘, 
Lord Salisbury denounced Empire Free Trade in a letter to The Times. The task of 
keeping ‗Max from going off the deep end‘ fell to Neville Chamberlain.122 More 
explosive still would be the reaction on the Tory backbenches, which forced Salisbury to 
write two additional letters to The Times in an attempt to clarify his thoughts.
123
 A week 
after Baldwin announced his commitment to a referendum on food taxes, the chairman 
of the Empires Industries Association, Page Croft, called on Beaverbrook ‗for the sake 
of the cause to co-operate with the Conservative Party‘, declaring that ‗of all crimes 
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fratricide is the worst‘. He argued that his Association constituted the ‗most effective 
spearhead for achieving the objects you desire and for keeping the front bench up to the 
mark‘.124 It is true that Beaverbrook was ‗supremely anxious for a coalition with the 
Conservatives‘, but he also felt somewhat betrayed by Baldwin. ‗I see by the Sunday 
Times that Mr Baldwin has done me in the eye‘, Beaverbrook told Davidson. As part of 
their agreement, both men had agreed that neither should be portrayed as having ‗sold 
the pass‘.125 Writing triumphantly to a friend, Davidson bragged that Beaverbrook and 
Rothermere were ‗greatly pained and rattled‘ by the criticisms they suffered in the 
‗columns of the independent press from Aberdeen to Cardiff and from Glasgow to Fleet 
Street‘. He went on to say that he had anticipated Beaverbrook‘s surrender for a full 
fortnight before it occurred, and that ‗we won by patience and maintaining against all 
comers an outward appearance of complete confidence‘. The result he (erroneously) 
concluded was that everything was settled and that ‗Beaverbrook has definitely broken 
politically with Rothermere‘.126 Amery‘s view that Baldwin was not ‗forthcoming 
enough for these very sensitive press magnates‘ proved to be too smug as Baldwin‘s 
handling of the by-election in Nottingham Central seemed to confirm that Beaverbrook 
‗had [in fact] surrendered everything for nothing‘.127 
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The Member for Nottingham Central, Sir Albert Bennett, wanted to be freed 
from his duties as an MP to focus on business interests and the local association selected 
the ex-member for Luton, T.J. O‘Connor, as the official Conservative standard-bearer. It 
was expected that ‗the question of safeguarding duties ... [for] the lace and hosiery trades 
... will play a prominent part‘ in the campaign.128 In a message to constituents, 
republished in The Times, O‘Connor declared that he had ‗no intention of being 
stampeded into rash or ill-considered action by the syndicated Press ....‘ In reality, he, 
like everyone else, was waiting for Baldwin to set party policy.
129
 O‘Connor‘s 
unconditional acceptance of (what Beaverbrook termed) Baldwin‘s ‗two jumps instead 
of one‘ approach to adopting protectionism was sufficient enough to allow the United 
Empire Party‘s candidate to refrain from contesting the seat, thereby ensuring Labour‘s 
defeat.
130
 O‘Connor was endorsed at the last minute by the Empire Crusade, but 
Beaverbrook saw the literature emanating out of the Central Office as proof that the 
Conservative Party saw ‗the Referendum not as a spear with which to fight for Empire 
free trade, but as a shield behind which to shelter itself‘.131 Publically Beaverbrook 
blamed those around Baldwin, but in private he had earlier told those very same people 
that Baldwin‘s decision to issue a letter of support to O‘Connor, who had disparaged 
food taxes, in what Chamberlain termed ‗a very foolish speech‘, was seen by the ‗public‘ 
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as evidence that he had been ‗swindled‘.132 The reality was that Beaverbrook had by the 
end of the Nottingham Central campaign ‗lost his confidence in S.B.‘ A sentiment 
increasingly shared by Chamberlain, who, like Beaverbrook, wanted to introduce food 
taxes right away, but hesitated ‗to throw the leadership into the melting pot‘.133 The Tory 
party remained in a ‗very disgruntled condition‘, with the ‗malcontents‘ still unsatisfied 
even after Neville Chamberlain replaced Davidson as party chairman. Beaverbrook 
believed he was wining, but the truth, Taylor writes, is that ‗Baldwin had taken 
Chamberlain prisoner‘.134 The perceptive editorial cartoonist, David Low, who had 
‗complete freedom‘ during his tenure at the Evening Standard, saw things differently.135 
Conservatives eventually would have to confront the contradiction(s) imposed by the 
fact that ‗opinion has moved so fast in our Party that a speech which would have been 
rapturously welcomed a year ago is now felt to be inadequate‘.136  
In mid-June, the Conservative Association in North Norfolk decided that they 
fight the forthcoming by-election, which was necessitated by the elevation of the sitting 
MP, Edward Noel-Buxton, to the peerage, on a platform of ‗Empire Free Trade, with 
duties on foreign foods—and no referendum‘. The vast majority of those assembled in 
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the town of Holt were tired of ‗half measures‘. Such was the appeal of Empire Free 
Trade that motorists and their wives poured into the square where the Association was 
meeting and their cars caused a ‗complete block in the old-world streets‘. After pledging 
loyalty to Baldwin and official party policy, the Association ‗unanimously pledged the 
candidate, Mr. Cook, to support to the full the policy of Empire Free Trade, ―to accept it 
and all it implies.‖‘ In a related story, the Daily Express reprinted Beaverbrook‘s letter to 
the Daily Mail from the day before announcing that it had become ‗abundantly obvious 
to Empire Crusaders that they have little assistance to expect from members of the 
Conservative Front Bench‘. The truce with Baldwin was dissolved, and the appeal for 
funds issued once more. In conclusion, Beaverbrook pledged that candidates like Cook 
could expect no interference from the Crusade.
137
 Finally, Beaverbrook had come to 
recognise what others in the Tariff Reform movement had long known. ‗The tariff 
Referendum has never been anything more respectable than the dodge of a hard-pressed 
politician to avert a party rupture‘, wrote journalist and tireless tariff reformer, Richard 
Jebb. Implementing Empire Free Trade meant destroying Baldwin, and, possibly, the 
Conservative Party itself.
138
 While Rothermere would not have hesitated, Beaverbrook, 
thought the former Secretary of State for War, Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, ‗was on 
a different footing‘ and consequently tried one last semi-independent approach.139 
 Moving away from his slogan of Empire Free Trade, Beaverbrook told the 
people of North Norfolk that he wanted to surround the Empire with a ‗Garden Wall‘. 
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He added, to much confusion, that ‗there will be within it some smaller walls dividing 
one portion of the garden from another‘. Beaverbrook‘s audiences included members 
from all parties, but The Times was perplexed by this new explanation.
140
 The goal was 
to aid industry across the Empire—thereby building upon the work of the Empire 
Marketing Board—and this could only be done through negotiation at an imperial 
conference. In the final rallies, Beaverbrook extolled the benefits of Empire Free Trade 
to the unemployed, farmers, agricultural workers and Liberals. A letter of support even 
from Baldwin was read out.
141
 Every time Beaverbrook spoke from a platform, a box 
would buzz every minute, and he would announce that Britain ‗has just spent another 
thousand pounds on imported food‘. During the course of the campaign, fifteen 
influential bankers and businessman abandoned Free Trade in favour of Beaverbrook‘s 
agenda.
142
 Little wonder that Conservative spirits were running high on the eve of 
polling. But it was not to be. Cook lost by 179 votes, much to the delight of Churchill.
143
 
The larger turnout the Tories had hoped for never materialised; in fact, numerous local 
Tories, like Hoare, abstained. Labour supporters, who had predicted a majority 
somewhere in the range of 1,500 to 2,000, were equally disappointed. An electorate 
which (according to Taylor) was ‗mostly Radical agricultural labourers‘ had returned, 
the local Labour notable, Lady Noel-Buxton, with the smallest majority of the entire 
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interwar era.
144
 Her claim that the election‘s outcome demonstrated that Britons would 
not be deceived by ‗Empire protection masquerading as a free trade policy‘ rings 
somewhat hollow as Cook won the seat in 1931, with a majority of almost seven 
thousand votes. As he said in 1930, ‗the process of unseating a Socialist candidate was a 
slow one‘. Regardless, having ‗lost the trick‘, Beaverbrook was eager to ‗get on with the 
game‘.145 It was becoming apparent that public opinion was shifting as unemployment 
rose ever higher, but (according to Amery) Baldwin remained ‗very convinced that 
Beaverbrook cuts no ice in the north and that any policy of taxing food would not go 
down there‘.146 A few weeks ahead of the North Norfolk by-election, voters in Glasgow, 
Shettleston had elected a replacement for their late member, and on the eve of polling 
the outcome was far from certain.
147
 W.P. Templeton had campaigned as a supporter of 
both Baldwin and the Crusade, but lost by 396 votes; in comparison, the previous 
Conservative candidate lost the last general election by 6,724 votes. Nevertheless, he 
claimed a ‗moral victory‘ for the greatly reduced majority, which was mainly the result 
of Labour voters, in particular, staying home.
148
 Beaverbrook was undoubtedly delighted 
to read in The Times that a leading Scottish liberal, Francis Norie Miller, had advised 
‗Liberal voters in Shettleston to support the Conservative candidate. He states that 
lifelong Liberals and free-traders are not only justified, but as patriots it is their duty, to 
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vote for the Conservative candidate, who is a supporter of Empire Free Trade‘. 
Meanwhile, the ex-suffragette and cofounder of the Women‘s Guild of Empire, Flora 
Drummond was working to get the ‗flapper vote‘ in Shettleston to understand the 
wisdom of safeguarding, without endorsing any particular candidate.
149
 It would seem 
that Baldwin was proven somewhat wrong about Scotland and the Crusade, but 
Beaverbrook and Central Office blamed one another when the ‗sitter‘ in North Norfolk 
was lost. The Party establishment were surprised at how little damage talk of food taxes 
actually entailed. On the larger issue of whether there would be ‗peace or war‘, 
Chamberlain would be disappointed as the ‗Beaver‘ had finally opted for war.150  
 As Chamberlain was writing to his sister, Beaverbrook told Amery of his desire 
to contest ‗a seat against a Conservative Office candidate‘. Although the last two by-
elections saw his candidates defeated, the closeness of the races offered reason to hope, 
and Beaverbrook wanted to see if the Crusaders were ‗stronger than the Conservatives‘ 
and, if so, could a ‗Conservative Empire Free Trade candidate‘ win in an industrial 
constituency? Chamberlain‘s attempt—via an intermediary—to negotiate a settlement 
broke down, as another by-election had to be held to replace the late member for 
Bromley.
151
 Beaverbrook and Rothermere viewed Baldwin‘s approach to safeguarding 
with contempt, during one debate he even professed that it is (in the words of Robert 
Louis Stevenson) ‗a far better thing to travel hopefully than to arrive‘.152 Meanwhile, the 
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Daily Express carried an appeal by Beaverbrook for donations to defeat ‗Cobdenism‘ 
once and for all. ‗In 1845 Cobden raised a fund of a quarter of a million [and] in 1846 he 
won‘, the paper reasoned. One supporter from Leeds was so ‗disgusted‘ by Baldwin‘s 
‗―Red Herring‖ Referendum‘ that he doubled his pledge to the Crusade as ‗failure means 
the end of the Empire and my self-respect as an Englishman‘.153 An opinion also held by 
the ex-middling-proconsul, Lord Lloyd, who told an audience in Portsmouth that Britons 
‗deserve[d] to perish‘ if they maintained their ‗silly trade policy‘.154 Baldwin‘s future as 
party leader had become an open topic of conversation.
155
 The by-election campaign in 
Bromley thought The Times was being ‗conducted in peculiar circumstances‘. Thanks to 
an outdated register, it was estimated that at least 25,000 residents were disenfranchised 
and almost 14,000 people who had moved out of the constituency could still vote; how 
many would turn up, however, was uncertain.
156
 The Conservative candidate sought to 
don the ‗amour of the Crusader‘, while simultaneously flying Baldwin‘s standard. 
Bromley, the Daily Express lamented, represented 
 
the spectacle of what is going on in more than half the constituencies of the 
country .... How much longer can the Conservative Party keep its self-respect—
to say nothing of the respect of the nation—when the constituencies are forcing 
their candidates to swear allegiance to an ideal and at the same moment the 
Central Office is forcing them to forswear it? 
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‗Bromley‘s dilemma‘ only got worse. Neville Chamberlain suggested that Rothermere 
and those around him viewed the crises threatening to consume the Tories as a means of 
driving newspaper sales and, unlike Beaverbrook, cared about ‗fun‘, not Empire Free 
Trade.
157
 Beaverbrook had previously suggested, presumably after conferring with 
Rothermere, that the best course of action was to adopt Rothermere‘s son, Esmond 
Harmsworth, as the candidate for Bromley. Chamberlain refused to ‗split my party‘ and 
worried that he ‗might have to go down fighting for S.B.‘ when his closest ally was in 
fact Beaverbrook. In the end, Rothermere decided to field a United Empire Candidate in 
Bromley, much to Beaverbrook‘s dismay.158 Although the United Empire Party did not 
‗excite the same enthusiasm as Max‘s ―Crusade‖‘, and the Daily Express sheepishly 
tried to distance Beaverbrook and the Crusade from Bromley, the Party placed an 
impressive third, with almost twenty-five percent of the vote. A ‗confidential report‘ 
concluded that the result was a consequence of a ‗general dissatisfaction with the 
leadership and this is only the echo of a refrain that reaches me from every quarter with a 
dreary monotony‘, lamented Chamberlain. The election took placed in (as The Times put 
it) ‗peculiar circumstances‘, but the party chairman had good reason to be gloomy.159  
The Conservatives‘ share of the vote declined almost fifty percent, polling a mere 
12,782 in a constituency with over seventy-three thousand voters. Tory dissidents made 
up the bulk of the almost ten thousand people that supported the United Empire Party‘s 
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candidate. The official Conservative candidate still won Bromley, but saw his majority 
fall to a mere 1,606 votes compared to over seven thousand in the two previous 
elections. Both the Labour and Liberal candidates polled lower than they had in the 1929 
general election. The combined support of the Tory and United Empire Party was almost 
ten percent higher than the Conservative‘s showing in the 1929 general election. Was 
this result a consequence of the greatly reduced voter turnout? This is doubtful, as a 
‗large proportion‘ of the disenfranchised were servants, who are ‗always regarded by 
Conservative organisers as a shade more blue than her mistress‘.160 More likely is that 
there was some movement of Labour and maybe even Liberal supporters to the United 
Empire candidate. Less than three weeks after the by-election the number of unemployed 
Britons rose by ‗nearly 80,000‘ during a period ‗when trade is usually improving‘. The 
right wing, pro-empire Saturday Review predicted that if United Empire and the 
Crusaders joined forces ‗they would make probably make Mr. Baldwin‘s position 
impossible‘.161 Others characterised the outcome as ‗a plague on all your parties‘ and 
dismissed the chances of the revolt attaining ‗serious proportions‘ due to the ‗amateurish 
methods of the United Empire Party‘. Ahead of polling, the Guardian boldly declared 
that if United Empire fails in Bromley, it would find the rest of England as ‗cold as 
ice‘.162 Newspapers may speak of the ‗lessons of Bromley‘, but in reality the situation 
was too chaotic. During the campaign The Times of India joked that the ‗confusion of 
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the electorate would be complete‘ if only a ‗Communist and an Independent candidate‘ 
entered the fray. Commenting on the results, Lloyd George said that ‗the most startling 
feature of the result is the depth of the revolt in the Tory party against its leadership‘.163 
It would be less than a month before The Times was reporting that Baldwin had no 
intention of resigning. Nevertheless, it could have been even worse. Beaverbrook had 
‗repudiated [the United Empire candidate in Bromley] on grounds both personal and 
political‘ and consequently kept a relatively low profile, which led one commentator to 
complain ‗that these leviathans of the Press move incalculably ....‘164  
All of that was about to change as yet another by-election had to be held 
following the death of the MP for South Paddington in a ‗yachting disaster off the 
Cornish coast‘ on 20 August. The likely Conservative candidate was the three-time 
mayor of Paddington, Sir Herbert Lidiard, who rebuffed initial efforts by the United 
Empire Party for him ‗to go into Parliament with my hands tied‘. The United Empire 
Party and its eventual candidate Mrs. A.N. Stewart-Richardson began canvassing in mid-
September. Lidiard, however, would not be able to fend off the Crusaders as easily. 
They had captured the riding association.
165
 After hearing the report on his interview 
with their deputation, the Crusaders ‗deplorts (sic) the negative attitude of Sir Herbert 
Lidiard ...[and resolved] to consider the adoption of another candidate who will be a 
whole-hearted and unequivocal supporter of Empire ―Free Trade.‘‖ Lidiard faced his 
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Waterloo, Empire Free Trade or Baldwin? Choosing the latter meant facing Vice-
Admiral Taylor as the Crusader‘s standard bearer. ‗Party Candidate Surrenders. Will 
Disobey Whips for Empire Free Trade‘, screamed the headline in the following day‘s 
Daily Express. If elected, Lidiard would enter Parliament ‗pledged against Mr. Baldwin, 
pledged against the Central Office and standing ... as a complete Empire Free Trader 
pledged to vote for duties on foreign foodstuffs, in defiance, if necessary, of his 
leaders‘.166 Chamberlain, as chairman of the party, found this intolerable and threatened 
to withhold support from the Central Office during the campaign, a decision that created 
quite the kerfuffle.
167
 A stinging editorial in The Times—entitled ‗The More the 
Merrier‘—ended by concluding that not only did Lidiard not know ‗his own mind‘, but 
also that ‗South Paddington has today no [loyal] Conservative candidate. Why should it 
not find one, and have an election at once instructive and amusing!‘ As one MP said of 
this call for Crusaders to be ‗excommunicated‘, ‗such dictatorial instructions would 
mean the complete severance of many stout-hearted Conservatives from the party‘. 
Another letter asked would not the Central Office be right to disown a candidate if, to 
take an ‗extreme‘ instance, a local association asked for a pledge to work for the 
‗abolition of the Monarchy‘?168 ‗Lidiard has been quietly transferred to my court and I 
have seen & approved his election address which ends by promising to support the 
Conservative Party loyally in the House‘, Chamberlain told his sister. The outcome was 
inevitable. Beaverbrook at last had the contest he wanted, and it could not have come at 
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a worse time for Baldwin. Unlike the 1922 revolt that ended Lloyd George‘s Coalition 
government, in which dissent was confined primarily to England‘s southern counties, by 
the end of September, local associations across Britain were ‗within a hair‘s breadth of 
breaking out in open revolt‘.169  
It is against this backdrop that the ‗South Paddington Crusaders Declare[ed] 
War‘. ‗Prominent residents in the constituency‘ addressed a letter to Taylor in a bid to 
have him contest the by-election as an Empire Crusader. Supporters were sick of ‗Mr 
Baldwin‘s Socialism‘, i.e. his support of Labour‘s quota system for wheat and the 
inevitable ‗army of inspectors‘ that would be needed to once again bring trading under 
‗Government control‘. Lidiard‘s behaviour, Beaverbrook told his editor, via a front page 
letter, must be denounced by all ‗right minded citizens‘. If pledges made at nomination 
meetings are permitted to become meaningless, ‗then elections become a sham and the 
representation of the people in the House of Commons no better than a farce‘. 
Rothermere had previously made a similar appeal. Beaverbrook, ever the skilful 
propagandist, highlighted that he had repeatedly subordinated his interests for the ‗good 
of the party‘. In this instance, however, he promised that no quarter should or would be 
given.
170
 A leading Tory believed that the ‗real fight‘ was with the Socialists, but to 
Beaverbrook the choice facing electors in South Paddington was clear, a ‗conservative 
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imperialist v. Conservative wobbler‘.171 At the nomination meeting, someone asked 
Beaverbrook what he thought of the fact that Rothermere also was fielding a candidate. 
‗The question was not answered‘, noted a smug Times.172 Three days later, the Daily 
Express published a letter written by Rothermere on 18 October 1930 to ‗one of his 
followers in South Paddington‘ that endorsed Taylor in the strongest language possible. 
A decision that the paper praised as it put ‗principle before Party‘. Others, however, 
drew different conclusions with regard to Mrs Richardson being cast adrift. While the 
Guardian deemed the by-election ‗most interesting‘, Baldwin dismissed it as ‗the 
wildest farce‘. As Taylor was adopted as the Crusader‘s standard-bearer less than two 
weeks before polling, ‗Beaverbrook descended on the constituency with an array of 
canvassers and motor cars. He spoke at eight meetings.‘ Baldwin described the press 
lords‘ behaviour as that befitting of ‗lunatics‘ or ‗like the devil knowing his time is short 
are raving‘.173 Might Baldwin and others be rattled? The fact that the Central Office 
reportedly despatched every party agent in London into South Paddington and ordered 
them to defeat the ‗Crusader[s] at all costs‘ suggests concern. As does the Sunday Times 
thundering that Lidiard ‗runs with the hare and hunts with the hounds‘. Chamberlain 
predicted victory for his candidate, telling his sister that ‗unless the canvas is hopelessly 
misleading he [Taylor] hasn‘t really made a very deep impression‘ in South 
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Paddington.
174
 Yet the Daily Express declared, to take but one example, that ‗Admiral 
Taylor stirs South Paddington‘ to such an extent that ‗even his opponents left the 
meeting with a new sense of his power and dignity as a candidate‘. Tory predictions 
spoke to the older political-press nexus that they experienced in years past. The post-war 
political world by contrast saw ‗communications ... play a more important role in 
political practice than ever before‘. Furthermore the papers of Beaverbrook and 
Rothermere reached millions of people ‗who had hitherto been beyond the reach of 
Westminster politics‘.175 The riding‘s electoral history—last contested in 1923—makes 
any kind of analysis impossible, but it is worth noting that the Fortnightly Review 
credited/blamed ‗the cooks and housemaids of South Paddington who sent Admiral 
Taylor to Parliament‘. Others viewed the results as proof that naval officers are the ideal 
candidate.
176
 Headlines, like ‗Forty-Four Conservative M.P.s Demand Mr Baldwin‘s 
Resignation‘, the day before polling in South Paddington, no less, had to influence 
public opinion.
177
 Whether or not this was a ‗manoeuvre to affect the Paddington 
election‘ is beside the point, a fifth of the party publically called for Baldwin‘s 
resignation and was at ‗the nearest point ... [of] throwing in their lot with 
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Beaverbrook‘.178 Scholarly opinion differs on which event overshadowed the other; one 
should not overlook the ‗curious‘ contemporary observation that Paddington South was 
the third Conservative association to demonstrate that it was not ‗solidly behind Mr. 
Baldwin‘. Low dismissed Baldwin as ‗the late leader‘.179 The Daily Express not 
surprisingly devoted a fair bit of space to the fact that ‗Mr Baldwin wins and loses (sic)‘. 
A Saturday cartoon in the Daily Express had Chamberlain carrying the Central Office‘s 
baggage and depicted Baldwin‘s triumph at Caxton Hall as a mere handbag, but a kindly 
porter informed them that they had missed the last train. A grinning Beaverbrook just 
made it onto the last car. The Guardian by contrast concluded that both men triumphed, 
and predicted that the press lords ‗will probably succeed in pulling him [Baldwin] 
down‘. Beaverbrook ultimately failed, so perhaps the ‗chief moral‘ of the Paddington 
South by-election is that there truly were ‗seats which the Conservative Party cannot 
lose, no matter how hard it tries‘. The same could not be said for ‗Labour 
strongholds‘.180 
Discontents were ‗rife in all parties‘ by the beginning of November 1930, most 
notably Beaverbrook (and Rothermere), Lloyd George and, the former Conservative, 
then Independent, turned Labour MP, Oswald Mosley; who latter founded the British 
Union of Fascists. ‗Were it not for the restraining influence of the Indian enigma the 
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political situation would very soon become in every sense a dissolving view‘, concluded 
The Observer. Britons were asking themselves if England made ‗her prodigious effort 
and sacrifice in the War for this miserable sequel‘. ‗The younger generation in all 
parties‘, the paper warned, were ‗in favour of ―clearing out all the Old Gangs‖‘. Had the 
vote on Baldwin‘s leadership been held a day later—and the outcome in Paddington 
South known—‗the vote for a change in the Conservative leadership would have been 
[even] larger‘.181 As for Tory complaints about the ‗wicked Press‘ and ‗press-dictation‘, 
The Observer bluntly said that no one ever ‗suggests that Press-influence is illegitimate 
when they are being supported by it‘. Overlapping the ‗uproarious‘ campaign in 
Paddington South was the campaign underway in the Shipley division, Yorkshire, to 
replace its late member, which was characterised as the ‗most decorous on record‘.182 
Voter turnout was essentially normal and against expectations, the Tories won the 
Labour stronghold with a majority of over 1,600. In the 1929 election, Labour‘s majority 
had been almost five thousand but their share of the vote fell by just over ten points, with 
ex-supporters going to the Liberals and even more so the Conservatives.
183
 There was no 
Crusade candidate, as Beaverbrook tended only to contest seats in the agricultural 
regions of southern England and London and its middle class suburbs. Presumably, the 
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fact that the Tory candidate ran on imposing tariffs on foreign textiles would have made 
him acceptable to Beaverbrook in any event.
184
 All three candidates condemned the 
government for its failure to stem the rising tide of unemployment, but the Tory 
candidate was the lone voice advocating for ‗a tariff to enable the woollen manufacturers 
to sell their fabrics in the home market‘. Chamberlain sent a telegram endorsing the 
benefits of protection. In the final days of the campaign, the Liberals to no avail 
‗sound[ed] the old alarm of the dear loaf‘.185 Shipley returned a Tory MP for the first 
time.
186
 When the Daily Express naturally celebrated the victory, Chamberlain and his 
wife 
 
enacted the last moments of [General] Wolfe. Annie rushed into my room crying 
They run! (or words to that effect). Rousing himself from his lethargy the dying 
hero faintly asked Who run? ―The Daily Express‖! [―]Then I die happy‖ and 
unfolding my paper I attacked a breakfast which would have killed anyone 
whose constitution had been less seriously undermined by prolong abstinence 
from food [owing to a cold, etc] than mine. 
 
To Chamberlain, ever since Bromley, Beaverbrook‘s actions had been ‗double 
faced‘. He imagined ‗the disciples asking themselves in doubt & fear ―What has come to 
the Son of Kish? Is Saul also among the prophets‖?‘187 Baldwin also took a dim view of 
the press, saying on one occasion that ‗the Beaver is trying to crawl back, and the foul 
press is lying back very quiet ...‘ Neither accepted that Beaverbrook and Rothermere, 
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like all ‗independent‘ journalists, had a ‗duty in times like these‘ to act as a ‗counter-
power‘. Britons proclaimed The Observer were tired of ‗pre-war minds and their post-
war platitudes‘. Moreover, true statesmen, like ‗Palmerstone, Disraeli, Gladstone, [Joe] 
Chamberlain, knew how to manage their relations with journalism, and knew that it had 
no public value when subservient or echoing. Mr. Baldwin, better advised, might have 
managed as well‘, the paper erroneously concluded.188 Chamberlain confessed to his 
sister that ‗if S.B. will only play up and follow good advice our position ought steadily 
to improve‘. Remember, as A.J.P. Taylor concluded, ‗Baldwin, not Beaverbrook, was 
the good hater‘. Ten days before polling in Paddington South, The Guardian concluded 
that ‗the press lords want to show their power .... But they have chosen for this purpose a 
constituency where there is the least possible danger of their manoeuvres resulting in the 
Government‘s gaining a seat.‘ In Beaverbrook‘s case, at least, these are the actions not 
of a two-faced press baron, but of a Conservative, independent press baron.
189
  
 The Observer denounced Baldwin‘s much vaunted desire ‗for a free hand to 
negotiate with the Dominions‘ as being nothing more than ‗a dodge, and a weak dodge‘ 
at that. For the Conservative party to get over its divisions, he needed to advance ‗from 
the free hand to the firm hand, and gives a lead to the Empire in Joseph Chamberlain‘s 
sense‘. ‗The boldest measures are the safest‘, the paper chided; invoking Horatio Nelson, 
no less!
190
 Time appeared to be running out for Baldwin. Yet another attempt was made 
at ‗healing the breach‘ in the weeks following the Paddington election, but it seems that 
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Chamberlain was the one most anxious to get down to ‗business‘. Beaverbrook focused 
on ‗interesting incidents in connection with Bonar [Law]‘ during the bulk of their 
lunchtime ‗tête-à-tête‘.191 Thanks to the Crusading, Canadian director of public relations 
at the BBC and Mrs Philip Snowden, who was a governor but her motives are less clear-
cut, the director of the London School of Economics, Sir William Beveridge, was 
allowed to expound on Empire Free Trade. No reply was given. The next day 
Beaverbrook told Chamberlain that he ‗propose[s] to drift for a bit until we see how 
things are developing‘. Beaverbrook ended the talks when he learned Chamberlain 
planned to run an official candidate against Admiral Taylor in the next general election. 
He informed Amery in late December 1930 that he intended to ‗open up with 
propaganda‘.192 Possibly, because the by-election held earlier that month in the 
Whitechapel and St. George‘s division of Stepney revealed that Labour strongholds 
rested on moveable foundations. In the four elections the late member contested, 
including the 1923 February by-election that first returned him to Parliament, Labour‘s 
share of the vote was greater than all the other party/parties combined.
193
 Therefore, it 
was expected that Labour would hold the seat, but, in the aftermath of the Tory victory 
in Shipley, ‗there is a feeling that anything may happen ....‘194 In 1930, even though the 
Conservative candidate came third again, Labour‘s share of the vote fell to under forty 
per cent. Voter turnout was almost identical to the last general election. Here is the 
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evidence of voter malleability or ‗cross-currents‘ (to use the language of The Times) 
alluded to in the opening paragraph.
195
 Empire Free Trade was an ‗elastic phrase‘, which 
Beaverbrook utilised in whatever manner ‗might be useful. Thus in S. Paddington it 
merely meant Hands across the seas ... Empire Free Trade means prosperity for the 
country. In Norfolk however it meant taxation of foreign agricultural products under the 
cover of reciprocal trade relations with the Empire.‘ The question was whether Britons 
could convince themselves to see what they wanted most in the ‗same cask‘ as many 
leading Tories already had.
196
 
 By mid-January 1931, Beaverbrook had finally concluded that Baldwin was the 
‗enemy‘ and now was time for ‗not peace but a sword‘. Beaverbrook resolved to ‗make 
the by-elections the occasions for my propaganda. It then becomes more human and far 
less boring to the people.‘ Rothermere welcomed the change of tactics.197 But it was too 
late to run a candidate in East Bristol, whose member had passed away. The Tories last 
contested the seat in 1910; in part due to a defunct party pact that cast the Liberals, who 
won the seat in 1918, as the standard-bearer against socialism. Prior to the War, the 
‗division was consistently Liberal‘. At the outset of 1931, there was a ‗distressing 
amount of unemployment in the division‘ and the Labour party wanted to avoid a three 
party race, lest the ‗free trade vote‘ be split. Eleven days ahead of polling, The Times 
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learned that Tories ‗will be advised to abstain from voting‘.198 However, the next day a 
twenty-three year old London solicitor, P.J.F. Chapman-Walker, was adopted as the 
Tory candidate following a ‗private meeting of the local Conservative Association‘; it 
was later revealed that local Tories ‗felt strongly‘ about testing the party‘s appeal. 
Chapman-Walker had previously contested the Abertillery Division in Monmouthshire, 
Wales, in the 1929 general election and placed a distant third, forfeiting his deposit.
199
 
Once again, the Tories were the only party to campaign on the success of safeguarding 
and the need for ‗an emergency tariff‘ and ‗concerted action with the Dominions ....‘200 
The main industries—confectionaries and footwear—both would have benefited from 
safeguarding, but canvassers reported that while there was ‗wavering among many‘ and 
a desire for change, ‗electors are reluctant to say how they will vote‘.201 That Labour 
held the seat surprised no one, though one wonders if the fact that the majority fell by 
less than three hundred votes—and was still over eleven thousand—was surprising, 
given the unemployment rate. The day before polling The Times reported that Chapman-
Walker, having performed better than expected on the stump, would garner more votes 
than would be expected. In a traditional Liberal—that turned Labour—seat, a Tory 
candidate ‗would normally be left in third place in a three-cornered fight‘.202 Chapman-
Walker garnered an impressive second place. Labour dropped a few percentage points 
but still polled over sixty percent, as it had in the last general election. The most 
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successful Tory in twenty years won just over a quarter of the vote, while the Liberals 
saw their share of the vote decline from 34.2 per cent in 1929, to 12.8 per cent.
203
 In the 
5 February by-election, which was necessitated by the succession of the Hon. Henry 
Mond to the peerage, support for the Tories in the East Toxteth division in Liverpool 
rose from just under forty-eight percent to over seventy-five percent, presumably 
because there was no Liberal candidate. Labour‘s mid-twenties share of the vote 
remained unchanged from the last election. Two weeks later, in the election triggered by 
Davdison‘s retirement, the Liberal candidate in the Fareham division in Hampshire 
forfeited his deposit. Labour polled exactly the same percentage share of the vote as it 
received in 1929, while the Tories increased their majority by over thirteen hundred. 
Again the Tories were the only party in favour of promoting ‗by every available means 
trade with the Empire‘ and restricting the ‗freedom given to foreign nations to import the 
products of underpaid or forced [Soviet] labour‘.204 To ‗smallholders and market 
gardeners‘ unable to sell their strawberry crop at a profit due to the ‗dumping of soft 
fruit from the Continent‘, the Liberal candidate, as ‗an out-and-out free trader‘, 
suggested that ‗better marketing ... not interference with trade‘ was the answer. ‗A little 
healthy protection‘ was the Tory remedy.205 It would seem that public opinion really was 
trending in favour of the Tories, in both ‗northern areas‘ of Scotland and the south- and 
north-west English coasts.
206
 But was opinion siding with the official party or the 
crusaders? To answer that question one must look at events in East Islington. 
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 Contemporaries speculated that only a lone Crusader could be fielded at any one 
time, so why East Islington? The most probable explanation is that Victor Cazalet, 
bother of the presumed Tory candidate and M.P. for the Chippenham division, had 
spoken for Ferguson at Twickenham, only subsequently to denounce him for ‗his 
persistent denigration of Baldwin‘s leadership‘. When the Empire Crusade candidate 
realised that he and the official Tory candidate, Thelma Cazalet, had almost identical 
views, he withdrew from the race.
207
 Beaverbrook (as The Guardian saw it) ‗tried to 
make a Lidiard of Miss Cazalet‘, with the invitation leaving no room for 
misunderstanding the consequences of saying no. Accompanying the letter was a pro-
Crusade document awaiting her signature. She denounced the latter in a statement: 
  
no Conservative or other candidate could have put his signature to it without 
losing every sense of independence and honour – naturally I refused ... his 
primary object and interest lies no longer in Empire matters but rather – as he has 
told us in two of his recent speeches – ‗in smashing up the Conservative Party‘.  
 
Victor Cazalet, who was now regularly belittled by the Beaverbrook papers, believed 
their proprietor was intent on arranging Thelma‘s ‗political assassination‘ out of spite. It 
is true that Beaverbrook held grudges, but he had more important matters to attend to.
208
 
Back in January, he had concluded that ‗to achieve Empire Free Trade, we have got to 
defeat Baldwin‘. As Rothermere told Beaverbrook, if they ‗can overthrow the Central 
Conservative organisation, the Conservative Party is ours‘. With Baldwin under heavy 
assault on two fronts—see Section 3.2—Beaverbrook picked fellow Canadian, 
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Brigadier-General A.C. Critchley, DSO, who happened to be rich and was the ex-
husband of his late wife‘s cousin, to go over the top in East Islington.209 
 Critchley‘s candidacy, proclaimed the Daily Express, was ‗an open challenge to 
Socialist ineptitude, to Liberal strategy, and to Conservative compromise‘. The 
campaign in East Islington represented the evolutionary ‗struggle between Party and 
Progress‘. As the dole lines grew ever longer, the existing leaders performed ‗party 
acrobats‘ to entertain the masses.210 While the establishment dismissed Critchley as 
‗hopeless on the platform‘, the ‗other parties‘ thought that the Crusade was trying to 
capture the ‗20,000 electors‘ that never voted in the general election. Nine days before 
polling, Thelma Cazalet, who represented Islington on the London County Council, 
claimed that ‗the Crusade had never been strong in East Islington and had not had a real 
organisation there‘.211 However, Beaverbrook undertook his ‗nightly pilgrimage to the 
constituency‘ and the atmosphere he created was described as ‗electric‘.212 A week after 
Cazalet made her pronouncement no one really knew what order the four candidates 
would finish in, though the returns from the three established parties suggested that 
Critchley‘s chances were ‗negligible‘. Confidence in them, however, was low. 
Estimating what impact the ‗spectacular and well-advertised campaign‘ masterminded 
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by Beaverbrook had was ‗difficult‘, The Times concluded.213 The Daily Express declared 
in the opening days of the campaign that only two men stood in the way of 
implementing Empire Free Trade. Philip Snowden, the Labour Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, had the ‗Premier and Mr. Lloyd George tied like Roman slaves to his 
Cobdenite chariot‘. He and his party preferred ‗extinction‘ to yielding to the Crusaders. 
Baldwin‘s position in contrast was ‗desperate‘ as the ‗relentless march of events‘ was 
overtaking him.
214
 The next day splashed across the front page was news that the Liberal 
candidate at the last general election was now a Crusader. These new ‗Liberal 
Crusaders‘ (as The Times termed them) were like jigsaw pieces that had ‗no place into 
which they can be fitted‘.215 Commenting on the general tenor of press coverage in the 
Rothermere and Beaverbrook papers, The Guardian, while lamenting ‗their methods‘, 
wondered at the result: 
 
All the resources of newspaper publicity and boost are exploited to the utmost, 
and with a shrillness that might be expected to repel an educated electorate. 
Astonishing photographs of their candidate appear day after day in their 
newspapers; astonishing descriptions of his flashing eye, his decisive manner, his 
profound sincerity. Any information that might be expected to affect his 
candidate adversely is simply not given; any information even remotely in his 
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favour is prominently and lengthily retailed. Such methods, in East Islington at 
least, have had a remarkable success, easily outdoing the more weighty 
propaganda of eminent Conservatives like Lord Hailsham and of the whole 
Conservative press.
216
 
  
Having previously only spent £23,000 of the £109,000 raised, Beaverbrook‘s decision to 
field a candidate in East Islington turned out almost perfectly for his purposes. Contrary 
to the party‘s chairman expectations, the people of London were quite happy to ‗vote for 
a man whose Master says he is out to smash the Conservative Party‘. As Critchley did 
not ‗cut a ridiculous figure‘, dear Neville was left ‗very disappointed‘. Nor would 
Chamberlain benefit from losing the seat due to vote splitting as the official Tory 
candidate placed third! But could the ‗Beaverbrook bomb‘ really have destroyed the 
‗three jolly parties‘?217 
 Turnout was a mere fifty percent, the lowest of the entire interwar era. Labour 
held the seat; with the lowest percentage share of the vote in the inter-war period, but 
technically increased the majority over that won in the 1929 general election. The 
official Tory candidate trailed Critchley by more than eleven hundred votes. However, 
the number of votes cast for the two conservative candidates combined was 15,496 
compared to 10,591 for Labour. Unlike the elections of the 1920s, the combined Tory 
vote was actually greater than the other two parties combined. The Liberal‘s share of the 
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vote declined by almost fifty percent, and Labour was down roughly a third from the last 
election, while the combined Tory vote polled an additional two thousand votes. Perhaps 
the electors heeded Beaverbrook‘s message—reprinted on the front page of the Daily 
Express—to ‗Socialists, Liberals, Conservatives and Crusaders [that] ―Critchley is your 
man‖‘. In any event, it seems clear that people were not disgusted with the shrill tone of 
the Beaverbrook and Rothermere papers. However, there was speculation that Liberal 
electors, not normally given to abstaining, ‗do not approve of Liberal support of the 
[minority Labour] government‘. The phenomenon of missing Liberals was not limited to 
East Islington. Surveying the political landscape led Garvin to proclaim ‗a plague on 
your parties!‘ It was clear to him that a large number of Britons loathed the ‗present state 
of the party system and the impotent fatuity of all three factions‘. Garvin called for a 
National Government, warning that if the ‗conventional game of mutual paralysis‘ 
continues Britain risked inflicting on herself the sort of damage ‗as defeat in the War 
could have inflicted‘. However, at East Islington, the electors in 1929 were against 
protection two to one, but two years later ‗an absolute majority‘ demanded it.218 Had 
Beaverbrook played his hand better and waited for his bomb to detonate, it is 
conceivable that British politics might have been reordered in 1931 instead of 1945.  
 In hindsight, Beaverbrook attributed the ultimate demise of the Crusade 
following the by-election, which saw ‗Mayfair goes mad‘, to running a Rothermere 
candidate more interested in running against Irwinism and to making Baldwin‘s 
leadership, not protection, the central issue. Beaverbrook‘s fatal mistake was actually 
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made ahead of polling in East Islington as the election day edition of the Daily Express 
announced that ‗the Empire Crusade will fight the by-election in St. George‘. It would 
have been wiser to ‗drift for a bit until we see how things are developing‘, as 
Beaverbrook had done earlier.
219
 Such a course of action would have likely had several 
outcomes, not least of which would have been to prove John Ralston Saul wrong. In the 
introduction to the lightweight Beaverbrook volume in the Extraordinary Canadians 
series, Saul wrote: ‗God knows Beaverbrook tried ... [but] empires can‘t be shaped by 
colonials or outsiders of any sort‘. Beaverbrook may have been fascinated by gossip, but 
it seems probable that he heard not even an inkling of what was being contemplated in 
the highest echelons of the Conservative Party and at Printing House Square in the days 
following the third place finish at East Islington.
220
  
 Two days after the loss, Chamberlain ‗dined alone‘ with the owner and editor-in-
chief of The Daily Telegraph and later told his sister that Lord Camrose ‗was coming 
definitely to the opinion that he [Baldwin] could never bring his party to victory‘. 
Camrose was ‗disappointed‘ that Neville would not entertain even the idea of seizing the 
party leadership for himself. Nevertheless, Camrose still doubted that Baldwin ‗could go 
on much longer‘. Three days later, Sir Howard Frank, head of the firm of estate agents 
Knight, Frank & Rutley, felted compelled to visit Chamberlain as through his work he 
encountered ‗all sorts & conditions of men in all parts of the country‘, and there was a 
‗profound dissatisfaction with S.B.‘s leadership and anxiety for change‘. Chamberlain 
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enquired whom the masses wanted, ‗and he said ―Mostly you‖‘. Once Frank left, 
Chamberlain learned that the Marquess of Linlithgow was waiting to convey a similar 
message, plus that faith in Baldwin was dropping even in Scotland.
221
 By 24 February, 
Chamberlain was ‗very distressed‘ by the growing anti-Baldwin sentiment and worried 
that, unless there was a snap election, ‗things might come to a head very soon‘. Amery, 
too, saw Chamberlain as the ‗natural‘ successor. Ferguson meanwhile tried ‗to do what 
he can to mediate between Max and Neville ....‘ But things looked grim. At the Carlton 
Club, Amery found a ‗terribly despondent‘ colleague, who worried that the party could 
not ‗win a single seat in London against Beaverbrook‘.222 In the midst of the ‗crises‘, a 
‗deus ex machina‘ appeared in the form of the party‘s chief agent, Robert Topping, who 
asked Chamberlain if he was prepared to receive ‗a memorandum on the feeling in the 
Party about the Leadership‘. Topping thought it ‗his duty to give me formal warning of 
the dangerous situation‘ that was unfolding; on 28 February, the Evening Standard 
reported that the party‘s candidate in Westminster, St. George‘s refused to defend 
Baldwin and withdrew his candidature. Chamberlain concluded his letter to his sister 
with a postscript: ‗4:30 p.m. Very Secret. S.B has decided to go at once‘.223 ‗Mr. 
Baldwin withdraws‘ was to be The Times‘ leader.224 Baldwin ‗probably ... would not 
stand again‘, and he and his wife discussed ‗their financial position & the changes that 
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they would make‘. Beaverbrook was victorious! Baldwin issued a summons for an 
emergency meeting the following day, where he intended to say goodbye. Such was the 
situation until ten pm when Sir William Bridgeman, Baldwin‘s closest ally in the 
shadow cabinet and who had dined with another Baldwin confidant earlier that evening, 
‗rolled in like an old Admiral and protested against my going out in so ignominious a 
fashion. Could I not make some stand, and go out on some first-class issue?‘225 The 
Daily Express had announced on polling day in East Islington that a Crusader would 
contest the by-election necessitated by the death of Sir Laming Worthington-Evans. A 
decision made in a matter of days for an election that was a month away. Had 
Beaverbrook kept mum about his intentions in the ‗impregnable Conservative‘ 
constituency of Westminster, St. George‘s until closer to polling day, as he had done at 
South Paddington, it seems likely that Baldwin‘s decision to resign would have stood. It 
was the outcome that was increasingly being seen ‗as the least damaging solution to the 
Party‘s difficulties‘.226 It is certainly plausible that Baldwin could have taken the 
decision to resign on 1 March but delayed the announcement in the hopes of a less 
ignominious departure. ‗Only the absence of an obvious successor and the dislike of 
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being coerced by the Press has prevented things collapsing before now‘, thought 
Amery.
227
 
As it turned out, Baldwin could have resigned on an important issue before 
Beaverbrook actually needed to make a decision about Westminster, St. George‘s. News 
of Lord Irwin‘s agreement with Gandhi—see Section 3.2— came on 5 March and 
temporarily improved matters, thereby offering an honourable exit as Baldwin, not his 
critics and Churchill, had been proven right. But, as Beaverbrook‘s intentions were 
known, Baldwin decided to await the result of St. George‘s.228 A decision that did not go 
down well as the consensus was that ‗S.B.‘s case is irretrievable‘, yet it was also deemed 
‗impossible for Stanley to resign before the result of the St George‘s election‘ is 
known.
229
 Had Beaverbrook been more patient and waited for the shockwave from his 
bomb to dissipate fully, he probably would have driven Baldwin into retirement. For six 
hours, ‗the laurels [truly] were with the new second Tory party‘.230 Had that victory 
become permanent, it is, of course, impossible to say what would have become of the 
Crusade. The consequences of Duff Cooper—who strangely volunteered to be Baldwin‘s 
champion after two prominent Conservatives had declined the position and had 
congratulated Beaverbrook, who was his son‘s godfather, after his triumph in South 
Paddington—defeating the Baldwinesque, Sir Ernest Peters are clear. While 
Beaverbrook campaigned on Baldwin‘s poor leadership and Rothermere harped on 
India, declaring on one occasion that ‗Gandhi is watching St George‘s‘. Baldwin 
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campaigned against press dictatorship, which the Daily Express, correctly denounced as 
‗a clever attempt to obscure the issue‘, before addressing the issue head on: 
 
A. The Daily Express and the Daily Mail are trying to persuade Mr. Baldwin 
to retire and make room for his successor. 
Q. Is that dictatorship? 
A. The Baldwinites say so 
Q. But The Times, Telegraph and Morning Post say that Mr. Baldwin should 
not resign. Is that dictatorship? 
A. No. That is loyalty  
 .... 
Q. What would be said if the Daily Express and the Daily Mail attacked Mr. 
Ramsay MacDonald or Mr. Lloyd George? 
A. That would be magnificent. 
Q. Then it is only dictatorship if Mr. Baldwin is criticised? 
A. Certainly.
231
  
 
The campaign in St George‘s was about far more than Baldwin‘s future. It was about 
who had the right to control public life in Britain and, on this issue, the establishment 
closed ranks.
232
 The Daily Express was the only paper known to be read by Britons of 
every class, though two thirds of sales came from the second lowest income bracket. 
Worse still, its proprietor believed, that ‗there was no difference between rich and poor 
except that the rich had more money‘.233 Geoffrey Dawson, editor of The Times, 
practically invited Cooper to assume editorial control as needed, while general manager 
of The Telegraph promised that everyone all the way down to circulation was ‗doing 
their damndest for you‘. Baldwin even obtained a statement signed by prominent 
Liberals, including the former foreign secretary, Lord Grey and ex-Viceroy, Lord 
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Reading, saying that the Beaverbrook and Rothermere papers constituted ‗a menace to 
our treasured political institutions, the gravity of which it would be impossible to 
overstate‘.234 Had the result gone the other way, and Britons were and are capable of by-
election surprises, the results could have been far reaching.
235
 It is difficult to say who 
would have won an early ‗battle for the Tory party‘, but Chamberlain recognised that he 
risked being caught in the undertow, unlike ‗Winston who has left the Sinking Ship‘.236 
Amery‘s diary entry for 27 February 1931 is suggestive: ‗Had a talk with George 
Hamilton, very down on S.B. and prepared to look to Winston [Churchill] as the future 
leader. I hope there are not many others like him but he shows what mugs our people can 
be.‘ Perhaps Churchill might have averted the ‗years which the locust hath eaten,‘ 
though there is every reason to believe he would have proven a total cock-up. Duff 
Cooper‘s repudiation of the Munich Agreement and his decision to resign as First Lord 
of the Admiralty has always been portrayed as ‗high-principled and courageous‘.237 One 
wonders if, as he rose to make his famous 1938 resignation speech, Cooper thought back 
to that famous by-election in Westminster, St George‘s seven years earlier when, with 
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the establishment under assault, he choose to side with the Guilty Men. For a famed anti-
appeaser, the irony is hard to overlook.  
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3. PART II: 'WE PADDLED IN A PURÉE OF WORDS AND HOPED TO 
CATCH A FORMULA‘: BRITAIN AND THE POLITICS OF IMPERIAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
 
What was to be the future of the British Empire? What were to be the 
relations between its various parts? How were we to reconcile that which on 
the face of it seemed to be irreconcilable—the sovereignty, the political, and 
economic independence of each of the parts—with the concept of an Empire 
presenting a united front to the world? .... Australian Prime Minister, W.M. 
Hughes, 1 July 1919. 
 
These three questions were at the very heart of imperial policymaking during the 
1920s. Yet, even with the dramatic post 11 September revival of British imperial history, 
constitutional history remains a ‗neglected sub-branch‘. A development made all the 
more remarkable as the field offers the possibility of escaping the seemingly dominant 
shackles of ‗indigenous and national histories‘.1 Britain‘s response to the so-called 
‗crisis of empire‘ was governed by the ‗principle of solvitur ambulando‘.2 Black and 
Tans were tried (unsuccessfully) in Ireland, while Gurkhas and the Royal Air Force were 
used to good effect at Amritsar and in Mesopotamia, respectively. However, Winston 
Churchill, then Secretary of State for War, was puzzled by the ‗squeamishness‘ his 
desire to use ‗poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes‘ provoked. ‗It is sheer affectation to 
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lacerate a man with the poisonous fragment of a bursting shell and to boggle at making 
his eyes water by means of lachrymatory gas‘, he reasoned.3 As will be seen in Section 
3.2 a variety of tactics were employed to thwart the (demands of the) Indian National 
Congress. Meanwhile, Britons fulfilled the wishes of their largest Dominions, while 
despatching a pro-consul on a ‗special Mission‘ to Britain‘s Egyptian protectorate to 
make ‗recommendation[s] with regard to the future administration of the country‘.4 
London took small steps after 1914 to ‗introduce an elected element into the Legislative 
Council of the East Africa Protectorate‘ and increased the unofficial elements in Gambia 
and the Gold Coast.
5
 In the autumn of 1919, the Under-Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Leo Amery, announced that the government intended to be considerably 
bolder. On the advice of Field-Marshal Lord Plumer, the government, Amery told the 
House of Commons, had decided that ‗the time has come to entrust the people of Malta 
with full responsible control of their purely local affairs‘. Issues related to Malta‘s role 
as an ‗Imperial fortress‘ would remain the purview of the inland‘s governor, Plumer. It 
was hoped that the new constitution would become law by the beginning of 1921.
6
  
The decision to apply the ‗principle‘ of the 1919 Government of India Act to a 
radically different context would seem to suggest that Britons were slowly starting to 
realise that ‗the old idea of dependence as a doctrine of the Empire‘ had outlived its 
usefulness. But across the Empire there were few who argued with ‗the notion of 
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independence ... [being] equally absurd‘.7 Calls to rebuild the (constitutional framework 
of) Empire were part and parcel of the immediate post-war period, but they emanated 
from all quarters throughout the 1920s.
8
 The relationship between coloniser and the 
colonised was to contemporaries ‗one of the outstanding problems‘ of the late 1920s. 
However, set against the experience of America in the Philippines and Puerto Rico, or 
French Senegal, it appeared to some observers that the British possessed ‗a peculiar 
genius in meeting the colonial problem‘.9 As discussed in the introduction, the British 
Empire offers an almost endless variety of case studies to choose from. Selecting India 
needs no explanation, while Ceylon was Britain‘s ‗premier Crown Colony‘.10 And, if the 
‗principle‘ of the 1919 Government of India Act was successfully implemented, it might 
have provided a ‗formula‘ for the entire Dependant Empire. By the spring of 1929, the 
world was looking to Britain (in the words of, then Lord President of the Council, Lord 
Parmoor) ‗to show the way towards that reconciliation among the new principles of just 
liberty and government that is necessary if civilisation in its larger sense is to be 
preserved‘.11 
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3.1 ‗Ceylon is to provide the British Empire laboratory with yet another constitutional 
experiment‘: The Donoughmore commission and ‗democracy with autocratic 
reservations‘ 
 
Firm and dignified insistence on Britain‘s rights, in the East no less than in the 
West, against nationalistic onslaughts has become an imperative and vital 
necessity for the preservation of the Empire‘s vast interests abroad. What is 
wanted is a masculine policy in which bullying and blustering need have no 
place. The magnificent fabric of Empire was not built on a foundation of 
supine, spineless sentimentality. A man with the qualities of mind of a 
Palmerston is needed today to save the Empire .... – Richard Hope, United 
Empire, November 1929.  
 
Was Ceylon, that ‗magic island‘ of P&O advertisements, really a suitable place 
for constitutional experimentation?
1
 Absolutely! In fact, for a period, doubt would have 
been unthinkable. Between the founding of the Legislative Council in 1833 and 1870, 
Ceylon was to the colonial world what Canada was to Britain‘s settlement colonies. To 
the Colonial Office, the Council—which consisted of three Europeans and a lone 
representative from the Sinhalese, Tamil and Burgher communities—was a source of 
information independent of the governor, and therefore a means of asserting Whitehall‘s 
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will. However, members also needed to curry favour with the governor as he controlled 
who could stand for direct/indirect election, though in practice prominent Sinhalese and 
Tamil families tended to retain control over their seats. These unofficial members 
provided local knowledge to the governor, and other colonial officials, so it is not 
surprising that they—and some of the island‘s newspapers—‗tended to look upon the 
Legislative Council as the local Parliament‘. In the 1850s, planters and the Burghers 
lobbied to expand their presence on the Council. ‗If ... the system of representation were 
so contrived as to exclude the bulk of the native population from real power, in order to 
vest it in the hands of the European minority, an exceedingly narrow oligarchy would be 
created‘, said a dismissive Earl Grey, then Secretary of State for the Colonies. A body 
dominated by ‗European merchants and planters and their agents‘, concluded Grey, 
would advocate for legislation based on ‗narrow views of class interests‘ at the expense 
of the ‗general good‘. This policy continued well into the 1870s; in part, as successive 
governors noted, because there was no demand from native Ceylonese for constitutional 
reform. ‗Masterly inactivity‘ prevailed until 1876-7, when a resident British journalist 
published two pamphlets that foreshadowed the argument political activists would 
articulate over the next four decades. Society and the economy had undergone a 
transformation since 1833, why had not the constitution and political system kept pace? 
Unlike Canada, Ceylon ceded its status as a constitutional pioneer to the West Indies, in 
part because the island was not a true plantation colony. Not only was there no settled, 
wealthy European plantocracy, but Ceylon, unlike the West Indies, possessed a large 
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indigenous population with a social strata robust enough that it survived the encounter 
with European imperialism.
2
  
  With the maritime districts of the island having been ruled by Europeans for four 
centuries, the island‘s elite had assimilated Western thought and consequently tended to 
be ‗socially conservative, politically moderate and tactically gradualist‘. Ceylon became 
a Crown Colony in 1802, with the last indigenous kingdom falling in 1815 following a 
brief military campaign. A unified administration was not established until 1830.
3
 The 
island‘s place in British grand strategy was far more limited in comparison to India, 
which served (in Sir Charles Lucas‘ famous phrase) as ‗an English barrack in the 
Oriental Seas from which we may draw any number of troops without paying for them‘. 
Trincomalee, by contrast, was simply a naval base; which admittedly remained 
important until the advent of the atomic age. This difference in roles had several notable 
consequences: first, administrative costs and revenues were far lower in Ceylon, where 
income tax and a general land tax did not exist ‗as late as 1925‘.4 Secondly, the vastly 
smaller population meant the island was easier to control and therefore posts in the 
                                                 
2
 K.M. de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka (Rev. & updated edn., New Delhi, 2005), pp. 447-53; Grey quoted 
in Ibid., pp. 449-50. 
3
 S.R. Ashton, ‗Ceylon‘, in W.R. Louis and J. Brown, eds., The Oxford History of the British Empire, IV: 
The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1998), p. 449. As will be seen, the different dates of conquest had a 
significant political impact as it divided the Sinhalese majority into ‗two groups—the Low Country 
Sinhalese, who have been continuously under European domination since the arrival of the Portuguese in 
the sixteenth century; and the Kandyans who, though latterly ruled by a dynasty of Malabar descent, 
succeeded in maintaining their independence until 1815‘. Governor, Sir Hugh Clifford, to the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, Leo Amery, 20 Nov. 1926, The National Archives, C[olonial] O[ffice] 537/692.  
4
 Quoted in K. Jeffery, ‗'An English Barrack in the Oriental Seas'?: India in the Aftermath of the First 
World War‘, Modern Asian Studies, xv (1981), p. 369; A. Jackson, ‗The Evolution of Ceylon as a Martial 
Colony, 1760-1960‘, Distant Drums: The Role of Colonies in British Imperial Warfare (Brighton, 2010), 
p. 72; Ashton, ‗Ceylon‘, p. 450. The official website of the Sri Lankan Inland Revenue Department states 
that income tax was first accessed in 1931-2. The British, like the Dutch and Portuguese before them, 
simply had perpetuated the tax on paddy and dry grains, which originated during the ‗times of the 
Sinhalese kings‘. de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, pp. 392-3. 
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Ceylon Civil Service ‗remained almost exclusively in European hands until the 1920s‘. 
Imperial authorities did use influential locals as intermediaries, but they did not need 
them as collaborators to raise revenue as officials in India did.
5
 Successive governors 
did, however, employ the tactics of indirect rule developed primarily in Africa and, by 
the end of the nineteenth century, the political ties between the colonial regime and 
traditional elites extended deep into Ceylonese society.
6
 Rivalry amongst the Sinhalese 
and Tamil elites, whose privileged position was being challenged by lesser castes, 
provided yet another bulwark for the colonial regime.
7
 Consequently, opponents of the 
existing order faced a far greater challenge than did their Indian contemporaries. The 
challenge was further compounded by economics. Plantations began in the 1830s, with 
coffee being the dominant crop until an incurable leaf disease appeared in the early 
1870s. Competition from Brazil ensured that coffee was supplanted by tea, rubber and 
coconuts by the outset of the twentieth century and without the influx of foreign capital. 
The indigenous population was involved in all three industries, with coconut production 
being almost monopolised by ‗local capitalists, smallholders and peasants‘. 
Consequently, a far greater proportion of the populace in Ceylon was a stakeholder in 
the colonial economy than elsewhere in Britain‘s tropical empire. Talk of boycotts and 
swadeshi campaigns found few adherents, particularly as Ceylon depended heavily on 
imported food.
8
 To paraphrase an early twentieth century British newspaper, the island‘s 
                                                 
5
 Ashton, ‗Ceylon‘, p. 450. 
6
 de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, pp. 408-9.  
7
 Ashton, ‗Ceylon‘, p. 451. Also see de Silva, A History of Sri Lank, pp. 456-7.  
8
 Ashton, ‗Ceylon‘, pp. 450-451. Further details about the (late) colonial economy can be found in K. 
Stahl, The Metropolitan Organization of British Colonial Trade: Four Regional Studies (London, 1951), 
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elite, and the Sinhalese, in particular, were far more interested in profits than political 
agitation.
9
  
 Even proponents of constitutional reform hesitated. ‗Why don‘t you agitate for 
it? The political history of England has been one long series of agitations‘, said one 
frustrated Whitehall official. It was well known on the island that the Colonial Office 
was not opposed to reforms. ‗It is useless to hope to get political privileges without our 
first agitating for them‘, lamented the Ceylon Morning Leader in 1908.10 The stalemate 
eventually would be broken by the Great War, and developments in London and India 
rather than Ceylon. Such was the opposition amongst the Ceylonese that the 
conservative Ceylon National Congress (CNC) was not created until 1919, two years 
after Edwin Montagu‘s (in)famous declaration (see Section 3.2 for details).11 But the 
need to be taken seriously by those in a position to grant the elite a greater stake in 
governance won out in the end. The depth of conservativism in the new organisation, 
which was undemocratic and dominated by the westernised-middle class Sinhalese, 
meant that independence would not become the stated goal until 1942!
12
  
Twenty-two years earlier, the president of the CNC declared that Ceylon‘s 
destiny is ‗indissolubly bound up with England‘. As stated in article one of the party‘s 
1920 constitution, the CNC sought to use ‗constitutional methods‘ to ‗reform ... the 
existing system of government‘ so that Ceylon could become ‗a self-governing member 
                                                                                                                                                
while a snapshot of non-European planters can be found in M. Roberts, ed., Documents of the Ceylon 
National Congress and Nationalist Politics in Ceylon, 1929-1950 (4 vols., Colombo, 1977), I, pp. xlvii-lii.  
9
 de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka pp. 458-9. 
10
 Quoted in Ibid. p. 471. 
11
 Ibid. pp. 474-80.  
12
 Ashton, ‗Ceylon‘, p. 453. 
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of the British Empire‘.13 The language evolved over the years, with ‗dominion status 
within the meaning of the Statute of Westminster, with control of finance, control of 
defence and the right to secede‘ being the goal by the end of 1939.14 The decision to opt 
for ‗complete independence‘ was made after the fall of Singapore.15 Australia and New 
Zealand, once Britain‘s ‗future pretensions of power in South-East Asia‘ was fatally 
exposed, similarly decided to reconsider their position and opted to ratify in 1942 and 
1947, respectively, the 1931 Statute of Westminster.
16
 Ceylon‘s route to independence 
has more in common with the Dominions—and maybe even Malta—than India. For a 
variety of reasons, the CNC ‗never underwent a Gandhian transformation‘. The road to 
power for Ceylonese politicians, who frankly were already doing rather well under the 
existing regime, was through ‗the exclusive and dignified confines of the council 
chamber, not in the demagoguery of the towns and villages‘.17 
Approximately a year after the Dominions demanded the ‗readjustment of the[ir] 
constitutional relations‘ with Westminster, and it was agreed that henceforth the Raj 
would send representatives to imperial conferences, the forerunners of the CNC sought 
                                                 
13
 Quoted in Hansard[‘s Parliamentary Debates], cxxxiii. 488; Roberts, ed., Documents of the Ceylon 
National Congress, II, p. 1687. Ceylon‘s executive and legislative councils, with its mixture of ex-officio, 
nominated (un)officials and elected members, was not atypical, and the island therefore had the potential 
to serve as a model for democratising Crown Colonies as warranted. ‗The Councils of the Crown 
Colonies‘, United Empire, xviii (1927), pp. 258-60.  
14
 Roberts, ed., Documents of the Ceylon National Congress, II, pp. 1690, 1694 and 1703-4; E.A.P. 
Wijeyeratne to Sir Andrew Caldecott, 17 Oct. 1941, in Ibid., III, p. 2547.  
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 ‗A Memorandum Submitted by Gilbert Perera Proposing a Revitalised Congress Programme‘ in Ibid., 
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Congress Committee scheduled for 3 Oct. 1942. 
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 D. Killingray and D. Omissi, eds., Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers 
c.1700-1964 (Manchester, 1999), p. 3. 
17
 Ashton, ‗Ceylon‘, p. 454. India, Egypt and Ireland all had ‗extreme demands for national recognition‘ 
that were at odds with British imperial interests, thereby making the three countries ‗different aspects of 
one great problem‘. ‗Autonomy and Authority‘, United Empire, xiii (1922), p. 123. 
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‗a measure of responsible government‘. In the short term, their request was easily 
brushed aside. The official reasoning being that Home Government could not possibly 
act without knowing the view(s) of the governor, and Sir John Anderson had 
(conveniently) passed away months earlier. It was obviously ‗impossible‘ for the new 
governor to write a report, having just ‗taken up his duties‘.18 Six months later, Amery, 
then Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, reported, that the question was ‗now 
engaging the Governor's attention‘. However, Britain‘s official mind was preoccupied 
with the ‗great problems of reconstruction in the Empire‘.19 The assertiveness that the 
Dominions displayed during the Paris Peace Conference and the constitutional changes 
being contemplated for India, which went ‗far beyond anything that has been previously 
contemplated or discussed in this country‘, were both an outcome of unprecedented 
wartime service.
20
 Ceylon‘s contribution by contrast was more modest, but not without 
merit. By the end of 1917, ‗approximately 2,750‘ men had left Ceylon to aid the war 
effort. It is unclear what service a lone ‗butler‘ rendered in Mesopotamia, but the initial 
105 men of the Ceylon Sanitary Company obviously performed valuable work in said 
theatre as the War Office telegraphed three times for additional men. All of whom were 
equipped and despatched using colonial funds. Donations also emanated from ‗every 
                                                 
18
 Extracts from Minutes of Proceedings and Papers laid before the Imperial War Conference, Cmd. 8566 
(London, 1917), pp. 4-5; Hansard, cviii. 1786; Hansard, cx. 3396.  
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 M. MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World (New York, 2002) pp. 44-5; ‗Note by 
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India. Hansard, xxvi. 818. On the even greater service of Canadians (and Australians) in the last year of 
the war, see T. Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1917-1918 (Toronto, 2008).  
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part of the Empire and every section of the population, from the native chiefs to the 
humblest of the people‘. In pledging a portion of their revenues to pay for the war, 
Amery feared, the colonies were incurring a liability ‗much larger than prudent finance 
would allow‘.21 Ceylon‘s Legislative Council, for example, pledged in late October 1917 
‗one million pounds as a further contribution towards the cost of the war; payment to be 
made within the next ten years by such instalments as may be found convenient‘. By 
February 1924, Ceylon had remitted £900,000 of the initial million pounds pledged in 
November 1915 and £600,000 of the second contribution. Amery need not have worried 
that Ceylon‘s wartime contributions would be forgotten. It would take longer than many 
would have liked, but eventually the Ceylonese people would have—for the colonial 
world—an unprecedented say in their country‘s governance.22  
 After the Legislative Council was established in 1833, Ceylon‘s constitution 
remained largely unchanged until 1910, when ‗modest‘ changes were made. Most 
significant was the creation of a standing Finance Committee that gave the Council‘s 
Unofficial Members a say in the budget and supplementary expenditures. In the spring 
of 1920, the governor, Sir William Manning, having learned ‗local opinion‘ on several 
occasions, was invited to London ‗to discuss the question of Constitutional Reform in 
                                                 
21
 Annual Report on Ceylon for 1917, Cd. 8973-20 (London, 1918), pp. 4-5; Hansard, cxviii. 2173. It was 
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Ceylon‘.23 A variety of deputations from Ceylon also made their way to Britain, 
including the Kandyan Association, the CNC, the Ceylon Reform League and the 
European Association of Ceylon. Amery assured the Commons that the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, Viscount Milner, would consider ‗all proposals placed before 
him‘. Amery hoped that he would soon be able to ‗inform the House of the general lines 
of the policy which he [Milner] proposes to adopt‘.24 A year earlier, the CNC sent 
Milner a telegram highlighting the opportunity before him: ‗Ceylon entitled more liberal 
treatment than India, being excellent field for realisation self-government subject to 
Imperial supervision. Such concession will prove to India and world genuineness of 
Imperial Government‘s desire for realisation of British ideals of liberty, self-
development and self-determination for all peoples.‘25 Ultimately, the compromise 
Milner devised was not well received.
26
 With the governor having a ‗permanent 
majority‘ in the Legislative Council, ‗reformers‘ dismissed the new constitution ‗as no 
reform at all‘. A leading Tamil politician, Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam, 
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 C. Jeffries, Ceylon: The Path to Independence (London, 1962), pp. 32 and 35-6; Hansard, cxxvi. 
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‗characterised the whole thing as a farce‘.27 Upon his return to Colombo, Arunachalam 
told the Times of India that the problem was that ‗their demands [were] too moderate‘ 
and the ‗many ―safe-guards‖ and checks‘ led the Colonial Office to conclude that ‗we 
distrusted ourselves‘. By contrast, critics in the House of Commons charged that the 
Colonial Office deliberately ignored recent constitutional changes in India as well as the 
broader ‗experience of the India Office in dealing with people, not only similar in 
character, but very largely identical‘ when drafting the 1920 Order-in-Council that 
implemented the new constitution.
28
 But Colonel Josiah Wedgwood‘s analysis 
overlooked a fundamental difference—to say nothing of differences referenced earlier—
that created an enormous challenge for the Colonial Office. The percentage of society 
that was ‗educated‘ was likely higher in Ceylon than India; in a debate filled with facts 
and counter facts of varying and unknown veracity, a Conservative MP put the total at 
forty per cent of the Ceylonese populace.
29
 What is clear is that Ceylon was approaching 
a stage of development that Britain‘s ‗experience of colonial administration up to that 
time provided little useful guidance‘. As a former deputy Under-Secretary of State for 
the Colonies acknowledged:  
The Colonial Office knew a lot about the problems of settlement colonies, large 
and small. It had learnt a good deal about the problems of governing countries 
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 The Guardian, 10 Aug. 1920, p. 6; Times of India, 11 Aug. 1920, p. 9. 
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with a primitive population. Now it was faced with the problem of a country with 
a population mainly indigenous, rapidly developing political maturity, yet riven 
by communal loyalties and rivalries.
30
  
 
After suggesting an opponent ‗really cannot know much about the Cingalese (sic),‘ 
Wedgwood proclaimed that thankfully Ceylon had ‗none of those silly rival religions or 
castes which separate people and make for intolerance and difficulty‘. He was convinced 
that communal representation was invented by ‗bureaucrats‘, presumably in the Colonial 
Office and/or Service, determined ‗to retain their present jobs and power‘. In suggesting 
that a Labour government would in ‗every case‘ move to establish colonial self-
governance ‗as quickly as possible‘, Wedgewood sought to abrogate the role of 
Westminster, the Imperial Parliament, as the centralising hub of the British Empire. 
Administering the empire on the ‗principle of democracy‘ as Labour wanted, however, 
simply was not practical.
31
 Although not invoked by name, the arguments in favour of 
the new constitution drew heavily on the ideas of Edmund Burke. Transplanting the 
equivalent of the House of Commons into every colony was bound to fail; in part 
because its ‗strength‘ and the ‗supreme‘ power of the Speaker evolved over time; of 
course, it was also claimed that the success of the Commons was rooted in the 
hyperbolic ‗instincts of the English people‘. Abandoning the existing Legislative 
Council, which allotted seats to the ‗different races and different classes‘ in favour of a 
‗territorial system‘, would lead to a less representative body given the island‘s 
demographics. It was also claimed that that ‗natives of Ceylon‘ had no interest in 
‗general representation‘. To critics that charged the new constitution did not transfer 
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enough power to the Council or that the governor‘s powers remained too extensive, the 
retort given was that ‗it gives a very greatly increased power to what the people of the 
country ever had before‘ and that the governor would be responsible to the Secretary of 
State.
32
 Progress in Ceylon ‗must be slow‘, declared a Labour MP. William Royce, who 
like ‗many of my hon. Friends round me‘ knew ‗nothing about Ceylon,‘ concluded ‗you 
cannot uplift a whole race to the same level of ideas that we possess in 24 hours‘. 
Parliament clearly was not the best venue for debating the future of the Empire, little 
wonder when in all of 1919 ‗this House had about four hours for the discussion of 
Colonial affairs!‘33  
 Perhaps it really was for the best, as Amery told the House, that ‗it is not the 
custom for changes in the Constitution of Crown Colonies to come up as Bills‘. To the 
Colonial Secretary, the new constitution represented ‗a genuine beginning of responsible 
government‘. Although the governor retained control over the Legislative Council, the 
reforms did include ‗urban and district councils, each with an elective majority and an 
elected chairman‘.34 The latter was part of the CNC‘s resolution on reforming the 
constitution, but the reforms were nevertheless denounced (in a cable to The Guardian) 
as ‗crude and reactionary‘.35 The Colonial Office‘s offence had been to enact an order-
in-council akin to the reforms Lords Ripon and Curzon had implemented in India a 
generation earlier. While the CNC recognised the importance of gaining ‗administrative 
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experience‘, they too favoured the ‗principle of solvitur ambulando‘ and envisioned 
gaining experience by being ‗made responsible for the administration of Departments‘ 
and ‗immediately‘ assuming at least ‗50%, rising up to 75%, of the higher appointments 
in the Ceylon Civil Service and the other branches of the public service‘. To ensure the 
‗smooth working of the political machinery under the altered conditions‘, the governor, 
with his ‗training in the public life of England‘, would be retained as a ‗constitutional 
ruler‘.36 In rejecting these demands, which the CNC incredulously termed ‗studiously 
moderate‘, the Colonial Office ran the risk of exposing Ceylon to the ‗evils of long and 
bitter agitation, unrest and discontent‘.37 Allegedly, it also created ‗advocates ... of the 
transfer of Ceylon to the administration of the India Office‘ and led to fundraising for a 
‗sustained and vigorous‘ propaganda campaign in favour of responsible government that 
was to be conducted in Ceylon and London.
38
 While the governor was later condemned 
for having ‗forfeited the confidence of this country‘, the CNC was persuaded by the 
island‘s distinguished Colonial Secretary, Sir Graeme Thomson, to refrain from a 
campaign of non-co-operation. Instead the CNC sent the governor a series of 
proposals—on the understanding that they were likely to be accepted—that gave ‗effect 
to the scheme of reforms‘ and ensured that the new constitution would be revised within 
a year of the new Legislative Council‘s first meeting.39 No one in London regarded the 
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1920 Order-in-Council as a ‗final scheme‘. But that is where the common ground ended. 
Amery had told the Commons in August that disappointed Ceylonese politicians had a 
duty ... to make the best of it, and the more capable you show yourselves of 
working this constitution in a practical and effective spirit, the more easy it will 
be for His Majesty's Government to introduce still further changes which will 
give you a wider representation and a greater element of responsibility.
40
 
 
The reformed Legislative Council met for the first time in June 1921, but the new 
Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Edward Wood, the future Earl of Halifax, 
warned that suggestions for further constitutional changes probably would not be 
forthcoming ‗until the Session has been in progress for some time‘.41 
 Six months later, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, 
erroneously told the Commons that the subject had yet to be addressed. The debate had 
actually concluded the previous week. The Oxford History of the British Empire 
notwithstanding, suggestions for a new constitution were proposed but no constitution 
was passed in 1921.
42
 As a result of Manning‘s skilful efforts ‗to speed it on its way to 
self-destruction‘, by the end of 1921, the CNC was confronted with internal and ethnic 
divisions; most notably, the Tamils no longer saw themselves as a majority community, 
like the Sinhalese, but as another minority community; a decision that still plagues Sir 
Lanka.
43
 However, Tamils also thought they deserved more representation on the 
Legislative Council, and ceased supporting the CNC. In any event, when the ‗moderate 
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... Nationalist‘ member for Colombo Town, James Peiris, introduced a plan in December 
1921 for a Legislative Council with twenty-eight of the forty-five seats elected on a 
territorial basis, with eleven and six seats for minorities and officials, respectively, the 
non-Congress majority balked and devised an alternative scheme, which proposed 
‗nineteen territorially elected members, eleven communally elected, three nominated 
unofficials and twelve officials‘. It fell to Manning (and the Colonial Office) to sort it all 
out.
44
 That did not, however, stem the tide of ‗telegrams of protest from some of the 
communities in Ceylon‘. Based on the information that reached him, Wood concluded 
that the slow progress in reforming the constitution was due to the ‗clash of interest 
between the Cingalese (sic) in Ceylon‘.45 
 The central issue was whether Ceylon had a homogenous populace. The CNC 
insisted on the ‗necessity of a territorially elected majority in Council‘. The Guardian 
echoed their claim that Ceylon‘s population was ‗substantially homogenous‘, and called 
on the Colonial Secretary to give the CNC‘s case ‗a fair hearing‘.46 Something Manning 
was determined not to do. His initial letter relaying details of the debate in the 
Legislative Council immediately focused on the ‗salient feature‘ of Peiris‘ proposed 
constitution, ‗namely, the recognition of the fact that the population of Ceylon is not 
homogeneous, and that the social structure is founded on a communal basis‘. Data from 
the 1921 Census drove the point home. A territorial system would likely produce pocket 
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boroughs for the Tamils and Sinhalese, Low-country and Kandyan. A Sinhalese alliance 
would ‗reduce all the other communities, severally and collectively, to political 
impotence‘. Raising the number of elected seats to forty-five would mean—to take the 
two extreme ends—that a member would be returned from Batticaloa Town and the 
Province of Uva, whose populations were 10,000 and 233,355, respectively. The number 
of seats allotted to minorities was also skewed. The 298,400 Muslims would receive two 
seats, while the 514,300 Tamils ‗were conceded at least nine seats‘. An amendment to 
Peiris‘ motion, which would have raised the number of seats elected on a territorial basis 
to thirty instead of the original twenty-eight, was defeated by a wide margin. However, 
the Unofficial Members vote favoured the amendment by a one-vote majority. The 
twelve votes in favour came from members representing nine territorial electorates, the 
Low Country Products Association and the nominated Kandyan Sinhalese members. 
Opposed were the Tamil, Burgher and European members, as well as the nominated 
Muslim and Indian members and a nominated Sinhalese member.  
All this led Manning to the obvious conclusion that voting ‗proceeded on 
Communal lines‘.47 Voting on other amendments further demonstrated that ‗there was 
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considerable divergence of opinion amongst the Unofficial members‘.48 If the Peiris‘ 
constitution were accepted, it would ‗reduce the satisfactory conduct of public business 
in the Council‘. Instead, Manning suggested a Council that incorporated aspects of the 
two schemes put forward by the divided Ceylonese politicians. In a nod to the CNC, the 
twenty-one territorially-elected seats would be filled via open elections. The Sinhalese 
would receive fourteen seats, while Tamils would be allotted all told eight seats instead 
of their previous three. Of the remaining communally elected seats, three were for the 
Europeans and two for the Burghers. The Muslims and Indians were allotted, 
respectively, three and two nominated seats, while officials had twelve seats and three 
nominated seats were reserved for special interests. The governor no longer had an 
official majority in the Legislative Council, though defeat on a central issue was unlikely 
given communal rivalry and the presence of European, Burgher, etc members.
49
 
Manning succeeded in convincing the Duke of Devonshire, who succeeded Churchill as 
Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1922, that Ceylonese society was organised on a 
communal basis and that this fact was ‗one of the essential considerations on which my 
decision must be based‘. It appeared ‗many years‘ would pass before limitations on the 
‗territorial basis of representation‘ could be lifted.50 It was a decision that would be 
welcomed by the ‗Burgher, Tamil, Mahommedan, Indian and European Members of the 
Legislative Council‘.  
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 Manning to Churchill, 1 Mar. 1922 and 14 Aug. 1922, in Cmd. 1809, pp. 8 and 29-30, respectively; 
Jeffries, Ceylon, p. 41. 
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Naturally, the CNC condemned Devonshire‘s despatch ‗as unsatisfactory and 
reactionary‘ and insisted that control of the Legislative Council should pass immediately 
to the Sinhalese through a ‗substantial territorially elected majority‘.51 Devonshire 
received a variety of ‗representations‘ on the proposed constitutional changes, 
interestingly both the Ceylon Tamil League and the Representative in England of the 
European Association of Ceylon, H.J. Temple, noted that ‗certain section of the 
Sinhalese ... have arrogated to themselves the name of the Ceylon National Congress and 
profess to speak on behalf of the whole people of Ceylon‘. Temple would ‗have nothing 
to say‘ had the CNC been named the Low Country Sinhalese Association. Instead, he 
went on to effectively counter CNC ‗propaganda‘ by pointing out (among other 
inconvenient truths) that ‗all the other races in the Island—together a majority of the 
population—stand out of Congress and have their own communal organisations for 
voicing their opinions‘.52 Devonshire acknowledged the expression of Ceylonese 
opinion he received by making a number of small changes to Manning‘s constitution; 
most notably adding an additional two territorially elected members and insisting that 
the Muslim and Indian members be elected rather than nominated.
53
 Once ‗so 
reactionary‘, the receptiveness of the Colonial Office to ‗representations‘ from 
Ceylonese political associations came as a surprise; moderation and ‗well reasoned‘ 
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proposals were the key to unlocking a ‗sympathetical‘ Colonial Office.54 For his part, the 
Colonial Secretary thought the ‗concessions‘ he made ‗constitute[d] a real advance in the 
direction of popular government‘ and suggested that Manning ‗should now lay before 
the Legislative Council this despatch and the despatches you have addressed to me on 
this subject‘. Although he was prepared to accept further ‗amendments in detail,‘ 
Devonshire considered the matter closed and thought in the ‗interests of stability‘ that 
further ‗amendments should be differed be deferred for five years at least, during which 
experience of the working of the revised constitution may be gained‘.55  
  While the practice of maintaining two voter rolls—one common, one 
communal—may have been ‗very skilful‘, in so much as it satisfied the Tamils, 
Muslims, Burghers and Sinhalese, the same cannot be said for the constitutional reforms 
as a whole.
56
 In hindsight, the main defect was apparent. ‗This constitution does not give 
any real responsibility to the new [Legislative] Council‘, lamented an MP. A vote of no-
confidence was meaningless to both the Governor and his Executive Council. The only 
power vested in the Legislative Council concerned the public purse. Whenever it came 
time to initiate new spending, if the unofficial members that controlled the Finance 
Committee would not vote supply, the executive branch only had two choices: abandon 
its plans or invoke the governors‘ reserve powers.57 The Colonial Office gambled that 
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the nominated and minority members would prove sufficiently friendly to the 
government‘s agenda; the lamenting MP referenced earlier actually dismissed the 
reformed Legislative Council as nothing more than a ‗creature of the Governor‘. Instead, 
the opposite happened. Communal loyalties tended to govern their interactions with each 
other, but a common culture, language (English) and social life united the Unofficial 
Members against the executive branch in most matters.
58
  
On the eve of the first anniversary of his arrival in Ceylon, the new governor, Sir 
Hugh Clifford sent his Colonial Secretary, then on leave in England, a ‗manuscript‘ that 
was to be ‗typed in this office‘ so that ‗no copy‘ would exist in Ceylon. These 
‗extraordinary precautions‘ were warranted.59 The despatch was a considered analysis of 
the prevailing political environment and ‗the circumstances in which the local 
Government is attempting to carry on the administration of this important Colony‘. In 
the headlong rush to reform the constitution, Clifford was unable to find any evidence to 
suggest anyone had tried to  
forecast the consequences of those innovations, to examine the practical effects 
which they would inevitably have upon the actual work of administration, or in 
any way to adapt the administrative machine—which was designed to serve the 
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Crown Colony system of government—to the wholly new conditions amid which 
it would henceforth be required to function.  
 
In the ensuing 136 pages, Clifford preceded to provide the missing analysis. Returning to 
the island after almost fifteen years away, the now-governor was noticeably struck by 
the changes that had occurred in Ceylonese society and politics.
60
 
 Clifford was ‗forcibly struck by the great awakening of racial antagonism and of 
religious animosity‘. A political awakening had also occurred. When he first came to the 
island, not ‗even the average highly educated Ceylonese‘ found being ruled by 
Europeans to be ‗humiliating‘. It was simply seen as being ‗part of the established and 
accepted order of things‘. The Morley-Minto Reforms—see Section 3.2—passed by 
‗almost unnoticed‘. A situation that could not continue as the press grew ever more vocal 
and, in particular, because ‗the Great War let loose upon the world a flood of theories 
concerning the rights and wrongs of small nations, the doctrine of self-determination and 
the like ....‘ A section of the ‗Ceylonese-owned‘ pre-war press increasingly accused the 
government of being the ‗oppressor of ―the people‖‘. However, such views were offset 
by European and Burgher publications that, while still critical of the Executive when 
warranted, dismissed the suggestion that ‗the Government was actuated by sinister and 
malevolent motives‘. Despite the criticism, the ‗power and the authority of the 
Executive‘ remained ‗unassailable‘ and, ‗in any Asiatic land‘, this, in turn, secured ‗a 
large measure of popular support‘. Moreover, the administration had a ‗great body of 
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sober Ceylonese opinion‘ on its side prior to the 1915 Riots.61 Not only did the 
crackdown introduce ‗an element of bitterness‘ into relations between the government 
and the ‗indigenous population‘, it further cemented the pre-war claim that the 
government and the governed were ‗diametrically opposed‘ and that anyone ‗claiming to 
rank as a patriot must necessarily be a consistent opponent of the Administration‘. This 
development would prove disastrous when constitutional changes were made. The two 
constitutions introduced both preserved the Legislative Council‘s ‗supreme authority‘ 
over spending, but they also left unchanged the ‗administrative machine designed for the 
executive control of public affairs under that system‘. That is to say, both constitutions 
assumed that the governor still commanded a ‗sufficient majority‘ in Council to ‗insure 
the good governance of the country‘. The ‗responsibility‘ for which ‗still rests as of old 
upon the Governor‘, but his power over the Legislative Council ‗has been taken from 
him‘. Article LIV offered illusory power as invoking the governors‘ reserve powers 
would likely  
cause locally such a turmoil of political excitement and disapprobation that the 
good will of the majority of the Legislative Council, upon which the Government 
is to-day dependent for all supply and for the means of carrying on the ordinary 
routine administration of the country, would thereby completely alienated, thus 
producing a situation which would render the work of Government impossible or 
would compel it to resort to measures that would be tantamount to a suspension 
of the Constitution. 
 
In effect, constitutional reform had transferred to a ‗majority of the Ceylonese Unofficial 
Members in the Legislative Council all power of decision in matters great and small that 
entail a penny of expenditure‘. Power had been completely divorced from responsibility, 
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with the governor left at the mercy of the ‗many ... weaknesses and peculiarities of [the] 
Ceylonese character‘.62 
 Clifford was not blind to the ‗many good qualities‘ of the Ceylonese, but their 
failings had to be ‗reckoned with‘ in light of the transfer of ‗power to a Ceylonese 
Majority in the Legislative Council‘. Before the War, the island had an ‗extraordinary 
restricted‘ worldview. But Ceylon was not immune to the ‗world-wide unrest of recent 
times‘. The ‗local press‘, now almost entirely in the ‗hands of Ceylonese‘, published 
‗columns of telegraphic news, garnered from every quarter of the world‘ on a daily 
basis. Unfortunately, the ‗Ceylonese publicist‘ processed a rather inexact ‗sense of 
proportion‘ that led to the belief that ‗he is taking no mean part in the universal 
upheaval‘. Consequently, the ‗educated sections of the community‘ were inundated with 
this ‗flood of new and exciting ideas‘, but were unable ‗to state facts which they know 
will be unpopular‘. Overall, the Unofficial Ceylonese Members tended to be ‗as able, as 
sound, as moderate and as reasonable a set of men as this Island can at present produce‘. 
However, they lived in ‗terror‘ of being criticised by their community‘s newspaper(s), or 
even worse being warned one was falling under ‗the malign influence of Queen‘s 
House‘.63 Influence and their ‗very seats‘ were all dependent on maintaining their 
‗personal popularity‘. Clifford thought that the ‗majority of them are convinced that a 
genuine and honest attempt is being made by the Government to administer the affairs of 
the Colony wisely and justly‘. But whatever their private thoughts actually were, 
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denouncing the Government was (understandably) ‗well nigh irresistible‘. Any 
Unofficial Member compelled into agreement with the Government—by ‗common sense 
and force of argument‘—assumes ‗an air of apology for such an act of apparent 
apostasy‘. Speaking the truth (to the masses) required a ‗man of great strength of 
character and exceptional moral courage‘. In the absence of a Gandhi-like figure, a 
‗puerile and nonsensical‘ atmosphere had developed. Discussion of ‗public questions‘ 
occurred in an ‗atmosphere of complete unreality‘. Newspapers and local patriots—of 
the ignorant and ‗highly educated‘ variety—were, for example, ‗unwearying laudatory 
temporis acti; and daily the most shamelessly apocryphal history is being taught 
broadcast to an ignorant, vain and excitable people‘. Numerous stories were spun of how 
Ceylon suffered ‗under the strangle-hold of British rule‘ in comparison to the ‗glorious 
days of Parakrama Bahu [r. 1153-86]‘.64 The ‗agitators‘ maintained that ‗the crimes of a 
British Colonial Administration‘ are the reason that this golden period did not persist ‗to 
this day‘. Earlier that fall, the Government Agent of the Western Province learned from 
‗one of his most experienced Mudaliyars‘ or chief headmen that the ‗villagers‘ were 
starting to believe the anti-Government message(s). Moderate Ceylonese, who viewed 
these developments with ‗apprehension‘, were unable/unwilling to ‗apply any 
corrective‘ for reasons already explained. The Government by contrast was completely 
powerless as ‗local susceptibilities bleed at the lightest touch, and such a thing as a frank 
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discussion of historical facts would at once be attributed to prejudice and to ―lack of 
sympathy with the people‖‘.65 
 ‗Agitation for constitutional reform is,‘ Clifford explained, ‗in its essence, racial, 
rather than political‘. In the language of the time, the ‗distrust and dislike of the Colonial 
Government‘ was a consequence of its ‗―foreign‖ character‘. As was suggested in the 
previous paragraph, the Ceylonese, and the Sinhalese, in particular, identified with 
Ceylon‘s past glory. Blaming Britons for their country‘s subsequent downfall was, 
Clifford concluded, ‗very grateful to the feelings and flattering to the vanity of a people 
who, for some hundreds of years, have never given token of any sort of originality and 
have not produced a single individual who has markedly excelled in any branch of 
human activity‘.66 Shockingly an official in the Colonial Office labelled Clifford‘s 
despatch as too ‗caustic‘ to be published. It was later determined that Clifford probably 
was ‗incensed‘ at ‗Sinhalese intransigeance (sic) and inefficiency‘ when he composed 
his despatch.
67
 As previously discussed, post-war constitutional reform in Ceylon 
seemed to follow the pattern of the Dominions, but the Ceylonese viewed things very 
different. Instead of ‗a gift freely made by His Majesty‘s Government,‘ the reforms were 
seen as ‗spoils wrung from a humiliated and defeated local Administration‘. Three 
constitutions in fifteen years simply ‗whetted the local appetite for further concessions‘. 
Relations between the ‗Government and the governed‘ were actually worsening in light 
of the ‗daily execration and attack‘, the governor lamented. Clifford blamed the 
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‗inordinate vanity‘ of the Ceylonese people for the disharmony, writing that the ‗oriental 
mind is attuned to respect Authority‘ and would remain so provided the Government 
vigorously defended itself ‗against assault‘. However, this was impossible as the 
Legislative Council was ‗a highly hypersensitive audience composed of gentlemen who 
are at once excitable and temperamental, acutely suspicious, quick to take offence and to 
imagine that offence is intended, and capable when their passions are aroused of almost 
any act of impulsive folly‘. Government business could only be carried out using the 
‗utmost tact and ... inexhaustible patience‘, while experienced ‗officers‘ also stressed the 
importance of suppressing or ignoring ‗material facts‘ that might ‗reflect adversely upon 
local characteristics‘. Such an attitude would have been unthinkable in London. Yet, 
Clifford and others had no trouble treating their fellow Britons with contempt.
68
  
Recent scholarship has suggested that ‗Britishness‘ was not limited to the white 
settler colonies, which, together with Clifford‘s own observations, suggests that the 
Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council should perhaps be treated similarly.
69
 
After all the Sinhalese elite were a ‗product of British training and influence‘. Although 
Clifford condescendingly dismissed them as an ‗essentially imitative people‘, the fact 
remains that they acquired a measure of that infamous English ‗public school spirit‘ in 
the secondary schools referenced earlier. They delighted in ‗orthodox‘ banquets and 
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‗after-dinner oratory‘, though they struggled with their Sinhalese and tended to rely on 
the ‗most hackneyed of English quotations‘ to settle disputes. Many of them were also 
members of the Church of England, a fact that makes their reference ‗in ordinary 
conversation ... to England as ―Home‖‘ seem less implausible. Whatever culture they 
possessed, Clifford concluded, was ‗essentially British in its origins‘. Given his tone, it 
seems clear that Clifford did not view the Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council 
as (near) equals, as Lord Curzon did with the Indian Princess. Nevertheless, the fact 
remains that these men were effectively cultural creoles; their proclamations of the 
‗innate superiority of Sinhalese ... culture‘ notwithstanding.70 Ever since the British 
conquered the island, the issue was how to consolidate the (increasing diversity of) 
peoples—as of 31 December 1925, Ceylon‘s populace consisted of 2,065,430 Low 
Country Sinhalese, 1,167,307 Kandyan Sinhalese, 532,535 Ceylon Tamils, 620,459 
Indian Tamils, 259,399 Ceylon Moors, 34,005 Indian Moors, 31,532 Burghers and 
Eurasians, 14,404 Malays, 10,212 Europeans and 26,338 Veddas and Others—of Ceylon 
into a ‗cohesive whole‘.71 Whereas the British had originally labelled the ‗Sinhalese as 
―indigenous‖ peoples and the Malabars [later termed Ceylon Tamils] as recent arrivals 
from South India‘, the issue in the mid-1920s was whether a Buddhist-infused-Sinhalese 
or a Creolised-British ‗spirit of nationality‘ would prevail.72  
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  Had the Kandyan aristocracy made common cause with their Low-Country 
counterparts, the Sinhalese would have assured themselves an ‗impregnable political 
ascendancy‘. However, much to the annoyance of Low Country Sinhalese politicians, 
Kandyan leaders declined the opportunity to become a marginalised junior partner.
73
 
Instead, the recently formed Kandyan National Assembly tried to claim a variety of 
rights under the 1815 Kandyan Convention that sought to assert the connection between 
‗His Britannic Majesty‘ and the ‗Kandyan people‘ and strengthen the position of ‗British 
gentlemen‘ in the Kandyan Provinces, at the expense of the Low Country Sinhalese.74 
Their argument was ‗clearly not sustainable‘, but Clifford thought that it demonstrated 
Kandyan ‗distrust of the present Legislative Council ...and apprehension which are 
aroused in them by the steady overflow of Low Country Sinhalese into the Kandyan 
Provinces‘. The latter made the Kandyan position in Council even worse. Low Country 
Sinhalese comprised a little over thirty-two per cent of Kandy town‘s populace, and 
therefore had little trouble getting one of their own elected to the Legislative Council. A 
predictable outcome when the Kandyans represented just under a quarter of the town‘s 
population, and the remaining electorate consisted of Moors, Tamils and Indian traders, 
but the Kandyan aristocracy still saw it as ‗a deep humiliation‘. It was also a harbinger of 
further problems. The Low Country Sinhalese, who were comparatively ‗better 
educated‘ and more ‗politically minded‘, were slowly colonising the ‗sparsely 
populated‘ Kandy provinces; a development that was to ‗some degree welcomed‘ by the 
‗Kandyan people‘ as it ‗strengthened them against their Chiefs‘. While Low Country 
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Sinhalese denounced the ‗communal spirit‘ as nothing more than ‗divide et impera, the 
Kandyans, no less than the [Ceylonese] Tamils and the Muslims, feel that their safety 
largely depends upon its continued recognition‘. Indian Tamils played no role in 
Ceylonese politics; being largely mobile ‗estate labourers‘ they typically could not meet 
the franchise qualifications and Tamils, who had the vote, like Indian and Ceylonese 
Moors, tended to be more interested in their ‗business affairs‘ than politics. As 
descendents of troops brought from Batavia by the Dutch, the Malays occupied ‗no 
prominent place in the political or economic life of Ceylon‘. By contrast, the Burghers 
had provided the ‗clerical‘ backbone of the Public Service for years, being seen by 
‗experienced Heads of Departments‘ as ‗more trustworthy and often more efficient than 
other Ceylonese‘. Nevertheless, they viewed the transfer of power with ‗acute 
apprehension‘. Both the Sinhalese and Tamils looked upon Burghers ‗with dislike and 
with suspicion‘. Feelings could be carried to ‗extremes‘ if there was a perception of 
‗preferential treatment‘, such as ‗Burgher lepers‘ receiving a different diet than 
Sinhalese lepers in the same asylum. Lastly, the Europeans, who could be divided into 
four categories—the planters, the business community, the superior artisan class and the 
Public Service officers—were largely ignorant of the ‗profound changes which have 
been wrought, during the last fifteen years, in the political constitution of the Colony, or 
the actual transfer of power from the Government to a Ceylonese Unofficial Majority in 
the Legislative Council‘. The planters, in particular, were living ‗in something of a fools‘ 
paradise‘. The era of ‗racial superiority‘ was ending. Moreover, their influence was 
further diminished by the creation in 1921 of the Ceylon Estates Proprietary Association, 
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which lobbied on behalf of the ‗big [limited liability] firms in Colombo‘ and thereby 
undercut the ‗authority‘ that the Planters‘ Association of Ceylon had formerly exercised. 
The lone representative for the ‗planting community‘ on the Legislative Council was 
‗almost completely impotent‘, while the two European members were only ‗listened to 
by their colleagues with attention when they speak on business questions‘. All told, the 
prevailing environment was not exactly favourable to the CNC, which has to be seen as 
‗a purely Sinhalese institution, to which, moreover, the Kandyans pay only a grudging 
allegiance‘. The Low Country Sinhalese, in particular, were also growing increasingly 
resentful of the Tamils, who refused ‗to account themselves merely a minority section of 
an united ―Ceylonese nation‖‘. As much as the CNC denounced it, ‗communal feeling‘ 
was simply inescapable in such a ‗heterogeneous population‘. In fact, Clifford noted, 
‗Sinhalese politicians‘ themselves were ‗au fond animated by it‘ as their community‘s 
‗numerical strength‘ made opposing communal politics a top priority. While Ceylonese 
society had evolved to the point that European officials—save for a handful of senior 
officials ‗brought up in the old school‘—accepted the ‗rather insistent assumption of 
equality by the Ceylonese‘ with ‗courtesy and with good temper‘, administratively and 
constitutionally the island had regressed under the recently imposed ‗modern 
conditions‘.75  
 Clifford concluded that ‗senior civil servants‘ had decided ‗to carry on the 
administration of the country very much as though no radical alterations in the 
machinery of administration had been made‘. Unofficial Members were therefore left to 
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discover information on their own, though they began to be seen by the public as 
‗convenient courts of appeal‘. The result was an atmosphere of ‗suspicion and 
antagonism‘. Department heads were unamused by the ‗deluge of criticism and advice‘ 
from frequently ‗patently ignorant‘ Unofficial Members and the ‗many hours‘ wasted in 
the anti-chamber awaiting their turn before the Finance Committee. Anyone that was 
also a Council Member was forced to endure ‗very prolonged debates ... while the 
undealt-with files accumulate on their office tables‘. The result was the ‗regrettable‘ 
loosening of the Colonial Secretary‘s ‗central control‘, a hallmark of the ‗Crown Colony 
system of government‘. As Department Heads became aware of this development, it 
became possible for ‗quite serious happenings‘ to occur ‗in a Department without the 
Governor or the Colonial Secretary being made immediately aware of them‘. Both men, 
however, were still consulted on ‗matters of great difficulty and moment‘. Department 
Heads experienced a similar loss of ‗control‘. Meanwhile, the Civil Service‘s ‗tone‘ and 
‗efficiency‘ was unchanged despite the admission of a ‗large Ceylonese element‘, 
thereby destroying the ‗homogeneity of that Body‘; a change that made life ‗less 
enjoyable‘ for the ‗British civil servant‘ assigned to an ‗out-station‘. Overall, the Public 
Service was plagued by a ‗marked decline‘ in ‗spirit‘ and the ability ‗to maintain secrecy 
with regard to confidential matters‘. Lobbying, to fill vacant positions, in particular, was 
‗being carried on quite systematically by Ceylonese public servants‘, but Clifford 
directed his harshest criticism at the Unofficial Majority in the Legislative Council.
76
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 Not only were they using civil servants as ‗their private intelligence officers‘ and 
examining the ‗contents of waste-paper baskets or of blotting-paper filched for their use 
from Government offices‘, thereby ‗undermining‘ the ‗integrity and the efficiency of the 
Public Service,‘ the Unofficial Members of the Council were quite simply 
‗constitutionally incapable of dealing impartially with any matter into which the 
personal, communal or racial equation enters‘. Worse still, they were actively weakening 
the ‗administrative machine[ry]‘ of the Government. ‗Having now completed this 
general survey of the situation in Ceylon to-day, as I conceive it to be,‘ wrote Clifford, at 
the bottom of page fifty-three, ‗I must return to a consideration of the position in the 
Legislative Council itself.‘ Over the course of sixty-plus pages, he outlined in explicit 
detail what had been learned from ‗working‘ the current Constitution; before going on to 
draw conclusions in the remaining twenty-odd pages.
77
 Clifford‘s ‗colossal and 
exhaustive despatch‘ defies easy analysis. ‗Impossible to summarise‘, minuted one 
official. Who then went on to write: ‗I am afraid that it is necessary to read the whole of 
it‘. A few things, however, do stand out. The 1923 Constitution should have 
accompanied a new governor. Instead, the new Council, with its enlarged Unofficial 
Majority and newly elected Vice-President, met for ‗some six months‘ prior to 
Manning‘s departure, whose ship was ‗appointed to sail from Colombo on April 1st‘.78 
Sailing from Lagos on 8 May, Clifford landed at Plymouth two weeks later. He was 
expected to sail for Ceylon in a ‗few months time‘. It was later reported that he would 
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not take up his latest governorship until October.
79
 Reports of ill health in The Times of 
Ceylon were denied, though Clifford did suffer from ‗occasional bouts of depression‘. 
Finally, following a banquet hosted by the African chapters of the London, Liverpool 
and Manchester Chambers of Commerce, Clifford and his wife departed Liverpool on 6 
November.
80
 They arrived in Colombo ‗amid scenes of enthusiasm‘ three and a half 
weeks later. However, during the eight-month ‗interregnum,‘ the Ceylonese Unofficial 
Majority had taken on the airs of a ‗Parliamentary Opposition‘. Their attitude hardened 
by the expectation that Clifford, as a former Colonial Secretary ‗under the old Crown 
Colony régime,‘ would ‗prove strongly reactionary and desirous of depriving them of the 
power which, during my absence from Ceylon, they had won for themselves‘. In fact, 
the opposite would happen as the consequences of the Unofficial Majority adopting a 
parliamentary attitude had proved utterly disastrous.
81
  
  Instead seeing themselves as an ‗integral‘ part of the Government, ‗in all 
financial matters‘ the Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council ‗instinctively play 
the role, not of custodians of the public till, but of the leaders of popular raids directed 
alike upon revenue and the expenditure‘. They were then judged by both the ‗virulence‘ 
of their ‗attacks and denunciations‘ and the degree of ‗embarrassment‘ the 
Administration endured. Furthermore, there was the immediate need to use their 
newfound powers ‗to impress the local public‘. Consequently, the acting Colonial 
Secretary received a resolution to reduce the 1925-6 budget by four million rupees, 
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while also abolishing taxes on popular foodstuffs and reducing by varying percentages 
all railway fares. It was all grandstanding that in the end put half a million rupees into 
‗the pockets of the boutique-keepers without the consumer receiving any benefit 
whatsoever‘ and ‗necessitated applications for supplementary supply upon a[n 
unprecedented] scale‘. More damaging was that such actions created the impression that 
the Government was ‗refusing to supply works and services for which the Council has 
duly voted the funds‘. In one case, a million rupees that was to be used to improve the 
rail network was deleted from the budget, only to become a supplementary vote ‗some 
six months later‘. The monies were approved ‗without a word of question or comment 
by Unofficial Members‘. Naturally, the ‗local newspapers‘ vigorously denounced the 
Railway Department. That the Government should not ‗be held responsible for mistakes 
which it has been unable to prevent, is an idea that penetrates very slowly into the public 
intelligence‘, wrote a frustrated Clifford. In another instance, ‗a number of Ceylonese 
Unofficial Members‘, who in ‗some cases‘ were ‗sincerely convinced temperance 
advocates‘, thwarted Government efforts to ‗prevent the illicit sale of liquor‘. Eventually 
they were persuaded to allow the Excise Department to gather admissible evidence, but 
‗for many months‘ it was ‗some of the loudest advocates of prohibition‘ that ensured 
illicit liquor was available ‗all over Ceylon‘. Little wonder that Clifford went on to 
complain that the current constitution had produced ‗a hopelessly illogical position‘. Had 
this been an isolated example it could be dismissed as mildly ironic, but the interference 
with the Excise Department was (to varying degrees) ‗occurring in almost every branch 
of the Administration‘. Ultimately, Clifford concluded, the 1923 Constitution was 
 250 
 
 
simply teaching the Ceylonese ‗how to weaken and disorganise the administrative 
machine and how to render good government difficult, if not impossible‘. Furthermore, 
in exercising their power ‗capriciously, mischievously and with complete 
irresponsibility‘, the Unofficial Majority were likely ‗postponing‘ the granting of further 
reforms.
82
 However, in trying to solve an issue he first encountered in 1907, Clifford 
could give the Unofficial Majority what it craved, power; while also answering the 
dilemma posed by Thucydides of how a democratic empire might work.
83
 
 Amongst all of ‗His Majesty‘s Tropical Possessions‘, Ceylon stood out for the 
degree to which its inhabitants ‗have become accustomed to depend upon government ... 
for services of all descriptions‘. Clifford knew of no other colony where a ‗British 
Administration‘ had failed to ‗engender ... even a rickety spirit of self-help‘ in the 
populace. Government, he thought, should absolutely respond to floods, famines and 
other ‗calamities‘, but the Ceylonese never thought that ‗anybody else should do 
anything‘. Whereas the more prosperous members of the Chinese community in Malaya 
aided ‗their poorer fellows‘, the Ceylonese ‗cry‘ that the Government is not doing 
enough. Free pastureland could be allotted to a village. However, if the Government 
suggested that the ‗villagers should clear and fence it for themselves‘, the free land 
would be ‗regarded as an act of tyranny‘. In another village, coastal erosion threatened 
the coconut trees. The Government decided ‗to supply them with rubble and to transport 
it, free of cost, to their very doors‘, but the villagers dismissed the idea that they ‗do the 
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necessary work themselves, even under technical instruction and supervision,‘ as 
‗altogether unacceptable‘. Numerous other examples followed. Underlying all these 
demands for services, including a ‗State Bank‘ that would give out loans to ‗needy 
Sinhalese on terms that would not appeal to a Bank or other business institution‘, was 
the idea that the ‗Government is the possessor of the purse of Fortunatus‘ and the 
Ceylonese, now in ‗control of the public purse,‘ dreamed of seeing ‗Colonial revenues 
devoted to the financing and stimulation of indigenous private enterprise‘. Looking 
ahead, Clifford foresaw, ‗many schemes of a highly risky and speculative character‘.84 If 
the Governor disapproved, his options were severely limited.  
To illustrate the impotency of Government, Clifford detailed a dispute that arose 
‗shortly‘ before his arrival. The Officer Administering the Government, Sir Cecil 
Clementi, had lent a ‗junior civil servant to the Director of Medical and Sanitary 
Services for the purposes of evolving order out of chaos in the headquarters office of his 
Department‘. This decision aroused the ire of the Ceylonese Unofficial Members, for 
whom there was ‗no term of contempt in their vocabulary so forcible, in their estimation, 
as that of ―bureaucrat‖‘. A Select Committee was struck to study the appointment. Its 
lacking of ‗any administrative experience‘ evidently was not seen as an impediment. 
Days later, the Committee recommended that a ‗senior member of the Clerical Service‘, 
rather than said civil servant, be appointed. A decision that Clifford and ‗all my 
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experienced advisers‘ regarded as ‗quite useless‘. If the Unofficial Members insisted on 
appointing a member of the Clerical Services to the ‗post of Office Assistant to the 
Director [of Medical Services]‘, Clifford would have no choice but to ‗disclaim 
responsibility‘ for the consequences. ‗A lot of good that would be‘, scribbled a Colonial 
Office official.  
Although the appointment was ‗very urgently called for‘, Clifford, unlike the 
Colonial Office official, and ‗later governors‘, recognised that appointing a civil servant 
to such a minor post could ‗hardly‘ be considered to be of ‗paramount importance‘ to 
justify invoking the governors‘ reserve powers. Any decision, no matter how trivial, the 
Executive made was ‗liable to be fettered by the caprices of the Unofficial Majority‘. 
But to appoint an ‗office Assistant‘ via emergency power was to make a mockery of the 
‗existing Constitution‘. The Unofficial Majority had acquired power without even a 
‗shadowy appreciation of the fact that they, and not the Executive, [had] become 
responsible for the results if that power be unwisely exercised‘. Clifford strongly 
recommended that a means needed to be devised to make the Unofficial Majority aware 
of the ‗full burden of responsibility upon them, and of bringing home to them the heavy 
weight and the meaning of it‘.85 And what could be better than handing them even more 
power? 
 When the new constitution was handed down in 1923, Devonshire had indicated 
that ‗no further constitutional reforms should be considered for at least five years‘ in 
order to provide sufficient time to determine the soundness of the reforms. ‗The results 
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of that experience are set forth in paragraph 25 et seq. of this Despatch‘, declared 
Clifford. In short, the Constitution ‗can be made to function after a fashion‘. But the 
‗prudent and efficient administration‘ of Ceylon was threatened, as ‗deadlock [with the 
Unofficial Majority] is merely a matter of time‘. Clifford hoped to ‗take the initiative‘ in 
proposing further reforms, in part to avoid the impression that further reforms were the 
‗result of local agitation‘. But the Governor had also obtained ‗a copy of correspondence 
which has recently passed between the ―National Congress‖ and the European 
Association, in which the former puts forward, as a basis of discussion, a scheme which 
would confer upon Ceylon full responsible government‘.86 Clifford quoted the 
‗document in extenso‘, including a letter from the secretary of the European Association 
of Ceylon that indicated the proposed reforms would be discussed at their ‗next Council 
Meeting‘ and invited the CNC to provide ‗fuller information‘ on seven issues, which 
they did.
87
 The ‗tentative scheme‘ drawn up by a sub-committee of the CNC called for a 
government ‗responsible to the Legislature‘, with ‗ministers chosen from among the 
elected members of the Legislature‘. The Governor would select a ‗chief minister‘, who 
would then ‗nominate the other ministers for appointment by the Governor‘. A 
Ceylonese executive consisting of Ministers of Finance, Justice, Education, Agriculture, 
Industries and Public Works, as well as a Home Minister, who would oversee eight 
disparate departments, would replace the existing Executive Council. Naturally, the 
CNC proposed that eighty percent of the seats in the Legislative Council be elected on a 
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territorial basis, though the final proportion was ‗to be fixed after consultations with the 
various communities of the Island‘.88 Was this an admission that the island was not 
homogenous after all?  
In any event, the CNC was rather conciliatory in comparison to previous 
proposals for constitutional reform; being ‗quite open to discussion‘ of the Governor 
retaining an official element in his ‗advisory body‘ and ‗prepared to discuss further with 
... [the European Association] any points you consider necessary‘. On several of the 
issues on which the European Association sought clarification, the CNC held up ‗British 
Parliamentary procedure‘ as their guide. The one departure they proposed concerned the 
Secretary of State‘s assent on legislation passed by the Legislative Council. For bills of a 
‗purely domestic nature‘ the CNC thought it was no longer needed.89  
While potentially more conciliatory to other Ceylonese, the CNC was also far 
more ambitious in comparison to the ‗more modest‘ scheme put forth by Peiris at the end 
of 1921. Ever since his arrival Clifford had engaged in ‗informal discussions‘ and these 
led him to conclude that ‗leading Sinhalese Unofficial Members are anxious for more 
power, and are especially eager to secure to themselves the exercise of the patronage at 
present at the disposal of the Government, [but] they are at heart very reluctant to 
assume any real responsibility for the conduct of public affairs‘. Appointing Unofficial 
Members to the Executive Council certainly had advantages, though the ‗invidious‘ task 
of selecting Ministers would fall to the Governor as the Unofficial Members ‗frankly‘ 
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said that their ‗communal and personal jealousies and differences‘ rendered it impossible 
for them to select the ‗best men‘. But Clifford concluded that overall, the proposed 
reforms would not make governing easier nor would it bring about the ‗most urgently 
needed‘ development, ‗viz. the transference of responsibility to the Ceylonese Majority 
in the Legislative Council‘. The Governor advised that now was time for reforms that 
would be seen ‗to differ, not in degree but in kind‘.90  
Dismissed earlier as being unsuitable to Ceylon, with its ‗central [rather than 
provincial] government‘, Clifford thought a ‗system of Dyarchy ... might be tried in 
Ceylon‘.91 Such a system held the devious potential for dealing (what Clifford termed) 
‗the ―National Congress‖‘ a two-fold blow. Not only would the Unofficial Members‘ 
desire for an expansion of their ‗powers of active interference‘ not happen, but in 
making select Members responsible for ‗certain Departments—e.g. Medical and 
Sanitary, Education, Agriculture, Forestry and perhaps even the Public Works 
Department—‘ they would become ‗target[s] for newspaper criticism‘. Anyone who 
possessed ‗any latent administrative abilities‘ would prosper, which offered the 
possibility of a cadre of native intermediaries emerging (as occurred in India) that, like 
the planter class, could potentially act as a bulwark of the colonial regime. Clifford was 
fully conscious of the magnitude his recommended course of action represented, 
warning that Department Heads ‗would have to be given the choice of accepting the new 
conditions or of retiring on the enhanced pension provided for in the case of abolition of 
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office‘.92 But the Governor recognised that Ceylon would ‗sooner or later, [receive] 
some form of self-government‘. If such an outcome is ‗not only desirable but 
practicable‘ why delay its implementation, he wondered; as will be seen, Lord Irwin 
followed a similar line in India.  
In light of recent experience, however, it was too soon to grant Ceylonese 
Ministers the ‗authority enjoyed by Ministers under a system of responsible government, 
or to bind the Governor to accept their advice in all circumstances‘. Clifford argued that 
while Indian-style safeguards were needed, ‗to make a success of the experiment‘ the 
Ceylonese Ministers needed ‗as much freedom of action as might be feasible‘ and should 
be accorded ‗every support and assistance‘. Having dutifully painted a ‗true and 
unvarnished picture‘, Clifford recommended despatching a ‗small Royal Commission‘, 
which should gather evidence ‗in camera ... to invite genuine expression of opinion‘ and 
included at least one ‗gentleman possessing recent experience of Provincial 
administration in India,‘ to visit Ceylon if the Home Government was ‗prepared‘ to 
introduce ‗new measures designed to train the Ceylonese for eventual self-
government‘.93 
While it would later be ‗cautiously detached from the files and locked up lest the 
ungodly should triumph‘, Clifford‘s despatch initially offered ‗the best plan‘ to (what the 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies deemed as) the ‗stupid‘ decision of 
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giving the Ceylonese an ‗unofficial majority before they were ready for it‘.94 Even a 
future head of the Eastern Department admitted that ‗in the long run‘ there could be no 
avoiding transferring ‗greater responsibility‘ onto Ceylonese politicians, who continually 
called for the appointment of ‗responsible ministers ... [but] always find some fault with 
any definite proposal‘.95 Another critic accepted parts of Clifford‘s analysis, minuting 
that the Ceylonese ‗are not fit yet for the power they have already got. Surely that is an 
argument for not giving them more?‘ He ‗plead[ed]‘ for a policy that would not ‗sell the 
pass in the East‘.96 But to no avail; the decision to appoint ‗a small commission‘ was 
made less than three weeks later.
97
 Amery endorsed Clifford‘s analysis based on ‗the 
reports which had reached me of on the working of the existing constitution‘ from 
unnamed sources, and planned to appoint a ‗small Royal Commission‘ towards the end 
of the year.
98
 With a general election expected ‗early in 1929‘, it was thought that MPs 
would be hard to recruit if the Commission was held in the ‗autumn of 1928‘, the eve of 
the fifth year anniversary of the existing constitution.
99
 As was the case with the Simon 
Commission—see Section 3.2—the Conservative Government was anxious that it, and 
not a potential Labour Government, found a replacement for the seemingly defunct vis-
à-vis Ceylon, at least, Crown Colony system of governance. Appointed on 6 August 
1927, the four-man commission was chaired by the Earl of Donoughmore, who was far 
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from the Colonial Office‘s first choice, but he had at least been a member of Edwin 
Montagu‘s 1917 mission to India. They were more successful in securing their other 
preferred choices; particularly the Labour MP, Dr. T. Drummond Shiels, whose role in 
the Empire Parliamentary Association‘s visit to Australia the previous year was highly 
praised by Lord Salisbury, the Tory Leader in the House of Lords.
100
 By the time the 
committee was appointed, doubts existed within the Colonial Office as to the veracity of 
Clifford‘s despatch, hence the terms of reference:  
To visit Ceylon and report on the workings of the existing Constitution and on 
any difficulties of administration which may have arisen in connection with it; to 
consider any proposals for the revision of the Constitution that may be put 
forward, and to report what, if any, amendments of the Order in Council now in 
force should be made‘.101  
 
Amery‘s decision to despatch another commission, almost timed to the centennial of the 
Colebrooke-Cameron Commission, was momentous and had a ‗galvanizing‘ effect on 
Ceylon.
102
 
Upon learning that a ‗special commission‘ was to be appointed to consider 
revising Ceylon‘s Constitution, a member of the Legislative Council immediately served 
noticed that he intended to ask if the correspondence between Clifford and Amery would 
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be published.
103
 Meantime, the president of the CNC wrote the Colonial Secretary to see 
if Clifford‘s despatch would be published and in the interim to request that a ‗copy‘ be 
forwarded to him to assist the CNC in formulating their ‗policy as regards the Special 
Commission to be shortly appointed‘. Clifford was not at ‗liberty to publish his 
despatch‘, but the reply included several lengthy quotations that (in the words of K.M de 
Silva) ‗must no doubt have given Congress politicians a great deal of encouragement‘.104 
These extracts were subsequently published, thereby allowing the Government to 
sidestep increasingly pointed questions in the Legislative Council.
105
 With said leaks 
seeming to endorse the CNC‘s ‗own line of thinking‘, the other communities began 
‗making exaggerated claims and demands in the hope of influencing the commission‘s 
work and the political-constitutional structure it would recommend‘. Not surprisingly 
this further exacerbated ‗communal and political tensions in the island,‘ but it also ‗led 
to a further weakening of the Congress as a political body‘ owing to infighting over 
whether constitutional reforms could be divorced from ‗social and economic‘ conditions. 
Equally divisive was the call for universal (male) suffrage; the faction that prevailed 
                                                 
103
 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, 12 Apr. 1927, p. 8; V.S. de S. Wikramanayake to 
the Clerk, Legislative Council, 12 Apr. 1927, CO 54/889/8.  
104
 Edward Perera to A.G.M. Fletcher, 12 April 1927; W.L. Murphy to Perera, 29 Apr. 1927, CO 54/889/8; 
de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, p. 517. Ultimately, on 15 March, the Legislative Council symbolically 
adopted a resolution by seventeen votes to fifteen condemning the Government for failing to publish 
Clifford‘s despatch as well as for its ‗failure to assign any reason thereto[, which] impairs confidence in 
the Government and is against the interests of the Country‘. Quoted in Stanley to Amery, 9 May 1928, CO 
54/889/8.  
105
 Enclosures in Stanley to Amery, 9 May 1928, CO 54/889/8. Clifford was given the ‗option of staying 
on in Ceylon or taking up the Governorship of the Straits Settlements, which carries with it the High 
Commissionership of the Malay States‘. Naturally, he chose his ‗first love‘. Quoted in The Singapore Free 
Press and Mercantile Advertiser, 7 Apr. 1927, p. 7. It appears that the move was simply a consequence of 
Sir Laurence Guillemard wanting to retire rather than an effort to get Clifford out of Ceylon. Replacing 
Clifford as Governor of Ceylon was the then Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir Herbert Stanley, whose 
suggested successor was the Colonial Secretary of the Gold Coast, Sir James Maxwell. Unsigned letter to 
Lord Stamfordham, 22 Feb. 1927, CO 323/978/2.  
 260 
 
 
favoured restrictions—even if it meant being perceived as a ‗rigidly conservative, 
oligarchic body‘—to ensure that only the right ‗class of person‘ would be 
enfranchised.
106
  
It was into this fractured environment that the Commission found itself, when 
they landed on 13 November, having departed England on 27 October after they finished 
reviewing ‗copies of all despatches, open and confidential,‘ and papers presented to 
Parliament.
107
 Over the course of two and a half months, the Donoughmore Commission 
familiarised itself with ‗all sections of the community‘ through unofficial tours of the 
island and examining 141 individuals and delegations, primarily in public sittings.
108
 
Evidence was gathered in private at the ‗request of witnesses or as in our opinion the 
public interested dictated‘. In addition to interviewing political, religious and 
commercial associations, the commission received a ‗large number of letters and 
memoranda‘ from people across the island that ‗either could not or did wish to give 
evidence in person‘. This ‗great volume of evidence‘ was later supplemented by 
interviews with representatives from the Ceylon Association in London. The 
Commission returned to London on 4 February 1928, and looked to the Colonial Office 
to make arrangements to print and index ‗over 13,000 folios‘ of evidence as ‗early as 
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possible‘ to facilitate their writing the Report, which was not presented to Amery until 
the end of June.
109
 However, printing anything more than the Report itself was deemed 
too expensive. As discussed above, Ceylonese history is not widely studied in the 
Anglophone world, which is unfortunate as the Donoughmore Report is possibly ‗the 
most remarkable state paper on colonial affairs of the twentieth century‘, on par with the 
1839 Durham Report. Having thoroughly studied the problems of governance in Ceylon, 
the Commission proposed a rather unique solution.
110
  
 ‗The most striking characteristic of the Ceylon constitution is the divorce of 
power from responsibility‘, the Commissioners declared at the outset of the section on 
the Legislative Council. Clifford‘s analysis was indeed correct. Set against the ‗accepted 
standards of parliamentary practice‘, they found, Ceylon‘s constitution was quite simply 
‗reductio ad absurdum‘. The Island needed a constitution that was adapted to the 
‗peculiarities of its environment‘, namely the ‗complete absence of any party system‘, 
which left Members of the Legislative Council ‗free to vote as their judgment at the 
moment dictated‘ and the Executive perpetually unable ‗to take stock of its position‘. 
Elected Unofficial Members also faced the ‗dilemma‘ of not being trained in the ‗arts of 
government‘ if they refused to work with the Government, but ‗if they acknowledged 
their co-partnership would they not be regarded as having abandoned their claim to 
manage their own affairs?‘111 Quite simply, given the political environment, Ceylon‘s 
existing Constitution had proven an ‗unqualified failure‘. However, in light of the 
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‗activities‘ of the Unofficial Members in ‗Council, in the Press and in their 
constituencies‘, it was also abundantly clear that the ‗old system of ―Crown Colony 
Government‖‘ had outlived its era. The time had come for the Ceylonese to be ‗invested 
with a substantial measure of responsibility for the government of the Island‘.112 No 
‗responsible quarter‘ advocated stripping the Unofficial Members of their majority, 
thereby re-asserting the Crown Colony governance. Consequently, the only issue that 
needed resolving was the degree of ‗responsibility [that] may justifiably be transferred 
and the means by which such a transference may most advantageously be effected‘.113  
 The Commission rejected as unsuitable the call (put forth primarily by the 
witnesses from the CNC) for ‗full responsible government‘, regardless of Dominion 
status. In addition to the island‘s fractured unity, no Ceylonese politician had any 
ministerial experience, and acceding to CNC demands would likely create an entrenched 
oligarchic society, given that the electorate consisted of a mere four percent of the 
population. Opposition to this proposal was also the only thing that united the ‗minority 
communities‘. For a various reasons, a ‗nominated executive independent of the 
legislature‘, a ‗mixed executive‘, ‗ministries in commission‘ and an ‗upper house‘ were 
all rejected as unsuitable ‗half-way house[s]‘.114 All of these proposed schemes suffered, 
to varying degrees, from the fact that they followed a ‗line which leads towards 
government on the traditional parliamentary model‘. Overlooked by ‗many of the 
witnesses who gave evidence before‘ the Commission was the fact that the proceedings 
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113
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of the Legislative Council offered no ‗clear cut lines of division on political, 
constitutional or economic issues which would form the basis of a party system suited to 
the constitution and forms of British Parliamentary government as that has generally 
been understood‘. At the present juncture, not only was there ‗no immediate prospect of 
the appearance of a party system‘ but also, if one was forced into existence, the 
Commission worried that ‗obligations of race or caste‘ would dominate, potentially 
inflicting ‗untold harm on the social structure of the Island‘.115 The Commission was 
guided by a desire to avoid ‗slavishly‘ following: 
the forms and practice of the British Model which was not designed to meet 
conditions similar to those obtaining in Ceylon, but to devise a scheme in 
consonance with local circumstances, a scheme which will be concerned not to 
reflect an alien philosophy but to give free play to the peculiar genius of the 
Ceylonese themselves and above all a scheme which may bring out about a 
resolute handling of social and economic questions before, as in most Western 
lands, they have grown too complicated to remedy. 
 
Current ‗conditions in Ceylon‘ rendered full responsible government ‗inadvisable‘. 
Instead the Commission recommended (what was later somewhat misleadingly termed) 
‗responsible government short of Dominion Status‘.116 
 The Donoughmore Commission devised a system that was ‗calculated to divert 
attention from the academic discussion of political theory to the practical consideration 
of the pressing administrative problems of the day‘. Ceylonese politicians would gain the 
power they craved, but would learn that with power comes responsibility! ‗Political 
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progress‘ was to be tied to ‗administrative knowledge‘.117 The Legislative Council 
would be replaced by a Council of State, which consisted of ‗seven committees, 
corresponding to seven Departments‘. The elected chairmen, together with three Officers 
of State, who were in charge of the ‗―reserved Departments,‖ will form the Cabinet‘.118 
The Council served a dual role, sitting for both Legislative and Executive Sessions. The 
Officers of State were to have the ‗full status as Ministers, but their functions will be 
mainly advisory‘. Heads of Departments were to assume a similar advisory role. The 
seven committees, with their Ceylonese Ministers, would be responsible for the 
‗executive business of government‘. The Governor would grant royal assent so long as 
proposed ‗measures‘ did not ‗infringe [upon] certain clearly defined principles‘.119 The 
Council of State could vote no confidence in a lone Minister or the entire Board, thereby 
triggering a General Election; which normally would be held every four years. As bold 
as this proposed new ‗constitutional system‘ was, bolder still were the proposed changes 
related to voter eligibility and the abolition of communal politics.
120
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 In abandoning the path to responsible government implemented in the 
Dominions, in favour of the administrative structure of the League of Nations and the 
London County Council, the Donoughmore Commission is said to have acknowledged 
that ‗Western parliamentary systems are irrelevant to non-Western communities‘.121 The 
report itself suggests that such a conclusion is perhaps overstated, making reference to 
the ‗varieties of races and outlook‘ represented within the League of Nations. One could 
just as easily speak of the ‗varieties of races and outlook‘ in Ceylon; the 1921 Census 
had eleven different racial categories.
122
 Even the Sinhalese differed dramatically in 
outlook; the Kandyan chiefs strongly argued that the 1815 Convention entitled them to 
‗self government of their own Provinces‘.123 Just as local circumstances in Ceylon 
pointed to trying standing committees, circumstances in British Honduras highlighted 
the absurdity of having an panoptic Crown Colony administration for a population of 
30,000 to 40,000 people, ‗not a tenth [of whom] are white‘. To ‗cut down a mahogany 
tree‘ on Crown land required the approval of four officials, the ‗local Commissioner, the 
Finance Department, the local Colonial Secretary, and the Governor‘. A ‗sham 
representative system‘ would likely have proven even worse. What was needed to 
develop the colony was ‗the kind of mind that [Cecil] Rhodes applied to South Africa or 
                                                 
121
 de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, p. 521; Wight, The Development of the Legislative Council, p. 95. de 
Silva cites Wight. Butler was ‗first and foremost a historian of international relations and of modern 
diplomatic history‘, amongst his publications was A Handbook to the League of Nations (1925). P. 
Martland, ‗Butler, Sir (George) Geoffrey Gilbert (1887-1929)‘, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
122
 Cmd. 3131, pp. 47 and 165. 
123
 Ibid., p. 92. A position the British dismissed. Assuming for the ‗sake of argument‘ that the Convention 
was a treaty, contemporary Kandyan politicians overlooked the fact that the ‗Kandyans broke the 
―Convention‖ by an almost general rebellion‘ in 1817-8. Minute by the Government Agent, Uva Province 
and (according to Stanley) an ‗acknowledged expert in Kandyan history and affairs‘, H.W. Codrington, 11 
Aug., enclosure to Stanley to Amery, 19 Sept. 1927, CO 54/886/6. 
 266 
 
 
the founders of the Canadian Pacific Railway to the North West‘.124 A similar tenacity 
would be needed if the ‗disintegrating effect‘ of communal politics was to be broken. 
The Commission came  
unhesitatingly to the conclusion that communal representation is, as it were, a 
canker on the body politic, eating deeper and deeper into the vital energies of the 
people, breeding self-interest, suspicion and animosity, poisoning the new 
growth of political consciousness, and effectively preventing the development of 
a national or corporate spirit‘.125 
 
It was hoped members elected on a territorial basis might proven even more attentive to 
the ‗common weal‘, being able to devote their full attention to the ‗general welfare of the 
Island‘ rather than being ‗constantly on the watch, fearful of the antagonism or the 
oppressive action of the other communities‘. Extending the franchise would further 
‗promote the union of the Ceylonese peoples‘. Candidates, from minority communities, 
in particular, could elect members from parts of the Island on an unofficial communal 
basis, but elsewhere would need to reach across communal lines once constituency 
boundaries were realigned to have approximately ‗70,000-90,000‘ electors per seat.126 
 While advancing ‗strong demands for full responsible government‘, at first, the 
CNC wanted ‗no extension of the present franchise‘. Disqualifying women, coupled with 
property/income qualifications, which disenfranchised ‗a large number of propertyless 
workers‘, produced a mere 204,997 electors from a population estimated to be ‗in the 
neighbourhood of 5,125,000‘. The Tamils also wanted to preserve the status quo; ‗other 
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witnesses‘ wanted a more restrictive franchise!127 The President of the Ceylon Tamil 
League, Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan, argued that women were ‗needed for the quiet 
discharge of the most important duties at home‘ and extending women the vote in the 
current ‗political life ... would lead to a destruction of domestic happiness, purity and 
harmony‘.128 Replying to the observation that the same argument had been used in the 
West, Ramanathan said: ‗What suits the Western women won‘t suit us‘.129 ‗It was 
obvious that the nationalist leaders of Ceylon desired to work full responsible 
government with an electorate from which the greater proportion of the people were 
necessarily excluded‘, the Commissioners dismissively wrote. Unless there was a 
dramatic extension of the franchise, the Commission ‗could not recommend a further 
grant of responsible government‘. Extending the franchise was deemed a ‗more urgent 
[priority] than any increase of responsible government‘. A wider franchise ‗would 
expedite the passing of such social and industrial legislation as is now in force in every 
progressive country‘. Britain‘s own history also suggested that enlarging the electorate 
lessens ‗corruption and manipulation of the electorate‘. Ultimately, ‗political 
intelligence‘ can only be gained by experience, and suffering the consequences of poor 
decisions at the ballot box.
130
 The Commission recommended full ‗manhood suffrage‘, 
which increased the electorate to 1,200,000, but opted only for the enfranchisement of 
women over the age of thirty. Adopting universal suffrage would have increased the 
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electorate from c.200,000 to roughly 2,175,000, and the Commission worried that the 
‗magnitude‘ of such a change could run the risk of ‗imperilling the success of the 
reforms which we have recommended by too drastic alterations in other directions‘.131  
In recommending that ‗complete control over the internal affairs of the Island‘ be 
turned over to Ceylonese politicians, and that the governor‘s role shift to a ‗supervisory 
rather than executive‘ position, with ‗proportionately strengthened‘ reserve powers, the 
Commission defied expectations.
132
 ‗Constitutional reforms of an important and far-
reaching character‘, declared the Times of India. ‗A bold and striking document‘, The 
Thunderer opined; predicting that the franchise extension ‗will prove a powerful solvent 
of caste‘.133 ‗Far-reaching recommendations were anticipated,‘ said the Times of Ceylon, 
but ‗few‘ expected that the Commissioners would ‗go to such revolutionary lengths‘. 
Other Ceylonese papers cautiously welcomed the Report, notwithstanding its various 
‗incidental defects‘. Days later Stanley telegraphed that the Report had been ‗received ... 
in friendly though slightly bewildered spirit‘.134 Communal leaders hesitated to pass 
judgment until they had thoroughly studied the Report, which suggested a constitution 
‗so original in conception, so sensationally novel, so unlike any present-day model‘ that 
it led a ‗leading Indian‘ to condemn the Report as (quote) ‗a sinister document‘.135  
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Reaction from the island‘s political factions was mixed. The CNC lamented the 
fact that the Commission had not recommended a ‗scheme of full responsible 
government‘ but resolved ‗to accept for the present the recommendations of the 
Donoughmore Commission subject to‘ several minor changes. Most notably, the CNC 
now advocated universal suffrage and complained that the governors reserved powers 
were ‗too wide and comprehensive and inconsistent with the grant of any measure of 
responsible government‘. The latter rationale was completely disingenuous as the 
sovereign and their representatives in the Dominions held and continue to (in theory) 
possess reserve powers.
136
 The Singhalese were united in their opposition to migrant 
Indian plantation workers being enfranchised on ‗almost the same terms as for the 
indigenous population‘. The workers might mimic the voting patterns of their employers, 
or seize control of constituencies in the island‘s central highlands; a prospect that 
horrified the Kandyans. Meanwhile, the minority communities were ‗bitterly hostile‘ to 
the Report owing to its repudiation of communal politics and insistence on a wider 
franchise, which threatened to entrench the Sinhalese in power.
137
 The All Ceylon Tamil 
Conference also passed a resolution condemning the ‗extra-ordinary powers‘ that the 
Commission recommended be given to the governor.
138
 Individuals, including the Vice-
President of the Legislative Council, Sir James Peiris, may have spoken out against 
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extending the franchise and that the ‗country was not ripe for responsible 
government‘.139 But only two groups, the Ceylon Labour Union and the arch-
conservative Ceylon Unionist Association—a small group of ‗Colombo-based native 
pukka sahibs‘ or gentlemen, who, like the old guard of the CNC, believed that Ceylon 
was not ready for self-government—‗supported the Donoughmore proposals 
unreservedly.
140
 But how would the Colonial Office react to a ‗unanimous‘, if 
‗somewhat novel‘, Report on what had been a ‗very interesting and important 
experience‘?141 
A week after the simultaneous publication of the Report, the Colonial Office 
thanked Donoughmore and the other Commissioners for their work, writing that the 
Report was an ‗exceedingly interesting document‘ but that it was ‗too early to appreciate 
the extent to which these novel proposals will be welcomed or criticized in Ceylon‘.142 
The Colonial Office invited Stanley to despatch by mail his thoughts on the Report once 
he could judge public opinion. Metropole and periphery awaited the other‘s ‗views‘.143 
In the interim, the Legislative Council passed a motion requesting that Amery wait until 
he received the Council‘s ‗report of proceedings‘, which were scheduled to end no later 
than 1 December, before making an ‗official pronouncement‘ or taking ‗any action‘ with 
regard to the Donoughmore Report. Debate on the Report began in late October and, not 
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surprisingly, the Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council quickly rejected key 
parts of the Report; including a motion—carried twenty-one to three—on the 
‗unnecessary and retrograde‘ proposed enhancement of the governor‘s power to 
withhold royal assent. The governors reserve powers were found by a margin of twenty 
to four to be ‗too wide and are incongruous in a scheme purporting to grant a measure of 
responsibility‘. On the more contentious issue of the degree of self-government the 
Ceylonese ‗people‘ sought, the margin fell to sixteen to eleven. But it was decided that 
Ceylon was indeed ‗fit for responsible self-government of the Dominion type‘. This was 
a questionable proposition considering that the Unofficial Members wanted the governor 
to ‗occupy a position similar to what is obtaining in self-governing Dominions in respect 
of those departments placed in charge of ministers‘.144 For whatever reason(s), only 
eighteen out of thirty-seven Unofficial Members voted on this motion, which was carried 
ten to eight.
145
 Commenting on the ‗first part of the debate in the Council‘, as 
summarised by the governor, a Colonial Office official minuted that demands for ‗full 
responsible government‘ were ‗of course impossible‘. One is left to wonder if the 
dismissive attitude was the thinking of what colonial nationalists would proclaim as the 
reactionary Colonial Office, or if said official actually considered the motion and quite 
rightly concluded that a quasi-Governor General overseeing the work of in essence 
Cabinet Ministers was ‗of course impossible‘. In London, it seemed ‗useless to discuss 
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the next step in the heat of the moment and on telegraphic summaries of the debate‘.146 It 
was predicted that the Legislative Council‘s debate on the Report would ‗last throughout 
November, and possibly longer‘. A lengthy debate was anticipated partly by the fact that 
only ‗approximately one-third‘ of the ‗over 30 motions‘ had been disposed of, but also 
by the ongoing power struggle. The CNC was trying to force its views onto the 
Legislature; including, for example, a completely transparent attempt to ‗disfranchise 
practically every Tamil (Hindu) estate labourer in the country‘. With Official Members 
only clarifying ‗misunderstandings‘, it fell (in this case) to the Unofficial European and 
Indian Members to provide the ‗strongest opposition‘. One has the sense that 
alliances/abstentions shifted depending on the issue at hand.
147
 For example, the 
combined votes of the Sinhalese and Europeans alone were sufficient to defeat a motion 
calling for the preservation of communal representation. Even if the Tamils had voted as 
a block, the motion would presumably been defeated fifteen to fourteen rather than the 
actual result of seventeen to fourteen. It was these debates, not the Donoughmore 
Report, which would rouse the Secretary of State to action. ‗Bombshell for Ceylon‘, 
screamed the Times of India.
148
 
Within days of receiving a telegram summarising the first group of resolutions 
under discussion, Amery despatched a ‗Confidential telegram‘ to Stanley outlining his 
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‗observations‘ at the end of October. The contents of the telegram remained secret as the 
‗Franchise group of motions‘ were already under discussion and the governor rightly 
wanted to ‗avoid any semblance of intervention in that discussion‘. Amery bluntly wrote 
that ‗the recommendations must be regarded as a whole ... I should not be willing to 
accept any amendments in principle which would destroy the balance of the scheme‘. If 
a ‗substantial majority of the inhabitants of Ceylon‘ were unwilling to ‗agree to a trial of 
the scheme as a whole‘, Amery warned that he ‗might feel compelled to re-open the 
consideration of the whole question of any constitutional change‘. Furthermore, in a 
warning aimed directly at the CNC, Amery advised that there was ‗no hope‘ that the 
rejection of the Donoughmore Report would ‗expedite the possibility‘ of the granting of 
‗complete responsible Government‘.149 To soften the blow caused by Amery‘s ‗fiat‘, the 
Colonial Secretary announced in closing that Stanley was open to private meetings with 
Unofficial Members either in a ‗body‘ or via a ‗small but representative delegation‘ to 
discuss (what the Times of India deemed) ‗an entirely new situation‘.150 Attacking ‗every 
proposal‘ was not—contrary to what an unnamed Unofficial Member thought—the best 
means of proving one‘s ‗fitness for self-government‘. As previously discussed, a quest 
for ‗publicity‘ was probably also at play. On the other hand, a ‗strong body of opinion‘ 
pressed for reform, but were ‗nervous‘ about the behaviour of Sinhalese Ministers and 
could live with the ‗present constitution‘ and its system of communal representation.151  
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Two weeks after Amery‘s comments were read out, ‗several members ... mainly 
or entirely‘ from the CNC indicated a desire to discuss ways of devising a means of 
avoiding the ‗complete rejection of scheme‘. The Legislative Council finished voting on 
the remaining motions and then ‗adjourned till the middle of January‘. Little, however, 
appears to have come of said desire; though Stanley did learn that the ‗real position‘ of 
the Unofficial Members differed from that which could be inferred ‗from recorded 
results of the debate‘.152  
Once again, a Secretary of State for the Colonies was awaiting receipt of a 
governor‘s report, in this case for ‗comments on the ˄
full
 proceedings in the Legislative 
Council‘—an answer again repeated in the House of Commons. Amery expected at the 
end of January 1929 that he would receive Stanley‘s despatch within ‗two or three 
weeks‘. Two months later, he informed the House that it still had not arrived.153 Anyone 
who read the Donoughmore Report ‗with any care will realise that it would be asking too 
much to expect a decision to be taken within a week or so of publication‘, was the 
suggested answer to a parliamentary question asked at the end of July 1928. Completion 
was delayed further by Stanley‘s desire to defend the ‗local Government‘ from 
‗criticisms‘ expressed in the Report, most of which the Colonial Secretary thought 
stemmed from the fact that Clifford ‗had no opportunity to explain his policy to the 
Commissioners‘.154  
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By February 1929, with the Department being ‗pressed in the House of 
Commons‘, Clifford confessed that he still had not finished his despatch ‗partly owing to 
pressure other work but mainly owing to grave doubts which I feel increasingly as to the 
wisdom of sudden change from present franchise to manhood suffrage‘. He pledged to 
do his ‗utmost‘ to despatch his report by mid-March. Despite rumours that members of 
the Round Table group were organising in ‗opposition to the Donoughmore scheme‘, the 
Colonial Office could do ‗nothing ... but ... wait‘. ‗We cannot ―rush‖ the Governor in a 
matter of such importance‘, minuted an official.155 Great importance was attached to 
Stanley‘s view as the Legislative Council had passed ‗numerous‘ resolutions that were in 
‗many cases contradictory and showed that there was obviously a considerable 
divergence of opinion in regard to certain proposals of the Commission‘. In addition to 
his recommendations as to what should be done, as the Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
of State for Dominion Affairs, the Earl of Plymouth explained to their lordships, in mid-
to-late April, the Colonial Office depended on Stanley to indicate ‗on which side as a 
whole the balance of opinion in Ceylon lies‘. However, even if Stanley sent his report in 
the ‗immediate future‘, the Colonial Office was unable to ‗give early consideration to 
question of action to be taken‘ due to the 1929 General Election.156 The Tories‘ pre-
emptive attempt to reform Ceylon‘s constitution had backfired. Stanley‘s report would 
                                                                                                                                                
public[ly]‘ abdicated ‗all power‘ and the memorandum was a retrospective defence of a ‗deep-laid 
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be received by a new Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Fabian socialist, Sidney 
Webb, now Lord Passfield.  
Fifty copies of a ‗lengthy‘ report were due to arrive on 29 June. Stanley 
recommended extending the life of the Legislative Council until the end of 1929 as he 
could not ‗guarantee acceptance [of the Report] after the [scheduled] general election‘. If 
the Unofficial Members accepted the ‗offer‘, Stanley ‗recommended a further extension 
to the end of 1930 as arrangements preparatory to the commencement of the new 
Constitution would take much time‘. Amery disregarded the former and opted for the 
latter course, thereby securing sufficient time to draft a new constitution even in the 
event of a ‗prolonged interchange of correspondence with Ceylon‘.157 A decision Stanley 
mildly objected to, as his intention was to provide ‗reasonable terms within which the 
present Council would have to come to [a] decision‘. The Governor stressed the 
importance of making the Unofficial Members solely responsible for the ‗acceptance or 
rejection‘ of any further constitution reform, thereby ensuring that London could not be 
held liable if the ‗Scheme‘ failed. If the Ceylonese believed Amery would implement the 
‗Scheme‘ regardless of how they voted, Stanley warned that, some of the Unofficial 
Members ‗might be tempted to reject ostensibly on the ground of disbelief in the 
committee system and thus retain free hand to clamour for full responsible Government 
without serious effort to cooperate in trying to make Donoughmore Scheme work‘.158 
Stanley was insistent on the importance of either the ‗Legislative Council or the people‘, 
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via a referendum, on ‗whatever franchise‘ Passfield devised, expressing ‗some explicit 
signification of acceptance‘ of the Scheme. Otherwise, he worried, ‗wreck tactics‘ stood 
a ‗good chance of success‘. The Colonial Office spent the latter half of the summer 
studying Stanley‘s despatch.159  
Crafted with an eye to the ‗contingency of its publication‘, Stanley concluded 
that the Donoughmore Constitution was now acceptable to the ‗present Legislative 
Council‘. However, he also cautioned that the ‗Unofficial Members are varium et 
mutabile genus‘. Again the governor warned against forcing the Scheme onto Ceylon, 
such a policy he said would be a ‗really disastrous mistake‘. Even if the present Council 
rejected the Scheme, it would likely be acceptable to the ‗next Council‘. Ceylonese 
politicians, he reasoned, had to hear the ‗unenfranchised thousands ... knocking at the 
gate‘.160 But the ‗question of the franchise‘ also proved the ‗most controversial‘. In 
addition to local divisions, Stanley personally had ‗certain doubts‘ over practically every 
proposal advanced by both the Report and its critics. But, like the Commission, he 
favoured ‗a real advance in self-government‘. The adjustment to the ‗new order of 
things‘ had no doubt been difficult for everyone, but his experience of ‗some twenty-one 
months‘ convinced Stanley that the ‗growing disposition towards cooperation‘ should be 
encouraged. Where the Commissioners saw an ‗unqualified failure‘, Stanley thought the 
present Constitution had proven ‗a qualified success‘. However, advised the governor, 
the ‗present Constitution is not one under which either the Government or the Unofficial 
Members could hope to do themselves the fullest justice‘. Nevertheless, Stanley 
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‗experienced much difficulty‘ and expended considerable prose in explaining his 
decision to recommend ‗an experiment which, if it proved successful, might be expected 
to remove many of the difficulties arising out of our local conditions‘. Success was not 
guaranteed, and the early years he predicted would prove particularly difficult owing to 
minimal ‗fully applicable precedents to guide us‘. Failure, therefore, would not 
‗necessarily imply unfitness for self-government‘. Again, Stanley was insistent that the 
Unofficial Members must decide for themselves whether or not to accept a revised 
constitution, and suggested informing the Members that any attempt to attach a 
‗qualification or condition‘ would be regarded by the Secretary of State ‗as equivalent to 
[a] rejection of the offer‘. He recognised that such methods were ‗arbitrary,‘ but would 
produce a ‗definite‘ result.161  
Speaking at Chilaw, a few weeks after submitting his observations, Stanley told 
those assembled that, if adopted, the Donoughmore Constitution ‗would give the future 
legislature of Ceylon a very much larger and wider share in the control of the 
administration and a more direct share than was enjoyed by the legislature of any other 
country he had known‘, including the ‗House of Commons‘ and the ‗Parliament of any 
self-governing Dominion‘.162 But, as the island awaited Passfield‘s decision, he also 
asked that ‗we should possess our souls in patience a little longer ....‘ Although his 
conclusions differed on ‗minor points‘, Stanley‘s suggested course of action had been 
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‗anticipated‘ by the Colonial Office. Having published the Donoughmore Report, 
masterly inactivity was off the table. To reject further constitutional reforms in favour of 
the status quo would inevitably invite ‗continued agitation and increasing difficulty in 
carrying on the Government‘. Implementing the Scheme was therefore almost 
inescapable, so the ‗most promising course‘ was to ‗put it into operation and leave it to 
be discovered from experience what detailed changes are desired.
163
 Such a course of 
action was regarded by the Permanent-Under-Secretary as ‗leaping in the dark‘, with the 
Scheme being seen ‗more as an experiment than anything else‘. But Wilson, like 
everyone else, did not know what else to do. His personal dislike of the Donoughmore 
Constitution notwithstanding, Wilson recommended that, if Passfield decided on this 
course, he should seek Cabinet approval ‗before you make any public announcement‘.164  
In marked contrast to India, where the subject of constitutional reform proved (as 
will be seen in Section 3.2) highly controversial, Ceylon‘s new constitution was 
approved following a single Cabinet meeting.
165
 ‗Little interest taken in England‘, was 
the subheading almost a decade earlier. Nothing had changed. Cabinet‘s approval of 
Passfield‘s decision to place a modified version of the Donoughmore Constitution—
there were changes in the ‗franchise and other matters‘—before the Legislative Council 
of Ceylon was presumably nothing more than a formality.
166
 But would the Unofficial 
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Members accept the invitation to (paraphrase the Times of Ceylon) escape the trap they 
had created for themselves by examining the Donoughmore Report in a ‗sectional and 
piecemeal‘ manner?167 
Passfield‘s despatch, unlike the Donoughmore Report, did not come as a 
complete surprise. Speculation, following a story in the Daily Mail, suggested that an 
‗important despatch ... is now en route to the Governor of Ceylon‘.168 The conventional 
wisdom is that the Scheme was ‗remarkably progressive‘ for its era, but ‗satisfied none 
of the important political groups in Sri Lanka‘.169 Passfield‘s despatch, which altered the 
voting age of women from thirty to twenty-one, but otherwise approved the 
Donoughmore Scheme, was ‗published at midnight‘, 22 October 1929. Passfield‘s 
amendments won the general approval of ‗the London morning press‘. The Ceylonese 
press, with the exception of the Daily News, which was the ‗most powerful national 
paper in the island‘, favoured accepting the offer of further constitutional reform.170 
‗Taken as a whole, Lord Passfield‘s dispatch does not send Ceylon speeding deliriously 
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towards Swaraj‘, was the hurried conclusion of the Daily News. In fact, the Scheme was 
denounced as a ‗retrograde step‘.171 However, ‗representative women‘ in Colombo 
welcomed their ‗great victory‘, while the President of the Labour Union called 
Passfield‘s despatch a ‗masterly document‘ that moved Ceylon a ‗step‘ closer to 
‗democratic government‘. Ceylon was on the verge of becoming the ‗first British colony 
in Asia—and indeed the first Asian country—to enjoy the privilege of universal 
suffrage‘.172  
The Daily News, however, was not the only one unimpressed. On the evening of 
1 November, some of the members of the Executive Committee of the CNC met. 
Divisions were exposed by the opening discussions, with six individuals named as being 
in favour of acceptance and five favouring rejection out of the almost thirty people 
assembled. A ‗lengthy discussion‘ ensued.173 Ultimately, it was resolved that ‗the 
Executive Committee of the Ceylon National Congress is of [the] opinion that the 
Legislative Council should reject the proposed scheme of reforms with a view of [sic] 
obtaining the wishes of the electorates‘. Following an amendment, the Executive 
Committee was now ‗of [the] opinion that the Legislative Council should reject the 
Donoughmore Scheme of Reforms‘.174  
Whatever happened to the wishes of the electorates? Rejection was ‗fast gaining 
in popularity‘, in part because of Lord Irwin‘s ‗announcement on the subject of 
Dominion Status for India‘ and the fact that ‗British statesmen‘ had said that Ceylon was 
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‗better fitted for self-government than India‘. Left unsaid, was that ‗Dominion Status‘ 
was the ultimate goal, not the next step.
175
 It was ‗beyond reasonable doubt‘, said The 
Straits Times, that the Legislative Council would reject the Donoughmore Constitution. 
If an election were held, it would be on the existing roll and would ‗in all likelihood‘ 
produce a similar Council in ‗personnel and political outlook‘, who would 
‗unhesitatingly‘ again decline Passfield‘s offer. The ‗more closely‘ the Unofficial 
Members studied the Donoughmore Constitution, ‗the more they have feared it‘. In 
summary, said the editorial, ‗the Donoughmore scheme is doomed‘. As far as The Straits 
Times‘ correspondent could determine, ‗those who opposed the Commissioner‘s 
recommendations are unchanged by the proposed modifications‘. A week later, the 
Unofficial Members ‗almost unanimously‘ were in favour of rejecting Passfield‘s offer. 
To their critics, such as the President of the Trade Union Congress, the Unofficial 
Members were ‗aristocratic money-bags‘, who ‗libels the masses and glories in doing 
so‘. They were afraid that ‗universal suffrage‘ would ‗demolish the strongly-fortified 
citadels of aristocracy and plutocracy‘.176 Back in London, it was still impossible to 
‗anticipate‘ how Passfield‘s despatch would be received. Cracks, however, were 
developing amongst the Unofficial Members. At a meeting of the Welikada Mahajana 
Sabha, presumably a nationalist organisation based in a Colombo suburb, a resolution 
was passed in favour of accepting the Donoughmore Constitution. Repeating a point 
made by the Trade Union Congress, the Legislative Council reflected the views of a 
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mere ‗four per cent of the population, and if the reforms were not accepted they would 
be doing injustice to their countrymen and women‘.177  
It seems that the Donoughmore Constitution was the main, if not only, subject of 
discussion for the entire island. By late November, ‗opinion now seems to be for the 
acceptance of the scheme and giving it a trial‘. Even more ‗remarkable‘ is that a number 
of Unofficial Members, including Sinhalese Congress members, ‗who vehemently 
opposed the scheme last year, both in the Press and in the Legislative Council when it 
came up for discussion there, are now for it‘. Others refused to budge from their initial 
views. Undecided Unofficial Members were consulting their constituents, with colourful 
meetings ‗being held in various parts of the Island‘. ‗Ceylon was to be vivisected for the 
benefit of England‘, warned one politician. A number of the members of the Executive 
Committee of the CNC changed their position in the course of a week.
178
 On the eve of 
the debate that would provide a ‗definite decision‘, the Unofficial Members were 
thought to be ‗almost equally for and against the reforms‘. A majority of the Sinhalese 
favoured acceptance, while everyone else—save the four European members—wanted 
to reject the Donoughmore Constitution. A ‗very close‘ vote was expected.179  
The change in attitude amongst the Sinhalese politicians appears to have been 
brought about by the people, whose ‗interest [was] raised to fever pitch‘.180 ‗Of 53 
public meetings held in 16 districts, 36 passed resolutions in favour of the reforms, 13 
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were opposed to them, and four passed no resolution‘, The Times reported.181 Ceylonese 
politics was experiencing such a profound upheaval that the Daily News had taking to 
calling the CNC a ‗pious fraud‘.182 A day later five ‗prominent‘ members of the CNC‘s 
Executive Committee resigned, charging that the decision to now accept the reforms 
‗destroyed confidence in Congress and have rendered ineffective the greatest progressive 
political force in the country‘. However, according to the chairman of the CNC‘s 
Executive Committee, the resolution against the reforms that was passed 1 November 
was simply an ‗expression of opinion ... [that] had no binding force‘. What a convenient 
ruling. A variety of arguments were put forth by those in favour of the reforms, 
including the ‗present Constitution is detrimental to the best interests of the country‘.183 
Others stressed the ‗grant of universal suffrage‘ and that, if the Legislative Council 
rejected it, Ceylon ‗would have no friends in the House of Commons‘.184 After five days 
of debate, the Unofficial Members divided nineteen to seventeen, as predicted. However, 
the amended Donoughmore Constitution was unexpectedly adopted. Though a decision 
generally welcomed by the Ceylonese Press, the Daily News remained opposed and 
called the verdict a ‗mistake‘. All journals, however, recognised that a ‗new era‘ had 
begun.
185
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The life of the Legislative Council was extended again to give the Colonial 
Office time to draft the ‗necessary Order in Council to give effect to the [Donoughmore] 
proposals‘. Draft copies, ‗together with copies of draft letters Patent and Royal 
Instructions‘, were despatched to Ceylon in February 1930. As was the custom, Stanley 
was invited to submit ‗any observations which you wish to offer on these drafts‘. 
Consequently, the Donoughmore Constitution would not come into effect until the 
spring of 1931.
186
 From the outset, doubts existed over the wisdom of the Donoughmore 
Report‘s approach to ‗combining real power with real responsibility‘. Vigorous criticism 
was expressed by the Unofficial Members, in and out of the Legislative Council, while, 
as was seen, the Colonial Office was sceptical. ‗While attack on two fronts may not be 
exactly pleasant,‘ wrote an American observer, ‗it seems to show that the kernel of the 
report is sound‘.187  
Further constitutional reform had come about in part by the increasing tendency 
of the Unofficial Members to work with the colonial regime. During this same period, 
Ceylon experienced a ‗few years of superabundant public revenue, and the Government 
was thus enabled to undertake work and to meet wishes for which provision could not 
have been made in times of financial stringency‘.188 Unfortunately, by the time the first 
government, under the new Constitution, took office Ceylon was ‗in the throes of the 
Great Depression‘. Once again, the crash of the American Stock Market adversely 
affected another part of the British Empire. It is, of course, impossible to say whether the 
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Donoughmore Constitution would have proven successful if the Depression never 
occurred. Odds are not great as Ceylon experienced two ‗cataclysmic‘ events in close 
succession. On top of the economic problems, to say nothing of the ‗unusually severe 
drought in most of the island‘, a malaria epidemic ‗devastated the Kurunegala and 
Kegalla districts‘. These twin catastrophes ‗baffled conventional wisdom of the day and 
the normal machinery of government in coping with the mass of misery they created‘.189 
In the case of Ceylon, a ‗Crown Colonial administration‘ was clearly outdated. 
‗[D]emocracy with autocratic reservations‘ was an attempt at moving away from the 
Exclusionary Empire of the past.
190
 It was an experiment that sought to give the 
Ceylonese people control over their daily lives, as evident by the departments that were 
handed over, while still preserving (in the words of Richard Hope and a ‗high bred 
Sinhalese‘) the ‗magnificent fabric of Empire‘ and a ‗country for a gentleman to live in‘, 
respectively.
191
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3.2 ‗Congress must disabuse their minds of any idea that they were going to be 
accepted as speaking for all India‘: The viceroyalty of Lord Irwin, 1926-1931 
 
Wedgewood Benn was another statesman who took a sympathetic interest in 
Indian affairs. As Secretary of State in the Labour Government, he had tried 
to impress upon the Viceroy the necessity of reconciliation with the Congress. 
The die-hard British bureaucrats, however, foiled all his efforts. – From the 
‗British Friends of India‘ section of the Indian National Congress‘ website. 
 
By the mid-to-late nineteenth century, British India had not only recovered from 
the trauma of the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny and the unexpected peasant insurrections of the 
1860s and 1870s, but had seen its bureaucracy professionalised and was moving towards 
defining distinctive roles for the executive and legislative branches of government.
1
 
Outside of the urban intelligentsia, a group of whom established themselves at a meeting 
in Bombay in late 1885 as the Indian National Congress (INC), the overwhelming 
majority of people in the subcontinent accepted the British presence as an idée fixe. 
However, the authority of the Raj at the village level was far from absolute. The British 
were too dependent upon native intermediaries—sepoys, clerks, lawyers, landowners, 
princes and the Muslim elite of northern India—ever to introduce reforms that would 
have radically altered the status quo. In fact, throughout its first thirty years, the 
primarily bourgeois INC worked to strengthen ties between Britain and India, lobbying 
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for reforms that would weld the (lower) middle classes to the Raj. Decades of relative 
calm gave rise to an ‗illusion of permanence‘.2  
The significance of the INC initially went largely unnoticed—similar 
organisations after all had come and gone—but its founding marked the advent of a new 
era in the relationship between the peoples of India and the Raj. Initially, however, the 
annual December meetings of the INC were nothing more than entertainment for the 
moneyed professionals that constituted the bulk of Congress‘ early members. Reflecting 
on his attendance at the 1912 ‗Christmas tamasha‘, one influential Congressman 
declared from his gaol cell that these meetings were ‗very much an English-knowing 
upper class affair where morning coats and well-pressed trousers were greatly in 
evidence‘. It all sounds so ornamental.3 However, as the years past, the conclusion that 
the INC would one day contest British rule itself became inescapable. This is not to say 
that the British did not try. Their late nineteenth century policy of retreating to the club 
or, in the summer, hill stations, however, was unsustainable. Nevertheless, in the years 
before 1914, notwithstanding the lone endorsement of swaraj or self rule at the 1906 
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Calcutta Congress, radicals made little headway. London still had room to manoeuvre, 
but the educated Bengali was henceforth perceived as a threat to the continuance of 
British rule in India (and by implication Britain‘s status as a world power).4 Regardless 
of the degree to which Edwardians were fearful over the future of the empire, London 
needed to alter its strategies of governing this ‗new‘ India. After two partial missteps, 
which are detailed at the outset of this chapter, a conventional yet ultimately radical 
viceroy would be despatched, who almost succeeded in transforming ‗Britain‘s vision of 
the Raj‘. 5 Britons traditionally saw India as being intrinsically ‗different‘ from the rest 
of their imperium. In proposing that the Morley-Minto and Montagu-Chelmsford 
reforms be taken to their logical conclusion, Lord Irwin sought to steer India onto a path 
analogous to that on which the Dominions had recently embarked. In contrast to 
previous scholarship that cast doubt over whether such a policy could ever have been 
endorsed by Westminster in light of ever greater campaigns of civil disobedience, this 
chapter argues that Irwin was successful in calling Congress‘ bluff that they alone spoke 
for India, but that his plans were fatally derailed by the 1929 crash of the American 
Stock market.
6
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odds with those that see a link between Irwin‘s policies and the process that led to the 1935 Government 
of India Act. See, for example, J. Gallagher, ‗The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire‘, in A. 
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Lord Ripon made the first tentative concessions towards Indian self-government 
in the early 1880s before the formation of the INC; though the efforts were purposefully 
confined to municipal councils and district boards. Imperial rule, declared a future 
imperial proconsul, would not be subverted by ‗allowing the Bengali Baboo to discuss 
his own schools and drains‘.7 Moreover, in shifting the issue of taxation for local matters 
onto elected Indian bodies, the Central Government would reduce its expenditures, while 
simultaneously creating an avenue for educated Indians to express their thoughts. Ripon 
was not motivated by any enlightened sense of equality; rather he aimed to co-opt the 
educated classes before they became implacable foes of British rule.
8
 The importance of 
these local bodies was further increased by the 1892 Councils Act, which made them 
responsible for electing representatives to the provincial legislative councils. Two 
decades later, the Ripon reforms resulted in an outcome that was clearly not what 
Britons intended. Instead of drawing in ‗the genuine, representative Hindus, the men we 
really want [as collaborators]‘, elections for local bodies, explained the acting financial 
secretary to the government of India and famed anthropologist, H.H. Risley, ‗selects 
those who rise to the surface—the men who talk and canvass and agitate‘, i.e. 
barristers. The illusive commercial community hid in ‗the silent depths of the steam‘, 
thereby allowing the Calcutta Corporation to fall under the grip of (in the words of the 
then viceroy, Lord Curzon) ‗a clique of Bengali Hindus‘. Reforming the ‗vile‘ 
municipal administration of Calcutta proved impossible ‗for fear of the Bengali 
                                                 
7
 Unless otherwise indicated, this paragraph is based on Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, pp. 200-203; Sir 
Evelyn Baring, ultimately first earl of Cromer, quoted in Copland, India 1885-1947, p. 26.  
8
 R. Hyam, Britain's Imperial Century, 1815-1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion (New York, 1976), 
pp. 232-3.  
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Party‘.9 Long before his viceroyalty (1899-1905), Curzon had been an out spoken 
opponent of those that equated the ‗Bengali Party‘ with the true people of India. 
During the second reading in March 1892 of a bill to amend the 1861 Indian Councils 
Act, which had created three cabinet-style bodies—the Supreme Legislative Council of 
the Viceroy and the Provincial Legislative Councils of Madras and Bombay—the 
Liberal member for North Manchester, Charles Schwann, argued that any reform to 
these councils that did not embrace the ‗elective principle‘ would not only be 
incompatible with good governance but would be opposed by the Indian people. After 
dismissing Schwann‘s attempt to be the ‗mouthpiece of the people of India‘, Curzon, 
then the under secretary of state for India, informed the Commons that: 
The people of India are the voiceless millions who can neither read nor write 
their own tongues, who have no knowledge whatever of English, who are not 
perhaps universally aware of the fact that the English are in their country as 
rulers. The people of India are the ryots and the peasants, whose life is not one 
of political aspiration, but of mute penury and toil. The plans and policy of the 
Congress Party in India would leave this vast amorphous residuum absolutely 
untouched .... [T]he constituency which the Congress Party represent cannot be 
described as otherwise than a minute and almost microscopic minority of the 
total population of India .... It appears to me that you can as little judge of the 
feelings and aspirations of the people of India from the plans and proposals of 
the Congress Party as you can judge of the physical configuration of a country 
which is wrapped up in the mists of early morning, but a few of whose topmost 
peaks have been touched by the rising sun.
10
 
 
                                                 
9
 Proceedings of the Bengali Legislative Council, 4 April 1898, quoted in C. Furedy, ‗Lord Curzon 
and the Reform of the Calcutta Corporation, 1899: A Case Study in Imperial Decision-Making‘, 
South Asia, i (1978), p. 86; Curzon to the Secretary of State for India, Lord Hamilton, 11 October 
1899, quoted in Ibid., p. 81; Curzon to Hamilton, 3 April 1901, quoted in Ibid., p. 83.  
10
 Hansard[‘s Parliamentary Debates], iii. 65-6.  
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Ultimately, not even the most determined viceroy could ‗cut the Baboo down to size‘.11 
Curzon‘s inability to reform the Calcutta Corporation laid in part in his decision ‗to 
shield his role in the affair (to protect himself and the viceroyalty)  ... 
[Consequently,] he was unable to come out into the open and effect the radical 
changes he originally envisaged‘.12 Irwin (as will be seen) learned from Curzon‘s 
experience, preferring to wage his campaign for even more radical changes in the 
public and private spheres (of officialdom). 
Britain‘s policy of trying to recruit loyal collaborators to work within a 
framework that safeguarded the interests of the Raj seemed to have backfired by 
the early twentieth century. However, Curzon‘s decision in 1905 to partition 
Bengal, which, like the Calcutta Corporation, was undertaken to improve 
administrative efficiency, while simultaneously undermining the growing influence 
of the Calcutta bar and press, inflamed the situation and further ‗consolidate[d] 
Indian opposition to British rule‘.13 Even Indian liberals, like Gopal Krishna 
Gokhale, wasted little time in claiming that Curzon‘s audacity in partitioning 
Bengal without consulting the so-called ‗Bengali party‘ had incensed India. 
‗Never‘, he cried out, during his 1905 Presidential Address to the Benares 
Congress, ‗was the discontent in India more acute and w idespread than when the 
late Viceroy laid down the reins of office‘. Hyperbole maybe, but the depth of 
Indian discontent was unmistakeably growing deeper. It is against this backdrop that 
                                                 
11
 Quoted in Furedy, ‗Lord Curzon‘, p. 82. D. Dilks, Curzon in India (2 vols., London, 1969) remains 
the definitive work on Curzon‘s viceroyalty.  
12
 Furedy, ‗Lord Curzon‘, p. 87.  
13
 P. Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India (London, 1989), pp. 934-5 and 911. 
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the Liberals came into office ahead of their landslide victory in the 1906 election, with 
John Morley receiving the India Office.
14
 Abandoning what the new prime minister, Sir 
Henry Campbell-Bannerman, damned in 1899 as ‗the vulgar and bastard imperialism of 
irritation and provocation and aggression‘ that characterised Conservative governments 
and their proconsuls, pre-war Liberal governments favoured an emphasis on compromise 
and co-operation in order not to unduly stress already frayed imperial bonds.
15
 Informing 
the new viceroy, Lord Minto, of his interviews with the Congress moderate, Gopal 
Krishna Gokhale, who was visiting London, Morley assessed their inescapable fate: ‗it 
will mainly depend upon ourselves whether Congress is a power for good or for evil. 
There it is, whether we like it or not (and personally I don‘t like it)….‘16 Nevertheless, as 
one of the last standard-bearers of Liberal Party of John Stuart Mill and William 
Gladstone, Morley found the alternative, ‗open warfare against the Indian population as 
a whole,‘ odious; to say the least.17  
The unrest touched off by Curzon‘s actions left those in London with little choice 
but to embark on another major face-off against Indian nationalism.
18
 The ensuing 
Morley-Minto reforms
19
 transformed the previously mentioned Legislative Councils into 
                                                 
14
 Quoted in S. Wolpert, Morley and India, 1906-1910 (Berkeley, 1967), p. 231; D. Hamer, 'John Morley 
(1838-1923)', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
15
 Quoted in B. Porter, The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-2004 (4th edn., 
Harlow, 2004), p. 202. On the general Liberal attitude towards the empire, see ibid., pp. 200-204. 
16
 Quoted in Ibid. p. 212. 
17
 Wolpert, Morley and India, p. 231. Morley was one of two ministers who resigned on principle from 
Cabinet in August 1914.  
18
 Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, p. 223. On the extent of the unrest, see R. Popplewell, Intelligence and 
Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian Empire, 1904-1924 (London, 1995), 
pp. 57-9.  
19
 The main features of the reforms were 1) the appointment of an Indian to the council of the presidency 
governors and Viceroy and two Indians to the council of the British secretary of state for India, 2) elected 
Indian members now outnumbered the nominated members on provincial legislative councils and 3) both 
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(what the moderate R.N. Mudholkar termed in his 1912 Presidential Address to the 
Bankipore Congress) ‗Parliaments in embryo‘, without altering the autocratic nature of 
the Raj. The effect of this so-called ‗order plus progress‘ approach for the British was 
the continuation of the power struggle between Whitehall and Simla. Paltry returns for a 
policy that sullied Morley his reputation as the conscience of Liberalism. In India, the 
reforms merely brought moderate nationalists into formal contact with the Raj, thereby 
allowing ‗the governed a better chance of understanding, as occasion arises, the case for 
the Government, against the misrepresentations of ignorance and malice‘.20 The results, 
however, were enormous. Writing less than a year after Morley‘s resignation, the new 
viceroy was ‗convinced that, were Curzon to return to India, he would hardly recognise 
the present situation‘. How long a substantial measure of representative government in 
the provinces could have co-existed with new repressive measures—directed primarily 
at the press—is, of course, impossible to say. What is clear, however, is that, prior to the 
Great War, India (in the words of William Roger Louis) ‗had little prospect of evolving 
on the model of self-government enjoyed by the ‗White Dominions‘‘.21  
British and Indian officials in Delhi,
22
 as elsewhere in the empire, greeted the 
outbreak of war in 1914 with an enthusiasm that the British could never have demanded, 
which perhaps explains the poor attendance at the annual INC meeting a few months 
                                                                                                                                                
the central and provincial legislatures were now allowed to debate budgetary matters, to propose 
amendments, etc. Porter, The Lion's Share, pp. 214-5.  
20
 Quoted in Wolpert, Morley and India, pp. 230 and 234, respectively. Italics in original; Morley to 
Minto, 27 November 1908, quoted in Porter, The Lion's Share, p. 215. 
21
 Lord Hardinge to John Morley, 11 May 191, quoted in Wolpert, Morley and India, p. 232; Hyam, 
Britain's Imperial Century, pp. 237-42; W.R. Louis and J. Brown, eds., The Oxford History of the British 
Empire, IV: The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1998), p. 8. 
22
 In 1911, then viceroy, Lord Hardinge reversed the partition of Bengal but transferred the capital from 
Calcutta to Delhi—the old Mughal seat of power—thereby depriving the Bengali baboos of their ready 
access to the central government. Hyam, Britain's Imperial Century, p. 242. 
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later. In the early years of the war, imperial forces were used in supplementary roles on 
the colonial periphery; in the case of India, this initially meant Mesopotamia.
23
 The 
maladministration associated with this campaign, which culminated in the surrender of a 
British army and its colours at Kut-al-Amara in 1916, undercut British prestige. To 
Britons, the 1857 Mutiny symbolised India‘s rejection of western civilisation and the 
benefits associated with British rule. In place of the outdated ‗civilising mission‘, 
‗prestige‘ became the catchphrase for Britain‘s new imperial ideology, which rested on 
moral, racial and military superiority. Throughout most, if not all, of the Great War, 
however, Britons were far more conscious of their diminished prestige than were their 
subject peoples east of Suez.
24
 Such was the environment that, following his return to 
India in 1915, Mohandas Gandhi accepted an imperial honour, the Kaisar-i-Hind medal, 
for his work in South Africa and throughout his speeches that year called for India to 
pull its weight in the imperial war effort.
25
 Whereas the far less populous white 
dominions contributed over 1.3 million men, ultimately, India only mobilised 827,000 
men for imperial service.
26
 Approximately, one in nine Dominion troops died in service 
of king and country. In comparison, roughly one in twenty Indians died; moreover, 
twenty-five to fifty percent of the wounds suffered by soldiers from the subcontinent in 
1917 were ‗probably self-inflicted‘. Whatever happened to that that famous ‗English 
                                                 
23
 R. Holland, ‗The British Empire and the Great War, 1914-1918‘, in W.R. Louis and J. Brown, eds., The 
Oxford History of the British Empire, IV: The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1998), p. 115-7; J. Galbraith, 
‗No Man's Child: The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-1916‘, International History Review, vi (1984), 
pp. 358-85.  
24
 D. French, ‗The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut: Prestige as a Factor in British Eastern Strategy, 1914-
1916‘, War & Society, v (1987), p. 58.  
25
 Copland, India 1885-1947, p. 48.  
26
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‗Indian Reforms‘, 27 June 1917, CAB 24/17/GT 1199. 
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barrack in the Oriental Seas‘? As was seen in Section 2.1, the Dominions (almost) reaped 
the constitutional rewards of fighting ‗for Britain as though they co-owned it‘. The fact 
that the Raj occupied a position of diminished importance in Britain‘s imperial system 
was of little interest to Indian nationalists, who kept themselves busy during the war 
formulating ever-greater demands.
27
  
The ferocity of the Great War, along with such debacles as Gallipoli and 
Mesopotamia, collectively shattered whatever remaining illusions the Indian 
intelligentsia had regarding British superiority. There was little doubt amongst the 
educated elite that the status of India within the empire would change after the war, but 
Indians were concerned over talk amongst members of the Round Table movement that 
theoretically could have seen the governance of the Raj shared between Britain and the 
white Dominions.
 28
 Preoccupied by the war, officials throughout the first two years of 
the conflict in both London and India largely ignored the question of India‘s future.29 
Into the void stepped the Home Rule Leagues of Maharashtra and Madras, founded by 
Balwentrao Tilak and the theosophist Annie Besant, respectively, that slowly began to 
create for the first time an India-wide, anti-government propaganda campaign. With 
Lord Hardinge having declared in his final speech to his legislative council in March 
                                                 
27
 Quoted in J. Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 
1783-1939 (Oxford, 2009), pp. 469; Quoted in K. Jeffery, ‗'An English Barrack in the Oriental Seas'?: 
India in the Aftermath of the First World War‘, Modern Asian Studies, xv (1981), p. 369; Belich, 
Replenishing the Earth, p. 467.  
28
 The term refers to a ‗movement, moot and magazine. Round Table, symbolising Anglo-Saxonism and 
equality, was the name taken by a prestigious Edwardian think tank about which more ink has probably 
been expended than on any other such small élite‘. The roughly two dozen members were an outgrowth of 
Lord Milner‘s South African ‗kindergarten‘ and were ‗dedicated to the cause of Empire unity‘. Presently, 
the journal remains the ‗best means of keeping up with the [contemporary] Commonwealth‘. D. McIntyre, 
The Britannic Vision: Historians and the Making of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1907-48 
(Houndmills, 2009), pp. 87-9. 
29
 A. Rumbold, Watershed in India, 1914-1922 (London, 1979), pp. 33-6.  
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1916 that Indian self-government was ‗a perfectly legitimate aspiration‘, the actions of 
the Home Rule Leagues were no longer seditious. It might have been possible to stamp 
out dissent at this early stage, but officials in neither India nor London had anything 
resembling tangible plans (for the eventual introduction of self-government).
30
 ‗As the 
months passed,‘ wrote a retired civil servant, who began his long career at the India 
Office, ‗the Government of India‘s power to control events declined. The belief that the 
British were in India indefinitely … and that they would deal rigorously with any threat 
to their position, was undermined‘.31 In reality, during 1915 and 1916, British officials 
throughout the world were engaged in a covert campaign to prevent terrorism from 
rendering Bengal ungovernable. Once successful, the British downplayed (for obvious 
reasons) what a close-run thing it had been.
32
  
Neither the new viceroy nor the new secretary of state for India, Lord 
Chelmsford and Austen Chamberlain, respectively, made any reference in their private, 
official correspondence to the protracted negotiations between the INC and the Muslim 
League that ultimately led in 1916 to the Lucknow Pact.
33
 Nevertheless, in late 
November 1916, the Government of India despatched recommendations to Chamberlain 
                                                 
30
 Ibid. pp. 46-8. Quotation is from p. 38.  
31
 Ibid. p. 50.  
32
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33
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on possible constitutional reforms to implement after the war.
34
 The belief that adjusting 
the constitutional relations of the ‗component parts of the Empire‘ could wait until the 
war ended persisted through the first Imperial War Conference. However, as a result of 
their wartime contributions, London came to regard the Dominions ‗in the light in which 
they wish to be looked upon rather than the light in which we would wish to do so‘. 
British India by contrast was to continue as an ‗important portion‘ of the Empire.35 Here 
is yet another manifestation of the ideology of difference that characterised Britons‘ 
conception of the Raj.
36
 Although some progress towards addressing the various 
concerns of moderate nationalists over the status of India and Indians within the empire 
was made in the first half of 1917, the downfall of the Tsarist autocracy, along with the 
entry of the United States into the war, in the spring of 1917 raised hopes amongst the 
Indian intelligentsia just as London began considering Chelmsford‘s 1916 despatch. By 
the early summer, Whitehall acknowledged that the ‗demand for Home Rule in India is 
now serious and insistent, and that some concession must be made to it without delay‘.37  
Neither developments within India since the passage of the Morley-Minto 
reforms eight years earlier nor wartime service—for those classes demanding reform had 
rendered none—warranted further concessions. And those Indians, who had made 
                                                 
34
 Rumbold, Watershed in India, pp. 54-7. Although the ultimate goal was ‗self-government‘, there was 
considerable confusion over what exactly that meant. Did it refer to India‘s external relations or to 
relations between the provinces and central government or to both? At a time when the status of the 
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valuable contributions to the war effort, ‗neither ask for nor [allegedly] want the 
particular reforms that are now under discussion‘. However, with ‗the free talk about 
liberty, democracy, nationality, and self-government‘ having become the ‗common 
shibboleths of the Allies‘, concluded a member of the War Cabinet, Britain could not 
avoid translating ‗into practice in our own domestic household the sentiments which we 
have so enthusiastically preached to others‘.38 Like the Balfour Declaration made later 
that year, the statement made in the House of Commons on 20 August 1917 was 
precipitated by wartime circumstances (and changes within the India Office).
39
 
 ‗The policy of His Majesty‘s Government,‘ announced Edwin Montagu, who 
served as secretary of state of state for India under David Lloyd George from 1917 until 
1922, ‗is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the 
administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view 
to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of 
the British Empire….‘40 Considerable attention was devoted to the wording of the 
statement, in large part because ‗educated Indians were past-masters in casuistry, and 
their criticism of formulae were embarrassing subtle and meticulous‘.41 But also because 
the policy went ‗far beyond anything that has been previously contemplated or discussed 
in this country….‘ Curzon anticipated that relations between Britain and India would ‗as 
                                                 
38
 Curzon, ‗Indian Reforms‘, GT 1199. It is worth remembering that the 120 elected members of the eight 
councils (viceregal and presidency governors) had an electorate of a mere 33,000 voters; ten thousand of 
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time proceeds‘ undergo a ‗complete revolution‘ but, in the interim, were ‗certain to give 
rise to an early agitation for concessions much more extreme‘.42 Indians would likely 
conclude that only a generation need pass before responsible government should be 
introduced, whereas the British Cabinet, Curzon presumed, ‗probably contemplated an 
intervening period that might extend to 500 years‘. Granting self-government more 
rapidly ran the risk of ‗setting up a narrow oligarchy of clever lawyers‘.43 Nevertheless, 
after extensive study and debate,
44
 within both Britain and India, a new Government of 
India Act passed without division at the end of 1919, thereby beginning the process of 
transferring ‗domestic concerns‘ unto Indian shoulders (and, by including a provision 
that the Act be reviewed by a statutory commission by 1929 at the latest, laid the 
foundation for the third and by far largest faceoff against Indian nationalism that would 
be taken this time by Irwin).
45
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Initially, reported the special correspondent for The Guardian, ―moderate 
opinion‖ tended in principle to approve of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, while 
extreme nationalists demanded ‗its entire rejection‘.46 Once the 1919 India Act became 
law, though they still ‗stigmatised‘ it as ‗unsatisfactory‘, the extremists were prepared to 
work the new system of governance. However, with Indians increasingly emboldened by 
the ‗Wilsonian Moment‘, Montagu feared that his entire scheme was in jeopardy.47 India 
was by no means immune to the ‗crisis of Empire‘, which followed naturally from 
Britain‘s decision in 1916 to mobilise her resources on a scale not seen since the days of 
the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815).
48
 But the Third Afghan War, the 
negative effects of General Dyer‘s deadly actions in the Punjab and, above all, Gandhi‘s 
first Non-Cooperation movement were relatively short lived.
49
 It is true that throughout 
the eastern arc of empire, the British were losing the support of those sections of colonial 
society that had traditionally supported British rule (or whose support would be needed 
if the empire was to be democratised, without sacrificing vital British interests).
50
 But to 
infer as Thomas Metcalf has that ‗the transfer of power on 15 August 1947 was ... the 
only outcome that could be anticipated from the ideals that sustained the Montagu-
                                                 
46
 Quoted in a memorandum on the reception accorded the Montagu-Chelmsford Report in India, 
circulated by Edwin Montagu, 31 July 1918, CAB 24/59/GT 5279.  
47
 General appreciation of the situation in India, circulated by Edwin Montagu, 15 Oct. 1920, 
CAB/24/112/CP 1987. Also see E. Manela, ‗The ―Wilsonian Moment‖ In India and the Crisis of Empire 
in 1919‘, in W.R. Louis, ed., Yet More Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in 
Britain (London, 2005), pp. 271-83. 
48
 J. Gallagher, ‗Nationalisms and the Crisis of Empire, 1919-1922‘, Modern Asian Studies, xv (1981), pp. 
355-68; D. Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century 
(New York, 1991), p. 111.  
49
 B. Robson, Crisis on the Frontier: The Third Afghan War and the Campaign in Waziristan 1919-20 
(Staplehurst, 2007); N. Collett, The Butcher of Amritsar: General Reginald Dyer (London, 2005); J. 
Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power: Indian Politics 1915-1922 (Cambridge, 1972), particularly pp. 342-9. 
50
 Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, pp. 185-99. Also see A. Roberts, 'The Holy Fox': The Life of Lord 
Halifax (London, 1997; originally published London, 1991), p. 19.  
 302 
 
 
Chelmsford scheme‘ is too deterministic.51 The Raj was only doomed if Britons 
stubbornly clung to India‘s enduring ‗distinctiveness‘ from the rest of the colonial 
world.
52
 The issue would be put to the test by the ‗unexpected‘, but ‗peculiarly 
interesting‘ appointment of the Right Honourable Edward Wood, soon to be Baron Irwin 
of Kirby Underdale, ultimately Earl of Halifax, to succeed the Earl of Reading as 
Viceroy of India.
53
 
Outside of a traditional post-Oxford tour of the empire that included stays with 
Curzon in India and members of Lord Milner‘s Kindergarten in South Africa, a 1907 
visit to Canada and an official tour of the West Indies in the early 1920s, there was little 
in Wood‘s background to suggest suitably for an imperial post of such prominence.54 
There is, however, a certain irony to his appointment. It was the educational reforms of 
his grandfather, the first Viscount Halifax, both before and after the Mutiny, that begat 
the (political) environment that awaited the new viceroy. Outside of Madras and the 
Punjab, the 1919 Montagu-Chelmsford reforms had failed.
55
 Instead of satisfying 
‗legitimate aspirations‘, Curzon informed their Lordships, they had ‗produced a general 
impression in India of weakness on the part of the Central Government‘. The Indian 
Civil Service was ‗dispirited and alienated‘, while opponents of the Raj were 
‗encouraged and embittered [in] their hostility‘. Worse still, parts of the subcontinent, 
                                                 
51
 Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, p. 230. Similar conclusions are reached in Rumbold, Watershed in India, 
pp. v and 100 and R. Danzig, ‗The Announcement of August 20th 1917‘, Journal of Asian Studies, xxviii 
(1968), p. 19. 
52
 Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, p. 215.  
53
 The Times, 30 Oct. 1925, p. 13. 
54
 Unless otherwise indicated, this paragraph is based on Roberts, ‗The Holy Fox‘, pp. 4-7, 16-17, 20-21 
and 29. 
55
 Moon, The British Conquest, p. 1017. The success in these provinces was the result of political parties 
forming that represented local interests at the expense of All-India politicians.  
 303 
 
 
Curzon lamented, had witnessed a ‗shocking recrudescence of racial and caste 
antagonisms‘. But the truly fatal weakness of diarchy had been identified months earlier. 
In deciding to meet simultaneously with his elected ministers and the reserved half of his 
government, the Governor of Bengal, the second Earl of Lytton, had hoped to make his 
appointed ministers more popular. Instead, his actions ‗destroyed the popularity‘ of his 
elected ministers.
56
 The whirlwind that Irwin‘s grandfather had sparked only intensified 
as the years past. Although Congress‘ Civil Disobedience movement had been 
suspended in December 1924, the secretary of state for India, Lord Birkenhead, still 
worried that ‗any spark‘ could reignite the (educated, middle class) nationalist 
movement, to say nothing of ‗the failed B.As. who edit the newspapers and the 
thousands of politically-minded students whom the communists are trying to capture‘.57 
Wood, who was long conscious of the ‗powerful revival of nationalism and racialism,‘ 
however, was widely seen within the House of Commons as ‗the highest kind of 
Englishman now in politics‘.58 Whereas Curzon had spent years establishing himself as 
an expert on the Near East in preparation for his inevitable viceregal appointment, Irwin 
was selected largely because his character appealed to George V, as well as his friend 
and mentor, prime minister Stanley Baldwin.
59
 One wonders whether either man knew 
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that their—albeit not first choice—replacement for Reading originally stood for election 
as a Conservative ‗more for lack of an alternative than any positive reason‘.  
Ideologically, the new Viceroy departed Victoria Station for India as the last 
Whig, arguably sharing more in common with his great-uncle, Lord Durham, than the 
right wing of his own party.
60
 Evidence of this could be found in the public record.
61
 
Sympathetic to the downtrodden, and believing that stability never arises out of 
stagnation, Irwin confessed to a journalist less than a year before his appointment as 
viceroy of his belief that ‗men no longer fear new departures any more than one who has 
been torpedoed in mid-Atlantic would shrink from being capsized on his garden pond‘.62 
India in the latter half of the 1920s accorded plenty of opportunity for new departures.  
Outside of sporadic communal violence, the resumption of terrorism in Bengal 
and agitation by fundamentalist Sikhs in the Punjab, Indian politics remained relatively 
uneventful after the arrest of Gandhi in 1922, which led to the rapid demise of the non-
cooperation movement. Communal tensions were ‗acute‘ at the outset of Irwin‘s 
Viceroyalty, in part because everyone had started jockeying for position since the end of 
the Raj seemed near. Under the terms of the 1919 Government of India Act, a statutory 
commission charged with investigating the progress of the reforms and making 
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recommendations for the next step, if any, was to be appointed in 1929.
63
 Within months 
of arriving in India, Irwin realised the necessity of breaking the 'present vicious circle of 
‗no advance without co-operation and no co-operation without advance‘‘.64 The 
elections of 1926 appeared promising; particularly at the provincial level. Although still 
the largest party in the Central Legislative Assembly, the Swarajist faction of the INC 
could not act without the support of both the Independent Congress Party and the faction 
willing to work the Reforms, the so-called Responsivists. Everywhere the Swarajists 
were ‗actively and solidly opposed,‘ Irwin told Birkenhead, ‗they have lost ground‘. The 
following month Irwin, hoping to undercut the Swarajist position further, addressed the 
Legislative Assembly. He warned the assembled politicians that Parliament was unlikely 
to submit to coercion and would not understand 
the line of argument which says that because the present foundations for 
responsible governments are alleged to be at fault, this is necessarily to be 
remedied by immediately asking those foundations to bear the entire weight of 
the whole edifice we desire to build.  
 
Holding out the carrot, Irwin suggested that if Indian politicians exercised their ‗albeit 
limited‘ responsibilities in a ‗spirit of service to India‘, they might be surprised how 
quickly ‗the very real powers of the British Parliament to intervene were silently allowed 
first to fall into desuetude and then to disappear‘ as had occurred in the Dominions.65 
This would never happen as long as Birkenhead—a man who considered extending the 
franchise to British women at twenty-one ‗a change so dangerous and so 
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revolutionary‘—remained at the India Office. Irwin suspected that his secretary of state 
thought self-government might be feasible in India sometime in the early twenty-sixth 
century, thereby making Curzon appear something of an optimist! Birkenhead, however, 
was too clever by half. Anxious that the Conservatives might lose the next election, and 
fearful of the possibility of a Labour government introducing far-reaching reforms, 
Birkenhead (acting on Irwin‘s advice) decided to appoint the Statutory Commission two 
years early.
66
  
After deliberating on the issue for almost a year, during which ‗objections to 
every course‘ were raised, the Liberal Sir John Simon was appointed chair of a purely 
Parliamentary commission in November 1927. Birkenhead, who initially felt strongly 
inclined to include Indian commissioners, bowed to opinion within the India Office and 
in India, particularly that of the Viceroy. Previous scholarship has depicted the exclusion 
of Indians as evidence that Irwin had ‗as yet gained no insight into the minds of the 
Indian people‘.67 His most recent biographer declared it ‗a blunder so fundamental that it 
was to wreck any hopes of tranquillity for the rest of the Viceroyalty‘.68 Days before the 
membership of the Statutory Commission was leaked to the Statesmen by an Indian 
politician Irwin had taken into his confidence, Birkenhead had assured the Viceroy of his 
readiness to face the ‗howl of rage‘ that would soon emanate from the native Indian 
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press.
69
 It would seem that Irwin did not want a peaceful conclusion to his time in India, 
but why?  
More than a week after his arrival in India, Irwin still lacked ‗any opinion worth 
having about the political situation‘, but as he toured India, he discovered, much to his 
surprise, the extent to which many of the Princes were ‗not necessarily in favour of 
democracy‘. Irwin explained to the King how the Nawab of Rampur, for example, 
managed to combine collecting Persian and Sanskrit manuscripts, within his broader 
patronage of the arts, while simultaneously possessing a ‗great dislike and contempt for 
democracy‘. Perhaps influenced by his own social standing, Irwin came to see the ‗land-
owners and upper middle classes‘, whom he believed had the ‗greatest stake‘ in India‘s 
future, as ‗fundamentally conservative‘.70 Implicit in the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, 
as Lloyd George explained to Irwin‘s predecessor, was the notion that ‗as the 
Government of India becomes more parliamentary in character, the Viceroy and his 
advisors must tend to speak and act more and more as representatives of Indian opinion 
....‘71 Irwin, like Curzon, a quarter century earlier, did not view the political intelligentsia 
as representing all of India and warned Birkenhead, and later George V, of the 
forthcoming ‗clash between what general opinion in Great Britain will consider to be 
required of it by its responsibility for the whole of India and what will be desired by the 
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small minority of political intelligentsia‘. Irwin believed that the agitation was less about 
the exclusion of Indians from the Simon Commission than ‗extremist pressure‘ fuelling a 
growing rejection of the supremacy of Westminster to pronounce on India‘s future.72 
The British Government, Gandhi told the Viceroy in their first meeting, should (as in the 
case of Ireland) commit to granting India Dominion Status and then meet Indians as 
equals to discuss the specifics of implementing such a policy. Irwin confessed to his 
father that the encounter ‗was rather like talking to someone who had stepped off one 
planet on to this for a short visit of a fortnight, and whose whole mental outlook was 
quite other to that which was regulating most of the affairs on the planet to which he 
descended‘. Approximately a year and a half into his viceroyalty, as much as Britons 
may have wanted to pretend otherwise, Irwin had concluded that there could be no 
‗ultimate compromise‘ with the INC, or those members of the political class that held 
similar views.
73
 Preserving the Raj, though diminished in importance, still remained an 
important component of Britain‘s imperial system, necessitated rallying its allies, a task 
easier said than done.
74
  
Within hours of the announcement regarding the composition of the Statutory 
Commission, Indian politicians denounced it; in many cases probably without even 
reading the official statements made in India and Britain. ‗Our trouble is that we are so 
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like the Irish, who speak first and think second‘, said an unnamed Indian. Talk soon 
turned to a national boycott.
75
 The agitation continued for weeks, in part, explained the 
president of the Muslim League, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, because the various factions 
were all afraid of losing ground. There was little doubt that Congress would boycott the 
Simon Commission. But at their annual conference, held at Madras in 1927, the older 
generation failed to stop Motilal Nehru‘s son, Jawaharlal Nehru, from successfully 
moving an almost unanimous resolution calling for complete independence, while the 
party elders who were present sought to co-operate with the other Indian parties to draft 
their own constitution, which retained Dominion status as the ultimate goal.
76
 The later 
was welcome news in London. Even if the ‗malcontents‘ overcame the formable 
problems confronting everyone involved, Birkenhead predicted, that it would shatter 
their new found unity, ‗which can only survive in an atmosphere of generalisation‘.77 
More troubling, however, was that throughout late 1927 and early 1928 a large section 
of ‗moderate‘ opinion remained silent, which Irwin attributed to a lack of ‗moral 
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courage‘. Such attitudes were common. Much to the Viceroy‘s dismay, he could not find 
a single politician ‗prepared to stand up against the clamour of his friends or of 
newspapers‘.78 Anyone that did stand against the ‗boycott view‘, Irwin understood, was 
subjected to a ‗good deal of pressure in public and private‘. Those who bankrolled 
Indian politics were not above twisting arms. Irwin viewed the present political system 
as being ‗not far removed from some methods Walpole employed in our own 
constitution development‘.79 Comparing the boycotters to ‗a child refusing to eats its 
supper‘, Irwin believed: 
There comes a point when it is no good pleading or reproaching any longer and 
when if its tempers are ignored it may return to eat it on its own. I should rather 
hope if we all, with the Press, could pursue this sort of tactic, a good many 
people here would seriously begin to wonder whether they had in fact missed the 
bus.
80
 
 
Irwin persisted in this vein following the Legislative Assembly‘s rejection by a mere six 
vote margin of co-operation with the Simon Commission; the other House of the Central 
Legislature, the Council of State, where almost half the members were appointed by the 
Viceroy, not surprisingly voted ‗decisively‘ in favour of co-operation.81 Arguing that the 
Central Committee, which was the body of Indians who were to sit alongside the Simon 
Commission, should not be abandoned because it would be discouraging to those ‗less 
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articulate‘ sections of society that not only wanted Government to assert itself over the 
‗noisy minority of unrepresentative politicians‘ but ‗desire[d] to utilise the machinery 
contemplated for the purpose of securing that their point of view is brought forcibly to 
the notice of the Commission‘. Simon, who was prepared to carry on without Indian 
members, nevertheless, asked Irwin to nominate co-operative Indians from the Central 
and the various Provincial Governments. Irwin sought to postpone any final decision 
until August in order to see how events unfolded. And, more importantly, forming the 
Central Committee six months ahead of time would be tantamount to ‗a definite 
declaration of war on the Assembly politicians‘. Being ‗a man of peace‘, in the long-
term interests of India, Irwin was ‗reluctant to see my opponents and myself 
permanently entrenched in our respective zarebas, from which we continue to throw 
long-distance bombs at each other‘.82  
Equally troubled by developments was the influential liberal, Sir Chimanlal 
Setalvad, and some of his ‗friends‘, who, recognising that the Parliamentary 
Commission would complete its task as originally constituted, worried about the 
potential damage the boycott could have on the findings of the Simon Commission.
83
 
Approximately a month before Irwin would declare the situation ‗impossible‘,84 Setalvad 
made it clear during the course of a lengthy chat with the Viceroy that he and his 
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associates were also unhappy with the Swarajists. However, as Irwin explained to his 
secretary of state, without a ‗plausible reason for co-operation, it was quite impossible 
for the more reasonable elements to break away‘. Irwin looked favourably upon 
Setalvad‘s suggestions—the specifics of which are irrelevant—as they struck him as not 
being substantive questions. But if acted upon, there was good reason to believe a 
‗wedge‘ would be inserted into (what Irwin later termed) the ‗all-India politician class of 
boycotter‘.85 And wedges ‗tend to widen‘, reasoned the viceroy. The propensity of 
Indian politicians to personal jealousies/rivalries, to say nothing of the generational 
divide within Congress (and the Nehru family), lends a fair degree of credibility to said 
strategy. Irwin‘s broader motivation, however, was to cool ‗the general temper and 
condition of political India with which we have to work‘, particularly in the post-Simon 
era. Birkenhead, not surprisingly, was unmoved. Even if the technical/legal difficulties 
inherent in Setalvad‘s suggestions were not an issue, the secretary of state for India 
found it ‗impossible‘ to endorse Irwin‘s suggested course of action in its entirety.86 
Irwin, unable to accept the decision of his secretary of state, had the matter referred to 
Cabinet; which eventually sided with Birkenhead (and Simon). Irwin‘s proposal was 
found to be of considerable substance, which proved to be the ‗fatal objection‘ for the 
Cabinet. Opinion in London held that ‗so long as there prevails in Indian political circles 
[an] expectation that further pressure upon His Majesty's Government or [the Simon] 
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Commission will produce further concession, so long will that pressure be kept up‘.87 
Throughout the late summer, early fall of 1928, with the impending return of the Simon 
Commission, the situation in India remained ‗restless‘.88 The same could not be said of 
the Viceroy, who was laying the groundwork for a policy that might have radically 
extended the range of political possibilities open to the Raj, but wound up throwing 
domestic politics in Britain into an unprecedented turmoil that persisted until 1935.
89
  
Believing that the Simon Commission would be akin to Lord Milner‘s 1919-20 
Egyptian Mission, Congress and its fellow boycotters met at Lucknow, at the end of 
August, to formulate their demands ahead of Simon‘s ‗endeavour to strike some sort of 
bargain with them‘.90 The so-called Nehru Report that emerged was nothing less than a 
‗Hindu attempt to take over a united, centralised Raj‘. Not surprisingly, it found no 
support amongst India‘s minority Muslim, Sikh and Christian populations.91 Although 
the reception of the Simon Commission varied greatly by province, there was no 
escaping its derision nor did the Viceroy believe it likely to devise a solution to the 
deepening ‗Indian problem‘, which Irwin later defined as the ‗creation of a united India‘. 
Feelings against the Commission were ‗diminishing‘, but the boycotters were simply 
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‗too deeply committed‘ to their position(s).92 In the aftermath of the Nehru Report, 
which Irwin latter termed ‗a political blunder of the first magnitude,' the rhetoric was 
ratcheted up as political India moved to the ‗Left‘. Talk of ‗independence‘ again 
emanated from the ‗most extreme quarters‘. More troubling was that moderate 
politicians, like Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, were now willing to ‗make terms with such talk‘ 
and, contrary to the situation of few years earlier, no longer thought foreign affairs and 
defence should be left in British hands. The appeal of ‗these ideas‘ would only increase 
as literacy levels rose. Irwin predicted that Britain‘s ‗principal problem‘ in the years 
ahead would be breaking the ‗artificial unity at present prevailing between the different 
sections of our political opponents‘. Thwarted in his attempt to act on Setalvad‘s 
September 1928 proposals, alluded to earlier in this chapter, Irwin simply noted that 
‗there is nothing to be done at the moment‘.93  
The Viceroy‘s fortunes, however, were about to change dramatically. 
Birkenhead, who muttered about ‗dealing with the situation as a Mussolini might‘, after 
earlier pressing the Viceroy to consider ‗a purging of the body-politic‘, resigned his 
office in October 1928 (for financial reasons). Less than two weeks earlier, Irwin 
(disingenuously, perhaps) had written of his ‗very large misgiving[s over] the possibility 
of Government being in new and perhaps inexperienced hands when our troubles come 
to a head‘. Birkenhead and his ilk on the right wing of the Tory Party were also 
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genuinely terrified of the consequences of the Simon Report ‗being examined by any but 
a Unionist Government‘.94 Their fears were completely misplaced. The danger was not 
the new minority Labour government but a Viceroy, that ‗glorious and peculiar beast‘, 
on the prowl for ‗a definite pro-Government party‘.95 
Ever since the late eighteenth century, viceroys, along with the governors of the 
three presidencies and other senior officials remained in India until their five year terms 
were completed. Under more liberal rules implemented in 1924, a single leave of 
absence, of up to four months, could be granted for ‗urgent reasons of public interest, or 
of health or of private affairs‘.96 Ostensibly made out of concern over his father's age, 
during the winter of 1928, Irwin secured permission to return to England the following 
summer to conduct personal discussions with (as it turned out) Wedgewood Benn, the 
new Secretary of State for India. The King approved of both reasons, though formal 
Cabinet approval would not come until mid-March 1929.
97
 In the months before he 
sailed for home, Irwin would be given plenty to think about.  
As the Simon Commission toured India throughout the fall of 1928 and spring of 
1929, gathering evidence for a report which would ultimately run to seventeen volumes. 
Irwin was entertaining for three months an old friend, Geoffrey Dawson, the editor of 
The Times. Among the subjects of discussion were ways of pre-empting ‗Simon and his 
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merry men‘. The Viceroy was also being pressed by London to marshal the full 
(repressive) resources of the Raj in preparation for the resumption of non-cooperation. 
At their annual meeting in Calcutta, Congress adopted what Irwin saw as a 'very 
unreasonable ultimatum', which demanded the granting of Dominion Status before the 
end of 1929. In the interim, a boycott of all British goods would be launched. 
Irrespective of these developments, the INC remained as divided as ever. A resolution in 
favour of independence over Dominion Status was defeated by a margin of 1,350 to 973 
votes.
98
 It was the lower classes and the youth who were fuelling the increasing 
radicalisation of the INC, with Jawaharlal Nehru and, the future fascist Japanese 
collaborator, Subhas Chandra Bose emerging as the faces of this new generation. 
Liberals and the princes, in particular, were dismayed by developments, but were 
temporarily powerless to counter the ‗gospel of independence‘. Officials in India 
meanwhile were somewhat puzzled at the deadline of 31 December 1929, but suspected 
that Congress wanted to time their actions to coincide with the publication of the Simon 
Report and speculated that the INC also needed time to ‗foster, in their own words, a 
revolutionary mentality‘. In London, with the Conservatives still in office, the Cabinet 
pledged Irwin ‗every support‘ so that his Government would not ‗be hustled into making 
concessions fundamentally unsound‘.99 Exactly when the Viceroy decided upon a course 
of action that he knew was ‗likely to bring down the full weight of right-wing Tory 
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wrath upon him‘ is not clear from his weekly letters to the secretary of state for India; 
which, if Curzon is to be believed, is where the ‗true story of each Viceroy is ... 
written‘.100 What is clear, however, is that by the end of January 1929 Irwin knew that 
London‘s approach towards Indian affairs made supporters of the Raj ‗indignant‘.  
Prior to his departure from South Africa, where he had been the Indian Agent-
General since the inception of the position in 1927, Srinivasa Sastri, told an official that 
Birkenhead‘s tenure at the India Office had ‗hopeless discredited‘ moderate nationalist 
politicians like himself, Sapru and Setalvad. Sastri was reported as being ‗bitterly 
disappointed‘ over the widening communal divisions, but (with Muslims co-operating 
with the Simon Commission) the official speculated that perhaps the true concern was 
that London had ‗stolen a march on the Hindu intelligentsia‘.101 Others in the 
subcontinent preferred a more direct solution. It was a ‗great injustice‘, Sir Umar Hayat 
Khan, a leading Punjab aristocrat and member of the Council of State, complained to 
Peel, on a visit to London, that Britain‘s determination to preserve order prohibited the 
loyal martial races from dealing with the ‗clerks, vakils and other noxious classes‘.102 
Peel, however, welcomed news of more practical allies a few weeks later. Indian 
commercial interests in Bombay had banded together with their British counterparts to 
form a single political association all in an effort to combat the ‗Bolshevik tendencies of 
professional Indian politicians‘. Meanwhile, Congress leaders refused to condemn 
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terrorism, which the secretary of state for India attributed to the impact of the Irish 
settlement.
103
 It was also symptomatic of the battle raging within the INC between the 
‗younger and wilder elements‘ who favoured Independence and the ‗old leaders‘, who 
fell among the ‗Dominion people‘ and/or the ‗more moderate elements‘. Irwin remained 
convinced that Birkenhead and the Cabinet had made a ‗mistake‘ in not trying to rope in 
the Liberals last summer but, with the struggle for the soul of the INC likely to last for 
years, all was not lost. In the interim, however, Irwin advised, that the best policy was 
one of patience to allow Congress ‗time to realise into what an impossible position they 
have got themselves‘.104  
Even among the ‗many leaders and schools of political opinion‘ that repudiated 
non-cooperation, Irwin acknowledged, in a speech to the Legislative Assembly, at the 
end of January 1929, that  
many of them openly profess distrust of the attitude of Great Britain. They say, 
and would have others believe, that hitherto Great Britain has given no sufficient 
proof of her intention to fulfil the pledge that Mr. Montague have on behalf of 
His Majesty‘s Government in 1917, and that Great Britain is seeking to forgot or 
deny the high policy there enshrined. 
 
Acknowledging that actions speak louder than words, Irwin conceded that he would not 
be standing before the Assemble, if he thought the ‗British people had withdrawn their 
hand from that solemn covenant‘. Before turning to why the words of a viceroy 
traditionally could not dissipate the ‗black cloud‘ that had ‗enshrouded so much of 
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Indian political thought‘, it is necessary briefly to consider encouraging developments 
beyond the borders of British India.
105
 
 Just before his summer of discontent with Birkenhead over Setalvad‘s 
suggestions, Irwin had been reminded by the King‘s private secretary of His Majesty‘s 
belief that the Princely States ‗will always be an element of loyalty and strength to the 
British Raj‘.106 The Princes, at their annual meeting, the following February did not 
disappoint. Unexpectedly the Indian Chamber of Princes resolved on the first day that all 
future proceedings were to be open to press correspondents. Before ‗dramatically‘ 
declaring the next day their unanimous opposition ‗to any proposals having for their 
object the adjustment of equitable relations between the Indian States and British India 
unless such proposals proceed upon the initial basis of the British connexion‘. In light of 
their treaties with the Crown, to say nothing of the extent of their states and populations, 
the Princes were unwilling to partake in (what the Maharajah of Alwar labelled) ‗any 
wild theories‘. ‗We stand for evolution not revolution‘, proclaimed the Maharajah of 
Bikaner. Not surprisingly, an editorial welcoming the ‗slow‘ but ‗singularly impressive‘ 
entrance of the Princes into the ranks of the Raj‘s allies, soon appeared in the pages of 
The Times.
107
 
 Whereas those sent to India throughout most of the nineteenth century took it for 
granted that India was governed in the interests of Britain, or, more specifically, 
Lancashire, the appointment of the Welby Royal Commission in 1895 marked the 
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beginning of the end of such attitudes, and throughout the early twentieth century there 
was an increasing recognition of India as an integral part of Britain‘s imperial system. 
Nevertheless, India‘s position within and connection to the Empire could not endure 
unless the Raj was brought into ‗organic relation with the rest of the Empire‘. If the 
Government of India was not to ‗relapse into a subordinate department of the India 
Office‘, concluded one influential pre-war observer, the Viceroy ‗must be the head of the 
Administration in the Parliamentary sense‘.108 Irwin, as has been seen, bristled under the 
tight leash imposed by Birkenhead, in particular. But, at the outset of his viceroyalty, he 
could not consistently count on being able to command a majority in the Legislative 
Assembly, which seemed to rule out Curzon‘s advice.109 Viceroys traditionally were 
surrounded by a ‗strictly non-Party atmosphere‘, a tradition Irwin maintained right up 
until polling day when he addressed his weekly letter to the under-secretary of state for 
India.
110
 The advent of a minority Labour government transformed matters. A weak 
secretary of state, coupled with the Labour Party‘s sensitivity on imperial matters, 
thereafter allowed Irwin to run roughshod over the Home government.
111
 Speaking at the 
Chelmsford Club ahead of (what The Times of India termed a few days later) his ‗fateful 
mission‘, Irwin‘s intentions were unmistakable:  
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When I go to England I shall seek an opportunity for discussing with His 
Majesty‘s Government all the grave matters concerning India, including the 
honourable settlement of India‘s Constitution. It will be my duty to represent to 
His Majesty‘s Government the different standpoints of those who can speak for 
Indian political opinion ...in the spirit and to the end outlined in what are for me 
the two governing pronouncements of British hope and purpose- namely, the 
familiar Declaration of 1917 and the Instrument of Instructions which every 
Governor-General receives from the King when he assumes office. In this 
Instrument of Instruction his Majesty affirms: ―Above all things it is our will and 
pleasure that the plans laid out by our Parliament for the progressive realization 
of responsible government in British India as an integral part of the Empire may 
come to fruition, to the end that British India may attain its due place among our 
Dominions.‖  
 
The Times‘ correspondent in Bombay warned that ‗moderate opinion‘ had come to 
regard the Viceroy as the ‗country‘s chief ambassador‘. Irwin‘s description of his role as 
partly that of an ‗intermediary‘ before the Legislative Assembly five months earlier was 
no empty gesture.
112
 For someone whose imperialism was of the ‗messianic variety‘ 
prior to his appointment as Viceroy, Irwin appears—at first glance—to have undergone a 
dramatic transformation.  
 Although he had ‗two, or perhaps three, principle objections‘ to Irwin‘s scheme, 
when told about it in Calcutta, Simon would less than a month later declare it his ‗duty ... 
to acquiesce‘. In trying to satisfy Gandhi‘s personal desire to be convinced of Britain‘s 
intention one-day to implement Home Rule, Simon believed, the Viceroy‘s actions were 
‗truest statesmanship‘ but worried that his plan amounted ‗to giving the authors of the 
threat what they want‘.113 That maybe, but the Viceroy‘s intention at this point was not 
about Gandhi. Irwin, after reading the second volume of Lord Ronaldshay‘s Life of Lord 
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Curzon, told his father that democracy ‗whether final or not, it is an inevitable phase‘ in 
the history of India. Before he ever set foot on the subcontinent, the Viceroy, then 
Edward Wood, had expressed a desire to ‗avoid the mistake of endeavouring to withhold 
a concession ultimately inevitable until it has been robbed by delay of most of its 
usefulness and of all its grace‘.114 His previous attempt thwarted by Birkenhead, Irwin 
hoped to induce the more moderate elements into co-operating with the Central 
Government, thereby leaving the extreme-wing of the INC to ‗hav[ing] made their beds 
so must they lie on them.' Eager to learn the ‗mind of the Olympians at home about our 
affairs‘, Irwin, having been warned by the editor of The Times of the ‗abysmal 
ignorance‘ he would encounter, returned to Britain ready for ‗a long up-hill course of 
primary education‘.115  
 Arriving on 13 July 1929, Irwin meet ‗immediately‘ with Benn and prime 
minister Ramsay MacDonald to discuss informally the documents he had brought from 
India, which included ‗drafts of imaginary letters‘ to be exchanged between Simon and 
MacDonald, written by the Viceroy and his officials.
116
 Simon‘s letter drew attention to 
the impossibility of the Statutory Commission ignoring the Butler Report and its 
findings on the relationship of the Princely States to the Raj. In light of their stand 
against the excesses of the INC, not surprisingly, Irwin saw the States assuming ‗greater 
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prominence‘.117 In order to facilitate this, the letter suggested that London hold a 
‗tripartite conference‘ with representatives from both British India and the Indian states 
to discuss the ‗provisional conclusions‘ of the Simon Commission before Parliamentary 
approval of the ‗final proposals‘ was sought. The Prime Minister‘s letter would of course 
accept Simon‘s recommendations. To assuage sceptics, both in Britain and India, of the 
government‘s intention to fulfil Montagu‘s 1917 pledge, Irwin suggested that the letter 
also include a statement along the lines of ‗India shall, through the realisation of 
responsible government, be enabled to obtain in due season recognition as a self-
governing Dominion‘. Initially, neither Reading nor (provided party leaders were 
consulted) Simon raised any objections. In late July, after listening to the Viceroy‘s 
description of the political situation, the Cabinet endorsed his plan.
118
 After further 
informal talks between Irwin, Benn and Simon over the exact wording of the letters, they 
were sent to the Prime Minister on 31 July. Ultimately, following further assurances 
from Irwin and officials in India that Irwin‘s policy was well worth the risk, MacDonald 
decided on 19 September to proceed with an exchange of letters.
119
 The examination of 
‗draft constitutional proposals‘ was dropped from the agenda for the Conference; 
presumably in answer to criticism like that voiced by the ex-governor of the Punjab and 
current governor of the United Provinces, Sir Malcolm Hailey, who worried the original 
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invitation was not ‗quite as full-hearted‘ as he thought Irwin intended. Moreover, Hailey 
continued:  
 
The invitation to the Conference does not seem to me to make it clear that the 
whole range of subjects will be discussed (and not only the position and the 
Indian States, &c.) and that leaders of all sides will be invited. These may be 
only verbal cavillings, but when you take a step of this importance, it is a pity to 
fail of effect owing to suspicion that your offer is half-hearted.
120
 
 
Reading was shown the new drafts in person, while copies were sent to Simon and 
Baldwin, who was holidaying in France. Unable to contact most of his shadow cabinet, 
including Birkenhead and Winston Churchill, who were in America, Baldwin 
nevertheless concurred, promising MacDonald that he ‗may rely on my doing all that is 
in my power to secure the unanimous support of my party‘.121 Murmurs of dissent, 
however, began emanating from both Reading and the Simon Commission, who now 
questioned whether a statement on Dominion status was wise. Ignoring the ‗held 
strongly‘ beliefs of Irwin and Goschen that the statement needed to be made by the 
prime minister in light of the looming threat of non-cooperation and non-payment of 
taxes, to say nothing of the belief held throughout India that the British people planned 
to renege on Montagu‘s promise, the Cabinet decided that the Viceroy would make an 
announcement concerning Dominion status ‗immediately‘ upon his return to India.122 
Although haggling over the exact wording remained, Irwin sailed for India on 10 
October having achieved his objective, though not without cost(s).  
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In announcing that London intended to hold a round table conference, the British 
government was tacitly admitting that the Simon Commission had in fact been 
‗effectively boycotted‘. Despite its voluminous length, a considerable amount of the 
opinion of those Indians responsible for the limited successes associated with the 
Montague-Chelmsford reforms would be absent from the Simon Report. The INC also 
officially ‗maintained [its] silence‘. Opinion in India was divided over what impact the 
government‘s new Indian policy would have. Hailey worried that the prime minister‘s 
letter lacked the ‗attitude of surrender‘ that would allow Motilal Nehru to convince the 
INC at its December meeting to cease ‗hostilities pending negotiations‘, though the 
governor of the Punjab, Sir Geoffrey de Montmorency, wondered whether he might be 
forced into co-operation if his followers began ‗veneering off‘ into the camp of his son 
and the other ‗advocates of Independence‘.123 Obviously, warned Benn, the political 
situation facing the Viceroy on his return was not ‗bright‘. Concluding his 
memorandum, the secretary of state for India, in a very Irwin-esque phrase, wrote:  
It is inconceivable that the settled and permanent policy of any British 
Government should be to hold India by force without attempting to win to the 
side of Government the support of thinking leaders of Indian opinion. 
 
Cabinet approval of Irwin‘s plan, which it noted merely ‗offered a hope of 
improvement,‘ came less than a week before the Sunday Times broke the story, 
precipitating a crisis within the Tory party.
124
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 Irwin‘s declaration that India‘s attainment of ‗Dominion status‘ was ‗implicit in 
the declaration of 1917‘ was, as Jawaharlal Nehru later wrote, an ‗ingeniously worded 
announcement which could mean much or very little‘.125 Although George V thought the 
draft statement he saw ‗excellent‘, particularly as it sought to ‗associate the Indian 
Princes with the problem‘, to the rank and file of the Conservative Party, Irwin was on 
the verge of further perpetuating the ‗dreadful mistakes made in the Montagu era‘. 
Having underestimated the depth of die-hard opposition, and with his own position as 
party leader weakened by losses in two general elections, using Simon‘s recent 
opposition as a pretext, Baldwin appealed to the Labour Government to ‗avert ... 
disaster‘ of Indian matters potentially entering the ‗field of party controversy‘. Benn sent 
the Viceroy a private and personal telegram at 3:00 a.m., but it lacked Birkenhead-like 
instructions to delay the announcement (until the prime minister returned from 
America). Knowing that his secretary of state would stand by him ‗absolutely‘, Irwin 
refused to budge. Besides, chided the Viceroy, delay ‗at the eleventh hour when the 
atmosphere is one of intense expectancy would inevitably arouse immediate suspicions 
and incur great risk of spoiling the entire effect‘.126 The Cabinet did not demur.127 
Having failed to persuade the government, on the night before the declaration would be 
formally made public, Baldwin personally telegraphed Irwin imploring him to stop 
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before (in the words of Lord Salisbury) ‗the party will be shaken to its centre‘. Whereas 
the Viceroy sent the Secretary of State for India ‗rather an uncompromising telegram‘, 
replying to Baldwin, whom Andrew Roberts termed Irwin‘s ‗political mentor, father-
figure, Party leader, close friend and the man to whom he owed his Viceroyalty‘, the 
Viceroy simply conveyed his polite regrets. Leaving aside the fact that Irwin had been 
leaking details of the announcement to various moderate politicians ever since his return, 
as he explained to his father, outside of ‗bayonets‘, Britain‘s ‗only solid asset‘ in 
perpetuating the Raj was actually implementing the ‗hastily given pledges‘ of 1917. 
Perplexed at the ‗political storm‘ he precipitated at home, Irwin was also caught 
somewhat off-guard by the reaction of political India to his declaration.
128
  
It was expected that moderate opinion would be strengthened by the viceregal 
announcement that India would ultimately achieve ‗Dominion Status‘. Irwin, 
nevertheless, was under no illusion as to the continued difficulty of forging the 
‗compulsory partnership between Great Britain and India‘.129 Opinion in India was 
generally favourable to the so-called Irwin Declaration, in large part because outside ‗a 
small band of irreconcilables‘, Irwin explained to the King, most Indians understood 
‗Dominion Status‘ to actually mean ‗Dominion Status with reservations‘, i.e. diarchy. A 
meaning opposite to how the term was understood within the Anglo-world. Irwin was 
optimistic, but worried about the damage ‗imprudent speech in England‘ could cause.130  
                                                 
128
 Quoted in Roberts, ‗The Holy Fox‘, p. 29; Irwin to Benn, 31 Oct. 1929, Halifax MSS, C152/5/no. 31; 
Irwin to Viscount Halifax, 4 Nov. 1929, Halifax MSS, C152/27/no. 166; 
129
 ‗Note by Lord Irwin on his Statement‘, undated but written early Oct. 1929, appendix V, CP 307.  
130
 Irwin to George V, 6 Nov. 1929, Halifax MSS, C152/1/no. 64; Irwin to Benn, 6 Nov. 1929, Halifax 
MSS, C152/5/no. 32  
 328 
 
 
Parliamentary debate, however, produced a ‗rather curious‘ effect in India. Some 
Indian politicians concluded the Irwin Declaration must be ‗rather‘ good as ‗it has the 
effect of annoying Birkenhead and Lloyd George‘.131 A pleasant surprise no doubt, but 
the intention behind the Declaration was far more cunning. Two days after informing the 
president of the Legislative Assembly of his plan, Vithalbhai Patel reported that Irwin 
indeed ‗had placed Congress on the horns of a dilemma‘. London had disregarded the 
demand put forth by Congress for the granting of Dominion Status ahead of any 
conference, but to ignore the Irwin Declaration Patel predicted would likely split 
Congress, leaving the extremist faction isolated (possibly for the foreseeable future).
132
 
Irwin‘s announcement, reported the director of public information for the Central 
Government, John Coatman, not only satisfied the ‗great majority of Indian-owned 
newspapers ... but has to a certain extent even captured their imagination‘. A special 
correspondent for The Guardian, writing from New Delhi, noted not only the 
friendliness of ‗even the most extreme newspaper‘ but also the enthusiasm displayed by 
the Allahabad Leader, the Calcutta Bengali and Bombay‘s Daily Mail. Somewhat 
unexpectedly, continued Coatman, the European section of the press was now 
unanimous in their support of the Viceroy. One of the Times of India‘s journalists, 
quoting Curzon‘s former private secretary, Sir Walter Lawrence, declared that ‗great and 
able as he was, Lord Curzon would not have been able to cope with the unprecedented 
situation in India as Lord Irwin has done.‘ Naoroji Dumasia then posed the question of 
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the hour: ‗Are we Indians to seize the great opportunity offered ... or shall we throw it 
away as Gandhi threw away the opportunity of peace in 1921. Surely we shall not be 
such fools twice‘. In issuing his Declaration, Irwin brought about a ‗complete change‘ in 
the Indian political world, but would it survive the inevitable counterpunch from 
Congress?
133
 
Initial signs were promising. Parliamentary debates in Britain did not alter the 
enthusiasm of the Raj‘s various ‗friends‘. Congress meanwhile remained mired, 
searching for a compromise position that would not completely rule out co-operation 
with the Government. ‗If they fail in this difficult task,‘ Irwin predicted, ‗they will either 
have to surrender to [Jawaharlal Nehru, Subhas Bose and their] young men or split 
Congress‘.134 Very quickly, however, Irwin learned that the leadership of the INC 
intended ‗to make the position of England as difficult as possible‘. Less than three weeks 
after the publication of the Irwin Declaration, the authors of the so-called Delhi 
Manifesto, which issued within days of the Viceroy‘s statement set forth Congress‘ three 
conditions for co-operation, confirmed that their position stood unchanged.
135
 Gandhi‘s 
attitude would be crucial. However, in the weeks ahead of the annual Congress meeting, 
Irwin received somewhat troubling news from some ‗American friends‘:  
if the Government mean business, why not convince me [Gandhi] and why 
not make a private statement to a few representative Indian leaders. If Mr. 
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MacDonald would wire the Viceroy a definite promise of Dominion Status at 
the Round Table Conference and send a pledge that the Labour Government 
would stake its political life upon that promise, I would be satisfied ....
 136
  
 
Asking for the moon probably would have been more promising. Nevertheless, Irwin 
met with leading Indian politicians on the eve of the Lahore Congress but found both 
Gandhi and Motilal Nehru ‗very intractable‘. Neither the Viceroy nor the trinity of 
Sapru, Jinnah and Patel were able to persuade them that the conference had to ‗examine 
the real difficulties that everybody knew to exist in the way of complete realisation of 
proclaimed British policy‘. To the disgust of their Indian colleagues, Nehru and Gandhi 
would not budge from their stance that a round table conference could consider nothing 
but the specific details of a Dominion status constitution. Irwin, however, still held out 
some hope that during the days ahead Congress would devise a ‗temporising formula‘ 
that left their hands relatively free.
137
 
At Lahore, Congress undertook the ‗momentous‘ step of overwhelmingly 
reaffirming its support for complete independence, which was to be won through a new 
campaign of non-cooperation directed by Gandhi. However, the alliance between 
Gandhi and, the incoming president of the INC, Jawaharlal Nehru, proved, as Irwin 
predicated, too much for some. Thirty members, including two ex-presidents, resigned 
their positions within the INC, and formulated plans to form a new party. Congress, 
warned The Times‘ special correspondent, at the end of 1929, had gone beyond the 
Calcutta resolution of the previous year and had effectively ‗return[ed] to the line held 
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after the Nagpur Congress in 1920‘.138 Furthermore, reversing previous policy, the 
Lahore Congress also called upon the Princes to implement responsible government 
within their states.
139
 As Gandhi and other leaders began planning for the imminent 
campaign of non-cooperation, all Congressmen were ordered to resign from the 
Legislative Assembly and the provincial council in Bengal. Developments that the 
broader populace, if reports from the United Province held true for other regions, took 
little notice of only months earlier. The Raj had bemoaned the indecisive nature of 
moderate Indians ever since the emergence of terrorism in the winter of 1906-7. Events 
at Lahore, Irwin heard through the grapevine, convinced Sapru that ‗the enemies of India 
are not in England but are to be found among our own people. Between them and us 
henceforth it must be a war of extermination.‘ Irwin assured London that moderate 
opinion throughout India would be stirred by ‗Jawaharlal‘s vision of an ideal future‘.140 
Spurred on by the coalescing of moderate opinion, the Viceroy too was fed up with the 
absolutist stance displayed by Gandhi and the elder Nehru and was anxious to 
demonstrate that Government no longer ‗intend[ed] to stand [such] nonsense‘.141  
Although it took longer than anticipated for the commercial community to cease 
funding agitation, the second non-cooperation campaign unfolded largely as expected.
142
 
                                                 
138
 D. Low, Britain and Indian Nationalism: The Imprint of Ambiguity, 1929-1942 (Cambridge, 1997), p. 
41; The Times, 2 Jan. 1930, p. 12; The Times, 27 Dec. 1929, p. 10. 
139
 Previously, Congress had always maintained that the future governance of the states was to be resolved 
by the princes and their subjects. I. Copland, The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire, 1917-1947 
(Cambridge, 1997), p. 77. 
140
 Irwin to Benn, 26 Nov. 1929, Halifax MSS, C152/5/no. 34; Copland, Princes of India, p. 28; Quoted in 
Irwin to Benn, 2 Jan. 1930, Halifax MSS, C152/6/no. 1.  
141
 Irwin to George V, 26 Dec. 1929, Halifax MSS, C152/1/no 66; Irwin to Stamfordham, 6 Jan. 1930, 
Halifax MSS, C152/1/no. 68. On the second non-cooperation movement, see R. Moore, The Crisis of 
Indian Unity, 1917-1940 (Oxford, 1974), pp. 165-86.  
142
 Irwin to George V, 5 Feb. 1931 and 24 April 1930, Halifax MSS, C152/1/nos. 100 and 75, respectively.  
 332 
 
 
Gandhi and the Nehrus steadfastly rebuffed efforts at mediation made by friends of the 
Raj but the failure of their larger campaign was almost a foregone conclusion given the 
inherent weakness of Congress‘ position vis-à-vis the Raj and its numerous bulwarks. 
That Gandhi negotiated personally with the Viceroy ahead of an inevitable ‗temporary 
truce‘ sounds more like spin than ‗tough political horse trading‘, to use Andrew Robert‘s 
phrase. Regardless, the Gandhi-Irwin Pact aroused the absolute fury of Winston 
Churchill and the other Diehards within the Conservative party.
143
 The Viceroy, unlike 
the Diehards, understood that the second non-cooperation campaign was but the first 
skirmish in a ‗test of strength‘, with an opponent ‗still intoxicated with ideas of its own 
power‘, that would determine the future of the sub-continent. No longer could Britons 
govern India ‗[un]disturbed by a bloody Indian‘, as Churchill put it. Ultimately, events 
beyond Irwin‘s control thwarted his plan to ‗carry though a policy of wise and liberal 
reform‘.144  
Nineteen days after he sailed for India, Britain experienced what contemporary 
American opinion terms an act of asymmetric warfare—the crash of the American stock 
market—that necessitated, less than a year after the Round Table Conference that 
Congress boycotted, the formation of a National Government in which MacDonald and 
his wee band of National Labour MPs became dependent upon the Conservative party 
for their remaining offices. Had the minority Labour government persisted, with the 
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King deprecating the position adopted by ‗retired die hards from India‘ and Lloyd 
George animated to keep Labour in office partly out of fear over what a Conservative 
government ‗might do about India‘, to say nothing of The Times‘ support, a revised 
Government of India Act would undoubtedly have been enacted.
145
 Even if Lloyd 
George returned to his mischievous ways of years past, Baldwin and the party whips 
only needed to convince forty-two conservatives MPs to abstain to ensure whatever 
reforms Irwin sought passed in the House of Commons. On the first of two occasions 
when Baldwin risked his political life to support Irwin, he declared in the House of 
Commons: ‗If ever the day comes when the party which I lead ceases to attract to itself 
men of the calibre of Edward Wood, then I have finished with my party‘. Baldwin 
presumably therefore would have ensured that any legislation passed, thereby leaving 
the diehards and the Daily Mail to fume.
146
  
In the traditional historiography, outside of the truce negotiated by Irwin, the 
years 1930 to 1934 were characterised by the ‗most widespread and prolonged 
confrontation between the forces of Indian nationalism and the British Raj that ever 
occurred‘. Less than two months into the non-cooperation campaign, Irwin told Benn, 
that ‗the present position ... must be transformed if we are not ultimately going to lose 
the big stake for which we are playing, namely, the retention of India within the 
Empire‘.147 No one, of course, can definitely say what would have happened had Irwin 
been able to enact his desired reforms, but, having been shown a copy of a memorandum 
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that was to be submitted by the governor of Madras to the Simon Commission, one 
politician angrily declared ‗your memorandum has killed us; it has given all that is 
wanted‘.148 Gandhi, after regaling some of Irwin‘s ‗American friends‘ with his thoughts 
on why the Government needed to convince him of its sincerity, went on to indicate his 
willingness ‗to fight the National Congress single-handed‘ if necessary. Are these the 
words (to paraphrase Churchill) of a half-naked, seditious, fakir or of the greatest ally 
the Raj never had?  
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
‗Today we can have the greatest failures or the greatest triumph—as we choose‘, 
was Winston Churchill‘s peroration to the people of Dundee in late 1918. The immediate 
post-war period was—to paraphrase another contemporary—quite simply glorious. Two 
years later, at the 1921 Imperial Conference, the Australian prime minister, ‗Billy‘ 
Hughes marvelled: ‗What remains to us? We are like so many Alexanders? What other 
worlds have we to conquer?‘ Such sentiments were perfectly in keeping with the scale of 
Britain‘s victory in the Great War, which at a minimum was as extensive, and fortuitous, 
as that of 1763.
1
 Together with Britain‘s continued maritime supremacy, another 
‗Antonine Age‘ seemed at hand. Lester Pearson, then a young historian, at the 
University of Toronto, confidently predicted in 1927 the ‗successful solution of Britain‘s 
Imperial problems‘ by century‘s end.2  
Yet, if one picks up the ‗sequel‘ to Britain‘s Imperial Century, 1815-1914 
(1976), it will probably come as something of a surprise to read Ronald Hyam‘s striking 
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opening assertion that ‗as the 1920s opened, Britain ... had become, in short, a declining, 
dysfunctional empire on the road to liquidation‘. Perhaps he missed the call to write the 
history of empire with a ‗greater recognition of nuance, complexity, ambiguity, paradox 
and uncertainty‘.3 Then again, Hyam immediately backpedals: insisting that his assertion 
‗was not, of course, immediately apparent‘. However, this, too, rings disingenuous. One 
would be hard pressed to find a contemporary Englishman, even in the 1930s, who 
believed that, to paraphrase Carl Bridge, the end of empire would occur in their lifetime; 
a sentiment lamentedly shared by prominent colonial nationalists. Imperialism remained 
an idée reçue, an outlook only reinforced by the continued expansion of colonial regimes 
across Africa. Furthermore, prominent Tories foresaw the Raj continuing for another 
half a millennia, perhaps even slightly longer.
4
 And yet, this is supposed to be the 
‗period immediately before decline began to register‘. Declinism may have had a 
significant impact on the writing of twentieth-century British history, but is now long-
past passé.
5
 Hyam‘s attempt to illustrate the ‗dysfunctional nature of the empire after 
1918‘ employs a similar sleight of hand. 
Of the ‗five flawed projects‘ discussed, three—Indirect Rule in Africa, the 
alleged ‗special relationship‘ with America and curiously Charles Ogden‘s ‗Basic‘ 
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English, a scheme only published in 1929— failed long after the 1920s. Admittedly, the 
viceroy‘s palace in New Delhi is a more ambiguous example, partly because 
planning/construction began before the Great War and human error led to a mistake in 
the gradient of the ascending processional avenue. But to suggest that this ‗vista was to 
be the [project‘s] principal visual excitement‘ surely misses the point. Building a new 
capital city, like the construction of Government House in Calcutta a century earlier, 
conveyed a symbolism, if not an outright demonstration of imperial confidence, that not 
even a bunged avenue can obscure. That this new capital lasted ‗little more than a 
decade‘, says Hyam, is ‗one of the greater ironies of history‘. Such a conclusion is only 
possible if one writes imperial history without any consideration of contingency; having 
weathered Congress‘ second non-cooperation campaign, the Raj‘s last capital likely 
would have persisted had it not been for an even greater cataclysm.
6
 By contrast, 
Britain‘s new dominion capital at Canberra was completed less than five years before 
Anglo-Dominion relations were dramatically reshaped; Australia and New Zealand‘s 
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refusal to ratify the 1931 Statue of Westminster until respectively 1942 and 1947, 
notwithstanding. Both construction projects have been taken as evidence that ‗empires in 
decline often undergo a resurgence of cultural vigour before the end‘. Declinists are 
quick to seize upon changes, whether it is in New Delhi‘s imperial role or the somewhat 
natural drifting away of the Dominions from their mother country, to cite but two 
examples, to turn the ‗inter-war world into a time of tragedy, when appearances misled, 
when power was a pretence, and when men were hollow‘. But these same changes can 
also be interpreted as evidence of the continued vitality of British imperialism during the 
1920s.
7
 
 Such an argument stands in stark contrast, not only to the Declinist school 
alluded to in the Introduction, but also to the idea that the twentieth century had an 
‗over-arching historical framework,‘ the struggle against totalitarianism; which is 
alleged to have begun in 1914 and ended in 1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall.
8
 There 
is no question that a new world was to follow the Great War, too many of Sir Edward 
Grey‘s lamps lay smashed in the ‗graveyard of empires‘ for it to be otherwise. But here 
again the issue of contingency arises.
9
 Nevertheless, Britain is said to be ‗weaker, its 
rivals stronger and more worrying ....‘ Also doubtful, unless one focuses unduly on the 
nervous Nellies within the official mind, is Hyam‘s envisioning of the immediate post-
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war years as the stuff of ‗near-nightmares for those in charge of the empire‘.10 That 
localised, ephemeral revolts sprang up across the globe was not exactly surprising. 
Between 1915 and 1918, Britain had been obligated to mobilise her resources on a scale 
not seen for over a century. Such was the geopolitical challenge posed by the Second 
Reich, ‗―our enemy of enemies,‖ the equivalent of France in the eighteenth century and 
Spain in the sixteenth‘, the historian J.A. Cramb had warned in 1913.11 However, one 
should not overstate the comparison. Britannia found herself in a far better position in 
1919 than she had been in 1815, in large part because she had been able to draw on 
imperial (military) resources to act as a terrene power on the Continent. Furthermore, as 
the Great War drew to a close, the Dominions were poised to assume a far greater 
prominence in imperial policymaking than ever imaginable. The Committee of Prime 
Ministers, however, came to naught.
12
 A development that would seem to bolster 
Hyam‘s critique that the ‗theme of ―revival‖ is not all that significant‘ in John 
Gallagher‘s influential The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire (1982); 
possibly, he suggests, because the word was simply inserted into the essay‘s title to 
distinguish it from Edward Gibbon‘s even more famous The Decline and Fall of the 
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Roman Empire (1776-88).
13
 Revival, according to Hyam, was simply impossible. 
Britain‘s imperial system was ‗dysfunctional‘ after 1918.14 A more generous assessment 
holds that Britons failed to take full advantage of the ‗extremely advantageous position‘ 
described above. Could things have turned out differently? Hyam‘s categorical 
rejection—‗Success is not a theme ... that history can endorse for the twentieth-century 
British Empire‘—is deeply flawed, owing to teleological objections as well as its 
disregard of a key juncture in British imperial history.
15
  
In the space of half a page, an assessment of the ‗crisis of empire‘ gives way to 
the depression triggered by crash of the American stock market in the fall of 1929. What 
about the intervening period? If revival truly was impossible then skipping over more 
than half a decade is understandable, given Hyam‘s modest aim ‗to give some idea of 
what empire was about ....‘16 However, ranking racism (without any consideration of the 
modifying effects of class and/or Britishness), together with Zionism, amongst the ‗key 
ideas‘ and/or ‗dominant preoccupations of the period‘ is somewhat dubious, particularly 
when talking about the mid-to-late 1920s. ‗Keep[ing] the natives loyal and contented at 
the same time that one absolutely refuses to hand over the keys to the citadel‘, on the 
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other hand, had long been recognised as a, if not the, central crux of the twentieth 
century.
17
 Britons, as Section 3.1 argued, had some genuine success in co-opting 
segments of the Ceylonese populace into co-operating with imperial authorities, while 
Lord Irwin‘s Viceroyalty saw the Raj win the opening battle in what promised to be a 
sustained conflict between the Indian National Congress (INC) and its native opponents, 
only some of whom had genuine pro-British sympathies. In both cases, imperial 
authorities, unlike their Die-hard critics—such as Winston Churchill, who favoured the 
preservation of the Edwardian status quo (in India)—recognised the need to abandon the 
Exclusionary Empire of years gone by.
18
 Furthermore, as alluded to earlier, heeding The 
Times‘ warning that a ‗New Way of Empire‘ was needed, a concerted effort was also 
made to accommodate the various, often divergent, wishes of the Dominions, a 
processes which ultimately culminated—arguably for the worst—in the 1931 Statue of 
Westminster. It was a system that enabled a further weakening of ‗the fabric of the 
British Empire‘, charged an Australian diplomat.19 Almost regardless of developments 
abroad, a genuine imperial revival depended upon a concerted effort by metropolitan 
authorities; the will for which certainly seemed to exist, as evident by the fact that the 
1920s were an ‗age of Committees and Conferences‘.20 However, the resumption of 
quasi-Edwardian politics after 1922 ultimately had the effect of quashing a nascent, 
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albeit slightly incoherent, pro-Empire political movement. That Lord Beaverbrook‘s 
Empire Free Trade Crusade got tangled up with Die-hard opposition to constitutional 
change in India only further undermined his efforts. Nevertheless, the fact remains that 
under threat the Establishment closed ranks, thereby delaying a re-ordering of British 
political life until 1945. 
It is at least conceivable that had Beaverbrook dislodged Stanley Baldwin from 
the leadership of the Conservative Party, the Crusade‘s message of imperial 
development would have resonated with the public. In addition to the wing of the 
Conservative Party who already favoured such a policy, namely Leo Amery and the 
sizable membership of the Empire Development Parliamentary Committee, the middle-
classes by the late 1920s were becoming ‗more technical, scientific and commercial‘.21 
Might another generation of polite and commercial people have taken root?
22
  
Moreover, in light of their island‘s long history, Britons could reasonably have 
expected that decades could pass before Germany might resurrect her hegemonic 
ambitions. But a second Pax Britannica was not to be. Another ‗global catastrophe‘ 
occurred a mere decade after the official end of the Great War. Diplomatic histories have 
long accepted that the 1929 Wall Street crash marked the end of the post-war era, but its 
effects vis-à-vis the nascent revival of the British Empire are far less well known.
23
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In both Ceylon and India, and likely elsewhere, imperial authorities were not 
only effectively countering nationalist politicians, but were in the process of outflanking 
them by the late 1920s. Universal suffrage promised to topple the ‗strongly-fortified 
citadels of aristocracy and plutocracy‘ to which Ceylonese politicians had become 
accustomed, while their Indian counterparts faced the terrifying prospect of being ‗given 
all that is wanted‘.24 But things did not turn out as planned. The crash of the American 
stock market brought an abrupt end to the economic boom that began in 1927, in the 
case of Ceylon ‗years of superabundant public revenue‘ had rendered the island‘s 
politics far less acrimonious.
25
 Worsening economic conditions also disrupted political 
unity within Britain over the future of the Government of India Act. Lord Irwin‘s plans 
for reforms on liberal lines (to sideline the INC) had substantial support at home, most 
notably that of George V and The Times, but also the minority Labour government and 
David Lloyd George, who reportedly feared what a Conservative government ‗might do 
about India‘.26 There was also reason to be hopeful, the 1919 Montagu-Chelmsford 
reforms had proven successful in two provinces, Madras and the Punjab. Having shored 
up support during a highly unusual visit home, Irwin departed England determined to 
play for what he later termed the ‗big stake … namely, the retention of India within the 
Empire‘. But the resumption of his vice-royalty coincided almost to the day with the 
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Wall Street crash, an event that ultimately compelled the formation of a Conservative-
dominated National Government, which in turn led to the Raj being plunged into a 
titanic confrontation with the forces of Indian nationalism.
27
 Irwin‘s policy, like that of 
Sir Hugh Clifford in Ceylon, had remained part of the broader effort (discussed briefly in 
Part II) to democratise the empire. However, he largely abandoned the principle of 
solvitur ambulando in favour of an older tradition, pro-actively appeasing the just 
concerns of those who remained open to a continued connection with Britain and/or took 
pride in their Britishness. As for those nationalist politicians unwilling to be persuaded, 
Irwin had absolutely no compunction about utilising the Raj‘s extensive repressive 
measures.
28
 Although their rhetoric demanded a craven surrender, probably not even the 
most radical members of the INC believed one was in the offing. What does that say 
about Hyam‘s assertions of a declining, dysfunctional empire? 
Nor had Britons by the late 1920s any reason to even contemplate taking up 
Adolf Hitler‘s subsequent solution to recalcitrant, native nationalists: ‗Shoot Gandhi, and 
if that does not suffice to reduce them to submission, shoot a dozen leading members of 
Congress; and if that does not suffice, shoot 200 and so on until order is established‘. It 
would be a mistake, however, to think (as Niall Ferguson might) that this reluctance to 
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kill in defence of empire reflected a slackening of imperial ruthlessness.
29
 Imperialism 
may well have worn an ever-more ‗elaborate fig-leaf‘ after 1918, but imperial authorities 
did not shy away from military deployments, a war was being fought somewhere in the 
British Empire throughout the inter-war period.
30
 Contemporary observers continued to 
regard Britain as a ‗formidable power whose enmity was to be avoided‘.31 Hitler‘s 
encounter with Tommies in Flanders had taught him that Britons‘ tenacity and ruthless 
pursuit of victory remained unchanged from years gone by. Others drew more ominous 
conclusions. ‗We shall have to face the fact that the Government of the United Kingdom 
is preparing for a new international deal and a new balance of power ...‘, warned the US 
State Department‘s Western Europe division ahead of the 1932 Imperial 
Economic/Ottawa Conference.
32
 Obviously, the onset of the Great Depression affected 
British planning, but America‘s official mind had a tendency to regard Britain as the 
‗most ruthless and dangerous state on earth‘.33 (Contrary to what modern critics may 
think) British policymakers were neither blind nor obtuse; they were in fact the ‗true 
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children of Palmerston, Lord Salisbury's sons‘, and as such, were determined to make 
full use of their victory in the Great War to (paraphrase Jan Smuts) recast the Empire.
34
 
The significant attention devoted to Imperial development, along with efforts at 
fostering an Empire of the Air, were arguably the two most tangible signs of this 
modernising impulse during the mid-to-late 1920s. The latter would have rivalled, if not 
surpassed, sea power as a central pillar of empire, both in terms of deterrence/defence 
and facilitating intra-imperial communication.
35
 Wireless telegraphy promised yet 
another level of integrating communications. Modernising Britain‘s imperial system, 
however, would not be quick; at the outset of this chapter, it was predicted that the 
process could take almost a century. Striking a new constitutional relationship with 
overseas Britons was a relatively easy matter, being largely completed by the end of the 
1926 Imperial Conference. Similarly, the Empire Marketing Board‘s advertising 
campaigns began the integration of the colonial and metropolitan economies; in the 
space of a few years, imports of dried, foreign fruits had all but ceased. Britons could 
also look forward to year round supplies of fresh empire fruits and other food stuffs. As 
important as these developments were, the seeds of far greater changes were slowly 
taking root in Whitehall. Britain‘s relative economic decline would make the dependent 
empire more important than ever. As discussed above, the likelihood of faster, more 
                                                 
34
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reliable communications pointed to a diminished future for the ever-famous ‗men-on-
the-spot‘ as between 1903 and 1925 the Colonial Office‘s staff increased almost four-
fold.
36
 More significantly, the scientific and technical work, beginning to be undertaken 
in the 1920s, often in conjunction with the Imperial Institute and other organisations, 
represented the first genuine effort at (re)vitalising the dependent Empire.
37
 A 
commitment reaffirmed with the passage of the 1929 Colonial Development Act. From 
the West Indies to Fiji, and numerous points in between, there was the potential/existent 
to grow a wide variety of tropical commodities, foremost amongst these being long-
staple cotton.
38
 As Part I explained, Britons were training staff, beginning to 
systematically undertake the research necessary to develop the ‗veterinary, agricultural 
and mineral resources‘ of the empire.39 
Of course, there had been setbacks. But the empire was, however, tentatively, 
being recast. By the late 1920s, Britons could unironically invoke Tennyson: ‗The old 
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order changeth, yielding place to [the] new‘. A decade later that ‗new‘ was dramatically 
different, owing to the rise of aggressive, predatory imperial powers in Europe and Asia. 
Imperial history needs to acknowledge ‗elements of accident‘, like the Wall Street 
Crash, that result in ‗historical trajectories not ultimately completed‘.40
                                                 
40
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